In between and outside : deconstruction and structuralism on semiotics and its limits by Wallden, Rea Emilia Alexandra
REA EMILIA ALEXANDRA WALLDEN
IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE: 
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM 
ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
UMI Number: U584611
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U584611
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
CARDIFF UNIVERSITY
CARDIFF SCHOOL OF ENGLISH, COMMUNICATION AND PHILOSOPHY
PH.D. THESIS IN PHILOSOPHY
IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE: 
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM 
ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
REA EMILIA ALEXANDRA WALLDEN
SUPERVISOR: Professor CHRISTOPHER NORRIS
CARDIFF, 2008
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
DECLARATION
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree 
and is not concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree
STATEMENT 1
This thesis is been submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of PhD
d l A I  CIV IC  IN I c
This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except 
where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit 
references.
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for 
photocopying and for interlibrary loan, and for the title and the summary 
to be made available to outside organisations
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
SUMMARY
The topic of my thesis is the complicated interconnection between 
deconstruction and structuralist semiotics, developed around the 
problematic of the sign and its limits. I argue that Jacques Derrida’s 
project of deconstruction can be seen as an extension of the project of 
structuralist semiotics in two ways: on the one hand, it extends the 
applicability of its principles beyond the semiotic realm; on the other, it 
investigates its conditions of possibility. Thus, to a significant extent, 
deconstruction develops on the basis of structuralist semiotics; it needs 
structuralism both as its own foundation and as its exemplary object. I 
investigate the way deconstruction affects the structuralist definition of 
signification and its epistemological implications. Louis Hjelmslev and the 
linguistic Circle of Copenhagen occupy an exceptional position in this 
context. Derrida’s quasi-meta-theory of signification looks in some ways 
very much like Hjelmslev’s stratification, put into motion and thrown out of 
balance, flattened or multiplied ad infinitum. Moreover, glossematics is 
probably the closest semiotics can get to posing the question of its limits 
without exceeding a strictly immanent point of view. Throughout the 
history of Western metaphysics, signification was defined in terms of 
mediation and exteriority. Structuralism retains the structure of this 
definition, while completely emptying it of any metaphysical import. 
Derrida proceeds to question that same structure; nevertheless, he also 
retains a residue of dualism so as not to fall back into metaphysics. In a 
dualistic structure, the question of bridging is of utmost importance. 
Having defined the object of knowledge as constituted by the semiotic 
articulation, both structuralist semiotics and deconstruction are faced with 
the structural impossibility of bridging the epistemological gap. Therefore 
my thesis, which begins as a study of the limits of semiotics, 
epistemological and other, turns out also to concern the semiological 
limits of epistemology.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. On the title
The topic o f this thesis is the complicated interconnection between deconstruction and 
structuralist semiotics, developed around the problematic of the sign and its limits. 
What begins as a study of the limits of semiotics, epistemological and other, turns out 
also to concern the semiological limits of epistemology; at least for the kind of theory 
of knowledge that both deconstruction and structuralism endorse, despite the fact that 
they diverge considerably on many issues.
The word ‘sign’ remains latent in my title. This silence is intentional. Both the 
theories that we are studying here are concerned with redefining the classical concept. 
The structuralist linguist Louis Hjelmslev proposes instead the term ‘sign-function’, 
while the deconstructivist philosopher Jacques Derrida systematically replaces the 
term with neologisms such as ‘archi-ecriture' and ‘difference'. Therefore, we will not 
start in a traditional way by defining what the sign is. This definition will be 
integrated with the progress of the entire thesis.
We will see, however, that the functions of ‘in between’ and ‘outside’ underlie 
all definitions of what we will refer to from now on as ‘the semiotic’. Derrida argues 
that these same functions describe the oppositional structure constitutive o f the system 
of Western metaphysics. He addresses his critique to this system by means of 
questioning the definitional functions o f the semiotic. The relation of deconstruction 
to structuralist semiotics exemplifies in many ways this relativasied oppositional 
structure. My own approach to structuralist semiotics and deconstruction can also be 
described as ‘in between and outside’ them; that is, deeply indebted to them.
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One observes here a complicated, almost impossibly complex, geometry of 
limits and borderlines, of inclusions and exclusions. There is more than one sense of 
the term ‘limit’: it can mean a reachable borderline or an unreacheable destination, in 
the mathematical sense; then, according to viewpoint, it can mean the demarcational 
line between two areas or the limit beyond which one cannot go. In my thesis, there 
appear all these senses of limit, in their divergences and their intimate 
communication. We investigate the limits of the semiotic, internal and external, and 
the semiotic in its function as limit; the limits between theory of signification, 
epistemology and metaphysics; and the limits, between and of, structuralism and 
deconstruction.
1.2. Choices and methodological problems
This research began with my interest in structural semiotics, the method which 
initiated the cultural movement of structuralism. Structuralism belongs to the 20th 
century’s ‘linguistic turn’, to which one can also relate the dominant trend in the 
English speaking world of ‘Analytic philosophy’. I am much interested in 
structural(ist) semiotics for many reasons, which can be grouped in two areas: on the 
one hand, it is very effective as a descriptive and predictive method of approaching 
texts and cultural phenomena; on the other, despite their crucial philosophical and 
stylistic differences, structuralism is the undeniable precursor of both post­
structuralism and postmodernism, which constitute important components of the 
contemporary ideological battlefield. Thus, understanding the limits and implications 
of structuralist semiotics offers an important insight into the underlying structures of 
our contemporary culture and thought.
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I have chosen to approach structuralist semiotics through a deconstructive 
critique. This may appear a paradoxical choice, because deconstruction is opposed to 
the main ideological declarations of structuralist semiotics. Additionally, it is 
considered by professional philosophers as much more controversial than 
structuralism itself. However, there are three reasons for my choice. Firstly, 
deconstruction is the most fruitful and insigntful critique of the epistemological limits 
of structuralism that I have come across and it has caused me for the first time to 
question what I had known as -  and still believe to be -  a very effective method. 
Simultaneously, the investigation of the epistemological limits of structural semiotics 
is a very important component of the deconstructive project. Secondly, deconstruction 
has a strong claim to be a philosophical theory, unlike structuralism which is ‘just’ a 
method. O f course, as was noted before me and significantly by Derrida, structuralist 
theories have preconditions, propositions and implications of philosophical interest, 
which are radical and influential enough to be treated as a philosophical theory. 
Moreover, Derrida would have his objections to the branding of his own work as 
philosophy, some of which we will investigate in this thesis. However, it remains a 
fact that the deconstructive project is directed toward issues of metaphysics and 
epistemology, while structuralist works usually include much more technical 
elements, with which we won’t deal here. Thirdly, I argue that structuralism is not just 
one of the precursors of deconstruction but its overall frame, that -  in a way -  
deconstruction is structuralism’s own self-critique.
My project is structurally infested with methodological problems. To start 
with, I am mainly using structuralist concepts and methodology, informed by the 
Derridian critique. My use of concepts such as ‘system’, ‘method’, ‘isotopy’ etc has a 
structuralist background. I try to give their definitions in the course of the text, when I
8
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think that it is necessary. Then, my very approach is structuralist, as I am looking for 
structural similarities and relations -  but this is not only part of the problem, it is part 
of the solution too, as we shall see. All this would normally demand, first of all, a 
definition o f ‘structure’. However, this definition is too intertwined with the thesis 
itself to be offered in advance. Furthermore, I am fully aware that my terminology and 
method are questioned by Derrida’s endeavour, and this questioning plays a great part 
in my thesis. However, I deem them absolutely necessary for my project; not only 
because, as Derrida says, they are unavoidable for philosophical thought but because 
they are particularly fruitful in analyzing Derrida’s texts. Derrida’s work, I claim, is 
not just a good object for a structural(ist) analysis, it is structural(ist) per se.
My structural approach means that I am studying only the underlying infra­
structures of theories and not their particular details. Apart from reducing 
considerably the length of my thesis, this choice agrees perfectly with my subject. In 
this aspect, Derrida’s description of his method fits my own:
We are not concerned with comparing the content of doctrines, the wealth of 
positive knowledge; we are concerned, rather, with discerning the repetition or 
permanence, at a profound level of discourse, of certain fundamental schemes 
and of certain directive concepts. And then, on this basis, of formulating 
questions. Questions [...] about the metaphysics in linguistics, or, as you will, 
about the linguistics in metaphysics1
1.3. On structure, references and conventions
My thesis consists of five chapters, including this introduction and the conclusion. In 
the second chapter, in an effort to define and clarify my subject, I address issues of 
naming and classification, which are proved to be anything but superficial in relation 
to the complicated interconnection between deconstruction, structuralism, their 
paradigmatic concepts and the question of the semiotic. In chapter three, I deal with
1 Mar Eng, p. 153 /  Mar, p. 184
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structuralist semiotics. This is actually a double chapter, both in length and function in 
the overall design of my thesis, as structuralist semiotics constitutes both the 
theoretical frame and the paradigmatic object of deconstruction. I needed to analyse in 
detail several of its aspects in order to situate this double interconnection. In the 
fourth chapter, I describe the deconstructive project as a meta-theory of signification 
and then compare it to structuralist semiotics. It is shown to bear an intimate relation 
to the theory of signification common to Western metaphysics, as well as having a 
potentially critical role. The final chapter summarises the conclusions of my thesis in 
two areas, regarding the theory of signification, on the one hand, and its 
epistemological implications, on the other.
It is customary in most theses to dedicate a chapter to a literature review. It 
would not be appropriate in this case. This is because of the subject of the thesis and 
the methodological choice of a structural approach. The search for meaningful 
structures demands a great breath of bibliographical research, concentrating on 
structural issues and not necessarily on details of content. This means, on the one 
hand, an emphasis on primary literature, where we search to identify structures, 
instead of an extensive research in the secondary resources. On the other, in 
combination with Derrida’s close reading and the structuralist tradition as analytic 
tool, the resources are closely intertwined with each part of our argument and are 
therefore dealt with in the relevant chapters. I will, therefore, limit myself here to a 
few clarificatory comments.
My approach to deconstruction refers solely to the work of Jacques Derrida 
and not that of other authors who subsequently used the term. In his work one can 
recognise some differentiation in style and preferred subjects over the long and varied 
course of his writing life. Whether to recognise a continuum or breaks, a progress or
10
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regress, is a subject of its own and it is not included in the scope of the present thesis. 
I accept the existence of three periods in Derrida’s writing, which I don’t think 
constitute radical breaks in his thought. Very provisionally, I would distinguish a first 
period, between ‘62 and ‘72, where he is mostly interested in epistemology and 
semiotics, and where he still follows a rather traditional philosophical mode of 
exposition. Then, there is a second period until the beginning of the 90’s, where he 
turns to metaphysical and aesthetic issues and their applications, and where he essays 
a performative enactment of his positions in his writing. In the third and last period, 
he seems to turn toward social and political issues, and to choose a more ‘popular’ 
style. Obviously, all these are relative, as Derrida’s style is always rather 
indiosyncratic and obscure, while his position, as I argue, is more or less the same. 
The period that interests me most is the first one. I am thus concentrating on his texts 
between 1962 and 1972, although I inform my reading with his later texts. It seems 
clear to me that whatever sample one chose from Derrida’s texts, one would come to 
very similar conclusions. I have checked this hypothesis in many of his texts. The 
same method and the same principles underlie all of them. What differentiates the 
early ones, and makes them particularly precious to my study, is the rigorous and 
rather more traditional exposition of these positions. Moreover, I was obliged to make 
a choice, considering the vast expanse of Derrida’s texts. I think I do not do any 
disservice to Derrida’s position by this choice.
The following books, which are the entirety of Derrida’s published works
between 1962 and 1972, constitute my main Derridean references:
Edmund Husserl, L’ origine de la geometrie: traduction et introduction, 1962 
De la grammatologie, 1967 
L ’ ecriture et la difference, 1967
La voix et le phenomene: Introduction au probleme du signe dans la 
phenomenologie de Husserl, 1967 
La dissemination, 1972
11
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Marges de la philosophie, 1972
Positions: entretiens avec Henri Ronse, Julia Kristeva, Jean-Louis Houdedine,
Guy Scarpetta, 1972
Of these, most central to my thesis are: ‘L’ecriture avant la lettre’, which is the first 
part of De la grammatologie; ‘Force et signification’, ‘«Genese et structure)) et la 
phenomenologie’ and ‘La structure, le signe et le jeu dans le discours des sciences 
humaines’ in Ecriture et Difference ; Positions; and ‘La difference’ and ‘Signature 
Evenement Contexte’ in Marges.
I have read Derrida’s texts mostly both in the original French and in English 
translation. The original is, I think, much more intelligible, as Derrida’s style relies 
greatly on word-games, semantic ambiguities and neologisms. However, the English 
translations are, interestingly enough, much clearer. The translators, even the most 
conscientious and faithful ones, are obliged to make choices. Therefore, good 
translations provide very interesting commentaries on the works. Here, I must pay 
homage to the very illuminating translators’ introductions, which I have found useful 
in spite of not usually agreeing with them.
The secondary texts on Derrida which I found closest to my interests and most 
useful are those by Rodolphe Gasche and Marian Hobson, for their structural 
observations, and by Christopher Norris, particularly for the Kantian epistemological 
connection. In his popularising introduction to deconstruction, James Smith proposes 
a very interesting classification of ‘responses to deconstruction’2: (a) the Yale School, 
de Man, Hartman, Miller, Bloom, ‘through the gates of literary theory’; (b) the 
Germans, Habermas and Gadamer, who ‘took up Derrida as an extension of 
Heideggerian hermeneutics’; (c) the Analytic Philosophers, Gasche, Norris, who 
‘describe deconstruction as analytic philosophy’; and (d) those After Postmodernism,
2 Jacques Derrida: Live Theory, pp.99-103
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Eagleton, Zizek, Badiou, who reproach deconstruction as postmodernist and 
politically regressive. I have two observations. First, apparently, all the three writers 
that I have found most relevant to my research belong to the Analytic school. This is 
not incidental, considering the intellectual context in which I write, the philosophy 
section of the University of Cardiff, and my intention, in Norris’ steps, to bridge the 
gulf between the Analytic and the so-called ‘Continental’ schools of thought. 
Secondly, there appears to be a gap in interpreting deconstruction, regarding its 
structuralist affinity. My intention is to fill this gap.
About structuralist semiotics and structuralism in general, which is a field that 
I have studied in depth, I consulted the work of its most prominent representatives, 
such as Saussure, Jakobson, Hjelmslev, Benveniste, Levi-Strauss, Barthes, Greimas 
and Eco. I also consulted several works of reference, such as the semiotic dictionaries 
by Ducrot and Todorov (1972), by Greimas and Courtes (1979), by Sebeok (1994) 
and by Ducrot and Schaeffer (1995). I found most useful Lagopoulos’ excellent works 
on the epistemology of semiotics. However, I have particularly concentrated on the 
mile-stone text Cours de linguistique generate by Ferdinand de Saussure and the 
theoretical work of Louis Hjelmslev and the linguistic School of Copenhagen. Most 
central to my thesis are the following:
By Louis Hjelmslev,
P ro le g o m en a  to  a  T h eory o f  L angu age  (1943)
L an gu age: an In trodu ction  (1943, 1963)
E ssa is  lin gu istiqu es  (1937-1957), and particularly ‘La Stratification du Langage’
By Hans Jorgen Uldall,
‘Outline of Glossematics: A study in the methodology of the Humanities with 
special reference to linguistics’ (1952)
I have given serious thought to the language of my references and I have 
chosen to present them in English. I made exceptions to that rule when the exact 
original wording was indispensable to my argument; in these cases, I include the
13
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English translation, usually in a footnote. The English translations o f texts originally 
in another language are those listed at the end of the thesis. When an English 
translation is not cited, the translation is mine. So is the translation of passages from 
Cours de linguistique generate, despite the English translation listed in the 
bibliography, for reasons that I explain at length in chapter three. In the case of 
Derrida’s texts, I occasionally modify the listed translations; consequently, any 
responsibility for errors lies with me. Moreover, with regard to my main Derridean 
references, his texts published between 1962 and 1972,1 always refer in a footnote to 
the pagination* of both the original and the translation. Finally, for reasons of 
convenience I use abbreviations for the most frequently cited works; a list of them 
precedes the text of my thesis.
I have presented publicly material from this thesis in the following occasions:
- 8th Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies, Lyon, France, July 2004
- Postgraduate Conference: Questioning the Disciplinary Frontiers, Cardiff, June 2005
- International Conference: Following Derrida: Legacies, organized by the journal Mosaic, 
Winnipeg, Canada, October 2006
- 8th National Congress of the Hellenic Semiotic Society, Fiorina, October 2007
- Invited speech, University of Athens, Department of Methodology, History and Theory of 
the Sciences, Athens, March 2008
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2. THE SIGN OF DECONSTRUCTION
2.1. Introduction
An analysis of the phrase ‘the sign of deconstruction’ could almost occupy my entire 
thesis. The expression /the sign of deconstruction/ is polysemous, or rather -  as 
Derrida would have it -  produces an effect of ‘dissemination’. Derrida introduces the 
notion o f ‘dissemination’ which exceeds ‘polysemy’, in the sense that it cannot be 
analysed by and reduced to a semantic tree. The notion of ‘polysemy’1 is shown to be 
inadequate to name the phenomenon of signification because the multiple alternative 
contents o f one expression inform each other and can not be rigorously delimited; 
among other reasons, because the distinctions between content and expression, 
connotation and denotation are structurally impossible to establish with any rigour or 
precision. ‘The sign of deconstruction’ produces an effect of dissemination as any text 
would do according to Derrida, but also exemplifies this textual function, the reason 
being that it includes /sign/ and /deconstruction/. Derrida’s critique of the notion of 
the sign, which is addressed to any sign whatsoever, affects par excellence the 
expression /sign/ and the terms that he introduced to substitute for it, which are the 
key-concepts of deconstruction, among them the very name /deconstruction/. In a 
sense, deconstruction is an effect of the semiotic, in the same way as dissemination. A 
practical consequence of the deconstruction of the sign is that one cannot use the term 
with full philosophical commitment in this context; it must be a provisional use, a use
1 The French term ‘polys& nie’ is translated in English as ‘polysemy’ by Weber and Mehlman and as 
‘polysemia’ by Alan Bass. I chose Weber and Mehlam’s term ‘polysemy’ which I use even when the 
term ‘polysem ia’ appears in texts translated by Bass for reasons o f  uniformity. For a comparison 
between polysemy and dissemination, see Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature Ev^nement Contexte’, in 
Marges de la philosophie, 1972, (pp.368, 376) / trans. in English by Samuel Weber and Jeffrey 
Mechlman in lim ited inc, 1988, (pp.2, 9); and Positions, 1972 (pp.61-62) / trans. in English by Alan 
Bass as Positions, 1982, (pp.44-45)
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‘under erasure’. Assuming this and many other Derridean precautions, which will be 
clarified in the course of my thesis, let us attempt to expound some of the meanings of 
/the sign of deconstruction/.
Firstly, it could mean “the sign ‘deconstruction’”. This could either refer to 
what deconstruction is -  the movement, the process, the technique -  or to the history 
and use of the term ‘deconstruction’. The fact that these two senses are not easily 
distinguishable, exemplifies Derrida’s position concerning the ‘disseminating’ 
character o f semiosis. Then, /the sign of deconstruction/ could also mean “the ‘sign’ 
of (in) deconstruction”. Now the stress is on the /sign/ and not on /deconstruction/. 
This is produced partly by a different explanation of the syncategoreme ‘o f . So /the 
sign of deconstruction/ could mean either “the critique of the notion of the sign in the 
movement o f deconstruction” or “the model of semiosis according to the movement 
of deconstruction”. There are further possible and co-existing meanings o f /the sign of 
deconstruction/, arising from what traditionally would be perceived as metonymic 
slippage or wordplay, which however is of significant philosophic import in Derrida’s 
case. /Sign/, as he reminds us, can also mean “symptom”, like the symptoms of a 
virus. In this case, the topic would be “how to recognise deconstruction”. Finally, 
Derrida has devoted close attention to the function of sign as monument and tomb, 
like a pyramid2. So ‘the sign of deconstruction’ could be homage to this philosophical 
system and, by the same token, its epitaph. Dealing with deconstruction in an 
academic way, the very kind of analysis to which I have just exposed ‘the sign of 
deconstruction’, is in a way an entombment of deconstruction.
2 See ‘Le puits et la pyramide, Introduction a la semiologie de H egel’, in M ar/ trans. in English by Alan 
Bass as ‘The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel’s Sem iology’, in M ar Eng
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Derrida often begins his texts with over-determined or under-determined 
expressions, which are then addressed and expounded by the entire text. The choice of 
these inaugurative expressions is presented as almost accidental, in the context of a 
discourse that questions the ‘essential vs. accidental’ distinction. He also often 
imitates structurally and stylistically the texts he reads. There is a certain temptation 
to follow his example regarding both these stratagems in a text reading 
deconstruction, particularly as he has so radically questioned the conventions and 
protocols o f academic writing, while opening the gates to the dazzling joy of poetic 
language. In a qualified way, I have already done so, by starting this chapter with the 
semantic possibilities opened up by its very title. However, I have done so in an 
unfaithful manner, subjecting this analysis to rather traditional academic norms. I 
believe that it is important to stress that linguistic games are far from exhausting what 
deconstruction is about , and this point is in danger of being obscured by the 
inclination of some sympathetic commentators to imitate Derrida’s style. The 
purpose o f deconstmction is the destabilisation of categorical distinctions, among 
them the distinction between philosophical and poetic language, not their annulment. I 
intend to show that deconstmction does not resist a provisional conceptualisation; if 
this was the case, it would imply a mystification of the process of deconstmction, 
which is totally at odds with Derrida’s enterprise. I will therefore proceed mostly in a 
traditionally systematic way.
This chapter is mostly historical, placing terms in the context of their 
complicated genealogies. Thorough definitions and further explication will be offered 
in the following chapters. This chapter functions as a clarifying delimitation of the
3 On the significant philosophical import o f  Derrida’s texts very informative are Christopher Norris’s 
works, such as Derrida, 1987 and others; as well as: Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction, 1983; and 
Rodolphe Gasche, The Tain o f  the Mirror, 1986
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terms that appear in the title of the thesis: ‘deconstmction’, ‘structuralism’, 
‘semiotics’. It also serves as a pretext for me to locate the two main philosophical 
affiliations of deconstmction, namely phenomenology and structuralism, and briefly 
explain my reasons for choosing to focus mainly on the second. I begin with an 
investigation of the issues and difficulties linked to the act of naming, and the 
strategies involved in overcoming them. Then I trace ‘deconstmction’ back to the 
notions of ‘Destmktion’ and ‘structure’. Finally, I provide an overview o f the history 
of the theory of signs. I point out how the names of the movements, ‘structuralism’ 
and ‘deconstmction’, in their complicated history of naming acts and inaugurations, 
relate to the movements’ conception of the ‘semiotic’ and their various ways of 
addressing the issue of definition, including the issue of whether such definition is 
possible or desirable.
2.2. About naming and deconstruction
To start with, definitions are incompatible with the deconstmctive project. What 
makes every definition impossible in the Derridean context is the fact that Derrida’s 
work consists largely in a critique of the ‘metaphysics of ontology’, and particularly 
of the stmcture ‘A is B’. Therefore, Derrida does not give definitions; or he gives so 
many as to destabilise the very notion of definition. He defines through a process.
‘ What is deconstmction?’ is a question that cannot be asked in so direct form4.
If we attempt a traditional categorisation, we could say that in deconstmction 
there co-exist a theory o f  language and a critique o f metaphysics. Its peculiarity is that 
these two projects are indistinguishable. Deconstmction appears both as a theory of
4 This difficulty o f  definition is very clearly expounded by Derrida him self in the ‘Letter to a Japanese 
Friend’ (1983). The letter was originally published in Japanese. Subsequently, it was published in 
different languages, among which French (1985) and English (1985).
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language and  as a critique of metaphysics. It also appears both as a method o f 
approach to language and metaphysics, and as a descriptive model o f them. This 
amalgamation of different functions is a direct result of deconstructive positions5. In 
an ordering and over-simplifying mode, against the grain of deconstruction, one could 
distinguish between two different ‘somethings’ that deconstruction approaches: our 
culture and the world. Its primary object of critique is ‘Western metaphysics’ in its 
complicity with ‘Western semiotics’, where in both cases the denomination ‘Western’ 
proves to be redundant. But by and through this critique, an epistemological position 
is implied. Adjectives such as ‘true’ and ‘false’ would be vehemently rejected by at 
least the early Derrida as playing any role to his project. However, in a qualified way, 
one could speak of ‘something’ proved ‘untrue’ in the process of deconstruction -  a 
necessary untruth, yet an untruth -  and, therefore, we are given indications about 
‘something else’, even if  in its case the notions of ‘truth’, ‘thing’ etc cannot be 
accorded their full ontological weight. Such epistemological questions in 
deconstruction always arise and are organised by the parallel questions regarding the 
notion of the sign.
Novel terms and notions have a name-like quality; among other reasons, 
because they are given by a stipulative act of nomination. Therefore, one has to start 
with the issue of naming before trying to give a narrative of the stories and tensions 
related to the principal name-like concepts o f this thesis: that is ‘deconstmction’, as 
well as ‘structuralism’ and ‘semiotics’. In the Derridean context, naming is entangled 
in a structural paradox. We must start with the impossibility of the name; and yet we 
do name6. The name is an extreme case of language, sometimes taken as the
5 See e.g. in Pos, 1 2 6 1 Pos Eng, 90-91against ‘regional delimitation’
6 Sauf le Nom, 1993
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paradigmatic case, so paradigmatic indeed as to fall out of it. As a particular type of 
word, it takes part in the general problematic of language; yet it adds a few questions 
of its own. The ever open oscillation between particularity and generality, for 
example, is but one of the questions haunting language and is closely linked with 
logical, epistemological and ultimately ontological issues. Since Derrida is most 
attentive to these interconnections -  one can even say that this is the crux of his 
method -  most o f the linguistic functions and complexities are addressed at some 
point in his work. I think that the most relevant questions regarding the use of flag­
like terms are linked to the act of naming as related to (a) the epistemological status of 
reference and (b) the connotational burden.
n
Derrida claims in ‘Force et signification’ that the two extreme poles of 
language are reference and poetry, i.e. articulation to the world and self-reference. 
The sign-reference is opposed to the text-poetry8. Both extremes are considered 
paradigmatic and in some way exceeding the limits of language and the Derridean 
notion of ‘writing’ plays between the two. Most theories of language in the tradition 
of Western metaphysics, as Derrida observes9, consider its referential function as its 
central, indeed its only legitimate one. It would take Roman Jakobson10 and 
J.L.Austin11, independently of each other, to recognise the complexity of the different
7 In L ’ecriture et la difference, 1967 / trans. in English by Alan Bass as ‘Force and Signification’ in 
Writing and Difference, (1978) 2001
8 ‘C’ est quand l ’^crit est defunt comme signe-signal qu’il nait comme langage’... Tinscription [ ...]  a 
seule puissance de po^sie’, ED, 23-24 / ‘It is when that which is written is deceased as sign-signal that 
it is bom as language’ ... ‘inscription alone [...] has the power o f  poetiy’, WD, 13
9 In Lim and elsewhere
10 Roman Jakobson originally presented his theory o f  the six communicative functions at a conference 
held at Indiana University in 1958. It was first published in 1960 in ‘Closing Statements: Linguistics 
and Poetics’, in Style in Language, Thomas A. Sebeok ed. Published again in 1987 as ‘Linguistics and 
Poetics’, in Language in Literature, Krystyna Pomorska and Stephen Rudy ed.
11 J.L. Austin elaborated his theory o f  speech acts in the series o f William James Lectures he gave in 
Harvard University in 1955. They were subsequently published in the volume How to D o Things with 
Words
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• 1 9 .  • • • •  •linguistic functions. This privileging of denotation , in the logical positivist sense, is
the source o f the philosophical centrality of the copula, since Aristotle, and of ‘a priori
synthetic judgements’ in Kant. A further quite recent step has been the distinction
1between the act of semiosis and the act of reference, appearing both in Saussure and 
Frege14. Structural semiotics in the Saussurean tradition makes a very clear distinction 
between signification and reference, between the question of meaning and the 
question o f truth (as correspondence). In structural-semiotic jargon, unlike Frege’s, 
‘denotation’ is intra-semiotic, while ‘reference’ is a relation between the semiotic and 
the extra-semiotic. The act of reference is the anchorage of language to the world, the 
epistemological component of language, or rather its articulation with the extra- 
linguistic15. One could say, more generally16, that the act of reference is the 
articulation of culture as culture, i.e. as meaningful system, with everything that is 
extra-semiotic, including culture as materialisation. This means, for example, the 
connection between the system of fashion and the clothes that we are wearing, as 
material objects. For both structuralism and deconstruction, language in a generalised
12 There is a certain terminological discrepancy between ‘analytical philosophy o f  language’, 
particularly o f  the logical positivist persuasion, and ‘structuralist sem iotics’. The crux o f  their 
difference is that the analytical linguistic investigations are much more interested in the truth value o f  
sentences, while the structuralist semiotic investigations concentrate on cultural signification. 
‘Denotation’, for analytics, is more or less synonymous with ‘reference’; it is the actual object (if  any) 
designated by the word or sentence. ‘Connotation’, on the other hand, is its definition (see Gottlob 
Frege, ‘On Sense and Reference’, 1892 and Bertrand Russell, ‘On Denoting’, 1905). Conversely, for 
structuralists, ‘denotation’ and ‘reference’ are very clearly distinguished. ‘Reference’ is the relation to 
the ‘referent’, the actual object, and it is considered outside the scope o f  semiotic investigation. 
‘Signification’ is the relation between signifier and signified, which produces meaning. The first degree 
of signification is ‘denotation’; higher degrees are ‘connotations’, i.e. metaphorical meanings (see 
Louis Hjelmslev, Prolegomena to a Theory ofLanuage, 1943). Both semiotic ‘denotation’ and 
semiotic ‘connotation’ fall under the realm o f analytic ‘connotation’, and analytic ‘denotation’ is the 
semiotic ‘referent’. In this thesis, I use mostly the structuralist terminology. Derrida, however, is 
referring occasionally to several different terminologies, and plays between their discrepancies. A 
further problem is that the verb ‘to denote’ can also be used in a layman’s way. Consequently, I cannot 
claim that my use o f  it is always completely consistent.
13 Cours de linguistique generale, (1906-11) 1916
14 ‘On Sense and Reference’, 1892
15 This, at least, is the definition. Post-structuralists and representatives o f post-modernity have been 
seriously sceptical regarding the very possibility o f  reference.
16 We shall see the generalisation taking place in structuralism, from natural languages to any semiotic 
system and thence to their organisation into the larger systems o f  cultures
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sense, as the ability to form semiotic systems through which to perceive, describe and 
explain the world, constitutes the epistemological limit of the human realm. Whether 
this is to be perceived as a bridge or as a barrier depends on further metaphysical
• • 17assumptions. And reference is the epistemological limit of language . The act of
naming, in a way, partakes of this function to a lesser extent because it is the
definitional extreme of arbitrariness, of non-motivation. So knowledge is everything
but the name, ‘sauf le nom’. Simultaneously, however, naming is the paradigmatic act
of reference, an act of anchorage to the world, the least semiotic of signs, least
dependent on the semiotic system and making the ‘purest’ claim to catch the
‘outside’. So knowledge is nothing but the name, ‘sauf le nom’. There is a
‘transcendent’ quality in reference; Derrida calls it the ‘referential transcendence’.
Quite possibly this is the one and only mode of transcendence. Derrida, paradoxically,
1 8even compares reference to ''difference' with an ‘a’ . ‘Paradoxically’ because 
‘differance’, as we shall see, is the condition of possibility o f the semiotic game, 
including reference. However, by being its condition of possibility, it is ‘beyond’ that 
game. This is a kind of transcendence under erasure. But then again the referential 
transcendence, for Derrida, is also under erasure. So indeed it is comparable in this 
respect to 'difference' . What we encounter again and again, from Kant to Derrida, is 
this impossible transcendence. Naming is impossible; but ‘we have to do the 
impossible’19. We can say nothing but the name. We can say everything but the name. 
We can’t and yet we do.
Secondly, a name includes a pre-comprehension and carries the burden of the 
system in which it was first pronounced. The meaning of any word, including name-
17 Derrida remarks on reference in its relation to knowledge, Nom, p.64
18 Ibid., p.61
19 Ibid., p. 63
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like concepts, depends on the entire system to which the word belongs, as well as to
the context in which it is used; this is one of the principles that Derrida inherits from
structural semiotics, as we shall see. Words, however, retain a trace from the contexts
in which they were used before and particularly from the one that introduced them20;
the names o f concepts much more so. This is not some inherent property o f the words.
It is a result of the collective memory of their previous usages. It is, of course, quite
conceivable that the sound or image of a word may become completely detached from
its first usage and meaning. However, people, when confronted with a word, often
hear resonances of its different usages. On this fact is based what structural semiotics 
0 1calls ‘connotation’ . Even if one is to redefine a word, taking particular notice o f the 
latent links to other definitions, it is still very difficult to erase the connotational echo 
of its past. One has only to observe the ideological or even armed conflicts over the 
names of countries and territories, to understand the very real force of this 
connotational burden. Derrida insists on that connotational property of words to the 
extent of almost contradicting the very principle of arbitrariness which he holds so 
dear. Words in his texts are on the edge of gaining an independent existence of their 
own, each carrying the entire metaphysics22.
For Derrida, the burden of meaning that a word carries independently from its 
context is the other side of its ability to be separated from any context, including its 
‘original’ one23. This is what he calls his ‘“graphematic” thesis’. The ‘contextual 
difference’ both ‘changes everything’ and ‘leaves certain aspects intact’
20 Compare to Kripke’s theory o f  reference, Naming and Necessity, (1970)
21 See Chapter 3
22 ‘chaque emprunt determine fait venir a lui toute la metaphysique’, ED, p.413 / ‘every particular 
borrowing brings along with it the whole o f metaphysics’, WD, pp.355-6
23 ‘force de rupture’, Mar, p.377 / ‘breaking force’, Lim, p.9. The ‘breaking force’, the ‘force o f  
rupture’, along with the notion o f iterability, will be further expounded in chapter 4.
23
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
CHAPTER 2: THE SIGN OF DECONSTRUCTION
this signifies that these aspects can always separate themselves from the allegedly 
“original” context in order to export or to graft themselves elsewhere while 
continuing to function in one way or another24
However, one has to remember that in order for a word to carry anything over from 
one context to another, its receivers must partake in the discourse of both contexts, 
even if to a minimal degree. So, in an extended sense of context, both uses would be 
contextual. The sound /sign/ can communicate nothing if it is not at least recognised 
as a signifier. And the sound /sign/, even if recognised as a signifier, still carries 
nothing for someone who has no knowledge whatsoever o f any Indo-European 
languages. Derrida speaks of ‘graft’ and ‘graphematics’ in order to stress the 
complicity between signifier and signified and in order to recollect the repressed 
importance of semiotic substance. For the same reasons, he would probably object to 
my description o f this aspect of language as a ‘connotational’ burden. The very term 
‘connotation’ carries a connotational burden and implies a particular view regarding 
language, one which Derrida interrogates. He would probably prefer something like 
‘metaphysical’ burden, considering that the words he criticises are ‘non-innocent’ 
because of their belonging to ‘Western metaphysics’. I am afraid, however, that the 
use of the term ‘metaphysical’ in this instance could unintentionally imply that words, 
as words, are metaphysically independently existing entities, which leads to a form of 
Platonism. Nothing could be further from Derrida’s , and the structuralists’, 
intention. For this reason, I would insist that the capacity of words to carry meanings 
across different contexts can be better conceptualised as an extended kind of 
connotation, always taking into account Derrida’s very radical critique of the term.
24Z/m, p.78
25 ‘je n’ai jamais cru qu’il y eut de concepts metaphysiques en eux-memes’, Pos, pp. 77-78 /  ‘I have 
never believed that there were metaphysical concepts in and o f  th e m se lv e sP o s  Eng, p .57
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One may observe in the previous paragraphs a rather complicated use of the 
terms ‘name’, ‘concept’ and ‘word’, which are not co-extensional. Their precise order 
of interconnection depends on one’s assumptions regarding the onto-epistemological 
status of language. As the answers to these questions are not taken for granted by 
Derrida, one who analyses Derrida cannot start with received definitions. The most 
neutral of the three terms is ‘word’. In the context of this thesis ‘word’ is mostly 
replaced by ‘sign’, with which -  of course -  it is not identical. Following structuralist 
linguistics, ‘sign’ is the more general term: a word is a kind of sign. As Derrida’s 
project exceeds spoken language and this thesis is particularly interested in the 
possibility o f change of expressive substance, ‘sign’ seems the most appropriate term 
and will often be used. Nevertheless, Derrida puts the concept of ‘sign’ under a very 
intense questioning, showing its metaphysical conditions of possibility. Therefore, I 
have so far avoided using the term ‘sign’, until I engage more closely with the debate 
over its use. I have used ‘word’ as metaphysically more neutral than ‘sign’, despite its 
narrower extension, as it happens to be appropriate for the subject under 
consideration . ‘Deconstruction’, ‘structuralism’, ‘semiotics’ are words, before being 
anything else. As the projects/theories/movements which bear those words as names 
happen to be very much interested in words, their insights necessarily inform any 
effort to address the issue of these words, as words.
The particular kind of words, which bear the name ‘name’ and ‘concept’, are 
deeply embedded in metaphysical issues and presuppositions. There are several marks 
that may differentiate the two: (a) Firstly, whether the word depends or not, and to 
what extent, on the linguistic system; or whether it is the other way round. Often 
language was considered as an accumulation of names, the way Adam named all
261 mean that in this sub-section I address ‘deconstruction’, ‘structuralism’ and ‘sem iotics’ as words.
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creatures in Genesis. Here appears the family connection between ‘name’ and ‘noun’, 
as opposed to verbs, and particularly the copula, and syncategoremes. Structuralism, 
conversely, considers all the elements of a language produced by its system, (b) 
Secondly, we may classify a word as either a ‘concept’ or a ‘name’ according to the 
epistemological status of the particular word or of words in general. It could be said of 
a concept, being strongly interconnected with the theory that supports it, that its 
epistemological value depends on the articulation of the entire theory with the
97world . A name, on the other hand, seems to make an independent move of 
articulation. In a narrower sense, a concept is related to a definition, a name to a 
referent. It is quite apparent that the first two criteria ((a) and (b)) do not forbid an 
empirical communication between the notions of ‘name’ and ‘concept’.
(c) Thirdly, Derrida in Positions28, distinguishes name from concept, 
attributing to concept a presumed stability and uniqueness indicative of Western 
metaphysics. This is not the most usual criterion of differentiation between the two. 
Why should the term ‘name’ allow for more textual play that the term ‘concept’? This 
prima facie  mysterious choice of Derrida’s points to the crux of the two terms’ 
differentiation, which is connected to a very particular opposition at the level of 
connotational resonances: signifier vs. signified, i.e. sensible vs. intelligible. Both 
‘name’ and ‘concept’ as words, signs, unite a sensible and an intelligible element. 
However, ‘name’ is sometimes used to refer to the sensible element alone, and 
‘concept’ to the intelligible element. The result is that the terms bear the resonance of 
these particular uses. So ‘name’ seems to place a stress on the sensible element of the 
semiotic and ‘concept’ on the intelligible element. Derrida, who uses an extended
27 As in Quine, ‘Two Dogmas o f Empiricism’ (1951)
28 ‘un nom ne nomme pas la simplicity ponctuelle d’un concept’, Pos, p.96 / ‘ a name does not name 
the punctual simplicity o f  a concept’, Pos Eng, p.71
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notion of the sensible aspect to destabilise the intelligible/sensible opposition, is 
consistent in using ‘name’ against ‘concept’. And this is the reason ‘name’ appears on 
the side of ‘text’ in this particular text. Elsewhere, and notably in Saufle nom, Derrida 
addresses the theological resonances of the ‘name’. Derrida’s multiple use of words is 
usually the mark of textual work, not of lack of consistency. The destabilisation of the 
sensible/intelligible opposition plays an important role in the Derridean project and it 
is interwoven with this thesis to such a degree that I cannot maintain an absolute 
difference between the terms ‘name’ and ‘concept’. Their communication proves to 
be more than empirical, if by no means a matter of conceptual necessity. Anyway, 
even in the most traditional of classifications, ‘semiotics’, ‘structuralism’ and 
‘deconstruction’ function both as names of historical movements/theories/methods 
and as concepts belonging to these theories; they are concepts that became generic 
names. In this chapter we concentrate mostly on their naming function, and in 
subsequent chapters on the conceptual system that supports them.
New theories have always proposed strategies of naming and concept 
production, more or less subtle or refined depending on their degree of linguistic self- 
consciousness. Some o f these are considered as improved definitions of existing 
concepts, others as introduction of new concepts, others again as discoveries of new 
entities29. In this process, the naming of the theory itself is a highly significant act; 
whether the name of the theory is selected by its originators or supporters or imposed 
by its opponents or commentators, whether it occurs through an inaugural choice or a 
posteriori, on purpose or accidentally.
29 See Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations, (1976) for the equivalent scientific process
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Structuralists, as bearers of a new theory and proud of it -  they actually
evangelise the beginning of a ‘new science’ -  have introduced neologisms and have
re-defined most o f the terms they use. They are very careful to stress that their terms
are not to be assigned metaphysical associations carried over from previous usages.
Inheriting a positive Enlightenment spirit, they value highly conscious innovation, the
moment of epistemic rupture. As Derrida rightly observes, structuralism, as a
theoretical move, needs the assumption of a rupture, a disruption. This does not mean
that structuralism does not take time and history into account. It just means that
one can describe what is peculiar to the structural organisation [as such] only by 
not taking into account, in the moment of this description, its past conditions 31 
{bracket addition my own]
Rupture is a conscious methodological choice. The result is the co-existence of two 
strategies o f naming, which are exemplified by the personae of the engineer and the 
bricoleur. On the one hand, structuralists build new systems and terminologies. On 
the other, they continue to make pragmatic use of old terms, which they detach from 
their past, treating them just as handy or makeshift tools, to be abandoned when better 
tools are available. Derrida observes that quite possibly engineering is structuralists’ 
desire, their methodological ideal, while bricolage is of necessity their actual 
condition. In the terms of his famous dictum: ‘the odds are that the engineer is a myth
77produced by the bricoleur’ . There is a tension, a paradox, inherent in any critical 
project: the only tools we can deploy against metaphysics belong to metaphysics and 
constantly bring us back to it. The only possible difference we can make, according to 
Derrida, is in the way we deal with this paradox. Derrida follows structuralism in the 
conscious recognition of this paradox but differs as to the belief in the possibility of
30 See chapter 3
31 WD, p. 368 /E D ,p .4 2 6
32 WD, p .360/E D , p.419
33 ‘une certaine maniere', ED, p.422 / 'in a certain way', WD, p.364
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escaping it. Structuralists consider their terms metaphysically neutral because they 
provisionally define them as such.
Derrida, on the other hand, has a very different relation to the possibility of the 
new and is much more suspicious of intentional choice. He is also more conscious of 
the reasons for which we continue to use the same word, despite our allegedly radical 
re-defmitions. Just as his conception o f words incorporates time, so likewise his 
strategy for dealing with naming incorporates time too. So, instead of the classical 
definition, he defines through a textual process. His most idiosyncratic strategy is 
what he calls ‘paleonymics’34, from the Greek ‘palaion onoma’ (mxtaxiov ovojia), old 
name. The strategy consists in keeping an old name to denote a new concept35, but 
involves a complicated process. It is inscribed in the double gesture of deconstructive 
writing, which will be further elaborated in chapter 4, where the project and ‘method’ 
of deconstruction is specifically described. In Positions, Derrida gives an extensive 
description o f ‘paleonymics’:
1. au prelevement d’un trait predicatif reduit, tenu en reserve, limite dans une 
structure conceptuelle donnee,... nommee X ;
2. a la de-limitation, a la greffe et a l’extension reglee de ce predicat preleve, le 
nom X etant maintenu a titre de levier d ’intervention et pour garder une prise sur 
1’organisation anterieure qu il s’agit de transformer effectivement.36
Therefore, in ‘paleonymics’ the ‘old name’ is used as ‘a lever of intervention’ in the 
old conceptual structure. While the old concept is liberated from its predicates and
34 The French term ‘paleonymie’ (Mar, p.392 and Pos, p.95) is translated in English by Weber and 
Mehlman as ‘paleonymics’ (Lim, p.21) and by Alan Bass as ‘paleonymy’ (Mar Eng, p.329) and as 
‘paleonomy’ (Pos Eng, p.71). ‘Paleonomy’ is certainly inappropriate, as it seems to refer to ‘nom os’ 
(law) rather than ‘onoma’ (name). Between ‘paleonymics’ and ‘paleonymy’, I chose the former, 
although the latter is morphologically closer to the French term. The reason is that ‘paleonymics’ 
implies more a strategy, while ‘paleonymy’ implies a property, like ‘polysem y’. I use the term 
‘paleonymics’ uniformly whenever ‘paldonymie’ is translated.
‘paleonymie ... la necessity « strategique » qui commande de garder parfois un vieux nom pour 
amorcer un concept nouveau’ , Pos, pp.95-96 / ‘paleonymics ... the “strategic” necessity that requires 
occasional maintenance o f an old name in order to launch a new concept’, Pos Eng, p.71
36 Pos, p.96 /  ‘(1) to the extraction o f  a reduced predicative that is held in reserve, limited in a given 
conceptual structure... named X; (2) to the de-limitation, the grafting and regulated extension o f the 
extracted predicate, the name X being maintained as a kind o f lever o f  intervention, in order to maintain 
a grasp on the previous organisation, which is to be transformed effectively’, Pos Eng, p.71
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‘grafted’ onto a new set of predicates, the conservation of the old name gives to the
new concept ‘the chance and the force, the power of communication’ . This strategy
bears certain similarities to the function of Levi-Straussean bricolage. Or rather, it
exploits the unavoidable ‘nature bricolatrice' (to commit a disseminating
onomatopoeia) of semiosis. The significant difference from the structuralist strategy
is that this one, instead of ‘bracketing’ the old name’s unwanted connotational burden,
has as its structural function to criticise it by a process of transformation. Old names
are used not because they can be emptied of their connotations but precisely because
they cannot. The process of ‘paleonymics’ is a good example o f deconstruction; in a
way it could be another name for ‘deconstruction’. Actually, every Derridean
neologism functions ‘paleonymically’. Even novel terms, such as ‘difference’ and
‘deconstruction’ itself, draw their power from existing semantic resonances, which are
mostly indicated explicitly and critically transformed by a textual process. What must
be taken into account is Derrida’s contention that
Un nom ne nomme pas la simplicity ponctuelle d’un concept mais un systeme de 
predicats definissant un concept, une structure conceptuelle centree sur tel ou tel 
predicat’38.
This is closely related to the deconstructive critique of the concept of the concept, and 
its logocentric assumptions. The unifying and stabilising ‘concept’ is replaced by the 
open and generative ‘text’. In imitation of another dictum39, it could be said that ‘the 
concept is an illusion created by the text’. Therefore, no name -  authorative or other -  
can unify a text; neither ‘Derrida’ nor ‘deconstruction’. In the Derridean project, 
names are replaceable through a subtle process o f displacement.
37 Lim, p.21 /  Mar, p.393
38 Pos, p. 96 /  ‘a name does not name the punctual simplicity o f a concept, but rather a system of 
predicates defining a concept, a conceptual structure centered  on a given predicate’, Pos Eng, p.71
39 See footnote 33, in this chapter
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2.3. About the naming of deconstruction
Interestingly enough, one of the least replaceable names in the project of 
deconstruction has proved to be ‘deconstruction’ itself. Crucially, Derrida claims that 
this was not an intentional act of baptism40. Nevertheless, he has more or less 
accepted it after the fact. The allegedly accidental and extraneous nature of this 
naming matches perfectly with Derrida’s own positions on intentionality. 
Theoretically, a number of other names could substitute for deconstruction: writing, 
differance, trace, supplement, pharmakon etc. As we shall see, there is a slippery 
dislocation between words and concepts in the deconstructive project in general. 
However, the name ‘deconstruction’ seems to prevail both in Derrida’s own accounts 
of what he does and, most certainly, in the reception and classification of his work. 
Rodolphe Gasche has noted41 how ‘deconstruction’ has become the kind of unifying 
label Derrida so abhorred. As this name has ended up by denoting positions radically 
different from Derrida’s and provoking too many ill-informed prejudices against his 
work, Gasche thinks it should be abandoned. He proposes ‘vigilance’ to substitute for 
‘deconstruction’. The term ‘vigilance’ appears in ‘Violence et metaphysique’42, an 
early text on Levinas, where it describes the unavoidable violence, ‘a certain other 
violence’, o f a critical project, against the violence of silence. Gasche is right; this is 
one of the many terms Derrida uses to describe his project. I doubt, however, that it 
could work as an equally effective substitute for ‘deconstruction’. Firstly, it is the
40 See Pos and Let
41 In the International Conference: Following Derrida: Legacies, organized by the journal Mosaic, in 
Winnipeg, Canada, in October 2006, as posthumous homage to Derrida. He also commented on the 
unavoidable fate o f  all theories to be misconstrued and classified in the history o f philosophy. After all, 
every theory claims -  by its very existence -  to be the right and final one, even the most moderate ones; 
it is their structural property. Yet, every theory cannot be more than a step in the history o f  humanity.
42 ‘Violence et metaphysique: essai sur la pensee d’ Emmanuel Levinas’, ED, (p. 172) / ‘V iolence and 
Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought o f  Emmanuel Levinas’, WD, (p. 146); ‘Vigilance’ also comes 
up repeatedly in later texts, like ‘O f an Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy’, where 
Derrida is conveying his ambivalent relationship to the heritage o f the Enlightenment.
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very history of the reception of Derrida’s work, including distortions and 
misconstructions, that now makes it impossible to abandon the name ‘deconstruction’. 
Then, it is the complicated textual work which Derrida has performed on the term 
‘deconstruction’ which is far richer than his use of the term ‘vigilance’. Finally, there 
are certain structural aspects that make ‘deconstruction’ more amenable to Derridean 
games and more representative of his project. Significantly, it is ambiguous as to its 
active or passive nature; a text ‘deconstructs’ itself and ‘is deconstructed’, at the same 
time. ‘Vigilance’, on the other hand, is quite clearly the act of a subject. Additionally, 
the term ‘deconstruction’ -  as we shall see below -  carries resonances of the two main 
philosophical affiliations of Derrida’s project: phenomenology and structuralism. For 
these many reasons, I think that ‘deconstruction’ is an appropriate name.
One understands that the deconstruction of the name cannot but affect to the 
highest degree the name ‘deconstruction’. Its definitional structure is inter-linked with 
other Derridean terms such as ‘difference’ and ‘ecriture’ -  all of which are playing 
between neologism and paleonymics. They share a peculiar difficulty o f definition. 
Often it is said of them that they are not concepts, not even words43. Derrida has 
occasionally compared the naming of ‘deconstruction’ with the strategies of naming, 
or not being able to name, God. It is a comparison by similarity44 or by opposition45, 
or rather both simultaneously46. We know nothing of God but His name -  not even the 
name. Like Dasein, deconstruction is not in the ontic realm of beings; like the God of 
negative theology, it is beyond Being; but unlike God, this is not a positive beyond, it 
is not another kind of Being, it is the very impossibility of transcendence. In a
43 This issue will be addressed in chapter 4.
44 Nom, p.56
45 pp. 82-83 o f  ‘Limited Inc a b c...’, in Lim; and ‘Ellipse’ in ED  /  ‘Ellipsis’ in WD
46 Let, p.3
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negative reminiscence of negative theology: deconstruction is not. ‘Deconstruction’ is 
not a name. ‘Deconstruction’ is just a name. Can anything be less just than a name?
In the ‘Letter to A Japanese Friend’, where he tries to help with the translation 
of the term ‘deconstruction’ into Japanese, Derrida writes the famous aphorism: 
‘What deconstruction is not? Everything, of course! What is deconstruction? Nothing, 
of course!’47. In the same letter, he gives information about the historical and 
structural genealogy of the word, which information has been widely used by 
Derrida’s commentators as a substitute for its definition. After an introductory 
paragraph describing the circumstances of the exchange, the text starts with the 
sentence:
When I chose the word, or when it imposed itself on me -  I think it was in Of 
Grammatology -  I little thought it would be credited with such a central role in 
the discourse that interested me at the time
The claim that he Tittle thought it would be credited with such a central role’ initiates
a series o f disavowals of the name ‘deconstruction’ by Derrida, who appeared worried
by the momentum this name had gained. Understandably, he was thinking it could
take the role of a ‘transcendental signified’ , which would totally contradict his
project. Following his lead, most favourable commentators insist on the accidental
history of this naming; either to exonerate the ‘master’ of his followers’ sins or to
save the project from inconsistencies. This discourse has turned out to inflate rather
than deflate the name ‘deconstruction’ and is now , I believe, part of ‘what
deconstruction is’.
47 Let, p.5. In the English translation, one wonders whether ‘o f  course’ refers to ‘nothing’, or ‘nothing’ 
to ‘o f course’. Unfortunately, the French leaves no such ambiguities: ‘Ce que la d£construction n’est 
pas ? mais to u t! /  Qu’ est-ce que la deconstruction ? mais rien !’
48 This term is introduced by Derrida and will be dealt with in chapter 4. It denotes a signified that 
appears to escape the semiotic system, and therefore centers and stabilises it. This is the metaphysical 
gesture par excellence; what deconstruction deconstructs.
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The ‘incidental’ history apart, there is indeed a consistency in this disavowal, 
an effect of dramatic symmetry, whether intended or not. As the phrasing ‘it imposed 
itself on m e’ implies, and as implied by the entirety of Derrida’s work, there is a 
questioning of the notion of authorial intention. Twice Derrida’s authorial intention 
and control is questioned here: firstly in the choice of the word and secondly in the 
role this word acquires. In the first instance, where the word ‘imposed itself on [him]’, 
one may hear the implication of a metaphysical intentio operis or even a divine 
inspiration. This would be a wrong assumption, as any reader of Derrida will 
understand. It is not a question of substituting something else for the author but of 
destabilising the authorial position. That is why he writes ‘when I chose the word, or 
when it imposed itself on me’ [my Italics]; this ‘or’ is neither an alternative nor a 
correction, it means an addition and a ‘sameness’49. Any choice of any word would be 
subject to deconstruction but this observation does not contradict the empirical 
experience o f choice, at least for someone accepting the general Derridean argument. 
Therefore, Derrida proceeds to describe his intentions and the process of choosing the 
word ‘deconstruction’. Now, the second instance of questioning his authorial control 
concerns the role that the word subsequently acquired. Even accepting this claim at 
face value, it fits perfectly with deconstruction -  and the perfect fit introduces doubts 
about the claim’s ‘sincerity’. Deconstruction destabilises various oppositional 
couples, among others necessity/contingency and before/after, as belonging to 
Western metaphysics. Consequently, there is no fundamental difference between an 
accidental choice and a structurally essential choice; or between a choice before or 
after the fact. ‘A posteriori a priori’ is the temporality of deconstruction. And, finally,
49 This peculiar logic is further explained in chapter 4.
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in this context, any question as to the ‘sincerity’ of the claim itself is meaningless; 
what is important is that it repeats the double gesture of deconstruction.
Further, the claim that he did not intend ‘deconstruction’ to gain ‘such a 
central role in [his] discourse’ has two possible explanations: it may mean (a) that it 
was not his intention that the description of ‘deconstruction’ be identified as a 
description of his project; or (b) that it was not his intention that ‘deconstruction’ be 
chosen above others as the sole name of his project. I argue that the former is refuted 
and the latter is relatively insignificant.
The term ‘deconstruction’ appears in all three of the books that he published in 
1967: De la grammatologie, L ’ ecriture et la difference, and La voix et le phenomene. 
These are his first independent books; they are only preceded by the long introductory 
essay to his translation of Husserl’s Origin o f  Geometry, in 1962, where the term 
‘deconstruction’ does not appear. The term is mostly used in De la grammatologie, 
which is probably the work that established it. In the first part of the book, where 
Derrida’s project is presented in by far its most systematic form, the term 
‘deconstruction’ and its derivatives appear 21 times50 in 130 pages (once every 6.5 
pages). One may observe that this is not such a high frequency. ‘Deconstruction” s 
appearances are by far outnumbered by those of the words ‘writing’ and ‘difference’, 
for example. They are significant, however, and distributed in the entire text. And 
there is a programmatic ambience, whenever the term appears. One third of the 
occurrences51 are combined with the verbs ‘falloir’ or ‘devoir’ (‘it must’); many of 
them are in sentences in the future tense or in conditional, implying imperative; once
50 pp 21, 25, 26, 33, 35 (twice), 39 (twice), 55, 68, 71, 89 (twice), 91, 97, 99, 107 (three times), 124, 
128; obviously, I count the occurrences in the original French.
51 25, 33, 89, 99, 107, 107, 124
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‘deconstruction’ is considered a ‘necessity’52; it is also termed a ‘work’53 and an 
‘enterprise’54. There is no doubt that ‘deconstruction’ is what Derrida calls us to do55. 
He finds his project, or elements of his project, in the texts that he reads (Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, Saussure, Peirce, Hjelmslev etc), because of the complicated relation he 
has with the notion of novelty. He insists, however, on the demarcation between 
‘deconstruction’ and its ancestry. Throughout De la grammatologie, there is not an 
absolute consistency in terminology. Concepts are clarified through the progress of 
writing, not only because of the usual Derridean playful strategies but also possibly 
because it is an early work and written over a long period of time. ‘Deconstruction’ in 
its noun form appears as ‘deconstruction’ (10 times) or ‘de-construction’ (3 times), 
with (twice) or without quotes. The verb form is ‘deconstruire’ (8 times). I could not 
discover any clearly-marked difference in meaning between the different forms. The 
first part o f De la grammatologie was initially published independently as an article in 
January 1966. Taking into account Derrida’s own words, ‘I think it was in O f 
Grammatology,56, we can count this as the public birthday of ‘deconstruction’.
As I mentioned earlier, the term also appears in the other two books that 
Derrida published in 1967. In L ’ ecriture et la difference, which includes essays
cn
initially published between 1959 and 1967, the term appears twice : once in each of 
the two final essays, first made public in 1966 and 1967 respectively. Although all the 
essays describe and pursue more or less the same project, ‘deconstruction’ as a term 
does not appear before 1966. The text ‘La structure, le signe et le jeu dans le discours
52 ‘n£cessit6’, p. 107
53 ‘travail’, p.26, ‘qui travaille’, p.35
54 ‘entreprise’, p.39
55 Strictly speaking, deconstruction is not something someone can ‘do’ but let us use the verb here 
provisionally.
56 Let, p .l
57 pp 414 ,429
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des sciences humaines’ was delivered in October 1966 at the famous conference held
co
in the John Hopkins University ; it is, therefore, officially posterior to the first part of
De la grammatologie, though it could have been written at the same time. The extract
including ‘deconstructin’ is clearly normative and self-descriptive again:
II s’agit la d’un rapport critique au langage des sciences humaines et d’une 
responsabilite critique du discours. II s’agit de poser expressement et 
systematiquement le probleme du statut d’un discours empruntant a un heritage 
les ressources necessaires a la de-construction de cet heritage lui-meme. 
Probleme d’economie et de strategie.59 [Italics are Derrida’s, the underlining is 
mine]
‘Ellipse’, on the other hand, is the last essay of the collection and was written 
specifically for it. The verb ‘deconstruire’ appears on its first page, not in a 
particularly prominent position. Still, being on the first page and denoting what ‘we’ 
may do in vain, it can’t be judged insignificant either. In La voix et le phenomene, the 
term ‘deconstruction’ also has a marginal place, appearing just three times60. In pages 
57-58, a description and a definition are given. It is quite clear that this 
‘deconstruction’ is a process Derrida is engaged with and which is interlinked with a 
system of differences.
We have shown that the question of whether ‘deconstruction’ is a name for 
Derrida’s project can be answered safely in the affirmative. I think we also have 
enough indications that this was an intentional choice on Derrida’s part, from the 
moment of its first appearances. About the question of whether he initially chose the 
term above all others as the sole name of his project, the chances are that he didn’t. At 
least in L ’ ecriture et la difference and La voix et le phenomene his use of the term is
58 Symposium: ‘The Languages o f  Criticism and the Sciences o f Man’; participated among others: 
Eugenio Donato, Lucien Goldman, Tzvetan Todorov, Roland Barthes, Jean Hyppolite, Jacques Lacan, 
Jacques Derrida, Jean-Pierre Vemant; published in 1971 under the title The Structuralist Controversy.
59 ED, p.414 /  ‘Here it is a question both o f a critical relation to the language o f the social sciences and 
a critical responsibility o f  the discourse itself. It is a question o f explicitly and systematically posing the 
problem o f the status o f  a discourse which borrows from a heritage the resources necessary for the 
deconstruction o f  that heritage itself. A problem o f economy and stra tegy ', WD, pp.3 56-7
60 pp 57-8, 83 (twice)
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rare and peripheral, though considering Derrida’s positions with regard to essence and 
centrality this can hardly be considered a conclusive argument. In De la 
grammatologie, on the other hand, as we have shown, he seems to favour the term. He 
even writes: ‘la demiere intention du present essai. Cette deconstruction’61. It strains 
credibility that Derrida should have unintentionally used two of his own ‘forbidden’ 
terms, ‘intention’ and ‘present’, together with the new term. So they must mark 
something important, at least for this particular book. It is not difficult to imagine how 
the prominence of the term here led to its adoption by Derrida’s readers as the general 
name of his project. The first part of De la grammatologie has the form of an 
academic exposition and was more widely read and possibly better understood than 
his other works. It is also expressly described as a ‘theoretical matrix’ of his work. So, 
if he names his project ‘deconstruction’ in De la grammatologie, it is reasonable to 
assume that this is the name of his project. His complicated questioning of naming 
had not yet infiltrated the minds of his readers. Furthermore, their assumption was 
reinforced by the paper ‘La structure, le signe et le jeu’ which he delivered in the 
Baltimore conference, the event that made Derrida more widely known. The result 
was that the Derridean project became known to friends and enemies as 
‘deconstruction’, and it little matters whether its author would prefer to call it by a
61 Gram, p. 103 / De la grammatologie, 1967 was translated by Gayatri Chakravotry Spivak as O f  
Grammatology, 1997. For the translation o f  the citation, see the next footnote.
62 By saying that they are ‘forbidden’, what I mean is that the terms ‘intention’ and ‘present’ are closely 
interwoven with the Western metaphysical tradition and, therefore, their unqualified use is avoided by 
Derrida. The English translation is even more anti-Derridean, to dazzling effect: ‘my final intention in 
this book. This deconstruction’ Gram E n g ,pJ0 . Here we have the accumulation o f  five ‘forbidden’ 
terms: ‘my’, ‘final’, ‘intention’, ‘this’, ‘book’. One should objerve that, firstly, fin a l intention’ would 
be the translation o f ‘intention fin a le ',which includes implications o f  teleology. ‘La dem iere intention’ 
of the original could simply be ‘the last intention’. Secondly, a ‘book’ is a significantly more closed 
entity than an ‘essay’. Thirdly, in the original, the intention is attributed to the essay, not to the author, 
which is rather more consistent with Derrida’s positions. O f course, ‘present’ is much stronger than the 
deictic ‘this’. However, Derrida lightens its use with the word that follows ‘deconstruction’, which is 
precisely ‘presence’. So, the present essay deconstructs presence. In any way, the English version is 
evidence to the translator’s understanding o f the book.
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multitude o f equivalent names. In any case, by the time of Positions, in 1972, the 
collection o f interviews that followed the 1967 books, Derrida seems to have accepted 
the name, at least as a generally recognised convention.
Returning to the initial sentence of the ‘Letter’, it remains to be pointed out 
that ‘deconstruction’ has gained ‘a central role in the discourse’ of Derrida in general 
and not only in what ‘interested [him] at the time’. The specification ‘at the time’ 
seems to imply that the term ‘deconstruction’ is connected to a particular period of his 
work. This, in hindsight, has proved to be false. On the one hand, through the process 
of public appropriation that I have already described, ‘deconstruction’ has become the 
name-label of Derrida’s entire ‘corpus’; a corpus that if it was not accepted 
structurally as such by his author, has at any rate become empirically definable after 
the historical fact of his death. My observation and the working hypothesis of this 
thesis is that -  despite its wide range -  the method, principles and objectives of 
Derrida’s work remain the same. It is, therefore, appropriate that the name used to 
describe it remained correspondingly the same. On the other hand, since 1966 and 
throughout his life, Derrida used constantly, but not exclusively, the term 
‘deconstruction’ as a characterisation of his own project, always keeping a cautious 
distance through qualified expressions. In 1980, in ‘Ponctuations’, where he gives an 
overview o f his work, Derrida acknowledges that ‘Tout cela rassembla sous le titre de 
la deconstruction’ .
As I have mentioned earlier, ‘deconstruction’ has proved exceptionally 
effective for naming the Derridean project, among other reasons because it seems to 
carry resonances of the double philosophical ancestry of the project: phenomenology
63 p. 447 o f ‘Ponctuations: le temps de la th£se’ (1980) in Du droit a laphilosophic, 1990 / ‘All this 
was assembled under the title o f deconstruction’. ‘Punctuations’ was delivered orally by Derrida in 
1980 during the viva o f  his doctor at d ’Etat at Sorbonne and was first published in English three years 
later.
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and structuralism. All his three books of 1967, that introduced the term, are explicitly 
concerned with this double tradition; every text of his since then bears its marks; and 
he often openly acknowledges it64. The following two subsections, 2.4. and 2.5., will 
try to trace the double origin of both the project and the term. Allegedly, the 
structuralist resonance o f the term was not planned or intended by Derrida. This lack 
of planning, however, refers to the particular connotational burden of the term alone. 
Nowhere does he question the structural and intentional relation of his project with 
structuralism. From the next chapter, my thesis deals with the structuralist connection 
of the project of deconstruction, and is no longer particularly interested in the term 
‘decoristruction’ itself.
2.4. ‘Deconstruction’: from ‘Destruktion’ and phenomenology
Derrida has shown a keen and profound interest in phenomenology since the 
beginning of his academic career, as he recounts in ‘Ponctuations’. Both his 
Master’s65 and unfinished Doctoral Thesis66 were on Husserl, and his first published 
book was the translation with a lengthy critical introduction of Husserl’s Origin o f
f s  7Geometry . This interest is evident in his three books of 1967, both in conceptual 
vocabulary and subject matter; one of them is dedicated to Husserl again, La voix et le 
phenomene, while in L ’ ecriture et la difference most essays address questions of 
phenomenology and two are directly and primarily dedicated to it, “ ‘Genese et 
structure” et la phenomenologie’ and ‘Violence et metaphysique’. Most o f the essays
64 See particularly Pone
65 ‘La probleme de la genese dans la philosophie de Husserl’ (The problem o f  genesis in the philosophy 
of Husserl), written in 1954 and published in 1990
66 Started in 1957 with the title ‘L’idealitd de 1’objet litteraire’ (The ideality o f  the literary object), 
under the supervision o f  Jean Hyppolite.
67Edmund Husserl, L ’ origine de la g^ometrie: traduction et introduction, 1962 / Derrida’s essay was 
translated in English by John P. Leavey, Jr as Edmund H usserl’s Origin o f  Geometry: An Introduction, 
1989, with Husserl’s text as an appendix.
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in L ’ ecriture et la difference address questions of structuralism too, while two of 
them and the entirety of De la grammatologie are dedicated to structuralism, but we 
will deal with this other affiliation in 2.5.
Phenomenology is one of the main philosophical paradigms of modernity. It 
was initiated by the work of Edmund Husserl and particularly his Logical 
Investigations in 1900-1. It is a movement, a discipline, and a method. It aims at a 
description of the ultimate irreducible elements of consciousness, which it finds in the 
flow of pure, unmediated experience. Its domain of study is conscious experience 
from the first-person point of view and its conditions of possibility. Phenomenology 
should not be confused with ‘phenomenism’, which studies what appears as opposed 
to what is in-itself. For phenomenology there is no opposition between essence and 
appearance and, therefore, the ‘phenomenon’69 is redefined in a somewhat 
paradoxical way. For phenomenology, the phenomenon, the thing as it shows itself, is 
the irreducible origin, which is found in the pure flow of experience as experience and 
precedes every concept and every judgement. Its method introduces a ‘bracketing’ of 
all the prejudices that cloud our experience of things themselves. This ‘bracketing’, 
also called ‘phenomenological reduction’ and ‘epoche’, does not mean forgetting or 
abstracting, but momentarily not using or suspending. There are four successive
68 For my overview o f  phenomenology I used the following sources: Martin Heidegger, The Basic 
Problems o f  Phenomenology, 1927; Alexandros Ph. Lagopoulos, Epistemologies o f  Meaning, 
Structuralism and Semiotics, 2004; David Allison, ‘Husserl’ and Robert Bemasconi, ‘Heidegger’ in 
Understanding Derrida, ed. by Jack Reynolds and Jonathan Roffe, 2004; Georges Gurvitch, ‘Husserl’ 
and Franfoise Dastur ‘Martin Heidegger’ in History o f  Philosophy, Encyclopedie de la Pleiade, (1974), 
Greek trans. 1987; Gerard Granel,‘Observations on the approach o f the thought o f  Martin Heidegger 
“Sein Und Zeit’” and Rend Scherer, ‘Husserl, phenomenology and its developments’ in Philosophy, 
ed. by Fran?ois Chatelet, (1979), Greek trans. 1990; the entry ‘Phenomenology’ in The Oxford 
Companion to Philosophy, ed. by Ted Honderich, 1995; and in the Stanford Encyclopedia o f  
Philosophy, in the Internet, 2003.
69 ‘Phenomenon’, latinization o f the Greek ‘cpaivdpevov’. According the dictionaries o f N.P. Andriotis 
and Ioannis Stamatakos, ‘(paivdpevov’ is the present participle o f  the passive voice o f the ancient 
Greek verb ‘(patvco’, i.e. to bring to light. Therefore, ‘phenomenon’ literally means ‘that which is 
brought to light’, ‘that which appears’. Traditionally in philosophy, since Plato, ‘phenomena’ are the 
appearances, usually opposed to ‘noumena’.
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stages of reduction: (a) historical reduction, where we bracket the historical context; 
(b) existential reduction, where we leave pending the question o f the existence of the 
perceived thing; (c) eidedic reduction, where we are interested in the eidos of the 
perceived thing and not its particular instantiations; and finally, (d) transcendental 
reduction, where we return to the transcendental consciousness as condition of 
possibility. Some of the best-known slogans of phenomenology, as defined by 
Husserl, are ‘the return to the things themselves’, ‘the intentionality of 
consciousness’, ‘the lived experience’ and ‘the demand for scientificity’.
After Husserl, many other philosophers have written in the frame of 
phenomenology, often redrawing it radically. Heidegger and Sartre have been among 
the most influential and most radically divergent from Husserl. Heidegger’s version of 
phenomenology is of particular interest here, as it has avowedly influenced the 
Derridean approach. Heidegger starts by distinguishing beings from Being. He uses 
phenomenology as a method no longer oriented toward phenomena but toward 
phenomenality. Its ultimate destination is the Ground of Being. This primordial origin 
has been forgotten since the beginning of history, and metaphysics is the name of this 
forgetfulness. Heidegger opposes Husserl’s demand for scientificity, as well as his 
emphasis on consciousness and subjectivity, as deeply embedded in metaphysics. He 
promotes an idiosyncratic form of philosophical etymology, as he believes that 
‘language is the dwelling-place of Being’. Sartrean existentialism exercises an 
anthropomorphic (mis)reading of Heidegger. It is a practical and committed 
philosophy, centred on the issues of freedom and subjectivity. It was the dominant 
philosophy in France before the rise of structuralism, which fervently opposed it70.
70 Francis Dosse, Histoire du structuralisme t.l ,  1992, pp. 19-25
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Derrida engages with phenomenology in two principal ways: (a) He considers 
Husserl as the last and paradigmatic case of Western metaphysics to be 
deconstructed71; (b) he considers himself inheritor o f a line of destructors of 
metaphysics, the last of which is Heidegger. Things are more complicated than that of 
course, as they always are where Derrida is concerned. Derrida is deeply indebted to 
Husserl, as to the entirety of the philosophical tradition, while he clearly demarcates 
himself from Heidegger, whom he sees -  contrary to Heidegger’s own estimate -  as 
deeply implicated in Western metaphysics. However, the general nature of his relation 
to phenomenology consists in this double move and has a certain analogy to 
Heideggerean philosophy. As David Allison rightly observes, the novelty of Derrida’s 
interpretation of Husserl is that he does not organise Husserl’s philosophy under one 
of the issues that this philosophy directly introduces but ‘by the examination of a 
certain prejudice -  namely, the epistemological and metaphysical value of
79presence’ . He finds in Husserl the set of essential distinctions that constitute the 
basis of traditional metaphysics, which he precisely names the ‘metaphysics of 
presence’ and poses as the object of deconstruction in his entire work. This counter­
metaphysical gesture Derrida traces back to Nietzsche, Freud and, finally, 
Heidegger .
In ‘L’Oreille de l’autre’ in 1979, Derrida claims that his first use of the term 
‘deconstruction’ was a translation of a Heideggerian term with marginal importance 
in his thought, and that it was only when others valorised it in the context of 
structuralism that he tried to define it rigorously in his own manner. In the ‘Letter’ in
71 Pos, p. 13 / Pos Eng, p.5
72 ‘Husserl’, in Understanding Derrida  (p. 113)
73 See, for example, ED  and Pos
43
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
CHAPTER 2: THE SIGN OF DECONSTRUCTION
1983, he says of ‘deconstruction’ that when he used it initially, possibly in De la 
grammatologie:
Among other things, I wished to translate and adapt to my own ends the 
Heideggerian word Destruktion or Abbau. Each signified in this context an 
operation bearing on the structure or traditional architecture of the fundamental 
concepts of ontology or Western metaphysics.74
The narrative goes on to describe how the canonical translation into the French
‘destruction’ had overtly negative implications, closer to the Nietzschean project than
Heidegger’s and Derrida’s own. The word ‘deconstruction’ ‘came to [him] it seemed
quite spontaneously’ and then he looked it up on the dictionary. It was a rarely used
French word that included a ‘mechanical’ sense that suited his purposes75. Its use
value has since been determined by the discourse by and on Derrida.
7 f \For Heidegger, ‘Destruktion’ is the last o f three components of 
phenomenological method -  reduction, construction, destruction -  which are mutually 
implied by each other. It is ‘a critical process in which the traditional concepts, which 
at first must be employed, are un-constructed down to the sources from which they
77were drawn’ . The term first appears and is mainly used in Being and Time in 1927. 
Robert Bemasconi observes, however, that Derrida used the term to describe and
70
correspond to the project of late Heidegger, at least a decade later , of overcoming 
metaphysics. In late Heidegger, the history of Western philosophy is perceived as a 
history of forgetfulness of Being. The stress is in on this forgetfulness, whose name is 
‘metaphysics’. Philosophy’s task, therefore, is to find itself again through a productive
74 Let, p. 1
75 Derrida is interested in the ‘mechanical’ sense o f  ‘communication’, in order to destabilise its 
‘subject-oriented’ sense, as he explains in ‘Signature, evenement, contexte’ in Mar, 1972 and later in 
Papier Machine: Le ruban de machine a ecrire et autres reponses, 2001
76 For ‘Destruktion’, apart from the sources mentioned in footnote 6 9 ,1 also used: Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, ‘Destruktion and Deconstruction’ in Jacques Derrida, ed. by Christopher Norris and David 
Roden, 2003.
77 The Basic Problems o f  Phenomenology, p. 23.
78 After the mid-thirties, and clearly expressed in his Nietzsche in 1961
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destruction of its own history, the history of metaphysics. Philosophy has to destroy 
its own ontological concepts in order to find itself.
It is obvious that there are many similarities between the late Heidegger’s and 
Derrida’s project. However, there are also very significant differences. I would even 
agree with Bemasconi that ‘deconstruction’ ‘was introduced to initiate a radical
70confrontation with Heidegger’s thought’ . The most striking difference between the 
two is Heidegger’s discourse on the Ground, the source and inaugural moment of 
philosophy. To destroy a mistaken tradition, in his case, means the search for an 
originary, primordial truth. This is not Derrida’s position. For him, the search for the 
condition o f possibility has no end. As a result, an important difference lies in the 
positivity o f Heidegger’s project as opposed to Derrida’s ‘double register’. For 
Heidegger, destruction is a fully enacted gesture which can reach the origin, at least in 
certain privileged moments. For Derrida, the exit from metaphysics can never be 
enacted and the origin has never existed and never will. The different connotations of 
the very terms are significant. ‘Destruktion’/destruction implies a complete ruination. 
On the other hand, ‘deconstruction’/de-construction implies an untangling of elements 
that compose something, maybe the undoing of a structure but not a complete 
devastation. Derrida argues in the ‘Letter’ that the element of untangling is already 
contained in the Heideggerian notion, which is moderate if compared to the 
Nietzschean ‘demolition’. However, it is Derrida who stresses this element and 
introduces the double structure to the concept and the term. After all, he does ‘not just 
translate’ -  Destruktion and the philosophical tradition in general -  but ‘adapt[s] [it] 
to [his] own ends’80. As Marian Hobson suggests, a double structure is implied by the
79 ‘Heidegger’ in Understanding Derrida  (p 121)
80 Let, p.l
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double prefixes ‘de’ and ‘con’: ‘Does the de apply to the con, or do they 
simultaneously gesture to different though not opposed directions?’ 81 So the novel 
term ‘deconstructin’ already points to the characteristically Derridean ‘double 
register’, i.e. both accepting and criticising the philosophical tradition, using the 
deconstructed tools of the object of his deconstruction. Deconstruction, in transformed 
Kantian terms, searches for the conditions of (im)possibility o f philosophy; and its 
name implies precisely that.
Possibly the first appearance of the term ‘deconstruction’, on page 21 of De la
grammatologie, seems indeed to be a translation from Heidegger
la destruction, non pas la demolition mais la de-sedimentation, la de­
construction de toutes les significations qui ont leur source dans celle de logos.
En particulier la signification de verite. [Italics are Derrida’s, underlining mine]
To consolidate the resonance, the name of Heidegger appears two lines later. 
Interestingly enough, however, it is in order that Heidegger be included among the 
objects o f deconstruction and not that he be credited with its paternity. After all, the 
specified object of deconstruction is truth, which was the ultimate objective for its 
Heideggerian counterpart. From the 21 appearances o f the term in the first part of the 
book, nine are in relative close proximity to the name of Heidegger and at least 
another three are close to recognisably Heideggerian terminology such as ‘arche’, 
‘finitude’, or ‘history of metaphysics’. The relation to Heidegger is ambiguous, 
though, as he is included as either the source of the method, or its object, or usually 
both. Additionally, Heidegger is not presented as the only source of inspiration for the 
project of ‘deconstruction’: on the one hand, he is twice related to Nietzsche in this 
regard; on the other, the term ‘deconstruction’ also appears in the context of 
discussions of Saussure, Peirce and Hjelmslev, who are also indicated as ancestors of
81 Opening lines, 1998, p.16
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the method. So we should speak of ‘reference to’ or ‘adaptation from’ rather than 
‘translation o f  the Heideggerian notion.
In ‘La structure, le signe et le jeu’ in L ’ ecriture et la difference, ‘de-
construction’ makes its only appearance, on page 414, just after the description of the
tensional relationship of the new science of structural anthropology with the
Eurocentric tradition. It takes its place as the culmination of a line of ‘destructors of
metaphysics’ that are lined up two pages before: Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger. The
term used repeatedly in connection with these three names and, finally, with structural
anthropology is ‘destruction’. ‘Deconstruction’ is used only once and in order to
describe what Derrida is proposing. So the term is not introduced, as the ‘Letter’
implied, to differentiate Heidegger from Nietzsche but rather to differentiate Derrida
himself from his ancestral line of Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger and structuralism. The
other appearance of the term in the same book is on page 429, in ‘Ellipse’, a text in
quasi-poetic style which avoids the immediate reference to any philosopher’s name
but which reverberates with echoes of them -  particularly Nietzsche, but also
Heidegger and Lacan. La voix et le phenomene, on the other hand, could justifiably be
conceived as a certain Heideggerian reading of Husserl and in this context any use of
the term ‘deconstruction’ can be considered a translation, adapted as it may be, of the
Heideggerian term. Two of its three appearances are located in a paragraph clearly
engaged with a Heideggerian thematic -  the verb ‘be’ -  which paragraph, earlier (in a
parenthesis), includes his name. The sentences in question are:
Le privilege de l’etre ne peut pas resister a la deconstruction du mot. Etre est le 
premier ou le demier mot a resister a la deconstruction d’un langage des mots.82 
[Italics are Derrida’s, underlinings mine]
82 La voix et la phenomene, 1967, p.83 / translated in English by David B. Allison as Speech and  
Phenomena: and other Essays on H usserl’s Theory o f  Language, 1973, p.74: ‘The prerogative o f being 
cannot withstand the deconstruction o f  the word. To be is the first or the last word to withstand the 
deconstruction o f a language o f  words’
47
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
CHAPTER 2: THE SIGN OF DECONSTRUCTION
In Positions, the collection of interviews published in 1972, one observes an 
interesting development from interview to interview. In the first interview, of 
December 1967, immediately after the publication of the three books, the two83 
appearances of ‘deconstruction’ (in verb form) are in proximity to Heidegger’s name, 
and in one o f the two cases it is explicitly attributed to him. In the 1968 interview, 
none of the three84 appearances of the term are in any way connected with 
Heidegger’s name, although two of them have as their object ‘the history of
O f
metaphysics’. Finally, in the 1971 interview, of the 32 appearances of the term, the
o r
only three occurrences where it is related to Heidegger are in a paragraph where
Derrida explains the differences between them. He actually insists that
J’ai marque, tres explicitement et, on pourra le verifier, dans torn les essais que 
j ’ai publies, un ecart par rapport a la problematique heideggerienne.87 [Italics are 
Derrida’s own]
It seems that by this time ‘deconstruction’ has been clearly defined ‘in [Derrida’s]
o n
own manner’. In the essay ‘Les fins de l’homme’ , delivered in 1968 and published 
in the 1972 volume Marges de la philosophie, for example, he writes of three kinds of 
deconstruction. First is the Heideggerian kind, second is ‘the one which dominates
O Q
France today’ , and third is the kind that he proposes: ‘A new writing [that] must 
weave and interlace these two motifs of deconstruction’.
83 pp.15, 19
84 pp. 30, 48 (twice)
85 pp. 56, 57 (twice), 63, 64, 68 ,69 , 70, 72, 73, 75, 78 (twice), 88 (twice), 98 (three times), 93 (twice), 
109 (twice), 116 (twice), 118 (twice), 125 (three times), 129 (twice)
86 pp. 72, 73, 75
87 p. 73 / Pos Eng, p. 54: ‘I have marked quite explicitly, in all the essays I have published, as can be 
verified, a departure from the Heideggerean problematic’.
88 Mar, p. 162-3 / Mar Eng, p. 135
89 John P. Leavey (in his Preface o f  Or Eng, p. 5) interprets this phrase as referring to structuralism. 
Another possibility, considering the rest o f the essay, could be Marxism. If we take into account the 
fact that the particular essay was first delivered orally in 1968, the chances are that what is meant is an 
amalgam o f the two.
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Before leaving the phenomenological origin of the term ‘deconstruction’ 
aside, we should also briefly address its second presumptive source in the term 
‘Abbau’ (dismantling). In the ‘Letter’, Derrida seems to consider the two terms more 
or less synonymous, ‘the Heideggerian word Destruktion or Abbau'90 [underlining 
mine]. Rodolphe Gasche91 sketches the history of the terms. It seems that Husserl was 
the first to use the term ‘Destruktion’, which was later to be differently defined and 
used by Heidegger, while Heidegger first used the term ‘Abbau’ which then became a 
Husserlian term. The terms obviously communicate philosophically with each other, 
particularly considering that Heidegger develops his concept on the basis of 
Husserlian philosophy. Husserl uses the term ‘mental destructions’ for the three first 
kinds of reduction. In contrast to these, what Husserl names in 1938 ‘Abbau’ is 
transcendental reduction. Heidegger, on the other hand, uses both the terms 
interchangeably for his concept of ‘Destruktion’ which we discussed earlier -  and this 
explains the passage cited earlier from Derrida. The phenomenological line of 
deconstruction’s ancestry, therefore, can be traced back to the transcendental 
phenomenological reduction. There is also a specific technique of Derrida’s that has 
its source in phenomenological reduction, in general, and Heidegger, in particular: the 
technique o f ‘putting under erasure’. The technique deals with the problem that such 
approach has necessarily to use terms which are inadequate. It consists in writing the 
word, crossing it out and, then, printing both the word and the deletion. As Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak explains, Heidegger used this technique in Zur Seinsfrage to 
deal philosophically with the impossibility of defining Being. Derrida’s questioning, 
as we shall see, goes further and the technique is modified to accommodate it.
90 le t, p . 1
91 1 Abbau, Destruktion, Deconstruction’, in The Tain o f  the Mirror, 1986, pp. 109-120
92 Introduction to the Gram Eng, pp. xiv - xvii
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There is no doubt about the strong relationship between Derrida’s project and 
phenomenology. Its other chief line of philosophical ancestry leads back to 
structuralism.
2.5. ‘Deconstruction’: from ‘structure’ and structuralism
Structuralism makes an equally strong appearance with phenomenology in Derrida’s 
three early landmark books of 1967, and many of his texts since. As we have 
mentioned, o f the three 1967 books, one is entirely dedicated to structuralism, De la 
grammatologie, which was also Derrida’s these de troisieme cycle. Most o f the essays 
in L ’ ecriture et la difference address questions of structuralism and two are 
immediately dedicated to it, ‘Force et signification’ and ‘La structure, le signe et le 
jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines’. Even the essay on phenomenology, 
“‘Genese et structure” et la phenomenologie’, chooses to address the issue of 
‘structure’ and general structuralism. One should remember that, in the mid-sixties, 
when Derrida started his philosophical career, structuralism was the established socio- 
scientific ideology in France, while the increasingly fashionable movement of post­
structuralism still shared most of its conceptual vocabulary. Even phenomenology at 
the time was subject to a structuralist reading. As Derrida recalls in 1980, in 
‘Ponctuations’:
...tout ce qui semblait alors dominer le massif le plus visible, le plus voyant et 
parfois le plus fertile de la production theorique ffan9aise et qu’on appelait sans 
doute abusivement ‘structuralisme’, sous ses differentes formes93.
93 Pone, p.447 /  ‘all that which seemed then dominating the most visible, the most visionary [or far- 
seeing?] and often the most fertile volume o f  the French theoretic production and which we called, 
doubtlessly abusively, “structuralism”, under its different forms’
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Structuralism94 is a movement that characterized the twentieth century -  
despite the fact of its not being very popular in Britain -  and still influences our way 
of thinking, particularly through the incorporation of many of its insights into the 
conceptual vocabulary of the social and human sciences. It spread from Geneva to 
Moscow and Prague, from Copenhagen to Paris; from linguistics to anthropology and 
cultural studies, from art to politics, from psychoanalysis to the social and even 
natural sciences; it influenced the rising of May ’68; and then Post-structuralism, 
Deconstruction and the several Post-modernisms. As Michel Foucault wrote in 1966, 
‘Structuralism is not just a new method -  it is the awakened and restless 
consciousness of modem knowledge’95. Some of the key figures of the movement are 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Roman Jakobson and Louis Hjelmslev, Claude Levi-Strauss 
and Roland Barthes; and, with the addition of a certain ‘post’ prefix, Jacques Lacan, 
Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, Julia Kristeva and Jacques Derrida himself.
‘Structure’, which christens the movement, is obviously among its central and 
self-defming notions. ‘Structural’96 is both the model of knowledge and the specific 
method to attain knowledge. It is very difficult to cover all the subtle varieties of the 
concept o f structure, as it passes from one level to another, from one author to 
another, from one theory to another, from one field to another. However, the central 
importance of the concept means that it is the definition of the term that determines
07what structuralism is and who is a structuralist. As Jean-Marie Auzias observes, too
94 For the historical overview of structuralism I used mainly the following sources: Jean-Marie Auzias 
Clefs pour le structuralisme, 3rd ed., 1971; Emile Benveniste, ‘“Structure” en linguistique’ (1962), in 
Problemes de linguistique generale, t . l ,  1966; Franfois Dosse, Histoire du structuralisme, tomes I and 
II, 1992; Alexandros Ph. Lagopoulos, Epistemologies o f  Meaning, Structuralism and Semiotics, 2004; 
David Robey ed., Structuralism: an introduction, 1973.
95 ‘Le structuralisme n’est pas une mdthode nouvelle : il est la conscience eveillee et inquiete du savoir 
modeme’, Les mots et les choses, 1966, p.221
96 The English word ‘structural’ translates both the French terms ‘structurel’ and ‘structural’. The 
difference between the two will be discussed in Chapter 3.
97 Clefs pour le structuralisme, p. 199
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restrictive a definition of structure may result to the exclusion from structuralism of 
important representatives of the movement. I will attempt an exposition of the 
fundamental characteristics of (structuralist) structure in Chapter 3 of the thesis. For 
the time being, let us stress that structuralism uses a particular conception of structure, 
as defined by ‘structural semiotics’; this conception of structure is closely intertwined 
with the main theoretical principles of the movement.
Q O
F ran c is  Dosse traces the history of the use of the term ‘structure’. The 
notion of ‘structure’ initially had a distinctively architectural meaning; it meant ‘the
tfiway something is built’. In the 17 century the term was widened to include living 
creatures, organisms. It referred to the way the parts of a being are organized into a 
totality. Finally, the term was used in a more abstract sense, for the first time as late as
ththe 19 century, by Spencer, Morgan, Marx and, particularly, Durkheim. It signified a 
phenomenon with a certain stability and power of endurance that unifies, in a complex 
and abstract way, certain individual phenomena. The neologism ‘structuralism’ was
thintroduced in the early years of the 20 century in psychology and used in opposition 
to ‘functional psychology’. However, the real starting point o f the movement was in 
linguistics, where it opposed the then dominant ‘comparative linguistics’.
Structuralism’s inaugural text is widely accepted to be the Cours de 
linguistique generale" ,  based on three courses delivered by Ferdinand de Saussure in 
Geneva between 1906 and 1911, as recorded by his students. The text was edited and 
published posthumously to Saussure by his colleagues Charles Bally and Albert 
Sechehaye, with the help of his student Albert Riedlinger, in 1916. Interestingly 
enough, the term ‘structure’ appears rarely in the CLG, and certainly not in the
98 Histoire du structuralisme, t .l, pp.l 1-12
99 Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de linguistique generale, ed. by Charles Bally, Albert Sechehaye and 
Albert Riedlinger (1916), critical ed. and intro, by Tullio de Mauro, Paris: Payot, 1972 -  from here on 
referred to as CLG.
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structuralist sense100. Saussure uses the term ‘system’ to name the concept on which
subsequent structuralists have modelled the concept of (structuralist) structure.
Nevertheless, despite the absence of the term, Saussure without doubt formulates the
fundamental axioms of structuralism, posing the radical de-essentialisation of
signification and stressing the relational aspect of language. In the same text, as we
shall see, he founded the novel science of semiotics. Semiotics, by permitting or
rather postulating the application of certain axioms and theorems of linguistics to the
entirety of the human and social sciences, became the condition of possibility for the
existence o f the structuralist movement.
The formalists of the Moscow Circle (founded in 1915) and the functionalists
of Prague Circle101 (f. 1926), notably Roman Jacobson and Nikolai Troubetzkoy, are
the ones who played a major role in spreading the use of the terms ‘structure’ and
‘structuralist’. In 1929, they publish their manifesto, Theses, on the occasion of the 1st
Congress o f Slavic Philologists, where the term ‘structure’ and its derivatives appear
often and in relation to ‘systems’. We can safely claim that the members o f the Prague
Circle are the first conscious members of the structuralist movement.
Explicit reference to ‘structuralism’ as a founding program was first made by 
1 00the Copenhagen Circle (f. 1931) in the inaugural issue of Acta Linguistica in 1939. 
The Danish linguist Louis Hjelmslev established the Circle in 1931, and in
100 The term appears twice in the text, in p. 180 and in p.244. Tullio de Mauro explains that only the 
second use is actually found in the Courses’ notes. However, it seems that Saussure used the term in 
several occasions in his work but always in the sense o f  a ‘linear grouping’, which is definitely not the 
structuralist sense; see de Mauro’s notes 247 and 259.
101 See F ran cis Dosse, Histoire du structuralisme, t .l, pp.72-79; and Emile Benveniste, ‘“Structure” 
en linguistique’ (1962), in Problemes de linguistique generale, t . l ,  1966, (p.94); David Robey, 
‘Introduction’ in Structuralism: an introduction, 1973, (p.l); Thomas A. Sebeok ed., Encyclopedic 
Dictionary o f  Semiotics, p.981
102 Viggo Brondal and Louis Hjelmslev, editors’ note in A cta Linguistica, vol.I, (1939), pp. 1-2; Viggo 
Brondal, ‘Linguistique structurale’, ibid, pp. 2-10; Louis Hjelmslev, ‘La notion de rection’, ibid., pp. 
10-23. See also Francois Dosse, Histoire du structuralisme, t .l ,  p .12, 77; Benveniste, ‘“Structure” en 
linguistique’ (p.96-97); ‘Louis Hjelmslev’, www.uni-erfurt.de ; Algirdas-Julien Greimas, Preface to 
Hjelmslev, Le langage, 1963
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collaboration with Hans Jorgen Uldall, elaborated the theory o f ‘glossematics’. Acta 
Linguistica, subtitled ‘revue intemationale de linguistique structurale’ (international 
journal of structural linguistics), edited by Hjelmslev and Viggo Brondal, was the 
official publication of the Circle. In the editorial of the first issue, the term ‘structural’ 
appears four times in one page and a half. The programmatic ambience is obvious. 
The term ‘structuralism’ appears in the article-manifesto ‘Structural linguistics’, 
signed by Brondal, to denote the ‘new conception’ of linguistics, which is ‘already 
known by [this] name’ .
As Saussure predicted104, the principles of structuralism were soon to be 
applied beyond the field of linguistics. In the 50’s, France became the center of the 
structuralist explosion. Claude Levi-Strauss and Roland Barthes are the two best 
known figures of the movement105. Levi-Strauss imported the linguistic model in 
anthropology. His doctoral thesis, Les structures elementaires de la parente, 
supported in 1948 and published in 1949, became a corner-stone for structuralism. 
Barthes popularized structural semiotics through a series of articles analyzing 
everyday culture, which appeared in the French magazine Les lettres nouvelles 
between 1954 and 1956, and were collectively published in 1957 as Mythologies.
Structuralism, as an intellectual movement, was the enthusiastic project of 
applying the radical principles of the novel science of semiotics to the analysis o f all 
the fields of human culture. Structuralism was not short of manifestos and efforts at 
unification and systematization. Rupture with the past and aspiration to a generalized 
human science were important elements of its ambience. Nevertheless, it has never
103 ‘La nouvelle conception connue dej& sous le nom de structuralisme’, V iggo BrOndal, ‘Linguistique 
structurale’, Acta Linguistica, vo l.l, (p.7)
104 CLGs, p.33: ‘La linguistique n’est qu’une patrie de cette science generale’ / ‘Linguistics is just a 
part o f this general science’, i.e. semiotics, structural semiotics.
105 Franfois Dosse, Histoire du structuralisme, t .l ,  pp. 26-42, 94-101
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been a dogma or a consistent and unified theory. The reason is a combination of its
founders’ intentions and historical contingency. Strictly speaking, there were at least
as many structuralisms as structuralists. Structuralism as a theory is an a posteriori
construction. At the time, it was a ‘new point of view’106, a ‘new orientation’107, a
‘hypothesis’108. Edmund Leach calls it ‘a way of looking at things’109, while Michael
Lane considers it ‘a mode of thought common to disciplines widely separated’110,
which ‘describes and prescribes operations’ rather than proposing ‘a consistent system
of beliefs and values’111. Therefore, what I present in this thesis as the theory of
structuralism is the product of synthesis and abstraction.
Further conceptual and methodological choices determine what and whom a
researcher finally classifies under ‘structuralism’. Let me clarify four points regarding
what is classified as structuralism in this thesis.
Firstly, ‘structuralism’ is often used as a meta-theoretical, meta-historical
characterization referring to theories and authors throughout the history of human 
110thought . As Derrida puts it: ‘a certain structuralism has always been philosophy’s
1 1 o #
most spontaneous gesture’ . However, in this thesis we are concerned with the 
specific historical movement of structuralism, as already described, which I consider 
pertinent regarding Derrida’s work. Not every interest in structure or use of the term 
can be classified as structuralist in this stricter sense. Many of the authors writing on 
the subject of structuralism choose a wider definition of the term. However, I believe
106 Hjelmslev and Brondal, Acta  Vol. I, p .l; Hjelmslev, Acta Vol. I, p. 12
107 Hjelmslev, Acta Vol. I, p. 10
108 Hjelmslev, Acta Vol. IV, pp. v-vi
109 ‘Structuralism in Social Anthropology’ in Structuralism: an Introduction, (p.37)
110 Introduction in Structuralism: a Reader, (p. 11)
111 Ibid, (p .l3)
112 ‘general tendency o f thought’, Ernst A.Cassirer, ‘Structuralism in Modem Linguistics’, Word,
V ol.l, No. II, (1945), (p. 120); Tanciennet6 de la methode’, Jean Piaget, Le structuralisme, Que sais- 
j e ? ,  1972, p. 101.
113 WD, p.200 / ‘un certain structuralisme a toujours et6 le geste le plus spontane de la philosophic’,
ED, p.237
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that the interest in structuralism in the meta-theoretical sense often has its origin in a 
structuralist view in the contemporary sense.
Secondly, the use of ‘structure’ both as a term and as a concept, defined in
thdifferent ways, was widespread during the 20 century and particularly after the 
Second World War. So we have an orientation toward non-semiotic structures114 too, 
in mathematics for example, which exceeds the structuralist movement as I have 
defined it. This can be partly explained by the success o f the structuralist movement, 
as a kind o f ‘cultural imperialism’, but only partly. I think we could speak of a general 
epistemological tendency of the last century, a ‘general structuralism’ as Lagopoulos 
terms it, of which the ‘semiotic structuralism’ is just the most influential, and possibly 
most original, sub-set. However, Derrida’s project is around the issue of meaning, 
therefore in this thesis ‘structuralism’ refers to semiotic structuralism alone.
• • thThirdly, during the 20 century, apart from the structuralists I have described 
above, there was another linguistic school often bearing the same name: the 
distributionalist school following Leonard Bloomfield115. The American linguist 
proposed his theory in the ‘20s, which was developed by his students and became 
popular in America during the ‘40s and ‘50s. Bloomfield’s notion o f structure, 
however, is very different from its European counterpart, being more or less 
synonymous to ‘organization’. This ‘taxonomic’ conception of language contradicts 
the most central, radical and original principles of European structuralism, namely 
arbitrariness and differentiality -  the principles on which Derrida has developed his 
own ‘difference’ and ‘ecriture’. Another significant difference between the two
114 See Alexandros Ph. Lagopoulos, Epistemologies o f  Meaning, Structuralism and Semiotics, pp. 35- 
44; Jean Piaget, Le structuralisme, Que sais-je ?, pp. 17-45
115 See Algirdas Julien Greimas and Joseph Courtes, Semiotique: Dictionnaire raisonne de la theorie 
du langage, 1979, p.360; Oswald Ducrot, ‘Distributionalisme’ in Dictionnaire encyclopedique des 
sciences du langage, 1972, pp.49-55
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schools is that distributionalists exclude the aspect of signification from their studies, 
although their object is language, i.e. semiotic in nature. As John Lyons116 observes, 
English-speaking attacks on structuralist theoretical and methodological deficiencies 
are often addressed to this kind of structuralism. Despite its historical importance, this 
school did not influence philosophical thought in the way European structuralism has. 
In my thesis, I will not deal with Bloomfieldian structuralism at all.
Fourthly, many researchers -  particularly in the English speaking world -  
include under the broad heading of ‘structuralism’ the post-structuralist theories. As 
these theories have been the means through which structuralist ideas infiltrated the 
English-speaking Universities, and particularly the American literary and cultural 
studies, they are often construed as paradigmatic of the structuralist movement. So, 
‘structuralism’ ends by actually referring to ‘post-structuralism’. The reverse attitude, 
very popular in the so-called ‘post-modern’ circles, is the over-simplification of the 
structuralist principles, used as a back-ground for the arrival of post-structuralism. In 
this case, many of the radical innovations of structuralist thought are attributed to its 
post-structuralist critics. I do not agree with either of these classifications. The close 
relationship between structuralism and post-structuralism, and more specifically 
certain aspects of deconstruction’s debt to structuralism, is the hypothesis my thesis 
seeks to prove. However, there are several very clear differences between the two
1 i n
movements, which Lagopoulos even classifies as belonging to different 
epistemological paradigms. Whatever complications the process of the argument of 
this thesis produces, when we refer to structuralism without qualification, we mean 
‘classical’ structuralism.
116 ‘Structuralism and Linguistics’ in Structuralism: an Introduction, (p.5-6)
117 Epistemologies o f  Meaning, Structuralism and Semiotics, pp.7-33
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In the mid-sixties, the structuralist avant-garde underwent a transformation
into the post-structuralist movement. Structuralism was by then the dominant
ideology of the intelligentsia and it became the object of fervent attack by the young
post-structuralist intellectuals. The leading representatives of post-structuralism
gathered around the journal Tel Quel, which was published by Les Editions du Seuil
between 1960 and 1982. As the Oxford French Literature Companion describes it,
From 1963 to 1966 Tel Quel explored the linguistic and philosophical 
implications of writing (ecriture), and began to elaborate a critical theory which 
transcended generic and disciplinary boundaries118.
This was the immediate context of Derrida’s early and intellectually formative years. 
It was part of the larger frame of the short and intense period of generalized 
ideological questioning, social upheaval and political hope that is remembered as the 
Parisian May of 1968. In the intellectual atmosphere of enthusiasm that led to and 
followed for a short period after the events of May, the young post-structuralists 
demanded ‘Revolution Here Now’119 and believed that they could point the way by 
theoretical study groups, lectures and discussions. Theoretically, they still used the 
main tools and principles of structuralism. However, they radicalized its system, 
producing effects that opposed its scientifism. Marx and Freud and Nietzsche and
190Heidegger entered the picture again . Derrida’s texts of the time participate in this 
radical, visionary and programmatic ambiance.
Derrida describes his relation to structuralism as ‘oblique, deviant, sometimes 
frontally critical’121. As my thesis shows in the subsequent chapters, Derrida’s relation 
to structuralism is double: he finds there both his foundation and his main opponent,
118 ‘Tel Quel’, The Oxford French Literature Companion
119 Tel Quel, no 34, summer 1968
120 According to Manfred Frank (as cited by Lagopoulos, ‘From semiologie to postmodernism: A 
genealogy’, p. 28), ‘the poststructuralist approach comes from the joining together o f classical 
structuralism and a reinterpretation o f German philosophy’. It is quite clear that Derrida’s approach, as 
a combination o f structuralism and phenomenology, fits well to this definition of poststructuralism.
121 ‘oblique, deviant, parfois frontalement critique’, Pone, p. 447
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an opponent which is so close as to be particularly useful for a self-definition by
opposition. When Derrida describes his ambiguous relation to structuralism, in
‘Punctuations’ and the ‘Letter’ for example, he intends also to demarcate himself
from his fellows of Tel Quel, whom he implicitly includes in structuralism. He does
not succeed in this, however. Self-situation by opposition, after all, was a common
gesture for the members of their group. It is as Henri Ronse observes in one of his
1967 questions to Derrida: his works appear often ‘tres apparentes’122 to those of the
Tel Quel group; which does not make them less original and worthwhile.
By Derrida’s own admission, the term ‘deconstruction’ demonstrates the
double relationship of the Derridean project to structuralism. What he denies is that
the choice of the term was intended to express a relationship to this particular
movement. The structuralist connection was allegedly imposed on Derrida by his first
readers; the Tel Quel group, one infers. As he writes in the ‘Letter’:
At the time structuralism was dominant. ‘Deconstruction’ seemed to be going in 
the same direction since the word signified a certain attention to structures 
(which themselves were neither simply ideas, nor forms, nor syntheses, nor 
systems). To deconstruct was also a structuralist gesture or in any case a gesture 
that assumed a certain need for the structuralist problematic. But it was also an 
antistructuralist gesture, and its fortune rests in part on this ambiguity. Structures 
were to be undone, decomposed, desedimented.123
So the term ‘deconstruction’ ‘seems’ to simultaneously be indebted to structuralism 
and opposed to structuralism; precisely in the way of the Derridean project, which it 
ended by naming. According to Derrida, the happy coincidence was read as 
intentional, which directed him to include it in his definition thereafter.
One should observe, however, that the structuralist reading of the term could 
not have been that unexpected and, in any case, was not unjustified. To start with, the 
two texts that introduced the term ‘deconstruction’ in 1966, the first part of De la
122 Pos, p.20 / ‘affiliated’, Pos Eng, p. 11
123 p. 2
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grammatologie and ‘La structure, le signe et le jeu dans le discours des sciences 
humaines’, have structuralism as their explicit subject. How could a reader or listener 
who meets ‘deconstruction’ for the first time in a text or lecture referring to 
structuralism, and full o f repeated instantiations of the word ‘structure’, not hear in 
the term the resonance of ‘structure’? And the connection would be reinforced by the 
fact that ‘deconstruction’ is related to Saussure in De la grammatologie, and also to 
Peirce and Hjelmslev, whereas in ‘La structure, le signe et le jeu’ the term appears 
after a paragraph on Levi-Strauss. Then, in Derrida’s words from the part from the 
‘Letter’ I cited above, ‘the word signified a certain attention to structures’, which 
‘assumed a certain need for the structuralist problematic’. I would suggest that this 
structuralist problematic is what differentiates Derrida’s project from its Heideggerian 
counterpart. Furthermore, the effort to deal philosophically with the particular double 
gesture that characterises his generation’s relation to structuralism, modernity and 
Western metaphysics, constitutes one of his most important innovations. His readers 
recognised not only what was familiar to them as Derrida obliquely implies, but also 
what was original philosophically.
There is a certain fallacy in the implication that an ‘attention to structures’ 
‘assumes a ...need for the structuralist problematic’. Derrida is aware of it and that is 
why he twice adds a qualification: ‘a certain attention’, ‘a certain need’. If 
structuralists were the only ones interested in structures, then even the external 
observation of how often Derrida needs the word ‘structure’ to clarify what he is 
saying would be enough to classify him as a structuralist -  because he does use it very 
often and particularly when explaining deconstruction. However, as explained earlier, 
structuralism does not have exclusive right to use of the term ‘structure’. 
Phenomenology, for example, uses it too, referring to the ‘structures of
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consciousness’. Of course, the centrality given to the notion of ‘structure’ and the 
frequent repetition of the term are indications of a structuralist stand. And the only 
Derridean discourse on consciousness consists in its deconstruction, while even the 
term ‘consciousness’ is one that he very rarely uses. Moreover, the contextual facts 
that we enumerated earlier also argue for the structuralist background of the Derridean 
use of ‘structure’. However, the decisive argument is that the properties attributed to 
structure by Derrida are clearly of structuralist origin124. Most significantly, structure 
is differential for him, and this is one of the distinctively structuralist premises. 
Derrida’s discourse on ‘structurality’ is very prominently displayed in ‘La stmcture, le 
signe et le jeu ’, where it is shown how its origin is to be found in structuralism and the 
Saussurean linguistics.
Derrida almost always has a double relationship with the texts he reads, 
philosophical or otherwise. As Robert Bemasconi observes, describing ‘the parasitic
• • m e
nature of Derrida’s readings’ , Derrida borrows from those texts -  concepts but also 
methods and structural schemas and stylistic traits -  which he simultaneously 
appropriates and criticises, in a process of cross-fertilisation with other texts. This 
means, on the one hand, that the structure of affiliation and opposition can be claimed 
for almost any philosopher, movement or text Derrida is commenting on -  which is 
consistent with his attitude regarding of our possible relation to our philosophical, and 
cultural, past. On the other hand, it also means that several philosophers and 
philosophical movements are omnipresent in Derrida’s work apart from 
phenomenology and structuralism; Nietzsche and Freud, at the very least, Plato and 
Aristotle, Hegel, and -  as Norris argues and this thesis confirms -  Kant. It would be a
124 See the next two chapters
125 ‘Heidegger’ in Understanding Derrida, (p. 124)
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mistake, though, to try to dissolve Derrida in his philosophical affiliations. It would 
equally be a mistake, I think, to level with each other the kind of influence these 
philosophies have on Derrida’s work. Phenomenology and structuralism indeed have 
an exceptionally close relationship to the Derridean project.
By Heidegger, Derrida is inspired to undertake a project of dismantling 
Western metaphysics using language as an instrument, whereas from structuralism he 
takes the axioms regarding language that make possible the dismantling. In Husserl, 
he recognises the paradigmatic culmination of Western metaphysics, but in 
structuralist concepts he discovers its final and most inescapable instantiations. And 
he uses the tools of structuralist analysis in order to locate the Husserlian essential 
distinctions in the texts he deconstructs. In a way, he uses structuralism in order to 
criticise phenomenology and vice versa, taking the logic of both to their extremes.
It should be noted here that phenomenology and structuralism are not mutually
1 7£exclusive. Despite the fact that they belong to different epistemological paradigms , 
they communicate both structurally and historically. Husserlian phenomenology, for 
example, shares a great deal with classical structuralism -  significantly, the scientific 
demand and ‘a certain attention to structures’, both of which can be traced back to the 
Enlightenment. It should be remembered that structuralism in its widest sense 
characterises many theories. It could even be said that ‘a certain structuralism has
177always been philosophy’s most spontaneous gesture’ . As already explained, when 
we refer to ‘structuralism’ in this thesis, we intend the narrower sense; however, the 
communication between the different senses of the term will not be insignificant in 
our analysis. Then again, structuralism in the narrower sense owes to phenomenology
126 Lagopoulos, Epistemologies o f  Meaning, Structuralism and Semiotics
127 WD, p.200 / ED, p.237
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too128. Also, there is the historical circumstance of the close co-existence of the two 
discourses which led important philosophers, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
Gaston Bachelard, to attempt to combine them. Finally, both Heidegger and 
structuralism belong to the ‘linguistic turn’ that has been such a prominent aspect of 
the 20th century. Furthermore, as Marian Hobson129 rightly observes, what 
phenomenology and structuralism share is ‘a structured relation between the empirical 
and the transcendental’. This Derrida inherits from both theories. As a structuralist, he 
is interested in ‘a form of meaning which is not lexical, but structural’; as a 
phenomenologist, he ‘articulates philosophy with history of philosophy’. Both these 
moves constitute ‘structured relation[s] between the empirical and the transcendental’. 
We can safely claim that a background in and a critical engagement with both 
structuralism and phenomenology are very apparent and central in Derrida’s project.
I think, however, that Derrida’s relation to structuralism is of a different kind 
than his relation to phenomenology; possibly more essential, in any case more ... 
structural. Firstly, one notices that Derrida’s approach to metaphysics is through 
language. This gesture can be traced to Heidegger, as we have already described. 
However, Derrida’s understanding of what language is, which understanding makes 
his project possible, is structuralist in origin. Precisely because his theory of language 
animates his metaphysics, the kind of linguistic theory he uses is essential to the 
project. And this theory, as the present thesis shows, is a version of structuralist 
linguistics. Secondly, Derrida’s epistemologically radical framework is entirely based 
on the Saussurean epistemological breakthrough concept of the linguistic ‘valeur’: the 
revolutionary claim that meaning is the product of differences ‘without positive
128 Both in the 1929 Theses o f  the Prague Circle and in the inaugural issue o f  Acta Linguistica (1939) 
of the Copenhagen Circle reference is made to Husserl.
129 ‘Histories and transcendentals’ in Opening Lines
63
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
CHAPTER 2: THE SIGN OF DECONSTRUCTION
terms’130. This constitutes without any doubt the main axiom of the Derridean project. 
And it is through the Saussurean concept of linguistic difference that Derrida reads 
the Heideggerian ontico-ontological difference and the Freudian concept of 
Verspatung in order to develop his central quasi-concept of ‘differance’. Finally, it is 
from structuralism that Derrida inherits his tools for addressing theories as signifying 
structures; tools such as codes, isotopies, symmetries etc.
Derrida’s involvement with philosophers and other writers is always related to 
the question of their semiotics; and his view on semiotics contributes greatly to his 
originality. Structuralism not only puts the question of the sign as the centre of its 
interest, a characteristic shared in some degree with Heideggerian phenomenology, 
but defines it as a relational and differential form. This particular rupture in the sign’s 
definition, which initiates the science of modem semiotics, is the starting point of 
Derrida’s discourse.
2.6. About studying signs
‘Semiotic’ is the adjective deriving from the Greek noun ‘oripelov’131 (semeion), i.e.
• • 1T2sign. ‘Semiotics’ or ‘semiology’ is the science or the method or the theory of 
signifying entities and their systematic organisation. Semiotics constitutes its own
130 Saussure, CLG, p. 166
131 As I have explained in chapter 1, for practical reasons, I use the modem accents in Greek. In this 
case, for example, as the transliteration bears witness, in the older spelling the iota (i) takes a different 
accent ( ~ ).
132 For this general and historic overview o f  semiotics I used mostly: Umberto Eco, A Theory o f  
Semiotics, 1976 and Semiotics and the Philosophy o f  Language, 1984; Pierre Guiraud, La semiologie, 
Que sais-je ?, 1971; Anne Henault, Histoire de la semiotique, 1992; Roman Jakobson, ‘A  Glance at 
the Development o f Semiotics’ (1974) in Language in Literature, 1987; Alexandros Ph. Lagopoulos, 
Epistemologies o f  Meaning, Structuralism and Semiotics, 2004; and the four invaluable semiotic 
dictionaries: Oswald Ducrot and Tzvetan Todorov, Dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences du 
langage, 1972; Algirdas Julien Greimas and Joseph Courtes, Semiotique: Dictionnaire raisonne de la 
theorie du langage, 1979; Thomas A. Sebeok et al. ed., Encyclopedic Dictionary o f  Semiotics, 2 tomes, 
2nd ed, 1994; Oswald Ducrot and Jean-Marie Schaeffer, Nouveau dictionnaire encyclopedique des 
sciences du langage, 1995.
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object of study; as Saussure puts it: ‘It is the point of view which creates the 
object’133. Therefore, it is not easy to answer what a sign is outside the framework of 
semiotics, or even a particular semiotics, a particular understanding of what semiotics 
is. The science and its object are conceptually co-temporal. Every definition runs the 
risk of circularity. How exactly the sign is defined by structuralist semiotics will be 
addressed in the following chapter.
Linguistics holds a prime position in the history of semiotics, words being the 
most frequently studied kind of signs. There is a great controversy regarding its exact 
relation to semiotics134. Saussure, in the CLG's famous citation, situates linguistics as
n r
‘but a part of this general science [semiology]’ . Barthes, on the other hand, has 
paradoxically said that ‘it is semiology which is part of linguistics’. There is no doubt 
that Saussure’s linguistics has been ground-breaking in the study of signs, whereas 
one of his important steps toward the constitution of linguistics as a science was the 
recognition of the nature of words as semiotic. The question is to what extent the 
historical contingency of language’s primacy in the semiotic studies mirrors an 
essential primacy over the other semiotic systems. In the CLG one can find elements 
to support both positions, i.e. both for and against language’s primacy. One can claim, 
and my thesis tends to agree, that one of the most interesting possibilities opened by 
structural semiotics is the non-hierarchical relation between the ways of 
communication. In any case, the extension of methods and principles first introduced 
in linguistics to the study of other semiotic systems has been encumbered with two 
symmetrical fallacies: On the one hand, there is the uncritical, analogical application;
133 CLG, p. 23
134 See, for example, Irmegard Rauch, ‘Semiotics and Linguistics’, in Sebeok, Encyclopedic 
Dictionary o f  Semiotics, pp. 912-920
135 p. 33
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1to turn the other systems into (natural) languages. On the other, there is the 
assumption of a deep, metaphysical difference between the systems, ultimately 
undermining their semiotic nature. Both underestimating and overestimating the 
differences between non-linguistic semiotic systems and (natural) languages can be, 
and often is, combined with a devaluation of the non-linguistic systems. This is 
particularly relevant to Derrida’s work.
Linguistics historically has been a part either of philosophy or philology, and 
has taken the form of morphology, grammar, logic, rhetoric, poetic, etymology, 
questions o f linguistic origin. Saussure in his brief summary of the history of
i 07
linguistics , after a mentioning of grammar and philology since antiquity and a 
reference to comparative grammar, situates the beginning of linguistics as a science 
proper around 1870 with Whitney and the Neogrammarians. Ducrot and Todorov in 
their list o f modem linguistic schools138 include general grammars since the 17th
thcentury and the 19 century historical linguistics. Then, they put Saussure, 
Glossematics, Functionalism, Distributionism and Generative linguistics. All the four 
schools after Saussure include ‘structure’ in their conceptual vocabulary. However, it 
is only Glossematics and Functionalism that can be classified as structuralist, in the 
way my thesis defines it. Leonard Bloomfield’s Distributionism and Noam 
Chomsky’s Generative linguistics belong to a different tradition.
Modern semiotics, along with stmcturalist linguistics, was born with Saussure. 
Semiotics and structuralism are conceptually distinct. On the one hand, structuralism,
136 As w ill be explained in chapter 3, in the structuralist semiotic jargon all semiotic systems are called 
‘languages’. The non-technical register o f the term is re-named ‘natural language’. However, there are 
serious problems with the term. The attribute ‘natural’ to a language is somehow contradictory with the 
main principles o f structuralist semiotics, whereas the implication that some o f them are more -  or less 
-  so is even more contradictory.
137 ‘Coup d’ceil sur 1’histoire de la linguistique’ (A Glance at the History o f Semiotics), in the CLG, 
pp.13-19
138 ‘Les ecoles’ (The Schools), in Dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences du langage, pp. 15-67
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as we have seen, can be perceived as wider than semiotics, including an interest in 
structure beyond the domain of signifying practices, strictly so defined. However, 
structuralism defined as the particular cultural movement popular in France after the 
Second World War, the one significantly influencing Derrida’s work, is certainly 
semiotic. On the other hand, semiotics can also be conceived as wider than 
structuralism. Throughout the history of human thought, there are many theories 
regarding significance which do not include an interest in structures generally, and of 
course precede the 20th century movement of the structuralist movement. However,
thsemiotics as an independent field of study was constituted in the beginning of 20 
century and, at least in Europe, has been closely intertwined with structuralism. In 
other words, strictly speaking, general structuralism and semiotics are two intersecting 
sets. The reason they are often considered co-extensive is that the movement of 
structuralism was founded on structuralist semiotics, whereas reference to semiotics
1 TOas science or a method usually denotes structuralist semiotics . Therefore, both 
terms are often used as synechdochai for their intersection, i.e. ‘structuralist 
semiotics’, which is the object of interest of my thesis.
In Ferdinand de Saussure’s Cours de linguistique generale140, published in 
1916, the appearance of a general theory of signs is predicted, one which ‘has a right
139 Compare Jonathan Culler’s statement: ‘semiology and structuralism -  [...] in fact the two are 
inseparable, for in studying signs one must investigate the system o f relations which enables meaning 
to be produced, and, reciprocally, the pertinent relations between items can be determined only if  one 
considers them as signs’, ‘The Linguistic Basis o f Structuralism, in Structuralism: an Introduction, 
(P-21)
140 As I have already explained in 2.5 (see also note 102) the published text is the product of editorial 
work after Saussure’s death. Roy Harris in Saussure and his Interpreters, p.3 explains very well the 
complications created by this fact. When one refers to ‘Saussure’ she may mean (a) ‘the putative author 
of the CLG ’, (b) ‘the lecturer who actually gave the courses o f lectures at Geneva on which the CLG 
was based’, and (c) ‘the putative theorist “behind” the Geneva lectures’. This complication, as we will 
see, is not unrelated to Derrida’s questioning o f  authorial control. In this thesis, anyway, we are not 
interested in the exact attribution o f the CLG paternity. What interests us is the way the text has 
influenced structuralist semiotics. Consequently, we are mostly interested in ‘Saussure, the author o f  
C LG \ by this I don’t mean the real persons o f  Saussure, his students and his editors. ‘Saussure’ for our 
purposes is the CLG.
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to exist, its place is determined in advance’141. Structuralists rallied to fulfil this 
prediction, founding the new science on some of Sausssure’s most original and radical 
insights. As it is often the case with fertile and widespread theories, we have an 
eclectic a posteriori quest for precedents. This happens either as a way to lend prestige 
to the new theory or to question its originality. Tullio de Mauro observes142 that to 
diffuse the findings of a theory to its historical precedents is one of the subtler 
strategies o f academic hostility. Of course, Saussure’s propositions did not appear ex 
nihilio. As de Mauro explains in his introduction to CLG143 many of the themes that 
we consider today as characteristically Saussurean circulated widely in the beginning 
of 20th century. However, several of his formulations and propositions -  among them 
the langue /  parole division and, particularly, the radical arbitrariness o f the sign -  
were innovative, founded structuralism and influenced decisively the social and 
human sciences.
As Tzvetan Todorov144 observes, there is ‘an implicit semiotic theory’ in every 
linguistic speculation since antiquity, from China to India, from Greece to Rome. 
These, however, were not distinguished from a general theory or philosophy of 
language. John Locke, in his 1690 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, was the 
first to propose the term
. . .  sem iotike  or the ‘Doctrine of Signs’, the most usual whereof being words145 
Jakobson cites several other philosophers who, following Locke, used terms 
derivative from the Greek word for sign: Jean Henri Lambert, Joseph Marie Hoene- 
Wronski, Bernard Bolzano, Edmund Husserl. None of them, however, conceives of
141 CLG, p.33
142 Critical notes to CLG, p. 380
143 Introduction to CLG, pp. iii-iv
144 In Dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences du langage, p. 113
145 As quoted by Jakobson, Language in Literature, p.437
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semiotics as a distinct science. At the beginning of 20th century, Ferdinand de 
Saussure (1857-1913), in the 1908-11 lectures that later formed the CLG, foresaw the 
birth of
une science qui etudie la vie des signes au sein de la vie sociale ; [...] nous la 
nommerons semiologie (du grec semeion, « signe »). Elle nous apprendrait en 
quoi consistent les signes, quelles lois les regissent. [...] elle a droit a l’existence, 
sa place est determinee en avance. La linguistique n’est qu’une partie de cette 
science generale’146 [Italics in the original].
According to Rudolph Engler147, when Saussure first used the term ‘semiology’, he
was referring to a linguistic semiology. His first mention of it as a ‘general theory of
signs’ was made in 1894; a science the object of which would be ‘socially determined
14Rsigns’. His contemporary Charles Sanders Peirce . (1839-1914) had been interested
in the scientific study of signs since 1863. He considered himself
a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up 
what I call semiotic, that is the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental 
varieties of possible semiosis149.
There are no indications that either of them was conscious o f the other’s work.
Tzvetan Todorov in Dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences du langage150
considers as the three sources of modem semiotics Peirce, Saussure and
Cassirer. Jean-Marie Schaeffer, in the revised edition of the dictionary151, lists
Peirce, Saussure, Husserl, Cassirer, as well as the logic of Frege, Russell and
Carnap.
What makes Peirce and Saussure stand out is their consciousness of the need 
for a distinct science studying signs, as well as the historical fact of their initiating the
146 CLG, p.33 / ‘a science that studies the life o f  signs within the life o f  society-, [...] we will name it 
semiology (from the Greek semeion, “sign”). It would show us what constitutes signs [and] what lows 
govern them. [...] it has a right to exist, its place is determined in advance. Linguistics is but a part o f  
this general science’
147 In Sebeok et al. ed., Encyclopedic Dictionary o f  Semiotics, p.846-847
148 Jakobson, Language in Literature, p.441
149 As quoted by Eco, Theory o f  Semiotics, p. 15
150 The entry ‘Semiotique’, pp. 113-122
151 The entry ‘Semiotique’, pp.213-227. One could comment on the difference between the 1972 and 
1995 version. It is obvious the effort o f an opening towards non-structuralist affiliations.
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two traditions of modem scientific semiotics. Starting from them, semiotics is no 
longer simply a field of study; it becomes an organised discipline152. On their work 
were founded two different traditions, independent and -  at least to begin with -  
almost unaware of each other’s existence and achievements. Saussure’s tradition puts 
the emphasis on the social aspect of signs, Peirce’s on their logical aspect153. Saussure 
clearly takes semiotics out of philosophy and philology. He apparently did not know 
about the philosophical antecedents of the issues regarding signs, and he certainly 
took no account of them. His influence in Europe was immense, both by his 
modernizing linguistics and by his providing the basic principles of the structuralist 
movement. His influence world-wide, mediated by structuralism and post­
structuralism, was to wait until after the Second World War. Peirce, on the other hand, 
was very much aware of philosophers preceding him and can be situated in Locke’s 
lineage. His influence was great in the United States of America. As a semiotician, his 
work was introduced to Europe much later. The study of his work has been impeded 
by the fact that there are successive versions of his theory, o f advancing complexity.
The Saussure filiation, starting from structural linguistics working in a 
semiotic perspective154, eventually to be identified with the structuralist movement, 
included the schools of Prague and Copenhagen, and figures such as Nicolai 
Troubetzkoy, Roman Jakobson, Louis Hjelmslev, and Emile Benveniste. In the same 
lineage, after the Second World War, particularly in France, explodes the structuralist 
phenomenon, inspired by the work of Claude Levi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, and 
Algirdas-Julien Greimas. More recently, the post-structuralists and the Greimacian
152 We follow here Umberto Eco’s distinction between ‘semiotics as a f ie ld  o f  studies and thus a 
repertoire o f interests’ and as ‘a specific discipline with its own method and precise object’, A Theory 
o f  Semiotics, (1976) 1979, p. 7
153 La semiologie, Que sais-je ?, p.6
154 Ducrot and Todorov, p .l 17; Ducrot and Schaeffer, p.221
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Paris School of semiotics follow the same lineage. What unites all these very diverse 
approaches is their perception of the semiotic as a social and cultural phenomenon. 
Peirce’s work was interpreted and expanded mainly by Charles William Morris, as 
well as Charles Kay Ogden and Ivor Armstrong Richards. After the Second World 
War, this lineage was pursued mostly in the U.S.A. by Thomas Sebeok and his School 
of semiotics, and more recently in Scandinavia. This perception of semiotics extends 
the notion of semiosis beyond human communication, a position which has been the 
cause of great controversy. The followers of these two traditions, unlike their 
founders, were not ignorant of each other’s existence. There were theoretical 
exchanges between them from quite early155, though few. The Second World War 
brought about the contact between them by the flight of Jewish intellectuals from 
Europe; notably Jakobson and Levi-Strauss. The Linguistic Circle of New York was 
founded and in 1945 there appeared the first issue of the review Word. Schaeffer156 
distinguishes a third tradition, which -  although it can trace its lineage to structuralism 
-  developed independently, in the Soviet Union. This was the Circle of Tartu, 
interested in a semiotics of culture founded on cybernetics and the theory of 
information.
In the 60’s, for the first time, semioticians from different schools aspired to
1 S7collaborate toward an ecumenical conception o f semiotics . In 1966 the first 
international semiotics conference was organized in Poland. In 1969, in Paris, the 
International Association for Semiotic Studies -  Association Internationale de
155 De Mauro in his notes to CLG refers to the 1927 negative critic o f Saussure by Ogden and Richards, 
spectacular proof o f their complete misunderstanding (pp. 439,449); he also refers to Jakobson’s 
frequent use o f  Peirce’s concepts o f ‘icon’, ‘index’ and ‘symbol’ (p.445). Harris in Saussure and his 
Interpreters also refers to Ogden and Richards’s misunderstanding o f  Saussure (pp. 69-70).
156 Nouveau dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences du langage, p.220-1
157 See the site o f  International Association for Semiotic Studies, http: //filserverarthist.lu.se/AIS/IASS
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Semiotique was officially established. Among its founding members were Greimas, 
Jakobson, Kristeva, Benveniste, Sebeok and Lotman. It has the following goals:
1. promote the semiotic researches in a scientific spirit
2.re-enforce the international co-operation in this field
3.collaborate with similar associations
4.organize national and international conferences, and educational seminars 
5.publish an international review. Semiot ica
i e  o
This gallant project has not been easy. As Anne Henault complains, Semiotica has
become a tribune of semiotic philosophical exchanges, leaving little room for semiotic
theory proper, particularly of the radically innovative kind. The main reason, let me
suggest, is that the Saussurean and Peircean lineages are divided by some very deep
and crucial epistemological differences, the crux being Saussure’s principle of
fundamental semiotic arbitrariness. Umberto Eco is the exceptional case of a
semiotician who belongs to no tradition and manages successfully to combine
elements from the different traditions. As Schaeffer puts it, he is
one of the rare European semioticians having developed a general semiotics 
searching the continuous dialogue with the advanced propositions of other 
researchers159
Eco gives an inclusive definition of the ‘theoretical possibility’ of a general semiotic 
theory as ‘a unified approach to every phenomenon of signification and/or 
communication’160. It has as its object ‘the entire universe (and nothing else)’161. This 
alludes to the fact that everything that is social and cultural is semiotic, but it does not 
mean that there is nothing more. It refers to ‘the universe’ as object o f cognition, 
which structuralism considers by definition as social and cultural.
In the context of a thesis submitted in a British University, one is more or less 
obliged to ask about the relation between Analytical philosophy and semiotics,
158 Histoire de la semiotique, pp.3-4
159 Nouveau dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences du langage, p.222
160 Theory o f  Semiotics, 1976, p.3
161 Ibid., p. 7
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particularly as they share some main topics of interest. From the Analytic point of 
view, the semiotic approach is merely descriptive, while theirs is critical. From the 
semioticians’ point of view, the Analytic approach is encumbered with metaphysical 
assumptions, while theirs is scientific. Actually both approaches carry their own 
metaphysical assumptions and critical insights. Traditional hostility aside, their meta- 
theoretical difference resides between philosophy and applied theory; which does not 
prevent philosophy from having its applications and the applied theory its underlying 
philosophy. Historically, semioticians have been more interested in the structure of 
language, analytical philosophers in its use; semioticians have been more interested in 
signification and intentional semantics, analytical philosophers in extensional 
semantics and the question of the referent. These differences are not pertinent any 
more, as both sides have extended their fields of study.
Derrida has been engaged with many semiotic theories and philosophies, 
including Analytic philosophy of language. However, as I have explained and will 
expound further in subsequent chapters, his project is particularly indebted to the 
structuralist definition of the semiotic. This definition will be presented in Chapter 3. 
Its most original and influential proposition concerns the principle of fundamental 
semiotic arbitrariness, as opposed to the arbitrariness of each isolated sign. 
Structuralist semiotics, in its striving to become a science, undertakes a project of 
subtracting metaphysics from its object o f study, much of which is based on the 
premise of this fundamental semiotic arbitrariness. Again, these issues will be 
analysed in the next chapter. What interests us for the moment is that this project of 
de-mystification becomes apparent in a terminological shift.
Firstly, structuralist semioticians feel a certain reluctance to use the word 
‘meaning’ (sens), despite the fact that both in a traditional philosophic and in a
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layman’s vocabulary this is exactly the object of their investigations. The reason is 
that traditionally the term ‘meaning’ seems to imply its pre-existing to expression in 
signs, which contradicts the premise of fundamental semiotic arbitrariness. For 
structuralist semioticians meaning is produced by the semiotic relation alone. Signs 
are no longer considered autonomous units pointing to autonomous essences. They 
are defined through function -  in both senses of the term. Jakobson, defines the 
semiotic through its function, i.e. its use, as communication. Hjelmslev defines the 
semiotic as a function, in the mathematical sense, i.e. a map between two sets. These 
two definitions of the semiotic, as communication and signification, are 
complementary and co-existent. ‘Semiotic function’ or ‘semiosis’ is the relation 
between signifier and signified, in Saussure’s terminology, or between content-form 
and expression-form, in Hjelmslev’s terminology. One should pay attention to the fact 
that semiosis has a slightly different meaning in Peirce; in this thesis, however, we are 
mainly interested in the Saussure-Hjelmslev tradition.
Secondly, structuralist semioticians deliberately and programmatically empty 
the metaphysical import of the terms ‘expression’ and ‘representation’. The reason 
lies again in the premise of fundamental semiotic arbitrariness. No longer is the one 
component of the sign an expression of the other, intrinsically linked with it. No 
longer is the sign an expression or representation of something pre-existing in the 
subject’s mind or expressive intent. No longer is the sign the representation of a pre- 
existing object in the world . The terms ‘expression’ and ‘representation’ may still 
be used but they are re-defined. Thirdly, for all the above reasons, questions about 
subjectivity and intentionality become secondary to semiotic research, while the
162 This does not necessarily mean that the sign has no referent or that the world does not exist 
independently o f our consciousness. It will be explained in Chapter 3, where the principle o f  
fundamental semiotic arbitrariness is expounded.
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‘subject’ loses much of its metaphysical import. Functionally, semiotic subjects 
appear just as points in the circuit of communication. All the same this never led to 
any implication that communication does not concern real human subjects.
Post-structuralist semioticians took further steps in the direction of 
philosophical de-mystification and terminological change. Even the term ‘sign’ is 
abandoned as metaphysically burdened and is replaced by ‘text’. Barthes describes it:
It is not a structure, it is a structuration;
It is not an object; it is a working process and a play;
It is not a set of closed signs, having a meaning which one would have to find,
but a volume of traces in displacement163
Derrida is probably the most extreme case o f terminological destabilisation. His 
philosophical critique of not only the terms but also the very possibility of making a 
statement, makes very difficult to articulate what is the object of our study; and his. 
We are left, if not with a conceptual, then at least with a terminological void regarding 
the place the ‘sign’ once held. What is this ‘something’, which can no longer be called 
either ‘expression’ or ‘communication’, certainly not ‘meaning’, and which is called -  
provisionally and neologically and paleonymically -  ‘ecriture’ or ‘differance’ ; and 
what is it for? It remains unnamed and its function unnamed: an unnamed connection 
between two negated poles164. It is ‘without’, ‘sans’165. Sign without signification, 
expression (as trace) without expression (as act), communication without 
communication.
This thesis, while taking into account Derrida’s critique, cannot but name its 
field of study, which is semiosis, i.e. signification and communication. We will be
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mostly concerned with the topic of signification. Even with these conditions,
however, the choice of the term ‘semiotics’ is not un-complicated166.
As we have seen, Saussure used the term ‘semiologie’ and Peirce the term
‘semiotic’. It is often the case that Saussure’s followers use the term ‘semiologie’,
whereas Peirce’s deploy the term ‘semiotics’. English authors, however, translate the
French ‘semiologie’ interchangeably as either ‘semiology’ or ‘semiotics’. As this
thesis is interested in Saussure’s tradition, in order to stress this lineage, a possible
choice would have been ‘semiology’. Nevertheless, the term ‘semiotique’ also
appears in structuralist bibliography quite often, either as an adjective or as a noun.
Firstly, it often denotes a particular semiotic system: ‘une semiotique’167. Secondly, as
168it does not include the root ‘-logie’ (‘-logy’) , it does not imply any relation to the
so-called natural languages. So, it became customary to use that term when referring 
to the study of semiotic systems other than natural languages, particularly in cases 
when there is some doubt as to their deserving the full title of a langue; for example, 
‘la semiotique de l’espace’ (semiotics of space). Considering that both Derrida and 
Hjelmslev, and this thesis in general, question the primacy of natural languages, the 
term ‘semiotics’ seems metaphysically more neutral. Thirdly, the term ‘fonction 
semiotique’ (semiotic function, sign-function), as substitute for ‘signe’, was 
introduced by Hjelmslev. Indeed, the use of the term ‘sign’ can be seen to have 
diminished progressively. Julia Kristeva169 initiated the re-organisation of the 
discipline no longer around the notion of ‘sign’ but of ‘text as productivity’, accepting
166 See Greimas and Courtis, Semiotique: Dictionnaire raisonne de la theorie du langage, pp.339-346; 
Jerzy Pelc, in Sebeok et al. ed., Encyclopedic Dictionary o f  Semiotics, pp. 893-912
167 To be precise, ‘a semiotic’ comprises a semiotic system and its corresponding semiotic process, as 
will shall see in the next chapter.
168 From the Greek ‘7oyo<;’ (logos), i.e. ‘speech’, ‘speaking o f ;  the word has other meanings, among 
which, ‘word’ and ‘reason’.
169 See Ducrot and Todorov, pp. 449-453
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the critique of the sign’s appartenance to the idealistic-logocentric tradition. Finally, 
the choice o f ‘semiotics’ as the name to denote the unified field of semiotic and 
semiological sciences was chosen by the inaugural Congress of the International 
Association for Semiotic Studies. I will follow their choice for all the reasons 
explained above, having made clear that I mean ‘structuralist semiotics’.
2.7. ‘Deconstruction’ and ‘structure’ in Positions
As we remarked earlier, Derrida claims that the use of the term ‘deconstruction’ is 
contingent and that he had not intended it to gain such a central position in his texts. I 
argue that to begin with the term was used in order to refer to what he was doing, 
even if this was not chosen as the unique term to name the project. Another claim of 
Derrida’s that we investigated concerns the source of the term ‘deconstruction” s in 
Heidegger’s ‘Destruktion’ and the fact that its relation to ‘structure’ and structuralism 
was not initially consciously intended. The Heideggerean connection is 
unquestionable but I argue that the ‘structure’ connection is equally essential. I will 
here try to support my argument regarding ‘structure’, if  not yet ‘structuralism’, by a 
formal study of the text of Positions.
The status of Positions in Derrida’s work is peculiar. It is a collection of three 
interviews which took place between 1967 and 1971. Its peculiarity consists, on the 
one hand, in its being primarily the record of oral exchanges, and on the other hand, in 
its clarifying, highly assertive style. Derrida obviously feels uncomfortable with the 
theoretical implications of the interview form. His argument throughout his work has 
been against the metaphysical privilege of speech over writing. Understandably he 
worries that his spoken words may be taken as more final concerning his writings, 
which would completely undermine his general argument. The preface to the 1972
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publication of the three interviews bears witness to his anxiety and takes precautions 
against this danger. The consciousness of danger, though, does not prevent him from 
actually explaining what he wanted to say in a quite confident and explicit manner. 
And this is not just the performative paradox of any interview. A large part of these 
particular interviews revolves around answering criticisms and responding to 
interpretations of his work, and he is very clear and forceful about the correct 
meaning of his texts170.
However, this is not the most interesting paradox of Derrida’s position 
regarding the function of interviews. He actually seems to consider them as 
hierarchically less valuable than his written texts, as becomes evident by his repeated 
comments:
la parole improvisee de l’entretien ne peut se substituer au travail textuel171 
je ne peux pas ‘parler’ Pecriture [...] c’est la demiere chose qui se laisse
a • • 172maitriser par un entretien 
This is at odds with his general argument. A superficial reading would probably see 
no contradiction in the devaluation of speech by someone who has striven so hard 
against its overvaluation. However, the entire argument against the overvaluation of 
speech is that it is ‘a kind o f  writing, not in any way ‘less than’ or ‘inferior to’ 
writing. The whole point of maintaining that speech is not more intentional, 
authoritative, controllable than writing, is that it is ju s t as w«-controllable as writing, 
being writing. Derrida says that all texts, including oral ones, partially escape 
intentionality, escape the metaphysics of presence. His mistrust o f interviews
170 See for example: ‘on me constitue proprietaire de ce que j ’analyse’, Pos, p.67 /  ‘I am constituted as 
the proprietor o f what I analyse’, Pos End, p.50; ‘on me prete ce que je denonce’, Pos, p. 72 / ‘what I 
denounce is attributed to me’, Pos Eng, p.53
171 Pos, p. 91 /  ‘The improvised speech o f  an interview cannot substitute for the textual work’, Pos Eng, 
p.67
172 Pos, p. 93 / ‘I cannot “talk” the writing [...]; this is the last thing that can be mastered in an 
interview’, Pos Eng, p.69
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contradicts this line of argument. He seems to value control over one’s text but to 
place the locus of this control in the written text and not in oral exchange. This 
symmetrical inversion is definitely at odds with the deconstructive project as practised 
and described by him throughout his work. I will, therefore, include his interviews in 
the corpus of his texts. I will not grant them a privileged status but neither will I 
refrain from analysing them and drawing conclusions from them.
Positions is important to me not because its interview form allows it to make 
more authoritative claims regarding Derrida’s work but because it comes just after the 
first books published by Derrida, those that constitute the main object of my thesis, 
and therefore functions as an overview and brief conspectus of them. By both 
repeating and synthesising these initial positions, he actually forms what came to be 
his ‘project’. And the fact that the terms ‘deconstruction’ and ‘structure’ have a very 
prominent position in this text is, I think, significant.
I have counted every occurence of the terms ‘deconstruction’ and ‘structure’ 
and their derivatives in the text of Positions. I obviously did not count the instances of 
the terms in the interviewers’ questions. In the case o f ‘deconstruction’, I also 
excluded those instances when Derrida cites another’s words referring to his own 
work173, and when he uses the term with immediate reference to Heidegger and can 
possibly be interpreted as a translation of ‘Destruktion’174. In the case of ‘structure’, I 
did not count the cases when the term explicitly or implicitly refers to structuralism or 
when it is used as belonging to another’s discourse -  so that I won’t attribute to him 
what he is criticising175: these occurrences amount to 11. If one wanted to be even 
more exact, one should probably count the use of similar and equivalent terms; in the
173 Once on page 70
174 Once on page 19
175 He seems particularly alarmed by this possibility, see footnote 174
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case of ‘deconstruction’, terms such as ‘demontage’176, ‘deconstitution’, 
‘decoudre’177; in the case of ‘structure’, the very frequent use o f the term ‘systeme’, 
which is often co-extensional with ‘structure’ in structuralist jargon. I limit myself, 
however, to the words ‘deconstruction’ and ‘structure’ and their derivatives, in noun, 
verb, adverb and adjective form.
Positions consists of 133 relatively short pages, o f which about one fourth 
cover the questions. So, we can say that we have about 100 short pages of Derrida’s 
text. In this text, and not counting the above mentioned exceptions, the word 
‘deconstruction’ and its derivatives appear 36 times, while the word ‘structure’ and its 
derivatives appear 29 times. We can, therefore, say that on average each of them 
appears once every three pages. This number can hardly be insignificant.
The next step is to observe in what sorts of phrases the terms appear, related to 
what other terms and for what purpose. ‘Deconstruction’, ‘deconstruire’, 
‘deconstructrice’, deconstruisant’ etc are always used to describe what Derrida is 
doing or what he thinks should be done. Each and every one of the 36 uses of the term 
and its derivatives refers to Derrida’s project, descriptively or prescriptively. There 
can be no doubt that the use is intentional. He even says once: ‘j ’ai propose ... le
1 78projet de deconstruction’ . And he explicitly differentiates his ‘deconstruction’ from
# 17Qthe Heideggerean project of ‘Destruktion’ . Deconstruction is described as a 
‘general strategy’180, a ‘critique’181, a ‘project’182, an ‘operation’183, a ‘fracture’184 , a
76 p. 70
77 p. 117
78 p. 69 / ‘I proposed [...] the project o f deconstruction' , Pos Eng, p.51
79 p.73
80 V , C/C
83 pp. 73, 125
84 entame, p. 109
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‘practice’185, a ‘labour’186. Therefore, deconstruction is an act and a process. The act / 
process of deconstruction appears to have as its object either a metaphysical system187 
or an oppositional structure188 -  which amount more or less to the same thing because
• 1RQthe metaphysical system is structured , while the oppositional structures are 
metaphysical. So, the object of deconstruction is metaphysical structures. Then we 
often have a description of the act / process of deconstruction190; and it consists of the 
double gesture one always observes in Derrida’s texts.
‘Structure(s)’, ‘structure(e)’, ‘structural(e)’, ‘structurel(le)’, ‘structurellement’ 
appear mainly in three connections: (a) in relation to the process o f deconstruction -  
‘differance’, ‘gramme’, ‘text’ etc are described either as structures or as structured191; 
(b) in relation to the object of deconstruction -  metaphysics and its constituent
1 09oppositions are either structures or structured ; and (c) in relation to necessity or
1 Q O
impossibility . The latter use is of Kantian origin.
The terms ‘deconstruction’ and ‘structure’ appear not only very often but 
always in key-phrases for the understanding of the Derridean argument. Their use also 
seems to be inter-connected. They often appear close to each other. One 
‘deconstructs’ a ‘structure’, while ‘deconstruction’ is ‘structural’. I think one can 
safely infer that ‘deconstruction’ in Positions is the name of Derrida’s project, while 
the notion o f structure is closely interwoven with this project.
185 p.125
186 p .129
187 e.g. pp. 15, 30, 48, 57, 57, 64, 78, 88, 88, 93, 109
188 e.g. pp. 57, 72, 125
189 e.g. p. 15
190 e.g. pp. 56-58, 89, 109
191 pp. 13, 38, 39, 78, 94, 111, 120, 122
192 pp. 15, 45, 57, 74, 86, 96, 96, 117
193 pp. 15, 45, 54, 57, 68, 82, 92, 119
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3. STRUCTURALIST SEMIOTICS
3.1. Introduction
My hypothesis is the importance of structural semiotics to Jacques Derrida’s project. I 
argue that structural semiotics provides him with the most significant axiom of his 
theory, as well as the basis of his methodological approach. It also constitutes one of 
his favourite objects of critique. Additionally, it is important to this thesis because it 
provides a large proportion of my analytical tools. The purpose of this chapter is 
critically to present the elements of structuralist semiotics that are necessary to 
support my argument: elements used and/or forcefully attacked by Derrida, or useful 
to my analysis. This amounts to a multiplicity o f inter-related subjects: ‘sign’ and 
‘structure’, their definitions, their articulations, their ontological status and 
epistemological implications; the main theoretical characteristics of structuralist 
semiotics and semiotic structuralism, and their implications; as well as the definition 
of several related concepts. The difficulty, however, is not so much in the co­
existence o f theses themes in the same chapter, as in their systematic distinction and 
organisation into a linear narrative.
The first danger encountered is repetition and circularity. This is the result of 
three factors. Firstly, as we have already mentioned, semiotics constitutes/constructs 
its object study. This is even more so in the case o f structuralist semiotics because it 
gives a radically new definition of the sign. This definition is closely interrelated with 
the invention of the ‘structural object’, which is different in significant ways from 
previous uses of the word ‘structure’. Consequently, strictly speaking, one cannot 
address the definitions of sign and structure separately from each other, and from their 
theoretical preconditions and implications. Secondly, semiotics has as object of study
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what other sciences use only as a means1. This could not but lead to a pre-occupation 
with its own methods, an extreme expression of which are the post-structuralist 
theories. The result is that meta-theoretical propositions are intrinsically part of 
structuralist semiotic theory. Thirdly, consistent with its premises, structuralist 
semiotics is structural, i.e. it is a structure. As we will soon see, this means -  among 
other things -  that everything is interconnected, nothing can be taken out without 
affecting the whole and that one cannot have an understanding of a part without 
taking into account the whole. In each level of the structure, there is no intrinsic 
priority of any element. Therefore, my presentation of the theory in a sequence of sub­
sections is necessarily arbitrary and deficient. I can only hope that by the end of the 
chapter the reader will be able to see the whole picture.
The second danger this chapter encounters is terminological confusion. A 
habit that can be perplexing for one unacquainted with the structuralist vocabulary is 
what could appear as ‘terminological metonymy’. In other words, structuralists often 
use a term which initially described one phenomenon or concept in order to denote 
another phenomenon or concept, usually of wider application than the first one2. This 
is far from being just a rhetorical device, because it is combined with very rigorous re­
definitions of the terms. The familiar term actually becomes a neologism. When the 
phenomenon of language, for example, is fully defined as a ‘semiotic system’, to call 
any semiotic system a ‘language’ is more than a synecdoche; it is substitution
1 Louis Hjelmslev makes a similar observation about language and linguistics: ‘We may overlook the 
means o f knowledge -  language itself [...] It is in the nature o f  language to be overlooked, to be a 
means and not an end [...] Linguistics [is] a study o f  language and its texts as an end in itself.’, 
Prolegomena to a Theory o f  Language, (1943) 1953 , p.2. So linguistics is the science that puts as an 
object o f knowledge the means to knowledge. Generalising from language to semiotic systems, as 
Hjelmslev himself did later, the claim can be interpreted as: semiotics is the science that puts as an 
object o f  knowledge the means to knowledge. Roland Barthes adds ‘semio[tics] is the only [science] 
that puts into question its own discourse; science o f  language, o f  languages, it cannot accept its own 
language as a given’, L ’aventuresemiologique, (1974) 1985, p. 14.
2 As we shall see, this technique bears resemblances and can be claimed to be precedent to 
deconstructive reading.
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between equivalent terms. Then, however, one has the problem of distinguishing the 
particular phenomena both conceptually and terminologically; in our example, the 
ones initially called ‘languages’. These have to be renamed; in this case, they are 
called -  not unproblematically -  ‘natural languages’. Subsequently, their specificity 
has to be investigated. A further terminological complication is, as expected, the 
persistence of the layman’s use of the terms, to which is added the equally 
unavoidable ‘connotational burden’ the scientific term carries3. This situation may 
have deeper implications than semantic confusion. It may lead to the unwitting 
endorsement o f uncritical assumptions about the familiar term and their generalization 
to the wider phenomenon it now describes. An example would be the attribution to all 
semiotic systems of characteristics we accept that a ‘natural language’ possesses. 
This, however, is an inherent danger to all scientific appropriation of everyday 
vocabulary4. A possible solution is to coin complete neologisms, as occasionally 
structuralists do, which however may be very burdening to the reader.
A third danger, related to the previous one, is the co-existence of several 
different sets of scientific terminologies. As it is often the case with new theories, for 
which an existing conceptual vocabulary is no longer appropriate, semiotics had to 
name its concepts in the process of inventing them. Each semiotician who has made 
some contribution to the subject has proposed to a certain degree his or her own 
terminology. Every effort to unify them is in a way proposing a new terminology too. 
Most difficult, however, are not the cases of terminological discrepancy but of 
homonymy. Of particular interest is the term /function/. Hjelmslev uses it in the
3 As we have mentioned earlier and will expound further, Derrida is particularly sensitive to 
connotational burden.
4 Roy Harris comments on how the intermingling o f  the technical and non-technical registers has 
allowed French speaking commentators o f  Saussure to camouflage misunderstandings {Saussure and 
his Interpreters, p.vi); Tullio de Mauro likewise remarks on how the easy equation between Saussurean 
terminology and its translation does not necessarily benefit understanding (critical notes to CLG, p.
442).
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mathematical sense, which means -  oversimplifying things -  as a relation. Jakobson 
uses it in the sense of use, what something is for. So, in Hjelmslev’s sense, the 
‘semiotic function’ is the relation that constitutes signification; in Jakobson’s sense, 
‘semiotic functions’ are the uses we can make of signs -  according to him, they are 
six. The two theories are not in contradiction with each other and one who accepts 
elements o f both can find herself with a sentence were both senses of ‘function’ co­
exist.
A similar case is the confusion around /semiotic structure/. It can either mean 
‘the internal articulation of the sign’ or ‘the articulation between signs’. Hjelmslev’s 
stratification is about the semiotic structure in the first sense; language is a semiotic 
structure in the second sense. These two senses are not easily distinguishable, and the 
reason lies in the principle of fundamental semiotic arbitrariness. As we shall see, it is 
a language that articulates its units and not the other way round. However, it is clear 
that Saussure’s definition of the sign and Hjelmslev’s stratification refer to a meta­
structure common to all semiotic systems, by reason of which they are semiotic, 
whereas each semiotic system is a particular structure different from every other. 
Consequently, ‘the structure of the semiotic function’ is completely different from 
‘the functions of semiotic structures’. My thesis is particularly concerned with the 
former. When addressing later the definition of ‘structure’, we will examine several 
other complications regarding the use of the term. The above preliminary remarks are 
needed simply because this chapter develops around the different senses of ‘semiotic 
structure’.
I will start with the definition o f the sign and semiotic function. Then, I will 
investigate issues regarding the semiotic medium. Subsequently, I will present the 
definition of semiotic systems as structures and the ways they are organized. This will
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help my attempt to deduce a definition of structure. Then, I will investigate the 
specificity of semiotic structure, as opposed to structure in general. Finally, I will try 
to show the interconnection between structuralist principles and the definitions of 
‘sign’ and ‘structure’. I will particularly address questions regarding the ontology of 
semiotic structure and the epistemology of structuralist semiotics.
The leading thread of this chapter’s argument is the premise of fundamental 
semiotic arbitrariness. It is so important that I could not dedicate a separate sub­
section to it. It will be first presented after and in relation to Saussure’s definition of 
the sign, and will re-appear in every sub-section. Furthermore, a most important 
conceptual distinction for structuralist semiotics is the difference between langue and 
parole; roughly put the difference between rules and processes. It will be extensively 
explained in sub-section 3.5. Preliminarily, however, I have to point out that the 
conception of langue as a structure is a definitional characteristic of structuralist 
semiotics; langue is the semiotic structure par excellence. Since in this thesis we are 
mostly concerned with the structural aspect of signification, langue is our preferred 
field of investigation.
The main primary sources for this chapter are Ferdinand de Saussure’s Cours 
de linguistique generale and the work of Louis Hjelmslev; complemented, of course, 
with the work of other semioticians, such as Roman Jakobson, Claude Levi-Strauss, 
Roland Barthes and Umberto Eco. The choice of Saussure needs no further 
explanation; the choice of Hjelmslev, however, may seem eccentric.
Louis Hjelmslev (1899-1965) is the Danish linguist who founded the 
Linguistic Circle of Copenhagen in 1931. He collaborated between 1933 and 1939 
with Hans Jorgen Uldall in the elaboration of a theory of language, which they named 
‘Glossematics’ -  from the Greek word ‘ytaboaa’, i.e. ‘tongue’ or ‘language’. He co-
86
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
CHAPTER 3: STRUCTURALIST SEMIOTICS
published with Viggo Brondal the review Acta Linguistica (1939ff). As we have said, 
Hjelmslev and Jakobson represent the father figures o f the two main interpretations of 
the Saussurean tradition. Hjelmslev’s importance for mainstream structuralism of the 
50’s and 60’s lies particularly in his rigorous reading of Saussure5. His work greatly 
influenced the leading French semioticians Roland Barthes6 and Algirdas-Julien 
Greimas7, and therefore the semiotic program in France. It is indicative that Tullio de 
Mauro’s critical notes to his comer-stone edition o f CLG are full of references to
o ,
Hjelmslev . However, Hjelmslev’s work is exceptional and not paradigmatic of 
structuralism. Most important is his elaboration o f the stratification of semiotic 
systems; namely the introduction of the distinction between ‘expression-form’ and 
‘expression-substance’, and between ‘content-form’ and ‘content-substance’. As I will 
attempt to show in the next chapter, I consider Hjelmslev as having a theoretical 
affinity with Derrida. This is the reason for my extensive preoccupation with his 
theoretical claims.
5 One should remember that there were no critical editions o f  Cours de linguistique generate in the 
early 60’s. Saussure’s manuscript notes o f his lectures, along with his students’ notes from the lectures, 
were published in 1957 by R. Godel. R. Engler’s critical edition, which takes these notes into account, 
appeared in 1968; whereas Tullio de Mauro’s critical edition appeared as late as 1972. The entire 
corpus o f  Saussure’s manuscript notes were published in 2002. Hjelm slev’s work, on the other hand, is 
very often written or translated in French or English, and therefore available to the international 
community, since the beginning of his career in the late 2 0 ’s. Particularly with regards to his 
interpretation o f  Saussure, his essay ‘La stratification du langage’ first appeared in 1954 in the 10th 
issue o f the American journal Word (in French); a collection o f  his essays was published in France in 
1959; his Prolegomena to a Theory o f  Language, published in Danish in 1943, appeared in English in 
1953 and in French in 1968.
6 Barthes’ main theoretical construction in the 1956 essay ‘Le mythe aujourd’hui’ (included in 
Mythologies, 1957) is based on Hjelmslev’s definition o f  connotative semiotic and meta-semiotic. Most 
importantly, his 1964 ‘Elements de semiologie’ (in Communications 4), which became the text- 
reference o f the French structuralism in the ‘60s, is clearly founded on Hjelmslev’s interpretation o f  
Saussure. Nevertheless, Barthes’ interpretation o f  Hjelmslev’s interpretation is rather personal. I would 
dare say that Barthes’ divergences from Hjelmslev are due to not only difference o f  opinion but quite 
often to straightforward misunderstanding.
7 Greimas’ 1966 work Semantique structurale: recherche de methode, which opened the field o f  
structural semantics, is greatly indebted to Hjelmslev.
8 1 have counted only in the 73 pages o f endnotes 31 appearances o f Hjelmslev’s name.
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3.2. The structure of the semiotic function
The CLG approaches the definition of the sign in several ways, the composition of
which allows the reader to have a complete view. As I have explained, this is not only
because of the particular editorial history of the book, its being an a posteriori
composition of three different series of lectures, but because of its methodological
choices and the nature of its object. Here, we will start from the point of view of the
semiotic unit, which will be then extended to the semiotic function. It is important
always to remember, however, that for Saussure -  and structuralist semiotics in
general -  the semiotic unit is the product of the semiotic system and not the other way
round. I should also remind the reader that in CLG Saussure most o f the time speaks
of the ‘linguistic sign’, the sign in ‘natural’ languages. It is his introductory reference 
to semiotics9, the science of which linguistics will be part, which allows us to apply
his claims to signs in general.
In the first chapter of the first part of CLG, the sign is defined as follows:
Nous appelons signe la combinaison du concept et de 1’image acoustique [...] 
[du] signifie et [du] signifiant10 [Italics already in text]
(We name sign the combination of a concept and an acoustic image [...] [the] 
signified and [the] signifier)11
9 CLG, p. 33
10 p. 99
11 As I have explained in Chapter 1, the translation o f  Saussure is mine. The reason is that I have some 
significant disagreements with Roy Harris’ translation o f  the Saussurean terminology, in his otherwise 
very useful 1983 translation o f  CLG. This extract is an excellent example o f  our divergences. Harris 
translates ‘signifie' as ‘signification’. I think that the equivalent o f  English ‘signification’ would be the 
French ‘signifiance’. Therefore, I have chosen ‘signified’ as equivalent to the term 'signifie'. Harris 
translates ‘signifiant’ as ‘signal’. ‘Signal’ is the term used by Peirce to denote one o f the three types o f  
sign, according to his theory. Every reader interested in semiotics today has at least a remote 
acquaintance with this part o f Peircean terminology. To avoid misleading connections, I have chosen 
‘signifier’ as equivalent to the term ‘signifiant'. Finally, Harris translates 7 ' image acoustique’ as 
‘sound pattern’. This choice changes the theoretical perspective o f Saussure’s term from 
phenomenological to ontological. The adjective ‘acoustique’ -  from the Greek ‘aicof|’ (akoe), i.e. ‘the 
sense o f hearing’ -  as well as the noun ‘ image’, focus on the perceptive aspect: signifier is an entity 
created by the subject’s perception. ‘Sound’, in contrast, seems to focus more on what is there to be 
perceived. As we will soon see, this would be a serious misunderstanding. Nevertheless, the term 
‘pattern’ is in a different way more faithful to Saussure’s spirit than his own term. ‘Pattern’ refers to 
form without any implicit relation to similarity; whereas the term ‘image’ is at the risk o f  carrying this 
implication. Still, I have chosen ‘acoustic im age’ as the closest interpretation o f ‘ image acoustique’.
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Two premises are combined in Saussure’s definition: (a) the sign is the inseparable 
co-existence of two aspects; (b) the sign is not of material nature. On the one hand, 
the signified and the signifier are inseparable Tike the two sides of a piece of paper’12, 
as the famous simile goes; they are ‘intimately joined and each calls to the other’13. 
On the other, ‘both [terms] are psychological and are united in our head,14; and the 
sign is ‘a double-faced psychological entity’15 [my Italics]. Both premises are directed 
against the traditional position of language as ‘nomenclature’16, according to which 
language names things. The first premise opposes the notion that the sign is the 
connection o f two entities that can exist independently from each other. The second 
opposes the notion that the sign is a material object, e.g. the spoken or written word, 
substituting for another material object. Both premises, as we will soon explain, 
derive from the principle of fundamental semiotic arbitrariness.
So, Saussure insists that the sign is the inseparable co-existence ‘not [of] a 
thing and a name but [of] a concept and an acoustic image’17. The signifier is defined 
as an ‘acoustic image’ because
[it] is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological
i n  i X
imprint of that sound, its representation by the testimony of our senses 
[Italics mine]






18 Derrida comments extensively on the use o f  metaphors o f  writing in order to describe language.
19 One notices the frequent use o f the term ‘representation’ in CLG. However, as it will become 
apparent, Saussurean ‘representation’ differs significantly from its traditional definition. It becomes a 
technical term, devoid of metaphysical implications o f  similarity. The tension between the technical 
and traditional register o f ‘representation’ is particularly relevant to Derrida’s work.
20 CLG, p. 98
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‘Acoustic21 image’ is opposed to ‘material sound’. The signifier is a form perceived 
by the senses of the subjects of communication, existing ‘in [their] head’. As the 
editors explain , the acoustic image is a ‘potential’ linguistic fact, independent of its 
actual realization by speech. The term ‘psychological’23 is used precisely in order to 
stress the sensuous and not material quality o f the signifier; it has nothing to do with 
‘psychology’ as we mean it today. Saussure was very hostile to ‘psychologism’, 
because he belonged to the trend among intellectuals of his generation who had 
scientific aspirations, among them Husserl and Frege. Anything pertaining to the 
subjects’ personal psychology is safely outside the realm of Saussurean linguistics. 
Hjelmslev24 also puts the question in what sense semiotic research is of the 
‘psychological order’ and answers that it has nothing to do with ‘sentiment’ and 
‘aesthetics’. For his part, he chooses to avoid the term.
The signified is of a ‘psychological’ nature too, i.e. not-material. It is called 
‘concept’ not at all in the platonic sense of a free-standing entity; Saussure makes 
very clear that the signified cannot exist without its signifier. It is called ‘concept’ in 
opposition to the ‘thing’, to stress the difference -  for example -  between the concept 
“shoe” ‘in one’s head’ and the shoes people wear on their feet. A few pages later, it is 
also clearly explained that these ‘concepts’ are not modeled on the existing objects of 
the world but are formed by the internal articulation of language. Generally in 
semiotics and philosophy of language, the object that exists -  or could exist or be
21 The fact that the ‘acoustic image’ is particularly ‘acoustic’, and not let us say ‘optic’, is not intrinsic 
to the nature o f sign as sign. See, for example, ‘the essential in language [...] has nothing to do with the 
phonic character o f the linguistic sign’ (CLG, p. 21). Hjelmslev’s refinement and expansion o f  
Saussure’s positions develops particularly the implications o f  this observation. See also footnote 9, 
about the choice o f the terms ‘acoustic’ and ‘im age’.
22 Eds note, CLG, p.98
23 Tullio de Mauro explains the terminological difficulty with which Saussure was faced, not being able 
to use the term ‘abstract’ because o f  its negative definition in the context o f  the epistemology o f his 
time, which was Kantian, idealist and positivist (critical notes, CLG , pp. 425-7).
24 ‘La stratification du langage’ (1954), Essais lingusitiques, 1971, (p.64)
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9 Cthought or even imagined to exist -  is called the referent. To be more exact, as 
Umberto Eco26 points out, the referent is more a logical entity than a perceptible 
object. In the above mentioned example of shoes, the concept “shoe” has as referent 
all existing shoes (as well as future and past ones), not any particular shoe one is 
wearing. All these points, however, go beyond our present purposes. What we need to 
keep in mind is that the existence of a real referent is not a necessary precondition for 
a signified. For example, one can speak about “unicorns” with no fear o f meeting a 
horn-bearing horse. In the Analytical jargon, a sentence can be meaningful or possess 
sense without being true or denoting any referent -  hence, Eco’s definition of 
semiotics as ‘a theory of lie’27. The problem of the referent does not belong to the 
proper domain of structuralist semiotics. It lies at its epistemological limits.
CLG complements the definition of the sign with two characteristics 
considered ‘primordial’ : the arbitrariness of the sign and the linearity of the
9Qsignifier. The latter refers to the specificity o f ‘natural’ languages to ‘be unrolled’ in 
one dimension and is juxtaposed to visual semiotic systems. It does not constitute a 
particular novelty of CLG but it has been central in the discussion regarding the 
distinction between semiotic systems. As we shall see, it has been philosophically 
contested by Derrida.
The former characteristic, however, the arbitrariness of the sign as defined by 
Saussure, is the most radical of CLG contributions to semiotics and, I dare say, to
25 See also Frege ( ‘On Sense and Reference’ and elsewhere) on the difference between ‘sense’ and 
‘reference’, and also on fictive/imaginary pseudo-referents.
26 A Theory o f  Semiotics, (1976) 1979, p. 66
27 ‘... semiotics is in principle the discipline studying everything which can be used in order to lie. If 
something cannot be used to tell a lie, conversely it cannot be used to tell the truth; it cannot in fact be 
used “to tell” at all’, A Theory o f  Semiotics, p.7. This citation will be further discussed later.
28 CLG, p. 100
29 ‘se deroule’, CLG, p. 103
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human thought. I name it ‘the principle of fundamental semiotic arbitrariness’30, to 
differentiate it from previous positions regarding the conventional nature o f signs. An 
intrinsic part of the principle of fundamental semiotic arbitrariness is the notion of 
differentiality, which is expounded in CLG in connection with the concept of
O 1 #
‘linguistic [semiotic] value’ . Arbitrariness and differentiality are the two aspects of
the same principle32; I address them separately only for expository convenience.
Semiotic differentiality is summarised by the famous dictum:
dan s la  lan gue il n ’y  a  que des d ifferences. Bien plus : une difference suppose 
en general des termes positives entre lesquels elle s’etablit; mais dans la 
langue il n’y a que des differences sans term es p o s it if s 33
in lan gu age there a re  only differences. Even more: a difference generally 
supposes positive terms between which it is established; however, in language 
there are only differences without p o s it iv e  term s
For Saussure, it is founded on an axiom regarding human understanding according to
which:
les termes a  et b sont radicalement incapables d’arriver, comme tels, jusqu’aux 
regions de la conscience, -  laquelle n’apersoit perpetuellement que la 
difference a / b 34
the terms a  and b  as such are radically incapable of reaching the level of 
consciousness -  consciousness always perceives only of the a  /  b  difference
According to CLG what language does is to articulate the unperceivable and 
amorphous continua of sound and thought into double-faced formal units. The 
signified and the signifier are in this way given specific definitions, instead of the
301 was inspired to adopt this phrase name from Oswald Ducrot’s phrase ‘il existe un arbitrage  
linguistique fondamental -  a distinguer de l’arbitraire de chaque signe isole’ [Italics mine] / ‘there 
exists a fundamental linguistic arbitrariness — to distinguish from the arbitrariness o f each isolated 
sign’, Dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences du langage, p.30. In his critical notes o f  CLG, Tullio 
de Mauro informs us that Saussure’s initial wording o f  the phrase that opens the sub-section on the 
arbitrariness o f  the sign, which now reads ‘The link unifying the signified and the signifier is arbitrary’, 
was ‘The link unifying the signified and the signifier is radically  arbitrary’. He argues that the purpose 
of the adverb was not just a general re-enforcement o f  the statement but meant that ‘the link is arbitrary 
radicitus, in its very foundations’, CLG, p. 442
31 CLG, pp. 155-169
32 ‘The arbitrary and the differential are two correlative qualities’, CLG, p. 163.
33 p. 16634 „
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approximate descriptions of ‘acoustic image’ and ‘concept’. Signifiers are the formal 
units produced by the articulation of the sonorous continuum by language, each 
inseparably connected with a signified. Signifieds are the formal units produced by 
the articulation o f the conceptual continuum by language, each connected with a 
signifier. As units, articula, they are perceived only in opposition to other units of the 
same order. An example in the level of signifier is /bid/ being perceived in opposition 
with /big/, /bill/, /bin/ etc. An example in the level o f signified is “green” being 
perceived in opposition with “blue”, “yellow” etc. So, a signifier (or a signified) is 
defined by two relations: (a) with its counterpart signified (or signifier, respectively), 
and (b) with other signifiers (or signifieds). Correspondingly, a sign is defined (a) by 
the internal relation between its signifier and its signified, and (b) by its relation to 
other signs. The first relation determines the sign’s signification. The second relation, 
i.e. the relation with entities of the same order, determines the sign’s value35. The 
value of an entire sign can change every time that the signifier or signified of a near­
by sign changes.
Signs are, therefore, completely relative entities. There are two ways they
*2 /" *2*1 
relate to other signs : either they follow each other in speech or they have
something in common which leads us to associate them in our memory. Saussure
calls these respectively ‘syntagmatic’ and ‘associative’ relations. The first kind of
relation, as we shall see later, can expand from the syntax of sentences to the textual
context and general situation. The second kind of relation may be founded on an
association in the level of the signifier or in the level of signified or both. For
example, ‘altruism’ may be associated with [altar, altimeter etc], with which it shares
35 The origin o f  this terminology is financial, see CLG, p. 159-160
36 CLG, pp. 170-175. They will be further expounded in 3.5.
37 As we will see in 3.4., ‘speech’ (i.e. parole) in this sense includes a written phrase.
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/alt/; or with [courage, generosity, kindness etc], with which it shares the conceptual 
property of being a virtue; or with [alter, alternate, alternative etc], with which it 
shares the root ‘alter’, i.e. both /alt/ and “other”; or with [altruist, altruistic etc] etc. 
However, the element that the signs ‘share’ should not be perceived as having a 
positive existence; it is rather the remainder of what differentiates them. It does not 
exist outside their relation. In Saussure’s words, ‘in every semiological system, what 
distinguishes a sign, this is all that constitutes it’38.
An issue relevant to this new definition of the sign is how one defines and 
disambiguates the cases that traditional lexicography calls ‘synonymy’, ‘homonymy’ 
and ‘polysemy’ . Traditionally, ‘synonymous’ are two words with the same meaning 
or almost, such as ‘altruism’ and ‘selflessness’; ‘homonyms’ are two words which 
sound or are written in the same way -  homophones or homographs - but have 
different meanings, such as ‘cent’/ ‘sent’ and ‘reading’ / ‘Reading’; ‘polysemous’ is a 
word that has more than one meaning, such as ‘administer’ meaning “provide” and 
“apply”. Approximately put, ‘synonyms’ would be two signs with the same signified, 
‘homonyms’ two signs with the same signifier and ‘polysemous’ a sign with more 
than one signified. However, in Saussurean terms, strictly speaking, one cannot refer 
to signifiers or signifieds separated from the signs to which they belong. Two signs 
cannot have the same signified; their signifieds cover the same fragment of the 
conceptual continuum but belong to different signs -  which, anyway, rarely if ever 
happens. They usually differ slightly and define each other reciprocally. Accordingly, 
two signs cannot have the same signified; their signifiers cover the same fragment of 
the sonorous continuum. Finally, more than one signified means more than one sign.
n CLG, p. 168
39 See Karin Boklund-Lagopoulou, ‘What is semiotics?’, (p. 18); Greimas and Courtes, Semiotique: 
Dictionnaire raisonne de la theorie du langage, pp. 175, 284-5, 375
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So what we call a ‘polysemous’ sign is one of two things: either a sign whose the 
signified covers the fragment of the conceptual continuous corresponding to the 
signifieds o f more than one other signs, or there are more than one ‘homonymous’ 
signs. The important point is that as signs do not exist by themselves, all these cases 
are disambiguated by situation in context.
Consequently, the value of a sign is determined by the combination of the 
differential position of its signifier and its signified, as well as by its own position in 
relation to other signs. We are led to the definition of language -  semiotic systems -  
as pure form. The positive terms, if any, are produced by their position in a system of 
relations. We can, therefore, call semiotic systems ‘differentional’.
The principle of fundamental linguistic arbitrariness depends on the 
differentional nature of language, as just described. The signs gain their value by their 
position in the semiotic system and not because of some intrinsic similarity or analogy 
with the extra-semiotic world. Linguistic arbitrariness, in the sense that the relation of 
a sign to its referent is the product of social convention, is not new; it was supported 
by many philosophers, from Democritus (allegedly) to Whitney. Saussure subscribes 
to the conception of language as social convention, as it is obvious even to the most 
superficial reader of CLG. He explains that his use o f the term ‘arbitrary’ does not 
mean ‘dependent on the free choice of the speaking subject’40, which would 
contradict the social nature of semiosis, but ‘unmotivated’. In a first level, this means 
that there is no intrinsic reason why a particular signified is paired with a particular 
signifier, and consequently no intrinsic connection between a sign and its referent. 
However, the Saussurean position is much more radical than this. By defining 
language as a form articulating the continua of sound and thought, he indicates that it
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is us, social communities, who give shape to the world through the process of giving 
meaning. It is not just the relation between words and things, but the very distinction 
of the world into ‘things’ which is no longer natural. This does not amount to a denial 
of the objective existence of the world. What it calls into question is the intrinsic 
existence of its divisions. There are many famous examples of how the division of the 
world into concepts changes from one semiotic community to another; such as the 
existence of four words in the Eskimo language denoting the different density of what 
in English is called ‘snow’41.
This radical form of arbitrariness, where language comes first and determines 
the constitution of concepts, as well as the distinction between sounds, is what I name 
‘the principle of fundamental linguistic arbitrariness’. The completely formal 
definition o f language as a semiotic system that this principle entails provides a basis 
for the generalisation of Saussure’s definition to all semiotic systems, which will be 
the object o f the next sub-section. Moreover, in this new definition, the sign is no 
longer originary. This opens the possibility that the significant semiotic unit be larger 
or smaller than what traditionally was called sign42.
Hjelmslev, when summarising the working hypotheses of his theory of 
Glossematics, in ‘La stratification du langage’43, includes in them: ‘considering 
language, in the sense commonly adopted by linguists, as a particular case of semiotic 
system’44. A few paragraphs later, he admits that the exact title of his essay should be 
‘The stratification of semiotic system’, with the condition that one would include in
41 The degree o f interdependence between our conceptual language and our perception is not an 
answered question.
42 See, for example, Roland Barthes, ‘Elements de sem iologie’, pp.l 17-118
43 This very significant essay first appeared in 1954 in the journal Word. It was republished in 1971 in 
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the concept of system the process which determines it45. His stratification is one of his 
most original contributions to semiotics and the foundation o f his theory. It is an 
elaboration of the Saussurean definition of language, particularly as presented in part I 
-  chapter IV of CLG, in relation to linguistic value. As the sign is constituted by its 
relations, Hjelmslev turns the investigation into the sign into an investigation into the 
structure o f the constitutive relations of the semiotic phenomenon, ‘sign-function’. 
‘Function’ Hjelmslev defines as a ‘dependence’46, which means more or less a logical 
relation47. The terminals of a function, i.e. the entities among which there is the 
relation, are called ‘functives’. In the case o f the semiotic phenomenon, the functives 
are constituted by the function.
Hjelmslev defines a semiotic system as ‘a specific form organized between 
two substances: that of content and that of expression’48. This is clearly in agreement 
with CLG49. Systematizing Saussure’s positions, Hjelmslev analyses semiotic systems 
according to a double distinction: (a) that between content and expression and (b) that 
between form and substance. The fundamental distinction is the first, between the 
planes o f content and expression. In this definition, ‘expression’ and ‘content’ are just 
the terms designating the functives that contract the sign-function. They are ‘defined 
only oppositively and relatively’50, they have no intrinsic properties. They are 
connected by a relation of reciprocal implication, they presuppose each other. The
45 ‘nous aurions du mettre: La stratification du system e sem iotique’, p.47.
46 See Prolegomena to a Theory o f  Language (1943), translated from Danish in English by Francis J. 
Whitfield, 1953. From now on referred to as Prol\ pp. 20-24.
47 Hjelmslev’s ‘function’ is equivalent to the mathematical concept o f ‘map’, o f which a sub-case is the 
mathematical concept o f ‘function’.
48 Strat, p.44
49 It is actually a very accurate summary o f  Part I -  Chapter IV o f CLG, ‘The linguistic value’, pp. 155- 
169. For example, we read in CLG  ‘language elaborates its units by constituting itself between two 
amorphous masses’ (p. 156) and, further on, ‘Linguistics operates on the margin where elements o f two 
orders are combined; this combination produces a form, not a substance’ (p. 157).
50 Prol, p.38
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second distinction, between form and substance, takes place within each plane51. 
Hjelmslev states explicitly that form and substance are, once again, relative and not 
absolute terms. He reminds the reader o f the prehistory of the two terms52, where the 
former denoted everything pertaining to definitions, whereas the latter signified all 
that was not included in the form but nevertheless belonged to an exhaustive 
description of the object; form always seems to expand in the domain of substance, 
always demanding a new complementary substance. The relation between form and 
substance is not a double implication; substance pre-supposes form, whereas form is 
independent of substance. The two distinctions are significantly different in nature. 
‘Content’ and ‘expression’ are two planes oppositionally defined, completely 
symmetrical and equivalent to each other; the terms are arbitrary. ‘Form’ and 
‘substance’, conversely, are as terms relative to each other but as entities are not 
equivalent. Semiotic substance owes its existence to semiotic form.
From this double division -  content-expression, form-substance -  result the 
four parts of every semiotic system, named strata: ‘content-form’, ‘content- 
substance’, ‘expression-form’, ‘expression-substance’. In the case o f a spoken 
language, such as English, expression-substance is the sonic continuum as perceived 
by speaking subjects; expression-form is its differentiation by the semiotic system 
into signifiers; content-substance is the potential conceptual universe as perceived by 
a semiotic community; content-form is its differentiation by the semiotic system into 
signifieds. The sign-function proper is the relation between content-form and 
expression-form53, which is a mutual dependence, a double implication, under the 
name of denotation. It is the equivalent o f the Saussurean relation between the
51 Strat, p.46
52 ibid, pp. 55-56
53 ibid, p. 54
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signified and signifier. The relation between form and substance inside each plane is a 
one-way implication, where substance presupposes form but not the other way round, 
which relation Hjelmslev calls manifestation54. The only two strata that have no 

















[Figure 3.1. -  Hjelmslev’s stratification o f  semiotic systems]
So, a semiotic system is ‘a specific form organized between two substances’, 
whereas a ‘sign’ is defined as a particular kind of function between two planes55, the 
‘sign-function’. The sign-function is theorized from the level of an entire semiotic 
system down to the level of its different signifying articulations, all of which can be 
called in this sense ‘signs’ -  or better ‘sign-functions’. In the case of natural 
languages, this means, as Hjelmslev observes, that ‘entities commonly referred to as 
sentences, clauses, and words seem to fulfil the stated condition [of sign]’56 and also 
‘[wjords are not the ultimate, irreducible signs’57. This is the reason the term ‘sign- 
function’ is less misleading that the term ‘sign’. The fact that every semiotic system is 
a sign-function obviously does not mean that every sign-function is a semiotic 
system58.1 should mention here that Hjelmslev often substitutes the term ‘a semiotic’ 
(as a noun) for the term ‘a semiotic system’ -  ‘une semiotique’ instead of ‘un systeme
54
56




The definition o f ‘semiotic system’ w ill be addressed in the sub-section 3.5.
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semiotique’. Actually, ‘a semiotic’ is a more general term than ‘a semiotic system’, as 
we will see later in this chapter.
The reciprocal relation between the two planes of the sign-function means that 
changes in the one plane cause changes in the other. This property59 provides the way 
of knowing60 whether a variation of an expression-form -  or content-form -  produces 
a new sign-function or not. If the change entails a difference in the other plane, then 
we are in the presence of two distinct sign-functions. For example, in the couple 
‘pet/pat’ the substitution of /a/ for /e/ produces the distinct content-forms “pet” and 
“pat”, therefore we have two distinct sign-functions. Conversely, different 
pronunciations of /e/ in ‘pet’ would not affect the content plane; therefore they will 
produce different variants of the same sign-function.
A definitional property of a semiotic system is that its planes of content and
expression are not isomorphic61, i.e. that their content-form and expression-form do
not have exactly the same inner structure. This means that the articula of content
should not correspond one-to-one to the articula of expression, although it does not
prevent the occasional articulum to do so.
I f  a structure w ith  reciprocal im plicational relation b etw een  content and 
expression  is to be recogn ized  as a language, w e  require that there m ust not be a 
on e-on e reciprocal im plicational relation throughout b etw een  its expression  
elem en ts and its content elem ents62.
The prerequisite for the n ecessity  o f  operating w ith  tw o  p lanes must be that the 
tw o p la n e s ... cannot be show n to have the sam e structure throughout, w ith a one- 
to-on e relation betw een  the fun ctives o f  the on e plane and the fim ctives o f  the 
other63.
59 Language: An Introduction (written in 1943, published in Danish in 1963), translated in English by 
Francis J. Whitfield, 1970. From now on referred to as Lang-, p. 100
60 ‘On the principles o f phonematics’, Proceedings o f  the second international congress ofphonematic 
sciences, 1936, p.51: method o f  commutation; Prol, pp.40-41
61 According to Greimas and Court6s, ‘isomorphism is the formal identity between two or more 
structures’ [the translation mine], Semiotique: Dictionnaire raisonne de la theorie du langage, p. 197 ; 
see also Ducrot and Todorov, Dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences du langage, p.39
62 Lang, p. 104.
63 Prol, p.72
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Considering that the difference between content and expression is purely 
differentional, two absolutely isomorphic plans would be reduced into one. Hjelmslev 
regards mono-planar structures as outside the realm of semiotics64.
Hjelmslev uses the algebra of sign-function to explain connotation and 
metalanguage (viz. metasemiosis). When a semiotic system has as its content-plane or 
its expression-plane a wholly distinct semiotic system, we call it a ‘second-degree’ 
semiotic system65. This process may be repeated ad infinitum, creating higher degree 
semiotic systems. A semiotic system whose the expression-plane is a semiotic system 
is called ‘connotative semiotic’. A semiotic system whose the content-plane is a 
semiotic system is called ‘metasemiotic’66. Therefore, we define connotation and 
metasemiosis as higher degree sign-functions. First degree function, denotation, is the 





S2: content expression = S1 S2: content = SI expression
SI: content expression SI: content expression
[Figure 3.2. -  Degrees o f  the sign-function]
To give an example of connotation, let us take the sign-function ‘Ithaca’. In 
the context o f English speaking people with some knowledge of geography, the 
denotation of ‘Ithaca’ is the connection of the expression-form /Ithaca/ with the 
content-form “Ithaca, the island in Greece”. However, for a sub-set of the above- 
mentioned people who also happen to have knowledge of Homer’s Odyssey, the 
expression-form /Ithaca/ is also connected to the content-form “final destination”.
The implications o f  this premise to the definition o f  semiosis will be addressed in 3.8.
65 Lang, p. 132
66 Prol, p.73; Strat, p.51
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This is a second degree sign-function, because it pre-supposes the previous one. In the 
Odyssey, the entire sign-function ‘Ithaca’ is connected to the content-form “final 
destination” : /Ithaca/ is the “island in Greece” that is Ulysses’ “final destination”. For 
a sub-set of the previous sub-set of people, who also happen to know of Kavafis’
67 •poem ‘Ithaca’ , there is a second degree connotation, i.e. a third degree sign-function, 
with regard to the sign-function ‘Ithaca’. The expression-form /Ithaca/ can also be 
connected to the content-form “life purpose”; which connection pre-supposes the two 
previous ones. A possible objection to this exposition would raise the case of, let us 
say, a schoolboy who knows Ithaca from studying the Odyssey without ever realizing 
that this is an island in Greece. However, this case does not refute the structuralist 
description of connotation, because signification is socially constituted. What we 
discuss here is not the knowledge of each speaking subject but the knowledge of 
social groups, smaller or larger, the abstraction of which constitutes signification. The 
question of the schoolboy is very interesting as a matter of how semiotic systems are 
used by individual subjects, but it does not affect the way signification is constituted, 
which is the object of our investigation68.
To give an example of metasemiosis, let us take the connection of the 
expression-form /H 20/ and the content-form “water, the liquid we commonly drink”. 
In the context of English speaking people, the most common connection for the 
content-form “water, the liquid we commonly drink” is the expression-form /water/. 
However, the sub-set o f the English speaking people who have an elementary 
knowledge of chemistry also connect the content-form “water, the liquid we 
commonly drink” with the expression-form /H 20/ because they were taught that
67 K (o v c t (x v t1 v o < ;  II. KaP<x(pr|<;, ‘IG&iaf (1911)
68 This distinction is connected to the definition o f language as a structure and the distinction between 
langue and parole , as we shall see.
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water, the liquid we commonly drink, is composed of two molecules of hydrogen and 
one molecule o f oxygen. Therefore, the sign-function ‘water’ is connected with the 
expression-form /H 20/ to form a second-degree sign-function, in this case a 
metasemiosis. Metasemiosis is particularly interesting for our purposes because 
theory itself is a kind o f metasemiosis69: a semiotic system about another semiotic 
system, i.e. a semiotic system having as a content-plane another semiotic system. 














SI /m o /
content expression
“water” /water/
[Figure 3.3. -  Connotation and Metasemiosis: Examples]
Nevertheless, there is a blatant contradiction between the above definitions 
and the conception of content plane and expression plane as purely ‘oppositively and
70relationally’ defined functives of the sign-function. If indeed content and expression
can mutually exchange their positions, then connotation and metasemiosis are reduced
to the same thing. Hjelmslev is aware o f this problem. He points out that:
Since expression plane and content plane are defined only in opposition and in 
relation to each other, it follows that the definitions we have given here for the 
connotative semiotics and metasemiotics are only provisional ‘real’ definitions, 
to which we cannot ascribe even operational value.7
He proceeds to re-define connotation and metasemiosis. This time the differentiating 
criterion is scientificity. He first distinguishes between ‘scientific’ semiotic systems 
and ‘non-scientific’ semiotic systems72. According to his previous definitions
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regarding scientificity , scientific is a semiotic system which is free of contradiction,
exhaustive, and as simple as possible. He then defines as ‘connotative’ the non-
scientific semiotic system whose one (or both) plane(s) is (are) a semiotic system. He
defines as ‘metasemiotic’ a scientific semiotic system whose one (or both) plane(s) is
(are) a semiotic system. Finally, he names ‘semiology’ the particular case of
metasemiotic system, whose the object semiotic is a non-scientific semiotic system.
‘Metasemiology’ would be the scientific semiotic system whose the object is a 
semiology74. My thesis would be classified in this last category.
M ETASEM IO TIC CONNOTATIVE SEMIOTIC
S2:
scientific
Plane a = SI Plane b S2: non- 
scientific
Plane a =  SI Plane b
SI Plane a | Plane b SI Plane a | Plane b
SEMIOLOGY
S2: Plane a = S 1 Plane b
scientific
SI: non- Plane a Plane b
scientific
M ETASEM IO LO G Y
S3:
scientific
Plane a =  S2 Plane b
S2:
scientific
Plane a = S 1 Plane b
S 1: non- 
scientific
Plane a Plane b
[Figure 3.4. -  Hjelmslev’s second definition o f  higher degree semiotics]
The new definition of connotation and metasemiosis avoids the problems of
the previous one and is consistent with the other propositions of Glossematics.
However, it introduces the issue of scientificity, which is far more ambiguous than it
seems. Uldall, in the Outline o f  Glossematics75, admits that in the last resort the
choice of the scientific method rests on aesthetic and practical reasons: it looks better
and it works. As Hjelmslev’s second definition never gained widespread acceptance, I
73 ibid, pp.6, 9
74 See also Umberto Eco, A Theory o f  Semiotics, p.30
75 p. 14
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will continue using the first definition, which is the one most structuralists used. We 
should just keep in mind that Hjelmslev knew it was no longer strictly consistent with 
the definition of semiosis76.
Glossematics was a systematic effort to apply the consequences of semiotic 
differentiality to every aspect of semiotic theory. In this way it was more true to the 
principles introduced by the CLG than the text of CLG, itself. Striving for 
consistency, it made apparent the radical implications and innovative possibilities of 
CLG, as well as several new questions and unsolved problems. Most important for 
understanding the work o f Jacques Derrida are the implications and questions around 
the concept of semiotic value, which are -  as we have seen -  intimately connected 
with the principle o f fundamental semiotic arbitrariness, i.e. arbitrariness and 
differentiality.
As we have said, the value of a sign as a whole is determined by the 
combination of the differential position of its signifier and its signified. CLG analyses 
value firstly from the point of view o f its ‘conceptual aspect’77, then of its ‘material 
aspect’78 and then ‘the sign considered in its totality’79; this means ‘from the point of
• on
view of the signified [...], of the signifier and the entire sign’ . Saussure’s 
terminology is not consistent, possibly because o f the editorial history of the book. 
One of the things that are not completely clear is whether the sign’s value is the 
product of the differentional positions of the signifier and the signified, or it has a 
value with regards to its signifier and another value with regard to its signified. The
76 He himself often kept using the first definition for reasons o f  convenience. For example he uses it in 
Strat in 1954, despite having shown its contradictions in P rol in 1943.
11 CLG, pp. 158-162
78 pp. 163-166
79 pp. 166-169. Obviously the term ‘material’ is used as a convention, considering that by definition 
value is an issue o f form. It is precisely the text under this title that shows that a semiotic value has 
absolutely nothing to do with the material.
80 p. 158
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first interpretation is supported by the fact that we speak of the ‘conceptual’ and
‘material aspects of value’ and not o f the ‘conceptual value’ and the ‘material value’.
Conversely, the second interpretation is supported by the fact that value is defined as
the relation between similar terms, in opposition with signification (denotation) which
is the relation between dissimilar terms, i.e. between the signifier and the signified.
Hjelmslev seems to choose the second interpretation. He says:
The form is defined by the value, that is, by the differential minimum of content 
[or expression] necessary to keep this unit apart from others units of the same 
sort81 [the addition is mine, in accordance with the symmetry attributed to the 
sign-function by Glossematics]
Hjelsmlev defines value in regard to each plane separately. However, it remains the
fact that in CLG value is always ‘o f the sign’ or ‘o f the word’; it never appears as ‘of
the signifier’ or ‘of the signified’.
What is clear, however, is that for CLG pure differentionality is a property of
the signifier and the signified, and not of the sign as a whole; translated into
Hjelmslev’s terminology, for CLG pure differentionality is a property of the
expression-form and the content-form separately, and not of the sign-function. In a
less cited extract from a much cited page of CLG, it is claimed that:
to say that everything in language is negative [..] is not true but for the signified 
and the signifier taken separately: from the moment that we consider the sign in 
its totality, we find ourselves in the presence of a thing that is positive in its 
order82
and a bit further:
• 83two signs [..] are not different, they are distinct 
Conversely, Hjelmslev situates pure differentionality at the level of form, which 
covers the entire sign-function proper; whereas he considers that it is substance which 
gives to the sign-function positiveness and stability:
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It is form that constitutes the value and the constant; and it is substance that 
closes the variables, to which different values are attributed according to the 
circumstances84
The question the answer to which would allow us to choose between the two 
positions is: whether the superposition o f two purely differentional systems, the one 
of the content-form and the one of the expression form, produces once again a purely 
differential system or not.
What is at stake is the exact meaning of CLG 's famous dicta: 
language cannot be but a system of pure values85 
in lan gu age th ere  a re  on ly  d ifferen ces  [..] w ith o u t p o s it iv e  te rm s86 
both of which agree with Hjelmslev’s position but seem to contradict the above 
citations of CLG. It is possible that this is a case of contradiction. However, as two of 
the apparently contradictory propositions are situated on the same page, with just ten 
lines between them, it would be more plausible to search for an alternative 
explanation. It is possible that what CLG meant was that the superposition of the two 
differentional nets produces stability in the semiotic system around the semiotic unit. 
It is in this sense that the sign is not a completely negative entity. In its turn, the sign 
can be distinguished from other relatively positive terms. Nevertheless, it is what 
distinguishes it from them that constitutes it87. Lagopoulos88 would agree with this 
interpretation. According to his reading, the signifier and the signified are each 
defined negatively due to ‘a value’, i.e. in relation to other signifiers or signifieds 
respectively; moreover, they are defined positively, with regards to their mutual 
relation. However, there is clear priority of the differentional relation; the relation of 
signification depends on value and not the other way round. So, semiotic systems are
84‘Langue et parole’ (1943) in Essais, (p.85)
85 CLG, p. 155
86 p. 166
87 See, CLG, p. 168: ‘what distinguishes as sign, this is all that constitutes it’.
88 ‘Static structuralism versus the dynamics o f  structure’, pp. 2-3
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indeed purely differentional, in the sense that there is nothing essentialist in their 
constitution; whereas, the point of connection of the two superposed differentional 
nets is characterised by certain stability. This proposition, apart from the advantage of 
self-consistency, is also in no contradiction with Hjelmslev’s position: the point of 
intersection of the two nets is a completely formal entity, which becomes concrete 
when it is manifested in substance; and can have more than one manifestation. 
However, there is a completely different interpretation. The interpretation supported 
by Derrida, as we shall see in the next chapter, would have it that the superposition of 
more than one differentional net does not reduce the degree of mobility o f the system, 
but augments it.
Whichever interpretation one endorses, in CLG we are led to the definition of 
language -  viz. semiotic systems -  as pure form. The positive terms, if any, are 
produced by their position in a system of relations.
Language [langue] is a form, not a substance89
3.3. The semiotic medium
The structuralist definition of the sign as pure form appears somehow counter­
intuitive, for the sign has been and is still commonly understood as the material means 
of expressing our thoughts. In more or less scholarly definitions, there has always 
been some kind of relation to a material element. The conception of the sign as being 
a channel of communication between our minds and the world is expressed in the 
conceptual and terminological amalgamation of ‘in between’ and ‘material’, as well 
as ‘a way’, in the concept/term of ‘medium’90. Whether viewed from an ontological 
or a phenomenal point o f view, i.e. as connected either to matter or to the senses, the
89 CLG, p. 169
90 ‘Medium’ means literally the ‘m iddle’.
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media of expression have often been hierarchised according to different metaphysical
criteria91. Traditionally, language has been intimately connected to voice, sound,
breath, and thus the medium of voice or sound has been given an exceptional position
in the metaphysical hierarchy of the media92. The field of ‘non-linguistic’ media of
expression has been connected with questions about the arts and about writing.
Saussure’s differentional definition of the sign is in complete harmony with
his explicit claim that:
The essential in language [langue]... has nothing to do with the phonic character 
of the linguistic sign93.
CLG disconnects semiosis from any particular medium, either in the ontological or 
the phenomenal sense, and opens the possibility of subsuming all the different modes 
of expression under the aegis of a unified science. Saussure compares language -  i.e. 
‘natural’, spoken language -  with writing, the alphabet of the deaf-mutes, symbolic 
rituals, the forms o f politeness, military and naval signals etc94. Apart from opening 
new horizons, CLG provides the source o f many of the questions addressed by 
subsequent semioticians, among them the possibility of different degrees of semiotic 
motivation95. Saussure is emphatic about the radical arbitrariness of the sign in natural 
languages. He juxtaposes it, though, with what he names ‘symbol’, where there is 
some ‘rudiment’96 of natural connection between signifier and signified. He gives the 
example o f scales as a symbol of justice. One is not sure whether he means it as a 
connotation in natural language or in a visual form of expression. As we have seen 
when addressing the issue of connotation, the connotative relation is purely
91 e.g. Aristotle and Hegel
92 We will discuss the issue further in chapter 4, in relation to Derrida’s critique o f  Western 
metaphysics.
93 CLG, p.21; ‘phonic’ means ‘vocal’, from the Greek ‘cpcovfi’ (phone) = ‘voice’
94 e.g. pp.33, 103, 165.
95 pp.100- 102.
96 ‘rudiment’, p. 101
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conventional, of social origin, exactly as is denotation. As the story of Ulysses 
connects ‘Ithaca’ with “final destination”, other stories -  such as the Egyptian and 
Christian weighing of the soul -  connect ‘weighing up’ with “judgement”. There is no 
reason to conclude any differently for a visual connotation. What is more delicate, 
though, is the arbitrariness o f denotation in a visual system; the issue is implied in 
Saussure’s uncertainty regarding the arbitrary, and therefore semiotic, nature of 
pantomime. Some form of similarity seems to be functioning in visual and kinetic 
signs, which contradicts their arbitrary nature. Saussure answers himself that the other 
forms of expression are not less fixed on convention than natural language. Therefore, 
if they are motivated, it must be only partly. His certainty of natural languages’ 
radical arbitrariness leads him to consider them as the paradigmatic case of semiotic 
systems; what is semiotic in any other system is radically arbitrary too. Furthermore, 
he unwittingly gives an answer to the question of similarity when he explains why 
onomatopoeia and exclamations do not constitute counter-examples to his claim 
concerning natural languages’ radical arbitrariness. The very recognition of similarity 
is an issue of convention. An instructive example supporting this position, gives the 
comparison between languages of the sounds specific animals are supposed to make: 
English cats apparently ‘mew’ or ‘miaow’, Greek cats ‘niaou’ or ‘niar’, whereas 
Swedish cats ‘jam ’! Another possible difference Saussure recognises between natural 
languages and visual semiotic systems is that the former develop on a single 
dimension, a line, whereas the latter ‘can offer simultaneous complications on 
multiple dimensions’97. We shall address again later the issues of the semiotic 
constitution of perception and of semiotic dimensions.
97 CLG, p. 103
110
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
CHAPTER 3: STRUCTURALIST SEMIOTICS
Hjelmslev’s algebra clarifies the Saussurean position. The complete symmetry
of the stratification has two immediate results. On the one hand, it puts all semiotic
systems on equal status. Not only does it make clear that all expression-substances are
equivalent to each other and that they have no necessary connection whatsoever with
a specific semiotic system, but it shows that the content also is comprised of content-
form and content-substance, and there is nothing essential about content-substance
either. As Ronald Schleifer puts it,
The distinction between ‘form’ and ‘substance’ allows [Hjelmslev] to distinguish 
between structural and phenomenal aspects of language without incorporating 
phenomenology into structuralism98
On the other hand, the double distinction of the stratification makes clear that the
sign-function is directed toward the world in two ways, through content-substance and
through expression-substance. This is a property that traditional binary or tri-partite
models of the sign seem to underestimate. Unlike Hjelmslev, Jakobson and the Prague
school do not consider form as independent from substance, which leads them to
prioritise natural languages over the other semiotic systems". Hjelmslev’s position is,
I think, closer to the nucleus of what is radical about structuralist epistemology and
holds great promise as regards the study of ‘non-linguistic’ semiotic systems. It also
has a direct relevance to Derrida’s project. For this last reason, we will now
investigate further some aspects of this theory, which are related to substance and of
particular interest for my thesis.
Firstly, Hjelmslev investigates the principles of the inner structure o f  
substance100. As paradoxical as it may sound, the substance-strata consist of substance
98 A.J.Greimas and the Nature o f  M eaning, 1987, p. 63
99 For the difference o f position between the Copenhagen and Prague Circles regarding substance, see 
Louis Hjelmslev, ‘L’analyse structurale du langage’ in Essais, (p .3 8 ); and Anne Henault, Histoire de 
la semiotique, Que sais-je?, p.60
100 Strat, p.56
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‘semiotically formed’101. This is not so unexpected as it seems, if one considers 
Hjelmslev’s conception of ‘form’ and ‘substance’ as relative terms, where form
always expands in the domain of substance, demanding a new complementary
102substance . To speak o f the manifestante without implying that it is semiotically 
formed, Hjelmslev uses in French the term ‘matiere’ (= matter), in English ‘purport’, 
in Danish ‘mening’. The choice of the terms ‘purport’ and ‘mening’ are rather 
misleading, as they could be interpreted by the uninformed reader as “signification”, 
which is almost exactly the opposite o f Hjelmslev’s definition. I think they were 
initially used to denote the ‘content-matter’ and then generalized for the expression- 
plane too, for reasons o f symmetry. Anyway, in the Hjelmslevian context ‘purport’ 
means ‘something like’ matter; I will use it in this sense from now on. Hjelmslev’s 
purport/matter, however, is also already in a certain sense formed, otherwise it would
icompletely escape cognition . It is ‘scientifically’ formed and sciences are also 
semiotic systems. There is, at least implicitly, the suggestion that the subdivision of 
substance into form and substance goes on ad infinitum. The explicit implication of 
the semiotic formation of substance is that one purport, let us say sound, can produce 
many semiotic substances, and a semiotic substance is neither necessarily confined to 
one purport nor does it exhaust the entire purport. In Hjelsmlev’s texts there is 
confusion about whether the term ‘purport’ should be also used for an even ‘rawer’ 
entity, that which escapes cognition altogether, and which cannot be referred to in the 
plural. There also sometimes seems to exist an asymmetry between the content- 
purports and the expression-purports. We will address these issues a few paragraphs 
later.
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Secondly, each substance consists o f  multiple levels, which have ‘defined 
functions and hierarchical order’104. These levels are supposed to be symmetrical in 
content-substance and expression-substance, although it is not completely clear how 
this happens. They are also symmetrical irrespectively of which purports they use as 
raw materials. Hjelmslev distinguishes three levels of substance: (1) the semiotic 
substance par excellence, i.e. the level o f social, collective perceptions, which belongs 
to his stratification in the strict sense and which he also calls ‘immediate 
substance’105; (2) the socio-biological level; (3) the physical level. When using the 
term ‘semiotic substance’, we mean the first level only. Level 3 depends on both 
levels 1 and 2, whereas level 2 depends on level 1. This does not mean that the 
existence o f the physical entities as such depends on the semiotic substance. What 
depends on it is their selection that constitutes them as relevant to the semiotic 
system. It is also important to understand that ‘the level of perception, or immediate 
semiotic substance, does not necessarily cover the entire domain o f the other 
levels’106. Therefore, for example, when one writes the characters of the alphabet 
color is of no semiotic interest, while in the case of a road signal color is a part of the 
semiotic substance.
104 Strat, p.62
105 This is probably an unfortunate choice, as the whole point o f  Hjelmslev’s position is that there is 
nothing ‘unmediated’ in substance, much less in its primary level. What he means is that this level o f  
substance is in immediate proximity to the sign-function and o f  immediate pertinence from the 
semiotic point o f view.
106 Strat, p.68
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[Figure 3.5. -  H jelm slev’s stratification o f  semiotic systems: levels o f substance]
1 07As Lagopoulos observes the lower two levels o f substance refer respectively to (2)
the mechanisms of production of the sign and (3) the bare objects or other material 
entities from which the social apperception derives: the ‘things’. In an effort to 
combine semiotics with historical materialism108, he articulates Hjelmslev’s levels in 
a different way, stressing the importance of productive praxis. The process of material 
production is called exo-semiotic I, and includes the second level of a system’s 
content-substance and expression-substance together. Exo-semiotic II and exo- 
semiotic III are similar to a system’s third levels o f expression-substance and content- 
substance, respectively. These two comprise the Matter.
The fact that the first level of substance does not necessarily cover the entire 
domain of the other levels, along with form’s independence from substance, lead us to 
a third point regarding substance: the multiplicity o f  semiotic substances; or, at least, 
of semiotic expression-substances. ‘One and only one form of expression can be 
manifested by a diversity of substances’109. For example, a national flag can be 
painted on paper or embroidered on silk or projected on a wall by an OHP etc. There
107 ‘In quest o f  architectural theory’ in Semiotica 55 -  V2 (1985), (p. 108)
108 ibid, (p. 109)
109 ibid, (p.57)
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are at least as many substances as semiotic systems, considering that a substance 
depends upon and cannot exist without its corresponding form. There must be more 
semiotic substances than semiotic systems, as a matter of fact, because each system 
can be and often is manifested by many substances. The question, however, as to how 
many ‘purports’ we have is a completely different one and it is not immediately 
addressed by Hjelmslev.
Hjelmslev’s two most radical and problematic propositions are the 
equivalence of substances and the symmetry between expression-substance and 
content-substance. Their implications become more urgent when our study extends 
beyond natural languages. When analyzing semiotic systems other than natural 
languages, it is relatively easy to recognize which is the expression-substance. It is not 
equally obvious, however, which is the content-substance. Then, the symmetry 
between the planes should result in the possible existence of more than one content- 
substance. Actually there is no reason to suggest that any purport could not act as raw 
material for both an expression-substance and a content-substance. Finally, the 
definition of language by its form alone and the complete dependence of semiotic 
substance on semiotic form must imply that the definitional distinction between 
different semiotic systems is a question of form and not of substance. We can no 
longer define semiotic systems according the substance in which they are manifested. 
I will now investigate these questions further and also attempt to draw implications 
about relevant issues that Hjelmslev did not sufficiently address.
Let us start with the application of Hjelmslev’s distinction of semiotic form 
and levels of substance to the expression-plane o f natural languages110. By ‘natural 
languages’, as already explained, we mean what is commonly called ‘languages’, such
uo Strat, p.59
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as English or French. I must also specify that -  initially at least - 1 mean, as structural 
semioticians always do, their spoken version. We will address separately the question 
of writing. So, in the expression-plane of a natural language, the primary level of 
expression-substance is the auditory aspect, concerning the apperception of the 
continuum of the sounds of the language by speaking subjects. This is then articulated 
into expression-form, i.e. a system of signifiers: words, sentences etc. The socio- 
biological level refers to the ‘myokinetic’111 aspects of producing and receiving the 
sounds. The physical level is the sound-wave as such. One can find these distinctions 
with regard to the expression-plane o f natural languages already in CLG112. They are 
not so systematically classified but they stem immediately from Saussure’s 
communication circuit and his definition of the sign. Saussure distinguishes between 
the phonetic substance and its differentiation into signifiers, which corresponds to 
Hjelmslev’s distinction between expression-substance and expression-form; between 
the ‘material’ and ‘sensuous’ parts of the sound, which correspond to Hjelmslev’s 
level 3 and level 1 of substance; between speech as mechanism of articulation-hearing 
and as acoustic phenomenon, which in turn correspond to Hjelmslev’s levels 2 and 1. 
He ascribes the study of the non-semiotic aspects o f speech to the science of 
Phonology.
I will now try to analyze in a similar way the example of the visual semiotic 
system of national flags, with regard to its expression-form and the levels of its 
expression-substance. Semiotic expression-substance is the visual apperception of the 
continuum of possible shapes and colors, by the group of people for which the flags 
are meaningful. Expression-form is the articulation of the expression-substance into
111 ‘myokinetic’ (in French ‘myocinetique’) derives from the Greek and means “o f  the movements o f  
the muscles”
112 See, for example, CLG, pp. 20-30, 37, 66, 98, 157
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the particular shapes and colors which become meaningful when related to content- 
form. The expression-form of this semiotic system is a visual image — as opposed to 
the acoustic image of the natural languages we investigated before. An interesting 
question is whether the color pertains to form. Color is certainly part of their semiotic 
expression-substance but I think that it is the difference between colors that 
constitutes the expression-form. This becomes apparent if  we think of translating all 
the colors into a grey-scale. If only one shade o f grey corresponds to one of the 
meaningful units of color in flags, then we have lost no information. In flags, it is 
units of colors, articulations, that are meaningful and not the entire visible continuum 
of light. The British flag is still the British flag whether we use in it petrol blue or 
ultramarine blue. This differentiation o f the expression plane does not enter into the 
sign-function of the national flags’ semiotic system. However, a flag with a red, a 
white and a turquoise stripe would be ambiguous. We would have to specify whether 
the turquoise is classified as blue or green, to know whether the sign we face is the 
French or the Italian flag. The disambiguation would be possible by comparing it with 
other signs, for example the British or the Algerian flag, or by taking into account the 
general situation. A counter-argument to the discarding of color from the expression- 
form would raise the different connotations that are attached to the different colors of 
the flags. However, according the structuralist definitions, connotations are 
constituted by cultural texts, semiotic processes, and not by immediate perception. 
Continuing our analysis, the level 3 of expression-substance of the flags’ system is 
comprised by the materials from which the flags are made. It makes no difference if 
these are paint and paper, or ink and threads, or pebbles. It makes no difference even 
if the flags are built with bricks or engraved in stone; in these cases, though, one of 
the elements of substance level 3 that will be discarded by the semiotic substance will
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be the third dimension. The expression-form of this system is two-dimensional. The 
level 2 o f expression-substance comprises all the processes needed for the 
construction of the flags and also the optical mechanisms needed for the reception of 
their image.
In ‘La stratification du langage’113, Hjelmslev also applies his distinctions to
the content-plane of natural languages. Semiotic content-substance o f a natural
language is the apperception of the world by the community of speakers of the
language, the conceptual continuum. Content-form is its articulation into distinct
concepts,- signifieds. As concepts are not meant only the conceptual images of what
are commonly called things -  such as “dog” or “house” -  but also evaluations,
relations, processes -  such as “good”, “similar”, “working”. Level 3 of the content-
substance is the physical level: the physical entities used as raw material for the
community’s apperceptions. Lagopoulos suggests, and I am inclined to agree, that this
is the equivalent to referent in Hjelmslev’s system. Level 2 o f the content-substance
comprises what Hjelmslev calls ‘socio-biological conditions and psycho-
physiological mechanism[s]’, everything that
either because of natural dispositions or because of acquired habits, reliable for 
sensory and other experiences, allow to the speaking subjects [...] to create, 
reproduce, evoke and handle in different ways the elements of appreciation114
One could interpret the level 3 of natural languages’ content-substance as including 
the physical existence of the entire world. An inattentive reader could then be led to 
the conclusion that there is only one possible content-substance. However, this 
pseudo-syllogism ignores the fact that that, in Hjelmslev, it is form that shapes 
substance and it is each higher level o f substance that determines what is relevant 
from a lower level. The only legitimate conclusion from this proposition, if indeed it
113 p.59-62
114 Strat, pp. 61-62
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is true, is that each community can speak in words about everything it experiences. 
Nevertheless, Hjelmslev is indeed led to a similar conclusion to that mentioned above, 
but from different premises115.
It is easy to imagine different content planes; for example, between English 
and French. What is difficult, though, is to imagine different kinds of content-planes; 
not their existence but what and how they might be different. Intuitively, particularly 
when engaged professionally with a semiotic system other than natural languages, we 
suspect that their content must be of a different kind than that of the natural 
languages. The most professional and detailed architectural description in words 
cannot give you all the meaningful information conferred by the building. 
Nevertheless, it is not obvious at all what constitutes denotation in architecture.
Lagopoulos makes an effort in this direction, exceptional in that it avoids 
completely any ‘loan’ from natural languages. Using the results of Hjelmslev’s 
analysis, he defines semiosis as ‘the process of corresponding between two material 
systems in order to communicate something’ and applies the four strata in order to 
analyze architecture. In his opinion, in the case of the architectural sign-function, 
content-substance is functionality -  in the sense of use -  as perceived by the 
community of users. Expression-substance is the social apperception of the part of the 
object/building where the sign is anchored. For example, in Cardiff castle the number 
of embrasures is o f no semiotic importance; therefore, it does not participate in its 
semiotic expression-substance — it is part of its third level expression-substance. 
Content-form is the perception of a particular object’s function -  always speaking of 
denotation. Expression-form is an abstraction of the visual image of the object. The 
articulation of functionality into specific functions and of visual perception into
115 We will investigate this a bit later in connection to the specificity o f  natural languages.
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specific visual images is produced by the architectural language, and it is not imposed 
by the material objects. Uses and images o f objects depend on each other but are not 
articulated isomorphically. Therefore, architecture fulfills the conditions o f being 
considered a language, i.e. a semiotic system. My only possible addition to this 
description would be with regard to the expression-plane. In my opinion, the 
expression-form of architecture should include a third dimension. Correspondingly, 
the expression-substance would include spatial perception; possibly, even kinetic 
perception. What is important and radical about this proposal, however, is that it 
shows that it is not only the expression-substance, that can vary between semiotic 
systems but also the content-substance. I am not entirely sure that Hjelmslev would 
ever have imagined it this way but I think that this interpretation is more faithful to his 
spirit than he was himself.
Having opened the way for the admission of many other systems to the status 
of language, Hjelmslev inquires as to what is the definitional difference o f natural 
languages116; what distinguishes them from other semiotic systems and constitutes 
them as a recognizable group. Once again, intuitive obviousness does not prove easy 
to substantiate. From what we have already expounded, the ‘inevitable logical 
consequence’ is that expression-substance ''cannot in itself be a definiens fo r  a 
language’111. After all, music shares with spoken French the expression-substance 
level 3, whereas written French does not. Hjelmslev needs a new criterion. He 
considers that the descriptive property shared by all natural languages is that all other
116 ‘la differentia specifica de la langue linguistique’, A cta Linguistica, volume IV (1944), (p.v); 
Hjelmslev uses the terms ‘natural language’ (e.g. P rol, p.65), ‘everyday language’ {Lang, p. 104), 
‘linguistic language’ {Acta IV, p.v) and ‘linguistic sem iotic’ {Strat, p.69) to denote semiotic systems 
such as English or French, as distinguished from other semiotic systems such as painting, music or 
architecture. Initially, the investigation is about their spoken forms, as it was the custom between 
structuralist linguists; however, as it must be obvious by now, whether they are spoken or not becomes 
irrelevant in Hjelmslev’s context.
117 Prol, p.65-66
120
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
CHAPTER 3: STRUCTURALIST SEMIOTICS
semiotic systems can be translated into them118. So, he defines natural languages 
through the concept of translability. Consequently, the first question is what is meant 
by ‘translation’ in this description. The second question is which structural 
characteristic of natural languages causes this property. The third question considers, 
obviously, the truth of each of the premises, the validity of this syllogism and, 
therefore, the truth of its final conclusion.
In Language: an Introduction119, which was composed around 1943 and was 
intended for a non-specialized public, there is no clarification as to what is meant by 
this ability to translate every semiotic system. The property, however, is associated 
with ‘universalism’ and the ability to be used ‘for all purposes’. In Prolegomena to a
1 Of) •Theory o f  Language , which was written about the same time and addressed to a 
specialized audience, there are given the definitions of two different kinds of 
‘translation’, only the first o f which is connected with the distinctive characteristic of 
natural languages. The distinctive characteristic o f natural languages is that they can 
be manifested by all purports; or, in other words, can form any purport whatsoever. It 
is not clarified whether this is meant to apply to the expression or the content plane, 
but we can assume that it is meant in both. The other kind of translability relates to 
what is commonly so called -  let us say turning an English text into French -  and is 
described as the substitution of one expression plane by another. As we have seen, 
this substitution is strictly speaking impossible, because of the mutual dependence 
between the two planes. What it is possible, however, is the attachment of a new 
expression plane to an entire sign-function121. Therefore, the common sense of
118 Prol, p.70; Lang, p. 104; Strat, p. 69
119 pp. 104-105
120 pp. 70, 75
121 According to Hjelmslev’s first definition, this would be metasemiosis; according his second 
definition, it would be connotation.
121
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
CHAPTER 3: STRUCTURALIST SEMIOTICS
translation is construed as a higher-degree sign-function; this is not immediately
connected to the specificity of natural languages in Prolegomena. In ‘La stratification
du langage’122, which was written about ten years later, the natural language is a
semiotic ‘destined to form all purports’; precisely the definition we read in
Prolegomena. Here, it is explicitly stated that the property refers only to the content-
substance. In ‘Stratification’, the two definitions of translability from the
Prolegomena are connected -  because o f the structural cause of natural languages’
distinctive property.
In Prolegomena, Hjelmslev writes:
We cannot here investigate the basis of this remarkable quality; there is no 
doubt that it rests on a structural peculiarity, on which we might be able to 
cast better light if we knew more about the specific structure of non-linguistic 
semiotics.123 [Italics mine]
In ‘Stratification’, however, he seems to have found it. He claims that the structural
specificity of natural languages is that their semiotic content-substance covers the
entire domain of the inferior levels, without concentrating on a particular sector of
them. Conversely, in all the other semiotic systems, the semiotic content-substance
concentrates on some sectors of the inferior levels. According to Hjelmslev, this
structural specificity of natural languages makes it possible for them to include in
their content-substance everything, even their own expression-substance, even their
own forms. This is the necessary condition for a semiotic system to act as its own
metalanguage. It is also the reason that the content of natural languages has only one
substance. There are two interpretations of this claim: a weaker and a stronger. It
either means that each natural language can have only one content-substance, or that
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weaker interpretation because, considering that each natural language has a different 
content-form and that substance depends completely on form, the other interpretation 
would be self-contradictory.
I don’t think that this treatment of the differentia specifica of natural languages 
is either the most successful or the clearest of Hjelmslev’s arguments. I think that 
there are several possible objections both to his premises and to the assumed logical 
connections between them. The fact that natural languages can translate any other 
semiotic system is supposed to be description by observation. This cannot precede, at 
least conceptually, the definition of what is meant by translation in this case. It is then 
defined as the ability o f their content-plane to be manifested by all purports, or form 
any purport whatsoever. It is not at all obvious why this is named ‘translability’ unless 
one takes into account later conclusions. It is not completely obvious either what it 
means exactly, but one can assume that it means what we suggested earlier: that a 
linguistic community can speak about all its experiences in words. Most importantly, 
taking into account this interpretation, one cannot positively claim that this is an 
observable fact. Moreover, even if  we assume it is observable and true, ‘speaking 
about’ something does not necessarily mean that one does so without loss of 
information. One question would then be whether Hjelmslev assumes that this is a 
process without loss of information or not.
What is interesting is that Hjelmslev speaks about the relation between higher 
and lower levels of the content-plane in terms analogous to metalanguage. 
Metalanguage refers to degrees higher than the sign-function, which -  according to 
the first definition we investigated -  use as content-plane an entire sign-function; one 
can construe this as using a sign-function as content-substance. Moving the analogy 
one level lower, Hjelmslev uses metalanguage to explain the relation between the
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sign-function and the content-substance. That is why the initial definition of 
metalanguage is related to content-substance. According to the second definition, this 
would be re-phrased as a relation between the higher degree sign-functions and 
semiotic substance.
When we proceed to the structural cause of natural languages’ descriptive 
differentional property, things get even more confusing and in a certain respect 
circular. As we said, natural languages’ semiotic content-substance is supposed to use 
the entirety of the lower levels of substance and, therefore, it ends by having as level 3 
the entire world. Considering, however, that inferior levels depend on superior, 
content-substance can never be ‘the entire world’; it can only be ‘the entire world as 
perceived by this linguistic community’. Hjelmslev himself has often stressed that it is 
meaningless to speak of substance by itself. Two different semiotic systems, natural 
languages or not, simply cannot have the same semiotic substance unless they have 
the same form. The immediate results of natural languages’ structural peculiarity are 
claimed to be the oneness o f their content-substance and their ability to be their own 
metalanguages. These seem to imply the definition of natural languages as ‘universal 
metalanguages’, which -  combined with the second definition of translation in 
Prolegomena -  would explain the use o f the term ‘translability’ for their descriptive 
differentiational characteristic. This final connection is not explicitly formed. What is 
also implied but not exactly addressed is the property that allows to a semiotic system 
in general to become metalanguage. What is clearly said is that, in the sub-case of 
natural languages, the property of having this specific content-substance makes it 
possible for them to become metalanguages o f themselves and -  for some unspecified 
reason -  this implies that they can become universal metalanguages. One cannot 
clearly deduce what properties a semiotic system should have in order to be a
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metalanguage, without being a universal metalanguage; and observation indicates that 
these cases do exist. Two definite conclusions one can derive from these arguments 
are that, for Hjelmslev, metalanguage/translability is somehow connected with 
content-substance -  or at least with substance in general -  and that the specificity of 
natural languages is situated in their content-substance. Both premises seem, and 
possibly are, quite inconsistent with the spirit o f Hjelmslev’s most radical assertions.
First o f all, to define a kind o f semiotic system by reference to its substance 
clearly contradicts the formal character o f the sign-function. Hjelmslev has stated very 
clearly the argument that semiotic systems are not to be defined by their expression- 
substance; it cannot be different with the content-substance. This leads to the second 
problem: the fact that the definition relies on content-substance alone contradicts the 
absolute symmetry between the planes. Strictly speaking, one should not be able to 
distinguish between the two. Thirdly, the analogy with metalanguage is valid only for 
the relation between sign-function and the semiotic (content-) substance, not for the 
relations between the different levels o f substance. Even then, it is a loose analogy. 
The only way to conform the definition of natural languages to the rest of Hjelmslev’s 
theory would be to construe it in terms of form. Whereas ‘substance’ or ‘purport’ are 
not elements of form, ‘to manifest itself in every possible purport’ is a function, 
therefore formal. This not enough, though. This function must be the outcome of the 
form of the semiotic system. Therefore, a more consistent definition -  I make no 
claim about its truth -  could be: natural language is the semiotic system of which the 
content(or expression)-form is such as to select a semiotic substance of which the 
level 3 includes potentially every possible purport. I am not sure that this definition, 
either in its initial formulation or in my re-formulation, necessarily entails universal 
translability. In any case, translability should also be re-defined in terms of form.
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Finally, if by translability we mean a complete transfer of significant information 
between semiotic systems, then it is questionable if natural languages or any semiotic 
systems fulfill this condition with regard to other semiotic systems; though it is not 
inconsistent with any o f Hjelmslev’s premises.
The question o f the differentia specifica of natural languages is one of the 
most problematic in Hjelmslev’s work. The reason is that one of the traditional 
tendencies o f Western thought, and therefore linguistics, is to combine the specificity 
of natural languages with their priority over other forms o f expression. Hjelmslev 
does not subscribe to the second position but he brings it along with him unawares 
through his rather traditional definition of specificity. One cannot blame him for that. 
Even today, we haven’t gone too much further than Hjelmslev’s investigations. He 
made clear, at least, that there are other ways o f seizing signification than natural 
languages. Jakobson and Barthes had the opposite opinion124 and were, I think, 
mistaken. Barthes, for example, when he says he’s analysing fashion, what he does is 
analyzing written articles about fashion. He chooses to ignore that the first-degree 
semiotic system of fashion is constituted by clothes, not words. According to 
Hjelmslev’s terminology, fashion magazine articles are part of a higher-degree 
semiotic system -  connotation or metalanguage -  distinguishable from the semiotic 
system they comment upon.
I think that the production of signification by systems different from natural 
languages can be considered an observable fact. It is outside the scope of my thesis to 
expound this in any detail; I will give some examples instead. There is a particular 
way of producing signification specific to each different kind of semiotic system. A 
film produces signification, among other ways, by its decoupage and editing. The
124 See Henault, Histoire de la  semiotique, p. 60
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succession and juxtaposition of two images is meaningful in a way that can be 
described with words to some degree but which is both distinguishable from and non­
reducible to them. A further proof of this can be found in the fact that composite 
semiotic systems which include natural language, such as opera, cannot be reduced to 
their natural linguistic component; reading the libretto of Dvorak’s Rusalka will 
hardly give you all the meaningful aspects of the work. The existence o f more than 
one interpretation of a painting, to give another example, is an indication that the 
painting constitutes an object distinguishable from its interpretations. One could then 
claim that this object is meaningless until it is invested with words. The existence of 
styles and schools of painting, of conventions and rules, of symbols and references 
indicates that this claim would be mistaken. The difficulty in proving these positions 
is that my argument is in words. Natural languages are indeed the most widely used 
metalanguages. It may be difficult to imagine -  particularly for somebody 
professionally engaged with words -  what would it be denotation, metasemiosis or 
connotation outside from the context o f natural languages; what would an argument 
be. However, I think that this is an obstacle which will eventually be overcome and, 
certainly, does not constitute a refutation by itself. Much research has been done since 
Barthes on the different semiotic systems, both by theoretic semioticians and 
practitioners of different arts. Christian Metz, for example, has done ground-breaking 
work on the semiotics o f cinema, while the architect Peter Eisenman has claimed that 
his buildings constitute a critique o f the anthropocentric ideology of dwelling. A 
comment in the language of architecture is a new building; so, a dialogue in 
architecture assumes a scale o f time, space and effort dissimilar to what we are used 
to call dialogue. This does not prevent architecture from fulfilling all the definitional 
conditions of a language. To return to Eco’s definition of language through the
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possibility o f lying, one can lie in architecture: a construction that appears to be a door 
and yet cannot be used as such, for example, is a lie; it can also be ironic. Conversely, 
it is most probable that one cannot say everything through architecture. Even if a 
building can be a love poem, it cannot translate Donne’s ‘Elegy: On His Mistress 
Going to Bed’; on this we can all agree. Then, undeniably, one can write in English a 
description or a critique of a building or a musical concerto. The question is whether 
English can translate, let us say, the temples o f Kamak or Vivaldi’s Concerto in D 
major R V  210. Hjelmslev seems to say that it can. I doubt it; unless one claims that 
describing is translating. In a sense this is true; they both fall under the category of 
metalanguage. However, when referring to texts in natural languages, we make the 
distinction between the two actions. I think that they are two different kinds of 
metalanguage and one should investigate what constitutes the difference between 
them -  though this is beyond the scope o f my thesis.
Hjelmslev’s semiotic system combines two different theoretical gestures with 
regard to the material world: on the one hand, it clarifies the fact that semiosis is 
anchored in two directions to the material, both in the expression and in the content 
plane; on the other, these anchorages to materiality seem to be perpetually transferred. 
This second gesture, we need to investigate further; particularly as it can illuminate 
the ways the semiotic phenomenon is intertwined with the human senses and the 
different materials, both of which have traditionally been connected with the semiotic 
medium.
The perpetual transfer of the connection to the physical world is expressed in 
the long scale of subdivisions between form and purport, inside each o f the planes. 
The different levels o f substance are situated in between these extremes. As we have 
seen, the term ‘substance’ is used for an entity wholly dependent for its definition to
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form; this is not the case with ‘purport’. As we have also seen, substance level 1 is 
formed by the semiotic form and thus allows it to be manifested. The relation of each 
level of substance to its above is described as analogous to the relation of semiotic 
substance (i.e. substance level 1) to semiotic form. This description, however, is not 
strictly correct; in the sense that the dependence between the different levels is not of 
the same kind. Substance level 1 has the nature o f a perceptual image situated ‘in the 
mind’; an image, though, which does not presuppose the real existence of any entity 
of which it is the image. It is continuous and undifferentiated and not shaped into 
recognizable units until it is articulated by form. Substance level 2 comprises the 
processes and mechanisms of production and perception of the sign. One could say 
that level 1 depends on level 2, and not the other way round. The reason this is not the 
case is because the sign-function is not an actual object but an abstraction. So the 
actual way that we manage to pronounce a vowel or see a picture is irrelevant to their 
semiotic function. Moreover, substance level 2 are only the processes and 
mechanisms necessary for the potential actualization of the specific semiotic system, 
not the entirety o f our abilities. In this sense, substance level 1 ‘forms’ substance level 
2; it chooses some sectors from their potential continuum. Substance level 3 is 
comprised by the parts of the physical world which the semiotic system either refers 
to or uses to manifest itself; it can, obviously, include parts or the entirety of levels 
above it. Once again, its being formed by the levels above means mostly a process of 
selection and not differentiation. Form, the higher level of this scale, is what makes 
them all perceivable and by a process of differentiation.
The term ‘purport’ or ‘matiere’ is introduced by Hjelmslev in order to address 
a slightly different question125. He needs a term describing physical entities
125 Strat, p.58
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independently of whatever relation they may establish with the semiotic phenomenon 
under description in order to explain, for example, that the sound wave can be used as 
raw expression-material by both music and English or that cinema uses both the 
sound wave and the light wave. The ‘purports’, i.e. the materials, need to be plural 
and, of course, recognizable. The problem is that for anything to be cognizable and 
distinguishable, it is necessary for it to be formed. This is one of the axioms of 
structuralism. For this reason, Hjelmslev claims that purports, if not semiotically 
formed, are ‘scientifically formed, at least to a degree which allows them to be
i  ^  r
distinguished from other purports’ . A further complication is the fact that sciences 
are semiotic systems too; so, purports end up as the articula produced by a semiotic 
form. What is happening is that certain sciences are used with regards to this issue as 
metalanguages. Whether this causes an inescapable circularity or not, is for each 
researcher to decide. Purports are the elements combined in substance level 3, of both 
the content and the expression plane. Occasionally, they are also called ‘substances’, 
not in the technical sense.
Although Hjelmslev generally considers purports as internal to knowledge, 
there is a specific passage in the Prolegomena where he describes it as ‘inaccessible 
to knowledge’127. This purport, I suspect, is different from the previous ones, because 
it defies any analysis. It is equivalent to the Kantian noumenon. This purport in the 
singular is the inaccessible continuum of the world-in-itself before any formation. 
Both the content and the expression planes seem to point toward it. This could be, 
finally, where the substances meet, in this common undifferentiated continuum, the 
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On the opposite side of the form/substance scale is form, i.e. the sign-function. 
In the structuralist view, the medium, the ‘in between’ is not material any more; it is 
formal. More importantly, the ‘in between’ is signification itself. Signification does 
not reside independently somewhere else. Having re-defined what we mean by 
semiosis and what we mean by substance, we need to re-investigate what we mean by 
form. One o f the difficulties created by the complete insignificance of substance for 
the definition of a semiotic system is that the criterion must be sought in form. The 
question is, for example, how to distinguish Architecture from English if  not by 
referring to their different semiotic substances. It is not enough to say that they have 
different forms, because this also true for the difference between English and French. 
What we must have here is different kinds o f form. I will propose, as a hypothesis, 
that the difference is in the dimensions that characterise each kind of form;
198dimensions both in space and time. When Saussure posed linearity as a 
fundamental characteristic o f the signified o f natural languages, thus implying a 
possible difference between them and visual semiotic systems, he was giving a 
principle according to which we could investigate different types of form. The first 
question is whether these dimensions refer to the expression-form alone or concern 
the content-form too. Hjelmslev’s principle of symmetry suggests the latter. 
Furthermore, I think that the generic form of a semiotic system may be defined by the 
combination of the generic forms of both its content and expression planes. This could 
explain the difficulty of translation between different kinds of semiotic system. The 
second issue arising is the worrying possibility of the concept of ‘form’ losing its 
abstract nature and reverting to something like its Aristotelian meaning; it seems to 
slip from differentionality to intrinsic shape. It is a question of ‘concretisation’ of
128 CLG, p. 103
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form. Then, it is possible to imagine that form is also subdivided in different levels; 
shape would belong to a less ‘formal’ level of form, whereas there would be a more 
abstract level comprised only of elements o f second degree spatiality and temporality. 
We will re-address all this later.
It has been traditional to classify semiotic systems either by their material of 
expression -  such as ‘graphic’ -  or by the senses that we use in order to perceive them 
-  such as ‘visual’. Let us briefly see to what these classifications correspond in 
Hjelmslev’s systematisation and the reasons that they might still be relevant to our 
quest. The material o f expression can be safely corresponded to expression-substance 
level 3, although there is also an oscillation between expression-substance level 1 and 
the purports used by the level 3, as the systematic distinction of the three was not 
previously performed. This is the constitution o f the actualisation of the semiotic 
system. It is expectable that it was traditionally identified with the sign itself, 
particularly as the sign was defined as the ‘materialisation’ o f an idea. The question is 
whether even in a formal definition o f the sign-function there is still a necessary 
connection between semiotic system and expression material. We said that the kind of 
semiotic system is defined by the kind of its form alone. Its generic form, however, 
has some limitations as to what kinds o f semiotic substance it can form. These 
limitations are related to the dimensions into which it is developed. Furthermore, as 
the substance level 1 is the abstraction of a perceptual image, it has some limitations 
regarding to which purports needs as substance level 3. For example, the expression- 
form of national flags can be manifested by an expression-substance level 1 of visual 
images or of tactile images but not o f acoustic images. Accordingly, the visual 
expression-substance level 1 of national flags can be manifested by cloth or stone but 
not by the sound-wave. It seems that, whereas each stratum can be manifested by
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something with equal or more dimensions than itself -  choosing in the latter case to 
semiotically discard the surplus dimensions —, it cannot be manifested by something 
with less dimensions than itself.
The senses that we use in order to perceive the actualisation o f a semiotic 
system are situated in Hjelmslev’s expression-substance level 2. The classification of 
semiotic systems by perceptive sense is particularly practical because, once again, the 
substance level 1 is the abstraction of a perceptual image. Each kind of perceptual 
image has a necessary connection with the perceptual abilities that potentially produce 
it; e.g. we can’t perceive two spatial dimensions through our hearing. As each kind of 
expression-form can be manifested only by certain kinds o f expression-substances 
level 1, and these, in their turn, can be connected only to certain of our senses, a 
relationship is established between certain kinds o f form and certain of our senses. 
This connection is not free of ambiguities, however. One rests with the distinction 
between the human senses, which are traditionally considered five; a distinction 
depending on other sciences than semiotics -  in the same way the distinction between 
purports does. Another question relates to the nature of our perceptual images; e.g. 
whether we perceive digitally or analogically, whether we perceive space in all its 
three dimensions or reduce it to two etc. As Hjelmslev admits, the further 
investigation of these issues:
w ould  additionally dem and a w h o le  other m ultitude o f  preparatory researches 
[...] w hich  for the tim e b ein g  are not at all availab le. It also  needs to take into 
account m any other facts [...] am ong w h ich , syn easth esia129.
129 Strat, p.64
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3.4. Material matters
The arts have traditionally been defined, classified and hierarchised according to the 
expressive materials they use or the senses by which we perceive them. The new 
definition of semiotic system does not allow the use of these criteria anymore. A 
further consequence is that the mere use o f a semiotic system other than natural 
languages is not criterion enough for the definition o f an art. Arts need to be defined 
as sub-set of semiotic systems, in the same way one distinguishes a novel from a 
weather report in the context of a natural language. Hjelmslev never addressed, to my 
knowledge, the question of art. Jakobson defined ‘artness’ -  or rather ‘literariness’, 
‘poeticness’ -  as a property of a text not o f a system, and situated it in the level of 
communication not of structure. It is one o f the six functions o f  language he
1 “j a
proposed , corresponding to the six factors determining any circuit of 
communication131: the addresser, the message, the addressee, the context, the code 
and the contact (i.e. the physical channel).
[1] [A]n orientation towards the context [is...] the so-called REFERENTIAL, 
‘denotative’, ‘cognitive’ function [e.g. ‘She left the web.’]
[2] The so-called EMOTIVE or ‘expressive’ function, focused on the addresser, a 
direct expression of the speaker’s attitude toward what he is speaking about, [e.g.
‘I like this web!’]
[3] Orientation toward the addressee, the CONATIVE function [e.g. ‘Do leave 
this web!’]
[4] There are messages primarily serving to establish, to prolong, or to 
discontinue communication, to check whether the channel works [...], to attract 
the attention of the interlocutor or to confirm his continued attention [...] 
PHATIC function [e.g. ‘Are you listening to me?’]
[5] Whenever the addresser and/or the addressee need to check up whether they 
use the same code, speech is focused on the code: it performs a 
METALINGUAL [...] function, [e.g. ‘When I say “web” I mean a piece of 
tissue.’]
[6] The set toward the message as such, focus on the message for its own sake, is 
the POETIC function of language, [e.g. ‘She left the web, she left the loom, / she
132made three paces thro’ the room’]
130 ‘Linguistics and Poetics’ (1958, 1960) in Language in Literature
131 The circuit o f communication appears in the CLG. Jakobson develops it further and Eco even 
further. We will briefly address it in the next sub-section.
132 ‘Linguistics and Poetics’, pp. 66-69. The numbers and the examples in the square brackets are mine. 
The last example is two verses from Alfred Lord Tennyson’s ‘The Lady of Shalott’ (1832).
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Jakobson makes clear that ‘although we distinguish six basic aspects of language, we 
could, however hardly find [...] messages that would fulfill only one function’. 
‘Literary’, ‘poetic’ is a message/text where the poetic function prevails.
Jakobson’s functions can be generalized beyond natural languages to every
semiotic system; the ‘poetic function’ can then be considered the function of art in
1 • •general . Poetic is the function o f attracting attention to the text itself: to the way
the particular text works, to the way its semiotic system works, to the way -  
ultimately -  the sign-function in general works. Consequently, one of the significant 
characteristics o f poetic texts, viz. works o f art, is that they exemplify the 
interdependence between the content and expression plane; this is a structural 
characteristic. Jakobson names it the ‘empirical criterion’ for the recognition of poetic 
function. Eco translates it into the terms of Hjelmslev’s systematization as a certain 
effort of isomorphy between the different strata. He observes that the art-work does 
not only concentrate on the content-form and expression-form but also on the 
substance, and particularly on the lower levels of the expression plane. In art we have 
a ‘semiotisation’ of the medium of expression. Let us take one of the famous still lives 
with oranges and apples by Cezanne: The expression-form would be the composition, 
the relative position of lines, the analogy between shapes, the relationship between the 
luminosity of colours etc. The conventional semiotic expression-substance would 
include the colours, such as the fruit being orange and the drapery being white. 
However, these do not cover everything that is meaningful in the expression-plane of
133 Umberto Eco calls it ‘aesthetic function’ (A Theory o f  Semiotics, p. 262). The term ‘aesthetic’, 
however, initially related to the senses and then to the concept o f  beauty, has been highly questioned by 
the 20th century theory o f  art. So, I think it may be more appropriate to continue using the term ‘poetic’, 
but in a generalised sense. Eco in A Theory o f  Semiotics (pp. 261-276) makes a very impressive 
synthesizing overview o f  the semiotic definition o f  art, which is my main source for this paragraph and 
the following one. I also used Jakobson, ‘Linguistics and Poetics’; and Boklund, ‘Contemporary 
methods o f literary text analysis’ in OiXoXoyoq 29, (1982)
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the painting. The particular hue o f orange, the real size of the painting, the kind of 
brush-strokes, even the material o f the oil colours and the canvas take part in its 
signification. What in other cases would be a sign-variation without semiotic interest, 
in art gains a formal value and becomes semiotically relevant.
Works of art use several devices in order to draw attention to their own 
structuring. The Russian formalists singled out the ‘device o f making it strange’, 
through breaking rules and increasing the difficulty o f perception. The art-work 
obliges one to reconsider the usual correlation between the expression and content 
planes of. a semiotic system, as well as the relation between substance and form, and 
therefore to challenge the system itself. As we perceive the world through our 
semiotic systems, challenging them leads us to see the world in a new way. For this 
reason, Eco argues that ‘art not only elicits feelings but also produces further 
knowledge’. These brief remarks will be useful in situating some elements of the 
deconstructive project. Fully defining the phenomenon of art is, o f course, a much 
more complicated endeavor and completely outside the scope o f my thesis.
Writing is the other case commonly defined in relation to the medium of 
expression, as ‘a durable, visible means of representing something’134. It is also 
traditionally defined as derivative with regard to natural languages, a characteristic 
which is often assigned some metaphysical value. Saussure ascribes to the definition 
of writing as dependent on a natural language, though he does not attach metaphysical 
properties to this derivation. He defines writing as a semiotic system whose ‘raison d’ 
etre’ is to represent natural language135. He has an ambiguous position in relation to 
writing’s evaluation, on which Derrida builds one of his most famous arguments. On
134 Sebeok ed., Encyclopedic D ictionary o f  Semiotics, p. 1165
135 CLG, p. 45. The chapter VI o f  the Introduction o f  CLG  is entitled ‘Representation o f  language by 
writing’, pp. 44-61
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the one hand, Saussure opens the possibility of not considering writing as 
metaphysically inferior to spoken language, as he breaks the ‘naturalness’ of the 
connection between what we call ‘natural136 languages’ and the medium of voice. He 
claims both that
The essential in language [langue]... has nothing to do with the phonic character 
of the linguistic sign137.
and that
it is not proven that the function of language the way it is manifested when we 
speak is completely natural138
So, neither does he consider the vocal character as an essential part of the nature of 
the linguistic sign nor does he accept the choice o f our vocal organs as our most 
common means of expression as unquestionably based on natural grounds -  though he 
thinks that the latter is highly probable. He also uses writing as an example of 
semiotic system or in order to clarify issues with regard to the spoken form of natural 
languages139. On the other hand, he is particularly fervent against what he considers 
an over-valuation of writing by traditional linguistics. He observes the discrepancies 
between the spoken languages and what was considered as their graphic notation, and 
he rightly concludes that one should not use the latter as the main means for studying 
the former. This opinion is expressed, however, in a surprisingly passionate 
vocabulary; all the more so, considering it is found in a book mostly bereft of any 
emotionality140. Most structuralist linguists, Jakobson among them, follow Saussure 
in defining writing as a second degree semiotic system, derived from and dependent 
upon a natural language.
136 Here it becomes obvious why the use o f  the term is problematic.
137 CLG, p.21
138 ibid, p. 25
139 e.g., ibid, pp. 33, 165
140 One wonders whether the source o f  this passion was Saussure or his editors.
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Hjelmslev disagrees. Firstly, he considers irrelevant the questions about
derivation: on the one hand, the fact o f a semiotic system being ‘derived’ or not does
not affect in any essential way its character; on the other, ‘it is not always certain what
is derived and what is not’141. Secondly, the principle according to which substance
depends on form but not the other way round, along with the observation of
discrepancies between the forms o f natural languages in their spoken and written
‘versions’, leads him to the recognition that they are not versions at all but
independent semiotic systems.
In the case of a language such as French or English, the phonematic analysis and 
graphematic analysis of the expression plan would show two different semiotic 
forms [i.e. two different semiotic systems] and not the same form manifested by 
different substances142
A case where a sonic substance and a graphic substance would manifest the same 
form would be if  they denoted exactly the same formal relations, as would be the case 
with a purely phonetic writing. Even then, none of them would be considered 
conceptually or metaphysically ‘primary’ as there is no necessary connection between 
sound and language; as about the historical primacy, we simply don’t know. Thirdly, 
Hjelmslev does not doubt that English writing, for example, is a ‘natural language’. In 
other words, there is something that spoken Arabic and written French have in 
common, as opposed to music or painting. This takes us back to our previous 
discussion about the differentia speciflca o f natural languages and how it must be 
situated in the level of form. Written and spoken languages do not belong to different 
kinds of semiotic system. A fourth issue concerns the specific relation between 
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language. Hjelmslev143 tends to conclude that they share the same content-form, 
which is a  distinctly at odds with his position about the interdependence between the 
planes o f  expression and substance. We could modify the identity to close 
resemblance.
Classifications of the kinds o f writings depend on the researcher’s definition 
of writing; however, their motivation is not simply epistemological interest but mostly 
practical need. I will briefly present the classifications of writings according to the 
most respected semiotic dictionaries144. Saussure145 makes a distinction between only 
two systems of writing: the ideographic and the phonetic, the latter sub-divided to 
syllabic and alphabetic. Greimas and Courtes146, by 1979, take into account 
Hjelmslev’s theory and define writing as the manifestation o f a natural language, of 
which manifestation the expression-substance is visual and graphic. Their 
classification, provisionary and still unsophisticated, distinguishes between three 
kinds of writing: narrative, morphematic and phonematic. The entry also refers briefly 
to Barthes’ and Derrida’s treatment of the concept o f writing, and not in the most 
flattering terms. Todorov in the 1972 Dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences du 
langage147 gives a wider and a narrower definition o f writing: the former comprises 
all visual and spatial semiotic systems, a field wider than Hjelmslev’s definition; the 
latter is close to the traditional definition of writing. Both are rather un-Hjelmslevian. 
He makes a more detailed description and classification of the systems of writing than 
Greimas and Courtes. The two general categories are mythography, where the writing 
system does not refer to any verbal language, and logography, where it does. The
143 See for example Prol, p.67
1441 do not include Sebeok’s Encyclopedic D ictionary o f  Semiotics because the entry is o f  a too 
obviously Peircean inspiration which takes us beyond the context o f  the present discussion. However, I 
cited earlier its general definition o f  writing.
145 CLG, p.47-48
146 Semiotique: Dictionnaire raisonne de la  theorie du langage, p .l 15
147 pp. 249-256, 435-437
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most widely used form of mythography is pictography. Then, there are two chief 
ways of logography: morphemography and phonography, the latter sub-divided into 
syllabographic and alphabetic. Todorov explains that what he classifies are principles, 
which in real systems of writing are often combined. Then, he offers a brief overview 
of the ‘science of writing’, grammatologie (grammatology)148, with special reference 
to the 1952 book by I.J.Gelb, A study o f  writing, the foundations o f  grammatology. 
The dictionary appeared five years after the edition of Derrida’s De la 
grammatologie, which is included in the entry’s bibliographical notes. Moreover, 
Todorov dedicates an entire separate entry to Derrida’s treatment of writing.
Twenty three years later, in 1995, in the second edition o f the same 
dictionary149, every reference to Derrida’s relation to writing disappears. Schaeffer 
classifies writing under the super-category of graphic notations, which are defined as 
durable semiotic systems with a visual and spatial support, i.e. expression-substance. 
He offers a very detailed description and classification o f the principles of graphic 
notations and agrees with Todorov that no writing follows purely a single principle. 
His first distinction is between mythography and writing: the former does not refer to 
a verbal language, the latter does. Here we must observe that Schaeffer’s ‘durable 
semiotic systems with a visual and spatial support’ do not seem to include painting or 
architecture; all o f them, mythographies and writings, fall under what we have earlier 
defined as ‘natural languages’. Mythography appears in many forms, the most 
important o f which are two: the symbolic notation, where an object is used to refer to 
something -  the connection may be motivated or arbitrary; and, pictography, where 
figurative designs are used as communicative units. Writings are constructed upon
148 Grammatology, from the Greek ‘yp apga’ (gramma) + ‘Xoyoq’ (logos) = letter + speech/reason, i.e. 
theory about the letters.
149 Nouveau dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences du langage, pp. 301-310
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two principles: the morphemographic and the phonographic; in the former the graphic 
signs denote signifying linguistic units and in the latter they denote phonetic units. 
There are at least four ways in which morphemography can connect the graphic sign 
to the signifying linguistic unit: (a) pictogram, which connects it to morphemes 
through analogical representation; (b) ideogram, which connects by association; (c) 
logic aggregations; and (d) abstract logograms. Conversely, the phonematic principle 
rules three types of writing: (a) segmental; (b) syllabic; and (c) alphabets.
Before closing, we should make a few observations. Firstly, for structuralist 
semiotics, writing is a class of manifestations o f semiotic systems, grouped according 
the characteristics of their expression-substance. It is not inherent to a semiotic system 
to be classified as writing. This does not mean that written English is a different 
manifestation of the form of spoken English. Written English and spoken English are 
manifestations of different forms. Secondly, in most classic structuralist definitions, 
not all semiotic forms when manifested in expression-substances using graphic 
purports can be classified as writings; it is only the semiotic forms classified as 
‘natural languages’. The form of spoken English if manifested in graphic substance 
would not be written English as we know it, but it would be writing. Romantic 
painting, though, would not be classified as writing in this definition. Thirdly, the 
question remains open as to how we can formally define the particular affinity 
between the spoken and written forms o f what we commonly call ‘the same 
language’. Spoken English and written English may not have the same form but they 
still are not French. Fourthly, precisely because a manifestation is classified as writing 
according its expression-substance, grammatology focuses on the study and 
classification of expression-substances. However, the study of the principles of 
writing reveals that they give also information about the semiotic form. As we have
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indicated earlier, because of the dependence of the semiotic substance on the semiotic 
form, a semiotic substance cannot but give information about the semiotic form that 
articulates it. Fifthly, and as a consequence of the previous points, several issues 
regarding the way semiosis works are thrown into sharper relief by a study of writing 
-  the interconnections between content and expression, between form and substance, 
between the different levels of substance, but also between different manifestations 
and even between different semiotic systems. Such issues include the questions of 
motivation and analogical reference. Most epistemologically instructive are the ways 
the different principles of writing are combined. Both editions of Ducrot’s 
dictionary150 dedicate some space to ways o f combination o f phonographism and 
logographism (or morphemographism), which show a communication between 
spoken and written forms of what is commonly called ‘the same language’, as well as 
between different languages. Among them is the ‘rebus’, the process in which we note 
one word using the character of another homophonous word. For example, in ancient 
Egyptian the signified “master” is noted with the hieroglyph of “basket”, because 
‘master’ is pronounced /nb/ and ‘basket’ /nb.t/. Then, sometimes an a posteriori 
semantic relation is produced between the two words. What these examples reveal, 
however, are the mechanisms of the process of production of semiotic systems; they 
don’t affect their structure as studied at any given moment. As we shall see in the next 
sub-section, the provenance of a semiotic system is of no interest when the system is 
studied synchronically. From a synchronic point of view, what is significant in a 
semiotic system is fully described by its form.
The notion of writing played a central role in the researches of the Tel Quel 
group. One of the reasons was precisely their choice to abandon the synchronic point
150 Dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences du langage, pp.253-254 ; Nouveau dictionnaire 
encyclopedique des sciences du langage, pp.305-306
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of view; another was a particular interest in ‘literariness’. ‘Writing’ in this context is 
expanded and sometimes radically re-defined. One of the most idiosyncratic 
definitions is Barthes’151. As about Derrida’s definitions of writing and 
grammatology, we will expound them at length in the next chapter.
3.5. Semiotic structures and semiotic processes
In structural semiotics, the principle of fundamental semiotic arbitrariness and the 
choice of point of view are o f primary importance; an importance that spreads from 
the level, o f theoretical principles to the level o f methodology. The principle of 
fundamental semiotic arbitrariness, apart from ruling -  and because it rules -  the 
production of signification, makes impossible any definition in other than differential 
terms. Consequently, semiotic entities are defined in relation to each other; which 
means that they appear at least in couples. Furthermore, the centrality of the concept -  
and the practice -  of choice of point of view is not unrelated to the principle of 
fundamental semiotic arbitrariness: on the one hand, semiotic research constitutes its 
own object of study; on the other, a process of differential definition entails the choice 
between the two sides o f a couple. The concept o f point o f view is connected to a 
topology of theoretical thought and not to the traditional concept of the subject. The 
topological perception of theory is a definitional characteristic of structuralism.
‘Langue\ or ‘semiotic system’, is the paradigmatic object of structuralist 
semiotics. On the one hand, it is its central object of study, which is constituted by its 
particular point of view. On the other, it is a specific kind of semiotic structure. As 
such it combines the two main philosophical innovations of structuralist semiotics: the 
introduction of the structural object and the re-definition of the semiotic order.
151 ‘Le degre zero de l’ecriture’ (1953)
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Langue is defined by Saussure through a process of delimiting what is ‘inside’ 
and what is ‘outside’ relationally drawn borders. The underlying criterion is that the 
science of linguistics -  and subsequently semiotics -  must investigate what constitutes 
the ‘semiotic’ as such, as opposed to different levels o f exteriority; whereas other 
factors related to the semiotic phenomenon are investigated by other sciences, such as 
history, sociology, biology etc. Langue is defined through three juxtapositions. 
Firstly, it is juxtaposed to the semiotic ability. Then, it is juxtaposed to the semiotic 
act. Finally, it is presented through two different points o f view: in a state of co­
existent relationships and in evolution. The former point o f view allows the researcher 
to perceive its structurally. The second and third o f these juxtapositions are two of 
the most important methodological distinctions o f structuralist semiotics.
The English term ‘language’ translates both the French terms ‘langage’ and 
‘langue’, each o f which has more than one meaning. Generally, the former tends to 
correspond to a wider and less technical definition than the latter. When defined by 
juxtaposition, langage is the general human ability to communicate, while langue is 
the social product of this ability. Nevertheless, in different contexts they are used 
differently. ‘Langage’, as we said, is the general ability to communicate, i.e. to form 
semiotic systems. However, in a less technical register, it appears sometimes either as 
the ability to produce the so-called ‘natural languages’ or as the general class 
comprised by all the ‘natural languages’. Obviously, this meaning persists from a pre- 
Saussurean use of the term. Unfortunately, it is often used in the same texts as the 
technical register; this leads occasionally to more than one possible interpretations of 
the same passages. It is also often the case in classical semiotic texts that terms and 
concepts are initially introduced with regards to natural languages and then 
generalised to every semiotic system. This practically leaves open a margin of choice
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as to how to correspond the terminology before and after the generalisation is made. 
Moreover, the term ‘langage’, combined with a determination, is sometimes used to 
denote ways of semiosis not organized enough as to deserve the name of ‘langue'. 
Some definitions of ‘langue' are quite restrictive, obliging dance or cinema, for 
example, to be excluded; so in this context, they are called ‘le langage de danse' and 
‘le langage cinematographique'. In this sense ‘langage' can be used in the plural and 
is of the same order as ‘langue’: ‘langues' and ‘langages' are the products of the 
ability of ‘langage'. For the same reasons, the term ‘langage' is also used when 
referring to non-human ways of semiosis. For classical structuralism, this is a 
contradiction-in-terms because semiosis cannot but be human. However, lately, 
semioticians influenced by the Peircean tradition investigate, for example, ‘le langage 
des abeilles' (the language of the bees). Conversely, ‘langue' since Saussure is quite 
clearly equivalent to ‘semiotic system’. In a structuralist context, it is never used in 
any other than its strictly technical register. Every time that it is applied to describe 
natural languages, it is always implied that the conclusions are generalisable to all 
semiotic systems. However, the same theoretical definitions that led some semiotic 
systems to be considered undeserving of the name ‘langue', have caused a slippage of 
the term back close to a co-extension with ‘natural languages’. In my thesis, I will not 
introduce this debate. I use ‘langue' and ‘langage' as defined by mutual opposition, 
referring generally to the semiotic system and the semiotic ability respectively.
For Saussure langage is the human semiotic ability. He makes clear that 
it makes no difference what the exactly nature of the agreed sign is152
It is not spoken language [la n g a g e  p a r le ]  w h ich  is natural to m an, but the faculty  
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a more general faculty, the one which commands the signs154
We see that the semiotic ability is ‘natural to man’. Here we have a certain anchorage
of the Saussurean theory to objective reality. We are not told whether some of the
basic characteristics of the semiotic systems, apart from those that constitute them as
semiotic, are also naturally, inherently human -  as Noam Chomsky and others claim.
There is nothing to suggest this position in CLG , although the work of Claude Levi-
Strauss and other structuralists imply it. What is certain is that the ability to construct
semiotic systems is considered natural to human beings and shared by all of them. It
could be said that it amounts to being the definitional characteristic o f humanity,
analogous to the Aristotelian ‘social animal’.
Langue, on the other hand, is
a social product of the faculty of langage and a set of the conventions adopted by 
the social body necessary to allow the exercise of this faculty by the 
individuals155
It is a system , i.e. a stock of elements and rules governing their relationships -  with 
the peculiarity that the elements are not determined in advance156. It is also a social 
institution. Moreover, it is different from other systems and social institutions; its 
special nature is o f a ‘new order’157 o f entities: the semiotic. Finally, langue is ‘a 
whole in itself and a principle of classification’158. Langue, i.e. the semiotic system, 
constitutes the prototype on which the structuralist concept of structure is based. It is, 
therefore, not wrong for ‘langue’ to be translated as ‘linguistic structure’, as Roy 
Harris proposes. However, this introduces a husteron-proteron because Saussure did 
not use the term /structure/ in this sense. Furthermore, conflating with no questions
154 CLG, p.27
155 ibid, p.25
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‘system’ and ‘structure’, it obscures some questions regarding the definition of 
structure. I prefer to keep the French term when necessary; otherwise I use /semiotic 
system/.
There are many langues, i.e. semiotic systems, whereas the capacity for 
langage is common to all. What all langues have in common is the (meta-) structural 
principle that constitutes them as semiotic structures; consequently, all langues share 
a meta-structure. This universal meta-structure is the object described by CLG159 and 
by Hjelmslev’s stratification160. However, the particular structure of each langue -  the 
articulation o f its content and expression planes -  is specific to it; it is social and 
fundamentally arbitrary. The question of the ‘naturalness’ o f language {langue) we 
have already addressed in connection to the differentia specifica of the so-called 
‘natural languages’, as well as in connection to the refuted priority of spoken 
language over writing. We have shown how the propium  o f the semiotic system is the 
principle o f fundamental arbitrariness. Traditionally, the term ‘natural language’ is 
opposed to ‘formal’ languages, such as mathematics and logic, to ‘artificial’ 
languages, such as the Morse code, to the supposedly derivative writing and to all 
other forms of expression. As we have shown, none o f these differences can be 
construed in terms of ‘naturalness’ anymore. In a certain way, by their nature, all 
langues are not natural. What is natural is the ability to produce them.
In order to clarify langue 's social nature and its closely related particular mode 
of existence, which by subsequent semioticians will be named ‘structural’, Saussure 
needs to place it inside the general semiotic phenomenon. He starts by a simplified 
description of the individual act which puts into action the circuit of
159 CLG, pp. 3 5 ,4 4
160 See Prol, p.48; Acta L inguistica  IV, p.ix
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communication161, in the case o f a spoken language. The circuit presupposes at least
two individuals. It starts in the mind of the individual A, where concepts and acoustic 
• 162 •images are associated — the units produced by this correlation are later named signs. 
This is purely a psychological phenomenon. It is followed by the order of the brain to 
the body organs to move so as to produce sounds corresponding to the acoustic 
images and then by the physiological process o f production of sound. This produces 
the physical existence of sound-waves which travel from the mouth of A to the ear of 
B. Then, the circuit continues inside the body organs of B, which receive by a 
physiological process the sounds and send the acoustic images to the brain. Inside the 
mind of B, the acoustic images are once again correlated to concepts, which again is a 
phenomenon of psychological nature. All individuals connected by a communication 
circuit need to associate the same concepts to the same acoustic images. 
Consequently, there needs to be a medium (moyen) between them, something which 
all of them already know, which makes possible the individual acts of 
communication163. This entity is of purely psychological164 nature. This is langue.
Our first approach to the structural nature o f language is, therefore, made 
through the opposition to ‘parole’ (speech). Parole, once again not to be confined to 
‘natural’ languages, is the act of using langue; whereas langue is the social stock of 
the signs and the rules o f their relationships which make parole possible. They are 
completely inter-dependent and can be fully understood only in juxtaposition to each
161 CLG, p.27-29
162 This description is situated in the Introduction o f  the CLG, before the Chapter I o f the First Part, 
where the principle o f  fundamental semiotic arbitrariness in introduced for the first time. Therefore, it 
is not as yet fully clarified the fact that the two faces o f  the signs are constituted by the system. 
However, there is a reference to the principle in p. 26 o f  the Introduction, where the faculty o f  langage 
is connected with the act o f  articulation, which is explained as follows: ‘In Latin articulus means 
“member, part, subdivision in a sequence o f  things”; as regards language, articulation can designate 
either the subdivision o f the spoken chain in syllables or the subdivision o f  the chain o f  significations 
in signifying units’; see also the note 157 o f  CLG .
163 See also de Mauro, CLG, p.iv
164 See my previous explanations regarding the use o f  the term ‘psychological’.
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other. The dependence o f each to the other, however, is of different order: langue is
the structure upon the basis o f which parole develops, while historically it was created
by parole. Langue, the individual receives passively and cannot change; parole is an
act of will and consciousness, allowing for initiative and originality. Langue is not the
sum of all the individual acts of parole. Langue is spoken by no-one; it exists partially
‘in the mind’ of each member of a linguistic (semiotic) community and it is complete
if their minds are considered collectively165. It is a kind of contract between the
members o f the community and needs to be learnt.
Distinguishing langue from parole, we distinguish at the same time: firstly, what 
is social from what is individual; secondly, what is essential from what is 
auxiliary [accessoire\, more or less accidental166
Saussure argues that the two faces of the semiotic phenomenon are heterogeneous to 
each other and, therefore, cannot be studied simultaneously. He chooses to
7/?7concentrate on linguistics o f langue .
I think it will be useful to clarify a certain confusion with regard to the 
classification of langue as either ‘subjective’ or ‘objective’. In the philosophical 
tradition, there are two different senses o f the ‘objective vs. subjective’ distinction, (a) 
In one sense this distinction is used is to differentiate between ‘the world as existing 
independently o f humanity’ and ‘the world as conceived by humans as a species’. If, 
therefore, we have the general disposition to perceive the world as having a property, 
for example as existing in space and evolving in time, and this perception is due to the 
human point of view alone, then the property is ‘subjective’, (b) Another sense is to
165 One would tend to say that langue is an abstraction o f  all the acts o f  parole  o f the members o f a 
semiotic community. However, Saussure insists that this is not the case (CLG, pp.32, 44). For 
Saussure, langue is an entity that exists concretely ‘in the minds’ o f  the members o f  a semiotic 
community. He have already mentioned Saussure’s hesitancy with regards the use o f the term 
‘abstraction’. We will try to address the ontological status o f  langue in the last sub-section o f  this 
chapter.
166 CLG, p.30
167 ibid, pp. 36-39
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distinguish between the perception of ‘all’ and the perception of any particular 
individual. We may all agree, for example, that the table is round but disagree 
regarding its beauty. Our tastes, then, are called ‘subjective’. And if I perceive the 
table as talking to me, this would most likely be considered a subjective perception. 
O f course, there is also the question o f what this ‘all’ encompasses — a large group of 
people, all o f humanity, a ‘representative sample’ of the species ‘human’. The 
important point about this definition is that ‘objective’ is something that has warrant 
outside my individual perception. Therefore, following the first sense of the 
distinction ‘objective/subjective’, langue is subjective. Whether there are some 
objective elements in the constitution of the human being that provide the grounding 
of langage-capacity is another question. Following the second sense of the 
‘objective/subjective’ distinction, langue is objective. It is not solely dependent on 
any particular individual act of parole. Its objectivity regarding any particular member 
of a semiotic community, and more importantly regarding any particular act of parole, 
is of social origin, not natural. This is a relative objectivity.
Another much debated point is the assumed ‘static-ness’ of langue. Saussure 
was clearly aware of the evolutionary aspect of semiotic systems. After all, this aspect 
was emphasised by the dominant trend of linguistics of his time, i.e. comparative 
linguistics. He recognises that there are two points of view from which a semiotic 
system can be studied: in relation to an axis o f succession and in relation to an axis of 
simultaneity; ‘diachronie’ and ‘synchronie ' m . The former resembles a horizontal 
cross-section of an object and the latter resembles a vertical cross-section. In CLG, a 
whole part is dedicated to each o f them 169. Saussure’s methodological innovation 
consists in establishing the importance o f the synchronic point of view; strictly
168 CLG, pp. 114-140
169 Second Part: Synchronic linguistics, pp. 141-192; Third Part: Diachronic linguistics, pp. 193-260
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speaking, the synchronic point of view was constituted for the first time by him. On 
the one hand, he makes clear that what constitutes a semiotic system as a semiotic 
system are the relations between ‘entities’ that co-exist. It is the concept of semiotic 
value which founds the structural nature of semiosis. This was new in the context of a 
linguistic science studying the etymology and the affiliations of isolated terms. On the 
other hand, the synchronic point of view is explicitly aimed against a ‘ panchronic’ 
view of language , often implicit in the ‘grammarian’ kind of linguistics. Far from 
being outside time, langue is situated in a particular socio-historical circumstance. 
Therefore, Saussure binds linguistics, viz. semiotics, to society and history. Not to 
confuse things, Saussure clearly considers socio-historical circumstances as external 
to the semiotic nature of langue. The dependence on them becomes apparent in the 
way each state of a language differs from the previous and successive ones. 
Consequently, in order to assess the structure o f a semiotic system one has to study a 
single state. As this is a study of ‘states’, it can be called ‘static’. This does not imply 
that semiotic systems are static; it means that we choose to study ‘artificially 
immobilised’ states of them. In absolute terms, a ‘state’ is defined by absence of 
change171. Saussure is once again fully aware that langue is constantly subject to 
transformation and to choose a state practically means not to take into account what 
one considers unimportant for one’s research. One would have to choose, for 
example, whether English has changed sufficiently in a decade or a century to be 
studied as a different language; whether American-English and Australian-English 
can constitute the same object of study etc. There are no definitive answers. This is a 
methodological choice, not a metaphysical one. It is left to each researcher to give 
their own provisional interpretation and put their own scientific hypotheses.
170 CLG, pp. 134-5
171 ibid, p. 142; see also
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One has to stress here that the question of parole and the question of 
diachrony are not one and the same, although they both introduce the dimension of 
time into the basically spatial conception o f the semiotic system. The distinction 
between langue and parole is one between a social structure and an individual act. 
The distinction between synchrony and diachrony, conversely, concerns points of 
view on the semiotic phenomenon, and mostly on langue; this particular social 
structure studied at a given state or through the sequence of successive states. 
However, Saussure claims that ‘everything that is diachronic in langue, it is so by 
parole’172. This means that the semiotic structure changes by incorporating 
innovations introduced by parole; nevertheless, not all o f parole's innovations are 
eventually incorporated into it. Saussure, unlike his immediate followers, does not 
consider the existence of either structural rules of transformation or jwo/e-structures; 
his is aware, though, that the ideal, theoretical distinctions do not always impose the 
exigencies of practical research.
To sum up, langue is a social construct and a structured system. I have 
observed that audiences with an analytic-philosophical background have a difficulty 
in grasping those notions, particularly in their combination. I think that this may be an 
inheritance of empiricism and logicism. So let me repeat the three points least 
understood: Firstly, langue is socially constructed; not to be identified either with the 
native set o f abilities and pre-dispositions, on the one hand, or with the individual use 
of language, on the other. Secondly, langue is a socially constructed structure; it 
encompasses something more abstract and complicated than a particular semantic 
range. Finally, langue is not static. Societies evolve along with their conventions; 
structures evolve. What is ‘static’ is a methodological choice of point of view.
172 CLG, p. 138
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Hjelmslev is particularly interested in the relation between langue and parole. 
He observes that Saussure’s distinction of langue vs. parole encompasses three 
oppositions: institution vs. execution, social v. individual, restricted vs. free.
1 7"}Hjelmslev uses each opposition as a criterion for a more detailed inner 
differentiation o f the semiotic phenomenon and he distinguishes four facets in it, in 




SCHEMA NORM USAGE ACT
[Figure 3.6. -  Hjelmslev: facets o f  the semiotic phenomenon]
‘Schema’ is the semiotic system as pure form; oppositional, relational and negative, 
without any positive quality. This is the level that constitutes the semiotic value. It is a 
social institution. ‘Norm’ is defined as the ‘material form’. This is the semiotic system 
including the level of semiotic substance. ‘Usage’ includes not only what is permitted 
by the system but also what is usual; i.e. ‘how people are accustomed to acting in 
given situations, or have in fact acted up to now’174. Finally, what remains is the free, 
individual semiotic ‘act’. Whether each of these facets is classified as belonging to the 
realm of langue or parole depends on which of the oppositions is considered as the 
definitional opposition between langue and parole. Hjelmslev considers that ‘the
1 7^essential border [is] the one between pure form and substance’ and that what is 
really new in Saussure’s concept of langue is what Hjelmslev himself has named
1 7A‘schema’ . Therefore, the most important sub-division for semiotic science is 
between schema and usage, which more or less correspond to Saussure’s langue and 
parole. As Barthes observes, the difference is that in Hjelmslev we have ‘a
173 ‘Langue et parole’ (1943) and ‘La stratification du langage’ (1954) in Essais, (pp. 77-89, 75-76)
174 Lang, p. 42
175 ‘Langue et parole’, (p.87)
176 ibid, (p.88-89)
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formalization of langue and a socialization of paro le '111. One should notice that the 
distinction form vs. substance is not one of the three Hjelmslev initially used as 
definitional criteria for his four-part division of the semiotic phenomenon, although he 
used it in describing each sub-division.
Usage is the semiotic process, i.e. the ‘texts’, where ‘text’ here includes the 
spoken utterances; whereas schemata are the semiotic systems, the structures that 
underlie them. Hjelmslev claims explicitly that 'a priori. .. for every process there is a
1 7ft • •corresponding system’ . He is critically self-aware enough to admit that his belief in
the necessary existence of underlying structures is a metaphysical conviction. The 
relation between system and process is not a mutual implication. The existence o f a 
process always presupposes the existence of a system; the existence of a system does
1 70not always presuppose the existence of a process . Furthermore, he believes that 
what ‘determines the identity and constancy’180 o f a semiotic system is its structure 
alone. If one adds his conviction that a theory must seek what is the invariant element
1 ft 1underlying fluctuations and changes , one understands why he chooses the structure 
of signification as his main object of study. He believes that, while the object domain 
of semiotics is the semiotic processes, its object o f study is the structures that underlie 
them; in other words, semioticians should study texts in order to learn about the
1 ft7 •semiotic systems . However, beyond semiotics proper, which he names 
‘glossematics’, there are opened the fields o f studying the usage. It is there that 
Hjelmslev classifies phonetics, grammatology, semantics, and even conceptual logic.
177 ‘Elements de s&niologie’, (p.95)
178 Prol, p. 5
179 Prol, p.24-25; see also Eco, A Theory o f  Semiotics, p.9
180 Lang, p. 37-38
181 Prol, p.4
182 ibid, p.9-10; Acta  IV, pp.vii-viii
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The relation between langue and parole, schema and usage, is a relation
between structure and process. Hjelmslev connects it with the relation between form
and substance. There is no question about the purely formal nature of the schema-
langue. However, the connection between substance and parole is not a definitional
one. A process is not by definition connected to the notion of substance. This is an
incidental characteristic of the semiotic phenomenon. Considering that structure is
purely formal and the semiotic phenomenon includes elements of substance, the
consequence is that what is not structure in the semiotic phenomenon is left with all
the elements of substance. In Hjelmslev’s systematization o f the semiotic
phenomenon, the distinction between form and substance is o f primary importance;
so, we are given the impression that what constitutes usage as such is the relation to
substance. There is a constant symmetry in the use of the two concepts. For example,
1a schema is ‘manifested’ by its usage, as a form is ‘manifested’ by its substance ; 
‘behind’ a text is a system, as ‘behind’ a substance is a form184. However, Hjelmslev
185is not conceptually confusing the two distinctions .
In the relation between schema and usage, the former is a constant and the 
latter a variable186. There is an implicit temporality in this opposition. The schema as 
a constant and its usage as a variable imply a difference in temporal terms; which 
involves a different order of temporality than the fact that semiotic systems, as 
schemata, change187. This second kind of temporality is connected to the relation
183 Prol, p. 51
184 ibid, p .61
185 ‘L’ analyse structurale du langage’ (1948) in Essais, (p.38)
186 Lang, p.40
187 Lang, p. 122
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between synchrony and diachrony in Saussure; this relation Hjelmslev chooses not to 
study and to limit himself in the research of synchrony755.
As we have seen, Saussure introduces two fundamental distinctions: between 
langue and parole, and between the synchronic and diachronic point of view. 
Correspondingly, he distinguishes between linguistics (viz. semiotics) of langue and 
linguistics of parole, on the one hand, and between synchronic and diachronic 
linguistics, on the other. He chooses to investigate the linguistics of langue and not of 
parole. In his courses he mentioned that he would later investigate the linguistics of 
parole’, but he never did. For Saussure, the synchronic and diachronic linguistics are 
two points of view of the linguistics of langue. He is concerned with both. Hjelmslev 
makes a slightly different classification. His glossematics is limited in the synchronic 
point of view. He discusses the relation of langue and parole inside the synchronic 
point of view. He chooses to concentrate on langue. So, whereas Saussure considers 
synchrony and diachrony inside the semiotics of langue, Hjelmslev considers the 
relation of langue and parole inside synchronic semiotics. The two fundamental 
distinctions -  between langue and parole, and between the synchronic and diachronic 
point of view -  are not isomorphic. They are, however, closely interlinked. It is the 
synchronic point of view on the semiotic phenomenon which revealed its systematic 
character, allowing structuralist semiotics to constitute its paradigmatic object of 
study: the langue or semiotic system. The synchronic point of view on langue is the 
novel and definitional methodological choice of structuralist semiotics.
1 RQAlexandras Lagopoulos explains the fundamental importance of the concept 
of ‘point o f view’ in Saussure’s theory. He reminds us of Saussure’s observation that 
in linguistics the object is not given but created by the point of view. One legitimate
188 ‘Langue et parole’ (1943) in Essais, (p.79); see also Prol and Uldall, Outline o f  Glossematics.
189 ‘From semiologie to postmodernism: A genealogy’, p. 12
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question would concern the ontological status of an object depending on the 
researcher’s point of view. One would have to decide whether the choice of point of 
view constitutes the object langue in the sense of creating it ex nihilio or revealing it 
or distinguishing it. The sense given to this ‘constitution’ of the object of study affects 
what one considers the epistemology of semiotics to be. However, no matter what 
sense is given to it, the concept of strategic choice of point o f view is indeed 
important for structuralist linguistics and, subsequently, semiotics. It is a case, maybe 
the most characteristic, of how the methodology in structuralism communicates with 
the content of the theory both ways: the choice to view the semiotic phenomenon in 
its structural aspect reveals its structural nature.
The structuralist semioticians are faced from the beginning of their research,
even before the beginning, with choices of this kind: langue and not parole,
synchrony and not diachrony. What is additionally interesting is that it is usually a
choice between two terms, defined relatively the one to the other; not necessarily in
opposition but certainly in mutual relation. Saussure claims that
the linguistic phenomenon presents perpetually two faces that correspond to each 
other and of which the one has no value without the other.190 [my Italics]
He offers the examples of enunciation/perception, sound/idea, viz. signifier/signified, 
individual/social, established system/evolution; we could add others, among which 
form/substance, signification/communication. One observes that what is described in 
the passage I cited is the principle of differentiation: two elements that have value by 
their relation. It is significant, I think, the use o f the verb ‘valoir’, i.e. ‘have value’. 
The very choice to perceive the semiotic phenomenon through these differentially 
defined couples is the first step toward a structuralist point of view. More precisely,
190 CLG, p.23
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the structuralist innovation is the realization of the differentional nature of these 
couples.
A differentional definition means that the two terms have no properties per se. 
They don’t have an essence. The properties of each are consequences of its relation to 
the other. Therefore, much depends on the positing of their relation by the researcher, 
which may mean the simple placing of the distinctive border between them or a more 
complicated function. As we have seen, the two initial methodological distinctions for 
semiotics are: (a) languelparole, or system/text, or structure/process, and (b) 
synchrony/diachrony, or static/evolutionary; which are not isomorphic but connected 
to each other. Lagopoulos, in ‘Static structuralism versus the dynamics o f structure’, 
classifies structuralist semiotic theories according to their way of making the first 
distinction, and rightly observes that ‘the very definition o f what constitutes the 
system or text in each case, depends on [the corresponding] theory’191. He also 
observes that this choice is ‘linked to a fundamental epistemological decision 
concerning the main locus of the creation of signification’. On the other hand, 
Saussure’s distinction between synchrony and diachrony has been one of his most 
controversial and highly contested positions. Many have claimed to overcome the 
division; first among them the members of the Prague Circle192. It is possible that
1 03most critiques are based on a key misunderstanding. As Tullio de Mauro rightly 
observes, the distinction has been misunderstood as being in re, whereas it is quite 
clear that Saussure considers it
191 p.l; Lagopoulos distinguishes four different currents o f  structuralist semiotics according to their 
strategic choice to focus on: ‘(I) the system, langue; (II) paro le  as the assumed direct result o f  the use 
of langue; (III) parole  as resulting from both langue and the conditions o f semiotic use, and also as 
forming langue; (IV )parole  as a self-sufficient and creative semiotic use in situation.’
192 See, for example, Roman Jakobson, ‘Language and Literature’ (1928) in Language in Literature, 
pp. 47-49, where he claims that ‘the history o f a system is in turn a system’ and refers to ‘types of 
structural evolution’.
193 CLG, note 176, pp.452-455
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an opposition of ‘points of view’; it has a methodological character, it concerns 
the researcher and his object [of study] and not the entirety of the things of which 
the researcher is occupied, his matter [of study].194 [additions mine]
Furthermore, the actual theoretical differences regard mostly the exact combination of 
the two methodological distinctions. As we have already noticed, whereas Saussure 
considers synchrony and diachrony inside the semiotics o f langue, Hjelmslev 
considers the relation of langue and parole inside synchronic semiotics. In the case of 
the Prague Circle, a main differentiation is their claim about the structurality of 
diachrony. De Mauro analyses this notion of structural diachrony into two elements: 
the first is teleologism, according to which the changes are produced for some reason 
immanent to the system; the second is anti-atomism, according to which changes are 
conditioned by the system to which they belong. Only the first notion is against the 
Saussurean positions. It is quite clear that for Saussure the changes occur accidentally; 
and he is right at least partially, otherwise knowing a language we would be able to 
predict its future changes. Another diversion, or rather extension, o f the Saussurean 
position is the notion of structures directing the way the langue is used, introduced by 
Hjelmslev’s concept of ‘usage’. Additionally, there is the notion of structures 
organizing each specimen of parole, i.e. each text, as elaborated by Greimas and 
others.
On the different takings of the two basic distinctions {langue!parole, 
synchrony/diachrony) depends the particular conceptualization of the relation between 
‘structure’ and ‘function’ with regards to the semiotic phenomenon, which is often 
different between semiotic theories. We have already referred to the two 
complementary points of view of the semiotic phenomena, as signification and as 
communication, and how it is generally accepted that the Copenhagen Circle placed
194 De Mauro, ibid
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the main emphasis on signification, whereas the Prague Circle to communication. 
However, the very decision o f which descriptions belong to each point o f view very 
much depends to what a theory considers the relation to be between structure and 
function-in-the-sense-of-use. To start with, semiotic structures are by definition 
functional, in the sense of not being essential. Here, the ambiguity between ‘function- 
as-relation’ and ‘function-as-use’ goes deeper than the level of the signifier. What an 
element of a semiotic structure is depends both on where it is in the structure and what 
it does:; however, what it does depends on where it is, as it must be obvious from the 
principle of fundamental arbitrariness and the relation between langue and parole in 
CLG. The question is to what extent the function depends on structure -  and we have 
seen that this dependence may extend beyond the limits Saussure considered. 
Dependence on a semiotic structure, however, does not mean necessarily depending 
on the semiotic system; we may consider other semiotic structuralities than the 
langue. Consequently, it is not easy to unambiguously classify a definition as 
structural or functional. The central semiotic paradox is the fact that every semiotic 
function in order to be semiotic has to depend on a structure, whereas it is still 
possible not only to say something new but also to change the structure in an 
unpredictable way.
3.6. Semiotic entities and semiotic relations
Langue, as we have seen, is a system; as such, it comprises elements and their 
relations. Being specifically a semiotic system, it is ruled by the principle of 
fundamental semiotic arbitrariness. This principle entails that the elements of semiotic 
structures are constituted by their relations. Therefore, in a semiotic system the 
relations precede the elements; one may conceive the elements as intersections, as
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knots produced by the net of relationships. In this sub-section, on the one hand, I will 
briefly refer to (a) the definition of the semiotic entities that are most interesting for 
our purposes; on the other, I will investigate (b) the mechanisms and the kinds of 
relations in semiotic structures.
Through our investigation up to now, we had the opportunity to make two 
observations which are relevant here: the semiotic phenomenon can be perceived in 
two interlinked ways, as signification and as communication; and semiotic entities are 
organised in different ways and levels. As regards the first observation, the definitions 
of semiosis as signification and communication are complementary to each other. The 
structure o f signification is the how; whereas the function o f communication -  in a 
general sense -  is the why. Structuralist semiotics has a functional conception of 
structure and a structural conception of function. Therefore, in this context, the 
prioritisation of one of the definitions never entails forgetfulness o f the other; it is a 
choice of point of view, secondary if compared to the main principles of 
structuralism. However, this choice does determine to some degree a semiotic theory; 
most importantly, delimits and orientates its field o f investigation. I should explain 
that when we distinguish between structural and functional semiotic entities, we may 
mean two different things. On the one hand, a unit is structural (or functional) if  it is 
defined with reference to its structure (or function). On the other, it is stmctural (or 
functional) because it has a structure (or function). According the latter definition, 
most entities that we study here are both structural and functional; although some tend 
to be more stmctural or more structured than others. However, it is the formal 
distinction to which I refer in this sub-section. In this sense, it is important to stress 
that a structural and a functional unit may designate the same entity. Additionally, 
because structure and function are so closely interconnected in stmcturalism, it is
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often difficult task to make a clear cut between structural and functional units, both 
conceptually and practically. As regards the second observation, when previously 
analysing the structure o f the sign-function, we have seen how it describes entities of 
different levels o f complexity: for example, both an English word and the English 
language. Therefore, we need to analyse the interlinked issues of how the elements 
fulfilling the condition o f sign-function are organised so as to produce structures of 
higher complexity, as well as how they are themselves produced by the semiotic 
structure. The question o f ‘semiotic structures’, in the plural, is o f a different order 
than the question o f ‘the structure o f sign-function’. Furthermore, we need to formally 
define the distinguishable entity ‘semiotic system ’, viz. ‘langue’, as differentiated 
from the more general use o f the term ‘semiotic structures’, previously opposed to 
semiotic processes. As the kinds o f relations that the semiotic units form in space and 
time depend on and determine the semiotic phenomenon as signification and 
communication, their study falls accordingly within different fields and points of view 
of semiotic investigation.
The most important scientific objects from the point o f view o f signification 
are the minimum semiotic unit and the semiotic system; in CLG  they correspond to 
the sign and langue. We consider them as structural entities because we distinguish 
and define them by a structural description195. Conversely, the central scientific object 
from the point of view o f communication is a functional entity, called by Saussure 
and Jakobson ‘message’, while Hjelmslev calls it ‘text’. Later, as used by the post­
structuralists, the term ‘text’ becomes a term that blends both structural and functional 
senses, embodying the very impossibility o f such distinctions. Let us just note in
195 O f course, they also are structured; they are actually the structures p a r  excellence in structuralist 
semiotics.
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passing that the term derives from a vocabulary o f writing and it was used by
Hjelmslev before taken by the post-structuralists.
So, the main functional semiotic entity according Saussure and Jakobson is
the message, a term they borrow from communication theory. Message is the semiotic
object that is exchanged in an act o f communication196. We have seen Saussure’s
taking of the communication circuit. Jakobson’s outlines it in the following terms:
The ADDRESSER sends a MESSAGE to the ADDRESSEE. To be operative a 
message requires a CONTEXT referred to [...]; a CODE fully, or at least partially, 
common to the addresser and the addressee [...]; and, finally, a CONTACT, a 
physical channel and psychological connection between the addresser and the 
addressee197
It is not by accident that Hjelmslev avoids the term ‘m essage’ in his theory, even
when he wants to describe the given object by the semiotic process to semiotic
analysis. He is not interested in the specific communicational process that provided
him with the object of his study. What he has is ‘a given’.
If the linguistic investigator is given anything [...], is the as yet unanalyzed text in 
its undivided and absolute integrity198
It goes without saying, and Hjelmslev states it anyway, that the term ‘text’ is 
generalizeable to the entirety of semiotic phenomena, beyond natural languages. The 
choice of the term concentrates on the main structural characteristic of this given: the 
co-existence of its elements under the scientific gaze o f the researcher. O f course, a 
piece of spoken language or performed music would also be classified as ‘text’. So, 
this ‘co-existence’ should more accurately perceived as closeness in space and time. 
Moreover, Hjelmslev in particular considers the relationship as abstract, only the 
manifestation of which expresses itself in spatio-temporal term s199. Nevertheless, the
196 In structural terms, a message is each instantiation of paro le .
197 ‘Linguistics and poetics’ in Language in Literature, (p.66)
m Prol, p. 7
m The question of whether the concept of structure can really be stripped of any form of spatiality and 
temporality is further addressed in my thesis.
i
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written text is a good example o f how this closeness may be vividly actualized in 
spatial terms, and I think this is the reason for its choice as exemplary. It is the 
concentration on the structural characteristic o f a functional unit that proves very 
helpful for researchers, such as Roland Barthes and Algirdas-Julien Greimas, who 
attempt to extend their studies beyond the distinctions as put by CLG. Additionally, 
the term ‘text’ is better suited than ‘message’ to describe the complexity* of the 
semiotic ‘given’. Umberto Eco200, taking into account Hjelmslev and Greimas, as well 
as newer findings of semiotic studies and communication theory, provides a much 
more complicated description of the communication circuit. Finally, for the post­
structuralists of the Tel Quel group, ‘text’ combines the advantages of avoidance of 
the metaphysics o f communication with an emphasis on the creative aspect of 
semiotic production. Therefore, the use o f the term ‘text’ substitutes for and gradually 
almost effaces the use o f the term ‘message’ in semiotic studies.
Conversely, through a structural description o f the semiotic phenomenon, we 
have gained a view of what Hjelmslev calls ‘the semiotic function’, i.e. the particular 
relation that constitutes semiosis. As we have seen, the semiotic relation characterises 
from a structural point o f view entities o f different degrees o f complexity; in the case 
of a natural language, for example, it characterises a prefix, a word, a sentence, a 
paragraph, the entire language. Then again, each o f these entities possesses other 
structural characteristics apart from the general structural principle which determines 
its semiotic nature. According to Saussure201, there are two mechanisms determining 
the semiotic structuration: ‘differentiation’ and ‘grouping’; Barthes202 rephrases them 
as ‘articulation’ and ‘integration’. Articulation is the differentional mechanism. The
200 Theory o f  Semiotics, pp. 139-142; see also ‘Introduction: The Role o f  the Reader’ in The Role o f  the 
Reader, (pp. 3-43)
201 CLG, p. 177
202 ‘Introduction a l’analyse structurale des recits’, (p.23)
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units produced by the articulation may and often are subject to further articulation. 
Integration, on the other hand, is the mechanism by which entities are composed into 
other entities o f a higher order of complexity. What Saussure did not concern himself 
with, while followers such as Barthes and Greimas did, is the way these ‘groups’ are 
organised, the inner structure of them; he simply ascribed them to the realm o f parole.
Two stmctural semiotic entities are particularly interesting for semiotic 
research. The first is the minimum semiotic unit under which the articulation no 
longer produces articula characterised by the semiotic function; in other words, the 
subdivision whose subdivisions no longer possess both an expression and a content 
plane. This is a refinement of the traditional concept o f the sign; a  necessary 
refinement after Hjelmslev’s attribution o f the stmctural characteristic o f  ‘semiotic 
function’ to many entities of different complexity. Articula  that are not sign-functions 
but enter into a sign-system as parts o f some sign-function are called by Hjelmslev 
‘figurae’.
The second interesting stmctural semiotic entity is, o f course, langue, i.e. the 
semiotic system. The semiotic system includes elements and m les for their 
combination. It is a different criterion o f stmctural classification which would lead us 
to recognise an entity as a ‘semiotic function’ from that which would lead us to 
recognise it as a ‘semiotic system’. Semiotic function is every entity that possesses the 
definitional double structure of semiosis. This structure, or rather meta-structure, is 
common to all semiotic systems, as well as any other entity worthy o f  the name 
‘semiotic’. A semiotic system, conversely, is a particular and arbitrary semiotic 
structure o f elements and mles. Here we should point out that whereas a semiotic
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system is a semiotic structure, not every semiotic structure is a semiotic system203; 
unless ‘structure’ is given a restrictive definition204. A semiotic system has other 
characteristics apart from being semiotic and a structure, such as being ‘a whole in 
itself and a principle o f classification’205. It is a limited object, whereas a structure is 
not necessarily so. It is a limited object, although it can produce unlimited and 
unpredictable number of texts. It is a limited object, even if  no user possesses it in its 
entirety. So, it is limited in different ways. However, it is quite difficult to delimit a 
semiotic system, both conceptually and in practice. The process of delimitation 
includes oppositions o f different orders:
(a) Firstly, the semiotic system is opposed to what is not systematic in 
semiosis. This is the opposition we already have discussed at length, between langue 
and parole. The opposition combines, however, two slightly different distinctions. On 
the one hand, there is the opposition between what is structured and follows some 
rules, and what is not. As both Hjelmslev and Jakobson have claimed, and despite 
Saussure, there is no question that parole , far from being a completely free act, is 
structured and subject to rules o f many kinds. On the other hand, there is the 
distinction between what is determined by the semiotic system and what is not. The 
question o f the extent of determination o f the semiotic phenomenon by the semiotic 
system, is the inverse side of the question o f where the semiotic system extends; in 
other words, it depends on what we define as semiotic system. If we consider 
everything that has to do with structuring and rules as belonging to the semiotic 
system, then the two distinctions coincide. Saussure, however, limits the field of 
langue to the level o f the sentence; and even then, he only considers the particular
203 This is an additional reason I disagree with Roy Harris’ choice to translate ‘langue’ as ‘linguistic 
structure’.
204 1 address this question in the next subsection.
205 CLG, p. 25
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kind of sentence that is a codified expression used as a single sign. Hjelmslev, 
conversely, allows for different levels of structuration. His initial problem was 
probably that defining langue as pure form, he could not account for the formal 
aspects of specific manifestations of a semiotic form, i.e. aspects purely formal but 
pertaining only to the specific manifestation. He solves it by introducing the 
distinction between ‘schema’, ‘norm’ and ‘usage’; as opposed to the completely non- 
structural part o f semiosis, the semiotic ‘act’. So, in order to define the extent to 
which ‘the semiotic system’ determines the semiotic phenomenon, we need to clarify 
in which of its senses we mean it.
(b) Secondly, a semiotic system is opposed to other semiotic systems. When 
we speak o f the relation between langue and paro le , we actually mean the langue and 
flie parole o f the same entity; it wouldn’t do to try and derive a German text from the 
French langue. So, we are actually often using the term ‘semiotic system ’ to denote 
this more general entity including a systematic and a non-systematic aspect. It is not a 
technical register of the term but it is necessary, considering that ‘semiotic system’ 
substitutes for ‘language in a generalised sense’. In this sense, Hjelmslev introduced 
the term ‘semiotic’ as a noun; ‘une sem iotique’206 is comprised by ‘une 
paradigmatique’ and ‘une syntagmatique’ -  only the former, as I shall explain, 
corresponds to the semiotic system strictly speaking. In any sense, a semiotic system 
is compared to and delimitated from other entities o f a similar nature to it. The 
question as to how one semiotic system is distinguished from another is conceptually 
easy: a semiotic system is a group o f rules and elements; therefore, a different 
semiotic system has different rules and different elements. Practically, this is not such 
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systems, whereas in the same system one may find variations o f  rules and elements. 
Furthermore, the differential character of the elements means that they fully depend 
on the system; ideally, the result is that the system must be a closed and autonomous 
entity of inter-dependent articula. The difference between one semiotic system and 
another, as we have examined at length in relation to H jelm slev’s stratification, is a 
difference between forms. In practice, however, there is no rule as to what precise
707amount o f difference in form constitutes a different system. As already Saussure 
had observed, the borders o f a semiotic system are not closed. While it is relatively 
easy to practically draw the line between French and painting, where we have two 
different kinds o f semiotic system, it is more difficult to draw the line between French 
and Italian, and even more difficult to draw the line between two different Italian 
dialects. In practice, the criteria delimiting a semiotic system include factors 
completely outside the realm of semiotics, which can be by no means considered 
either intrinsic or structural. In the case of national languages and local dialects, the
7 0£determining factors are history and politics . However, in semiotics our criteria need 
by definition to be intrinsic; and it is practically impossible by intrinsic criteria to 
rigorously delimit a semiotic system. Nevertheless, this does not affect conceptually 
the definition o f the semiotic system but rather the determination of any particular 
semiotic system. We should note here that in the functional entity o f ‘text’, which we 
discussed earlier, it is possible the fusion of elements of different origin; i.e. the co­
existence o f elements, structures, codes and rules belonging to different semiotic 
systems. One can observe a difference between the structural entity 4parole’, which is
207 He addresses the question o f  frontiers between langues, in the conceptual and geographical sense, as 
well as the difference between language and idiom in Part IV o f  CLG.
208 A very instructive exam ple is the Serbo-Croatian language, which was officially divided into two 
languages, the Serbian and the Croatian, after the division o f  Yugoslavia in 1991. Ironically enough, 
double dictionaries have been published since to translate between what until recently was considered 
the same language. D ifferences o f  dialect were accentuated or introduced. In a few hundred years, it is 
quite possible that people w ill really need translation between them.
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the opposite facet o f a langue, and the functional entity ‘text’, which is the semiotic 
‘given’.
(c) Thirdly, the semiotic system is opposed to the stmctural entities, of 
different degrees o f complication, which it articulates. Hjelmslev defines a semiotic as 
a hierarchy209 ; and analyses in detail the relations inside this hierarchy. A semiotic 
system may include sub-systems and be included in super-systems. This does not 
mean, of course, that all the stmctural entities com posing a system are systems 
themselves. Nor does it mean that the difference between a semiotic system and other 
stmctural semiotic entities is just a difference in degree o f  complication. There can be 
very simple semiotic systems; there can also be very complicated stmctural semiotic 
entities which are not systems. There is no threshold o f  size or complexity. The 
criterion for recognising a semiotic system as opposed to other stmctural semiotic 
entities is its autonomy, self-containment and self-reference. A semiotic system 
constitutes its sub-divisions; it produces and groups them  in the same move. Each 
sub-division becomes signifying by its position in the overall system, as we have 
seen. Its position in the system is not the only criterion deciding the meaning of an 
element; its communicational environment, at each particular use, also determines it. 
However, the signification produced by the structure is a necessary precondition for 
any further meaning an element can acquire. It is a condition of possibility of any 
production of meaning and needs to be learnt.
There are two ways o f articulation-integration o f semiotic elements: in 
praesentia and in absentia; they have come to be called, respectively, the 
‘syntagmatic’ and the ‘paradigmatic’. The first relation is between elements that co­
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elements, associated by the human ability of memory. Both are ‘in large part
9 i nestablished by the langue'’ . Both relations contribute to the generation of 
signification by constituting its structure. On the one hand, the syntagmatic relation, 
being defined by the co-existence in a communicational unit, seems to show an 
affinity with the communicative aspect of semiosis. However, it is no less structural 
relation than the paradigmatic. Furthermore, we should clearly distinguish the term 
‘syntagmatic’ from the term ‘syntactic’, deriving from ‘syntax’; we will eventually 
see that syntactic is a subset of syntagmatic. On the other hand, the paradigmatic 
relation, taking place ‘in memory’, must remind us o f the way higher-degree
911 •semiotics are constituted . Finally, the sense o f the term ‘paradigmatic’ in this 
context should not be confused with the sense ‘exemplary’ that the term has in 
different contexts, a meaning that derives from its Greek ancestry.
The two kinds of structure-generating relations -  syntagmatic and 
paradigmatic -  have been described, in slightly different terms, by all prominent
91 9semioticians. Saussure says that the relations and differences between linguistic 
terms develop in two different spheres, each generating values o f different order. The 
first is founded on the linear character o f language and produces groups of 
consecutive units, syntagms. The second is founded on something that different 
elements share in the level of the signifier, o f the signified, or both; it produces groups 
of thus associated units, paradigms213. A semiotic term, therefore, belongs to and is
210 CLG, p. 176
211 See sub-section 3.2. Actually, connotation as studied by Jakobson is based on both kinds o f  relation: 
metaphor on the paradigmatic relation and metonymy on the syntagmatic relation. We will see, 
however, that an extended definition o f the paradigmatic relation includes previously made syntagmatic 
connections. A further point to be made is that, considering connotation and m eta-semiosis are not 
structurally distinguished, meta-semiosis has to rely on the paradigmatic relation too.
1X2 CLG, pp. 170-184
213 Not to be confused with the ‘epistemological paradigm’ (see Kuhn, The Structure o f  Scientific 
Revolutions) or the Greek meaning o f  the word (i.e. ‘exam ple’), although there are interesting 
interconnections.
170
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE 
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
CHAPTER 3: STRUCTURALIST SEMIOTICS
determined by, on the one hand, a chain of co-existing terms214 and, on the other, a 
constellation of absent terms, o f which it is the center. Hjelmslev215 calls ‘hierarchy’ a 
‘class of classes’. He distinguishes two sorts o f hierarchies, processes and systems, 
which he names respectively, ‘syntagmatics’ and ‘paradigmatics’216. They are 
founded on two different mechanisms o f human reason: the function ‘both-and’, on 
the one hand, and the function ‘either-or’, on the other. Couples of terms constituted 
by either mechanism can be related to each other with regards causality in three ways: 
mutual implication, one-way implication or no causal relation at all217. The classes 
comprising a syntagmatic are called syntagms, and they are chains in the case of 
natural languages; they are further partitioned into smaller parts. The classes 
comprising a paradigmatic are called paradigms; they are articulated in smaller 
members. A semiotic -  une semiotique -  is a super-hierarchy comprised by both kinds 
of hierarchies. Hjelmslev identifies ‘syntagmatic’ with ‘text’218 and ‘paradigmatic’
0 1 0  o o nwith ‘langue’ . For Jakobson there are two double-faced modes of arrangement: 
the first is combination/contexture, in which any linguistic unit ‘serves as a context 
for simpler units and/or finds its own context in a more complex linguistic unit’; the 
second is selection/substitution, in which there are arranged units that are ‘equivalent 
in some respect and different in another’. In the former, the entities are conjoined in
214 It is interesting to notice that in CLG  the term ‘structure’ refers to these ‘chains’ -  a sense which is 
completely unrelated to the subsequent use o f  the term by structuralists.
215 Prol, pp. 18-37; Essais, pp.49-52 ; and Hans Jorgen U ldall, Outline o f  G lossem atics, pp. 42 ff.
216 The terms ‘syntagmatic’ and ‘paradigmatic’ are used here as nouns { ‘une syntagm atique’, ‘une 
paradigm atique'), the same way as the term ‘sem iotic’ is used ( ‘une sem iotique’). It is important to 
remember that both a syntagmatic and a paradigmatic p ossess a content-plane and an expression-plane.
217 Hjelmslev names each o f these relations: interdependence, determination and constellation. 
Additionally, he gives two other sets o f  names according to whether these are syntagmatic or 
paradigmatic.
l* See earlier in this sub-section how co-existence constitutes the structural characteristic o f  the 
functional unit ‘text’.
219 The main difference between Saussure’s langue and H jelm slev’s paradigm atique  is that the latter 
includes explicitly the rules o f  formation o f  phrases, the equivalent to Noam  Chom sky’s ‘competence’.
220 ‘Two Aspects o f  Language and Two Types o f  Aphasic Disturbances’ (1956) in Language and 
Literature, (pp.95-114)
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the actual message, although they may also be conjoined in the code; the relation is 
based on contiguity. In the latter, the entities are conjoined in the code but not in the 
message; the relation is based on similarity. Jakobson finds a correspondence between 
the two modes of semiotic arrangement and the two types o f aphasia: the first type of 
aphasia is a disturbance o f the combination/contexture relation and causes problems 
with the hierarchy o f linguistic units and the use o f metonymy; the second type is a 
disturbance of the selection/substitution relation and causes problems with the use of 
metalanguage and metaphor. Jakobson also makes correspondences o f the two modes 
of semiotic arrangement to the two sets o f Peirce’s interpretants, to Freud’s 
mechanisms of the dream, and to Frazer’s classification o f magic rites. Barthes221, in 
his idiosyncratic presentation of the elementary concepts o f semiotics, identifies the 
syntagmatic mechanism to the function o f decoupage and the paradigmatic 
mechanism to the function o f classification. He traces this division o f the semiotic 
phenomenon through Hjelmslev, Jakobson and Martinet. He observes that there are 
two cases where this fundamental division becomes less clear: dream and art. 
Interestingly, he uses the terms ‘monstrous’, ‘perverted’ and ‘scandal’ to describe 
them.
We will investigate a bit further the two different classes of semiotic sub­
divisions: the syntagm and the paradigm. The syntagm222, as we have said, is the 
group of in praesentia related semiotic terms. Having accepted the linear character of 
natural languages223, we infer that the syntagm in this case is linear -  a ‘chain’ as
221 Elements de sem iologie, pp. 114-130
222 For the following two paragraphs, I m ainly used the three sem iotic dictionaries: Ducrot and 
Todorov, Dictionnaire encyclopedique des sc ien ces du langage, pp. 139-146, 375-382, 443-448;
Ducrot and Schaeffer, Nouveau dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences du langage , pp. 594-607, 
764-775; Greimas and Courtes, Sem iotique: D ictionnaire raisonne de la  theorie du langage, pp. 66- 
67,102-106, 376-377, 389-390; I also used H jelm slev, Prol, p.28 and Lagopoulos, ‘Static structuralism 
versus the dynamics o f  structure’, p.23 and ‘From sem iolog ie  to postmodernism: A genealogy , p. 14
223 At least classic structuralists share this premise.
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and Hjelmslev call it. We also infer that, accordingly, different kinds of 
;jfcmiotics may have syntagms o f more dimensions. There are two definitions oft
jyntagm: the wider definition considers syntagm every element that co-exists in an 
iterance; the narrower definition demands that the terms are related according to the 
tittles of the system, which include syntax and grammar. In the latter definition, the 
Jimer organization o f the syntagm becomes important; in the case of natural 
slanguages, this means the order o f succession. Thus, [she left the web] and [the web 
pie left] are syntagms in English language, while [she the left web] is not. Another 
ivergence between definitions is that some semioticians, following Saussure, 
consider that the syntagmatic relation exists only between semiotic, i.e. two-plane, 
elements; others, like Hjelmslev, recognize its existence even in the level of figurae. 
■Finally, Saussure limited the range of syntagms in compound words and typified 
fhrases, whereas since it has been extended in larger semiotic units.
i,
|  Hjelmslev, as we have just seen, identifies the syntagmatic hierarchy with the
i.e. ‘the semiotic given’. Initially, ‘tex t’ and ‘writing’ were opposed to
pJtterance’ and ‘discourse’ according to the difference in substance o f expression.
fwhen this difference ceased to be considered o f structural importance, the generalized
Versions of the terms became co-extensive. Furthermore, ‘w riting’ and ‘discourse’ as 
\
fCpposed to ‘text’ and ‘utterance’ imply the difference between an action and the
let of this action. However, the two meanings are amalgamated already in
sical structuralism, and more explicitely after the post-structuralist critique. Then, 
iiscourse’ and ‘text’ imply more strongly than ‘utterance’ the fact that they are 
emally structured. Finally, the reasons for the preference o f the term ‘text’ over all 
others, a term that derives from a vocabulary o f writing, were already implied 
flier and will be further explained in relation to Derrida’s project. In structuralist
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‘ semiotics today all these terms are often used interchangeably as they are founded in 
the syntagmatic relation. ‘Context’ is the wider unit o f text that surrounds the text 
under consideration. There are two kinds o f contexts: the explicit context, which 
belongs to the same semiotic with the text under consideration, and the implicit or 
situational context, which does not. Hjelmslev believes that natural languages can 
render any implicit context explicit. The concept o f context is also in a way the bridge 
between the semiotic and the extra-semiotic, as situational context includes semiotic 
and extra-semiotic components. Jakobson rightly relates the determination of the 
referent of a semiotic entity to its context.
The in absentia related group o f semiotic terms is called a paradigm224. For 
Saussure, the terms of a paradigm should share some common characteristic, either at 
the level o f signified or at the level o f signifier or both. So, for example, some of the 
paradigms to which the word ‘web’ belongs are: [web, wed, weld, well, wend, ...], 
where the terms are grouped together by their signifier; [web, tissue, loom, cloth, pall, 
net, nexus, plexus, complex, grid, tex t,...], where the terms are grouped together by 
their signified; and [web, weave, w eaver,...], where the terms are grouped together by 
both their signifier and their signified. The wider definition o f paradigm, however, 
includes any class o f semiotic elements, irrespectively o f the principle of 
classification which unites them. This eventually includes previously existed 
syntagms, as long as they are stored in the collective memory o f a semiotic 
community. Jakobson gives a much narrower definition o f paradigm: its members,
24 For the following three paragraphs, I m ainly used the three sem iotic dictionaries: Ducrot and 
Todorov, Dictionnaire encyclopedique des sc ien ces du langage, pp. 137, 139-146; Ducrot and 
Schaeffer, Nouveau dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences du langage, p. 538; Greimas and 
Courtis, Semiotique: D ictionnaire raisonne de la  theorie du langage, pp. 26-34, 39-40, 266, 197-199, 
229-230; I also used Barthes, Le degree zero  de I ’ecriture  and ‘Introduction a 1 analyse structurale des 
rtcits’; Eco, A Theory o f  Sem iotics, p p .57-136 ; Greimas, Sem antique structurale: recherche de 
s nithode, Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1966; Norris, ‘R eview  Article — Questions o f  Method. Greimas s 
f'Structural Semantics’
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according to him, must be able to substitute for each other in the same syntagm. This 
coincides with Hjelmslev’s definition o f category, which is a specific kind of 
paradigm. The terms o f a paradigm are generally o f no predetermined number or 
hierarchical order. However, there are paradigms o f limited number of members, such 
as the declinations of a noun; there are also paradigms with internal structure. An 
organized paradigm is a code. Hjelmslev considers the entirety o f a langue, along 
with its rules of usage, as a paradigmatic hierarchy -  une paradigmatique. There are 
larger structured paradigms than the particular semiotic systems; such as Quantum 
Mechanics or Western metaphysics225. The entire culture o f a semiotic community is 
a structured paradigm, a kind of super-code, including all the other semiotic systems 
used by the community along with their rules o f construction and inter-relation. This 
is called a ‘semiotic universe’ and it can be only partially accessible, through the texts 
it generates.
Hjelmslev defines ‘category’ as a paradigm  endowed with a determined 
function. Because of the relational nature o f semiosis, a category can be designated 
only in relational terms. We can, therefore, refer to the ‘masculine /feminine’ category 
but not in the category o f ‘masculine’ alone. This does not mean that the categories 
are necessarily two-termed; they may contain more terms. It means, however, that the 
elementary semiotic structure is a relation o f at least two terms. O f great interest for 
semiotic study are the kinds of relation that can be formed between these terms. Many 
semioticians have attempted to construct models and typologies o f these relations. 
Greimas’s famously obscure ‘semiotic square’ is the visual representation of the 
logical articulation of semantic categories, according its inventor. Hexagonal models 
have also been also proposed. Categories are organized into larger paradigmatic
225This sense relates to Kuhn’s ‘scientific paradigm’ and Foucault’s ‘episteme
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packages, which are called ‘micro-universes’. A paradigm detected in a particular text 
is an ‘isotopy’. The term was introduced from chemistry to semiotics by Greimas. 
Operatively, it is the repetition in the text o f terms belonging in the same paradigmatic 
package that allows us to recognize an ‘isotopy’. Isotopies include paradigmatic 
packages o f which the members are entire categories. We can thus recognize in a text 
multi-isotopies, complex isotopies and modalities. Greimasian isotopies belong to the 
content-plane. Enlarged definitions, however, include the expression-plane.
The concept of isotopy constitutes the correspondence between a paradigmatic 
group, usually structured, and its syntagmatic expression. It thus allows us to achieve 
a more detailed and rigorous structural description o f the ‘text’. Greimas and Barthes 
have extensively investigated the paradigmatic aspect o f the content o f texts; and their 
studies are particularly relevant to Derrida’s technique o f deconstructive reading. For 
them, texts have also structural criteria o f delimitation, other from their accidental 
appearance by an act o f communication. A text, in this sense, is both a coherent unit 
and a part o f a greater organization. On the one hand, it becomes unified and coherent 
by the repetition of terms belonging in the same paradigmatic packages; i.e. isotopies. 
It has a style. It corresponds to a micro-universe, which can be articulated in 
subordinated micro-universes. On the other hand, it is exactly their including of 
paradigmatic packages that opens texts to their wider context. Texts incorporate 
through their isotopies relations to other texts. This function was analyzed by 
Kristeva, who called it ‘intertextuality’. Consequently, interpreting texts involves 
analyzing the internal organization o f their isotopies into codes and their inter-relation 
into super-codes, which eventually leads us to relate them to a much wider context.
An issue that emerges recurrently in the previous paragraphs is the structure of 
both syntagms and paradigms. This organization is interwoven with notions of
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spatiality and temporality. The differentional aspect o f the principle of fundamental 
semiotic arbitrariness dictates that the ‘deeper’ generative mechanism of the semiotic 
is digital. Semiotic terms are constituted by what they are not. However, when 
grouping terms together, we treat them as entities that share some characteristic; we 
group them according to what they are. It is important to stress that this is not a 
contradiction. The differentional mechanism conceptually precedes the mechanism of 
classification. Actually, the mechanism of classification is based on the mechanism of 
differentiation. The criterion of classification -  whether this is a position in a system 
or a text -  is the product o f a differential process. Thus, properties depend on position.
Initially, Saussure conceptualized syntagms and paradigms as simple 
‘groupings’, ‘groupem ents\ without any indication about an inner structure. 
However, when he refers to syntagms as ‘chains’ and connects them to the linearity of 
the signified of natural languages, a dimension is introduced. He conceives it as a 
temporal dimension; he speaks o f the succession o f signs in speech. It is just the 
representation of this temporal linearity by writing that appears as a spatial dimension. 
Not sharing Saussure’s certainty o f the primacy o f  the spoken forms o f natural 
languages over their written forms, we may generalize that the linearity o f a syntagm 
means that it possesses one dimension, either temporal or spatial. Additionally, this 
dimension is directed. Either as a spoken utterance or as a piece o f written text, the 
syntagm o f a natural language has a determined direction. This necessarily implies 
that the terms constituting a syntagm appear in a particular order. Saussure does not 
analyze how its particular order affects a syntagm. His suspicion that semiotic 
systems other than natural languages, such as the visual semiotic systems, probably 
have signifieds of more dimensions implies that he could symmetrically conceive of 
multi-dimensional syntagms too. Paradigms, on the other hand, are compared in CLG
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to constellations around the term under consideration. It is explicitly stated that the 
terms of a paradigm are o f ‘indeterminate order’226. Saussure clearly conceives of the 
paradigm as a group of ‘loose’ terms; in the model o f constellation he uses the spatial 
dimensions in a figurative and not literal sense.
Saussure’s successors were very much interested in the inner organization of 
syntagms and paradigms. Many semioticians, notably Jakobson, visualized the 
opposition between the syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations as intersecting axes, 
introducing direction in the syntagmatic axis. The model o f axes has been proved very 
strong and was almost hypostasized by the collective imagination o f semioticians; it 
has stealthily introduced a double linearity. Hjelmslev is not part of this tradition. He 
conceptualizes syntagms and paradigms as classes, and classes o f classes. He analyses 
and classifies all the possible relations that can be established inside and between 
them. O f particular interest is the relation o f ‘hypotaxis’, which subordinates an 
element or a structure to a superior element o f structure. This relation introduces the 
conceptual possibility o f exceeding linearity. Following him, and as predicted by 
Saussure, semiotic systems other than natural languages were studied, with syntagms 
possessing more than two spatial and/or temporal dimensions. Following him, as we 
have already seen, structural semantics studied extensively the structure o f paradigms, 
from categories to codes. What is interesting, however, is that, unlike Jakobson, 
Hjelmslev conceived the syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations as completely bereft 
of spatiality and temporality. He thought that space and time were part o f their 
manifestation alone, which he considered contingent. Nevertheless, against his 
intentions, we have seen in sub-section 3.3. that elements o f spatiality and temporality 
cannot but expand into the domain o f semiotic form — both in the expression-plane
226 p. 174
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and the content-plane. I think that a certain spatio-temporality is intrinsic to what is 
described as the structure o f syntagms and paradigms; unlike the metaphoric use of 
‘axes’ and ‘constellations’.
Summarising the second part o f the sub-section, semiotics are constituted and 
formed by different orders and kinds o f relations, and they are structured in multiple 
levels. The fundamental principle o f semiotic arbitrariness entails that the basis of all 
these relations is differentiality. Generative mechanisms o f the all the multiple levels 
of structure are the completely interdependent mechanisms of articulation and 
integration. General kinds o f structural relations are, firstly, those that determine the 
co-existence or not o f terms: in praesentia and in absentia; secondly, relations of 
dependence: interdependence, determination, constellation; thirdly, topological 
relations of order and subordination. The relations that characterise the meta-structure 
that share all semiotics are: firstly, signification, i.e. the relation between a plane of 
expression and a plane o f content; secondly, manifestation o f a form in substance; 
thirdly, manifestation o f a system in processes; fourthly, as semiotic structures evolve, 
it is possible to study them synchronically and diachronically. Finally, there are the 
particular relations that characterise a semiotic and distinguish it from any other; there 
are also some particular relations that characterise only a specific instantiation o f the 
semiotic, a text, and distinguish it from the other texts the same semiotic generates.
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~~A. GENERAL KINDS OF STRUCTURAL RELATIONS
1. of co-existence: both-and, either-or _________________________
2. of dependence: interdependence, determination, constellation
3. of topology: order, hypotaxis-hyponymy etc___________________
l i .  THE SEMIOTIC META-STRUCTURE
1. signification: content-expression______________________________
la. degrees of semiotics (denotation, connotation, meta-semiosis)
2. manifestation (i): langue-parole_______________________________
2a. levels of substance__________________________________________
3. manifestation (ii): system-process_____________________________
4. in evolution —»two points of view: synchrony-diachrony________
~C. PARTICULAR SEMIOTIC STRUCTURES
1. the structure of a particular semiotic____________________________
2. the structure of a particular semiotic instantiation, i.e. of a text_____
[Figure 3.7. -  Sem iotic relations]
3.7. The structu ra list concept of struc tu re
Having described quite extensively semiotic structures as perceived by structuralists, I
227will now attempt to deduce a definition o f the structuralist concept o f structure . As 
I have implied earlier, the difficulty o f this task lies not in the lack of definitions of 
the concept but rather in their redundancy, as well as in the hidden, unspoken 
premises of the existent definitions. In the structuralist discourse, several claims about 
stmcture are made; different uses o f the term appear from theory to theory, as well as 
in the context of the same theory; several different structural objects are defined, of 
which the names sometimes become interchangeable; whereas structure is not only 
the central concept but also the main analytical tool. Additionally, structure
227 This sub-section is mainly an organisation o f  observations made during the analyses o f  the entire 
chapter 3 till now, as well as sub-sections 2.5 and 2.6 from chapter 2. It, therefore, relies to the same 
bibliographic sources as they do; which I w o n ’t repeat here. It is, however, particularly indebted to 
Greimas and Courtes, Semiotique: D ictionnaire raisonne de la  theorie du langage, pp. 360-366, Louis 
Hjelmslev, Prolegomena', Alexandros Lagopoulos, ‘Static structuralism versus the dynamics o f  
structure’; Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology', and Hans Jorgen Ulldall, Outline o f  
Glossematics’.
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communicates with other concepts, such as ‘system’ and ‘form ’, with the danger of 
being confused with them . Furthermore, as structuralist semioticians were aware of 
and in dialogue with the advances in abstract mathematics and mathematical logic, the 
structuralist definitions o f the concept o f structure are influenced in different degrees 
by mathematical definitions, but not identified to them229. Finally, the concept 
occasionally retains elements from its previous philosophical definitions, of building 
or organic origin; without sharing their metaphysics. The minimum common 
denominator of all these would define it as a mode o f organization. Nevertheless, 
despite the complexity just described, structuralist semiotics -  or rather semiotic 
structuralism -  did unquestionably give a distinctively novel definition o f structure, 
intimately connected with its radical re-definition o f signification. This is the reason I 
needed to start from semiotic structures in order to deduce through abstraction the 
definition of the concept of structure; of which Levi-Strauss says that has a structure
970  <* •too . As the semiotic structure par excellence is langue, this is the obvious point of 
departure. We need, however, to compare it to the other uses of the term in 
structuralist semiotics in order not to fall in the trap o f completely identifying the two 
concepts. Selecting elements from the analyses o f the previous sub-sections, through a 
process of comparison and elimination, I attempt to clear up conceptual ambiguities. 
Particular stress is given on the spatial and temporal elements o f  the definitions, as it
228 Derrida, for example, cautions us not to confuse structures with ideas or forms or syntheses or 
systems, ‘Letter’, p.2
2 9 Concepts like ‘structure’, ‘system ’, ‘set’, ‘function’, ‘category’, ‘linearity’, ‘com plexity’, 
‘isomorphism’, ‘isotopy’ etc are defined, som etim es in more ways than one, by different mathematical 
theories. There is no question that structuralist definitions communicate with the mathematical ones, 
particularly as classical structuralism subscribes to scientifism , in its ambition to promote semiotics to 
the level o f  mathmatical sciences. Structuralist sem ioticians had different degrees o f  knowledge and 
understanding o f the mathematical concepts; H jelm slev and Uldall were o f  the most mathematical- 
oriented among them, both in the sense o f  information and understanding. However, the differences 
between semiotic theories and the mathematical ones by which they are inspired are several. It is 
beyond the scope o f  my thesis to investigate the exact mathematical theoretical background o f  semiotic 
theories and their complicated inter-relations to it. I am using som e mathematical concepts and terms, 
adapted to my object o f  study, when necessary for its clarification, as semioticians have done.
230 Social Anthropology, p.278
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is shown that structure is intimately connected with a kind o f spatiality and 
temporality.
231As Lagopoulos observes, ‘structure’ may denote either an organization 
between existing elements or an organization by itself. In structuralist semiotics, it is 
the later, completely relational, sense o f the concept that is used. The reason lies with 
the principle o f fundamental semiotic arbitrariness and the differentiality principle it 
entails. It is rooted, however, in a more general epistemological position, as it is 
explained by the founders o f Glossematics. Uldall232 argues that we are wrongly 
accustomed to think under the Aristotelian trichotomy o f ‘things’, that have 
‘properties’ and engage in ‘activities’. M odem science has shown this to be an 
illusion. It has first ‘obliterated the boundary between property and activity’ and then 
questioned ‘existence as divorced from property-activity’. The original three aspects 
are thus reduced to one, and this one is conceived in terms of functions; where 
‘function’233 is meant in the sense o f ‘relation’. Uniting existence, property and 
activity, ‘function’ in this context amalgamates different senses o f ‘relation’, which 
include topology, operation and logical dependency. Therefore, as Hjelmslev234 puts 
it, the totality of knowledge does not consist o f things but o f relationships. Objects are 
‘nothing but intersections of bundles o f ... dependencies’. An entity is defined by the 
way it functions, i.e. its dependencies with other entities and the role it fulfills, the 
‘place’ it assumes. The fact that semiotics is concerned with structure should not 
confuse us, he says. Structure is not an object but a ‘functional net’; its functives are 
defined by its functions. Whether all structuralist semioticians explicitly subscribe to
231 ‘Static structuralism versus the dynam ics o f  structure’, p .3
232 ‘Outline o f  Glossem atics’, pp.8-9, 37
233 According to one o f  its mathematical definitions, ‘function’ it is a particular kind o f  map between 
two sets: a many-to-one but not one-to-m any map. In Glossematics the term actually corresponds more 
closely to the general concept o f ‘map’. The technical sense o f  the term ‘relation in Glossematics 
denotes particularly the syntagmatic function, whereas the paradigmatic function is called co-relation .
234 Pro/, pp. 14, 21, 51 and Lang, p. 8. A lso  see Anne Henault, H istoire de la  semiotique, p.60
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this general epistemological position or not, they certainly agree to it with regards to 
the semiotic domain. The primacy o f relation, intrinsically connected to the de- 
essentialisation o f signification, entails a completely topological conception of the 
semiotic.
An important characteristic o f this functional net is that it cannot be reduced to 
binary oppositions, even if it is composed o f binary oppositions. This was, for 
example, the innovation that Claude Levi-Strauss235 brought to anthropology, 
opposing his predecessor in the field, Alfred Radcliffe-Brown. Radcliffe-Brown was 
the first to introduce some form of structuralism in anthropology but his kinship 
structures are eventually equated with dyadic relations between individuals. Levi- 
Strauss shows that it is impossible to understand the kinship relations if  you don’t take 
into account also some relations between the relations, which make the system 
irreducible to binary relations. This happens because, as Hjelmslev observes, this 
system is hierarchical. And this makes structures different from mere intelligible 
concepts. They contain some form of spatiality. In this spatiality, as we shall see, is
• • • 236included a form of temporality, where time is considered as a kind o f space .
Therefore, the two definitional characteristics o f structuralist structure are its 
being relational and topological. These introduce the concept into wider philosophical 
and scientific debates. On the one hand, if  structure is considered as completely 
relational, its definition becomes interwoven with a typology of relations. The 
typology of logical relations has been historically the object of philosophical logic 
and more recently of mathematical logic. On the other, the spatio-temporal aspect of
235 ‘Social Structure’ in Social A nthropology, see particularly pp. 304-305
236 In Modem Theoretical Physics, there is a crucial controversy over whether time is a dimension or a 
parameter. The former position underlies the theory o f  General Relativity, whereas the latter the 
Quantum theory. The two theories, each explaining successfully  but partially the world, are 
incompatible to each other. The solution o f  the problem o f  the time is one o f  the central objectives o f  
the several theories that try, unsuccessfully till now, to com bine the two foundational theories o f  
Modem Physics. Structuralist sem iotics generally subscribes to a conception o f  time as dimension.
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Structure situates it in the wider context o f philosophical and scientific debates about 
space and time. I will now analyze the classification o f semiotic relations, as 
construed in the previous sub-section237, in order to deduce the characteristics of the 
Structuralist notion o f structure. In the process, I will deal with several related issues 
and necessary clarifications.
To start with, the principle o f differentiality, which entails the relational nature 
of structure, is in a sense pre-structural. Whereas structures have dimensionality, this 
first principle, by being defined completely negatively, is based on a logic of excluded 
middle. This at least is the classical interpretation o f it, as derived from the famous 
passages in CLG. The mechanisms o f articulation and integration are the operation(s) 
that generate/construct the topological space o f structures; they are the bridge between 
differentiality and structure. They also may be conceived as structural, in the sense of 
structural law.
The relations that I classified as ‘general kinds o f structural relations’ (A) 
correspond to the general concept o f structure before being specialized as semiotic; 
which is exactly what we seek to define in this sub-section. Firstly (1), there is the
23 8distinction between in praesentia and in absentia relations. Hjelmslev , calls them 
the ‘both-and’ function and the ‘either-or’ function; and sees them as corresponding to 
the logical operations o f ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’, as well as to ‘co-existence’ 
and ‘alteration’, respectively. The former correspondence is logical, the latter 
topological. Secondly (2), there are three kinds o f dependences. Hjelmslev calls
i
them: interdependence, determination, and constellation. They correspond to mutual 
implication, one-way implication and the lack o f causal relation, respectively.
237 See Figure 3 .7.
231 Prol, p.22
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Interdependence and determination are ‘cohesions’; they indicate the existence of 
some causal relation between the terms. Interdependence and constellation are 
‘reciprocities’; unlike determination, they lack orientation. Thirdly (3), I have 
classified together all the relations that indicate the topological nature o f structure, 
although they were never considered as a group and I have collected them from 
different passages. Such relations are hypotaxis-hyponymy, order, transformation etc. 
The fact that relations between relations make impossible the reduction o f structure to 
an order of binary opposition, as Levi-Strauss claims, introduces at least a second 
dimension. Hierarchical relations of sub-ordination, as Hjelmslev describes them, 
again indicate a spatiality; possibly also orientation. Order implies orientation and 
temporality-as-spatial-dimension. Evolution is an oriented transformation. 
Transformation is intrinsically connected to temporality. Considering that time is 
perceived as a spatial dimension, transformation is construed as another kind of 
combination. To the same consequence leads the fact that relation and process are 
reduced to one. Let us notice that in this context structure-transformation and 
structure-movement become indistinguishable. One observes that the first two kinds 
of structural relations (1,2) can correspond to logical, non-spatial operations. The third 
kind (3) belongs to, or rather constitutes, a topological space. Against the mainstream
I
■ \
* conception of logic, the question has been addressed philosophically whether some 
kind of topology underlies logic; and the notion o f structure may have a role to play in 
! this debate. However, irrespective o f whether logic implies topology by itself or not, 
|  the structuralist concept o f structure is the indistinguishable connection o f the two.
Then there are the relations that characterise semiotic structures; all semiotic 
ifractures (B). From their examination, we can advance further our understanding of 
it structure in general is. Immediately one observes that the term structure
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appears in more than one position: all the relations under consideration constitute the 
semiotic (meta-) structure; then, structure is related to ‘form’ as opposed to 
‘substance’; then, it is related to ‘system’ as opposed to ‘process’; and, finally, it has 
an epistemological relation with its synchronic point o f view. Firstly (1), there is the 
relation o f signification, an interdependence between a content-plane and an 
expression-plane; which we have recognised as the definitional relation of the 
semiotic. Let us recall the completely de-essentialised and non-metaphysical 
definition o f the two planes. Each plane is a structure, though not yet semiotic, and the 
function relating them constitutes a structure too. Such a structure is ‘a semiotic’ 
(noun). A semiotic that has another semiotic as one o f its planes is a higher degree 
semiotic (la); which adds another dimension to its structure. Then, there are two 
relations o f determination, ‘manifestations’ as Hjelmslev also calls them: (2) between 
form and substance; and (3) between langue and parole. In each case, structure is 
sided with the former term, which ‘determines’ the latter. As regards the first 
distinction (2), structure is formal, as opposed to being sensible or material or 
essential. It is a consequence of the principle o f fundamental semiotic arbitrariness, 
which entails both the relational and the arbitrary nature of the semiotic. Thus, in this 
context, structure is not a property of the things as they are. When examining the 
concept o f substance, we have seen how it is not devoid o f formal elements, in 
different ways and degrees. Considering that ‘substance’ is not ‘matter’ but a product 
of the semiotic game, it is not devoid of structure too; therefore, we have the levels of 
substance (2a). Completely non-semiotic is the incognisable ‘purport/matter’. To 
make a claim about its having a structure or not would enter the realm o f metaphysics. 
As regards the second distinction (3), following the matrix o f the ‘langue / parole’ 
opposition, structure tends to be aligned with the system rather than the process.
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There is no question that the concepts of structure and system are intimately 
connected. We have seen, however, that the concept o f ‘function’ includes processual 
relations; we should actually consider them systematic too. We have also seen that 
both the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic relations are structural. I think that, in this 
case, the significant difference between langue and parole is the one between 
generative structure and generated instantiation. Finally, considering that semiotics 
are dynamic structures, there are two points o f view through which to approach them 
(4): the synchronic and the diachronic. Strangely, it seems that the concept of 
structure is more closely connected with the former point o f view. However, as the 
distinction concerns the ways we study structure and not what structure intrinsically 
or objectivelly is, the intimacy between structure and synchrony is of an 
epistemological nature too. It is the synchronic point o f view that has allowed us to 
perceive structure as structure; this does not make structure less structural in its 
evolution.
The last kind of semiotic relations are those that are constituted by particular 
semiotic structures (C). It is the way in which a semiotic (1), i.e. a langue, articulates 
its content-plane, its expression-plane and their inter-relation; which includes its laws 
of combination and evolution. This structure is specific to it and separates it from all 
others. This, importantly, entails that each semiotic proposes its own way to perceive 
the world, which is the ultimate consequence o f the principle o f fundamental semiotic 
arbitrariness. As one semiotic generates more than one texts, there is a final kind of 
structure (2): the particular structure that organises a single text and distinguishes it 
from any other; this is often termed ‘surface-structure’. The text is the only observable 
semiotic entity-fact.
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In the previous classification, the relations described first are ‘deeper’ and 
there is a gradual decrease o f ‘depth’: differentiality, articulation-integration, general 
structural relations (A), the semiotic meta-structure (B), langue (C l), surface 
structures (C2). No metaphysical connotations are intentionally placed upon the 
notion of ‘depth’ by the structuralists. ‘Depth vs. surface’ is a relative distinction. The 
relation constituting the distinction is one of generation-manifestation: the ‘deeper’ 
level generates the ‘less deep’ level and is manifested by it. This ‘generation’ includes 
both a relation between type and token, and a relation between cause and effect. In a 
sense, all the ‘deeper’ levels are conditions of possibility o f every ‘less deep’ level. 
This is a structural law, a kind of structural causality, which -  like all structural laws -  
is itself a structure. Here we detect two different meanings o f ‘structure’: structure- 
object and structure-cause. They are not easily distinguishable, not only because of 
the conceptual amalgamation of object-property-activity, but also because the same 
entity may be perceived in both ways. Accordingly, in this technical register of 
French, there are two terms for the adjective ‘structural’: ‘structureV and 
‘structural,24°. The former is a description of the relations constituting a structure; the 
latter refers to its ability to generate other, structured, entities. For the same reasons, 
‘structure’ is both the entity under description and its property of being structured. 
Sometimes, these two senses are referred to as ‘a structure’ and ‘structureness’ or 
‘structurally’, respectively. We can also add the process of giving structure: 
‘structuration’; which also denotes the procedure o f constructing a structural model 
for a phenomenon. We have thus gathered a multiplicity o f senses for ‘structure’: 
structure-object, structure-law, structure-cause, structureness, structurally,
240 ‘A relation is ‘strucurelle' when we consider it in its role as determining a given organisation; the 
same relation is ‘structural^  when we consider it as susceptible to be realised in several different and 
equally determining ways in several organisations’, Jean-Marie Auzias, Clefs p o u r  le structuralisme, 
p .15
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structuration; but we should remember that, strictly speaking, we cannot distinguish 
between them in a structuralist context.
We have just seen how the relation of ‘generation’ produces a structure of 
relative ‘depths’. Structures of different degree o f ‘depth’ are not just different kinds 
of structure; they are of a different order. The conceptual relation involves 
dependence o f the ‘less deep’ levels to the ‘deeper’ ones. However, there are crucial 
issues, regarding cases where ‘less deep’ levels seem to affect the ‘deeper’ ones. They 
can be grouped under two problematics: the way that structure may invade the pre- 
structural levels; and the way the semiotic may invade pre-semiotic levels. In the first 
problematic is included the question as to whether formal logic is already structural. 
In the second problematic are included questions as to whether logic is a semiotic and 
whether the semiotic meta-structure is a semiotic too, both o f which are connected to 
the possibility o f the existence of universal meta-structures and, ultimately, of 
objective knowledge. To clarify matters concerning the second problematic, as it 
proves to be relevant to Derrida’s critique and the epistemological investigations of 
my thesis, let us analyze further the ‘less deep’ orders o f structure. Semiotic structures 
have two characteristics that the ‘deeper’ levels don’t share: an intrinsic internal 
ambiguity and an arbitrary connection to the non-semiotic world. On the one hand, 
unlike the ‘deep’ level of the principle of differentiality where a non-middle-term 
logic rules, in the semiotic level ambiguity is not only possible but structurally 
necessary; it is implicated by the necessary non-isomorphism between the content- 
and expression-planes. Disambiguation, which is always possible according to 
classical structuralism, happens -  when desired -  in parole , where a particular 
instantiation o f a semiotic is placed in a context. On the other hand, the principle of 
fundamental semiotic arbitrariness entails a kind of epistemological ‘disconnection’
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from the non-semiotic world. Each semiotic community ‘structures-structurates’ the 
world through its semiotic systems, in a way that does not depend on any property of 
the world itself. Therefore, two completely strange between them semiotic systems 
construct two completely different views of the world; and whereas disambiguation 
inside each discourse is considered possible, the translation between them becomes 
problematic. Even if one accepts the ontological existence o f a unique objective 
reality, as classical structuralists do, it is impossible to know whether two entities 
belonging to mutually exclusive semiotic systems refer to the same entity in the non- 
semiotic world. This causes a serious problem with regards the possibility of universal 
claims. If we can’t access any objectivity, then every meta-structure which we think 
has universal application -  such as logic and the semiotic function -  is necessarily 
limited by our semiotic constmction of the world. As Hjelmslev reminds us, science is
241a semiotic too .
Another inference from our review of the classification o f semiotic relations is 
a confirmation that indeed structure is not reducible to binary oppositions; despite the 
underlying principle of differentiality. Each order o f structure is irreducibly multi­
dimensional, whereas the different orders of structure cannot be reduced to each other 
either. This is the reason why, as Levi-Strauss and other structuralists have repeatedly 
stressed, structure is more than the sum of its elements. Structure is intrinsically 
connected with spatiality and temporality. The different orders o f structure correspond 
to different orders of spatiality and temporality. There is again an escalation from the 
‘deeper’ to ‘less deep structures’: from weaker to stronger topologies, to geometry, to 
geographic place and historical time. I will try now to clarify two ambiguities 
regarding semiotic spatiality and temporality. Firstly, let us see some structural
241 He considers it, however, semiotic ‘o f  a different order’; but he doesn’t expand further on the 
subject, Essais, p.58
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
CHAPTER 3: STRUCTURALIST SEMIOTICS
temporalities that we have met in our analysis. There is the temporality of an entire 
semiotic which is implied by the possibility of its evolution; e.g. the English language 
and church-architecture evolve through time. Then, there is the temporality that may 
be embedded in the form of a semiotic; this is the case, for example, with natural 
languages, music and cinema. Then, there is the temporality o f a specific text. This 
includes different kinds o f temporalities; in the syntactic and the semantic level, as 
thematic, as connotation, as referent242. Then, a text, as observable fact, is perceived 
in a duration of time and is situated in a specific historical moment.
Secondly, in our analysis, we have met two different couples of ‘presence’ and 
‘absence’, ‘co-existence’ or not; which may seem confused and contradictory with 
each other. On the one hand, we have synchrony and diachrony; the first is the point 
of view o f structural relations as co-existing and the second as evolving in time. On 
the other, we have the syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations, defined as in 
praesentia and in absentia, as co-existing and alternating, respectively. However, 
langue as object o f structuralist semiotic study is related to ‘synchrony’ from the first 
couple and ‘paradigm’ from the second, i.e. to co-existence and absence 
simultaneously. The notions of presence, absence and co-existence depend all on 
position in space and time. Basically, two entities co-exist if they are present in the 
same space -  but not at the same spatial point! -  at the same point in time; the most 
general definition would be existence at the same temporal point. We should probably 
notice here that having defined time as another spatial dimension affects this 
definition. Therefore, alternation can also be construed as a kind o f co-existence on 
the temporal dimension; i.e. existence at the same spatial point. Disambiguation of the
242 See Antoinetta Angelidi, ‘Cinematographic Time’, 2008; and Rea Wallden, ‘The built mirror: 
between architecture and cinema’, in Megacities: And tt/ v  npaypaxiKrj axr\ (pavracrciKr\ noXrj, 2000, pp. 
39-40.
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I above-mentioned apparent paradox is based on these observations. Synchrony and 
diachrony refer to points o f view on the entire semiotic. Synchrony, as the term 
f implies, is co-existence at the same temporal point, or rather the same relatively short 
duration. As such, it allows us to better observe the distribution o f the elements in the 
rest of the semiotic’s dimensions. Conversely, the presence and absence of the 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic relation refer to the text. The syntagmatically related 
terms co-exist in this segment of space and time that the text defines243; whereas the 
paradigmatically related terms co-exist in the space-time o f the langue but not o f the 
text. Additionally, if  a text manifests a semiotic that includes the dimension o f time in 
its form, then its syntagms develop in time; thus, strictly speaking, they don’t co-exist. 
However, for this definition, we consider as the temporal point o f reference the entire 
duration of the text.
Structural semiotics keeps the question o f the ontological status of structure 
suspended; it ‘puts it in parentheses’ and uses the concept operationally244. The 
operational use, however, cannot really be devoid o f ontological implications, 
especially not when accompanied by a multiplicity o f definitional and programmatic 
claims. Let us see, then, what we can deduce regarding the ontological status of 
1 structure from its use and multiple definitions. To start with, it must certainly be of a
I
different order than the phenomena. Collecting material from several different 
structuralist definitions, we find that structure is conceptually ‘deeper’ than the 
1 phenomena, relatively more stable than they are, unifying them, abstracting from 
them, generating them. We have analysed above how the concept o f structure includes 
the function of ‘generating’ less ‘deep’ entities than itself; and that this function
1 243 Of course, they also co-exist in the space-tim e o f  the langue, as they are produced at a specific 
I moment o f the structure’s evolution.
| 244 Greimas and Courtes, Semiotique: D ictionnaire raisonne de la  theorie du langage, p .361
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combines a relation o f causality with subsumption under a type. Structure as an 
abstraction comes against Saussure’s claim that langue is not abstract but concrete245. 
However, as Tullio de Mauro246 explains, the cause of this denial resides with 
Saussure’s ‘Kantian, idealist, positivist’ epistemological background, for which an 
‘abstraction’ is devoid o f ‘the force of the fact’. Structure is an abstraction that 
‘operates effectively in a “concrete” way’; a sense which the concept of ‘abstraction’ 
takes in the context of the work of philosophers such as C. S. Peirce, E. Cassirer, R. 
Carnap. In any case it is clear in CLG that langue exists ‘in the mind’. Hjelmslev 
empties it even more from sensible elements by his form-substance division; the 
schema is purely formal. Even the textual process, however, is for him in a sense 
‘virtual’247, potential, a type of which the token alone is the object o f our perception. 
So, we can safely claim that the structuralists’ structure is not an entity immediately 
perceivable by the senses. There is every indication that it belongs to the intelligible 
realm. Nevertheless, it doesn’t fit the traditional philosophic definition of the 
intelligible either, because it includes elements of spatiality and temporality. It is a 
form of thought which is beyond the senses and yet cannot be fully conceptualised.
Considering that structures are not immediately accessible, the belief in their 
underlying the observable entities-processes is strictly speaking metaphysic, as 
Hjelmslev observes. This is the reason that structuralist semioticians suspend any 
research on the issue, as they consider themselves scientists and not philosophers. The 
philosophical question would be where the locus o f existence of structure is. In all 
structuralist semiotic literature, starting from the CLG, it is clearly stated that the 
semiotic structure is subject-constituted, but not in an act of will or even
245 CLG, p. 32
245 ibid, editorial note 70, pp. 425-427
247 Prol, p.24
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consciousness. We investigated its social subjectivity and context-relative objectivity 
earlier in this chapter. The question of structure in general takes us a step further: 
from (social) signification to (human) perception. The question would be whether 
structure is a property of the object or of the subject perceiving it. To clarify: On the 
one hand, we have to distinguish between the property o f being structured in general 
and having a particular structure. On the other, we can distinguish as possible loci of 
structure: (i) the semiotic community, or (ii) the human constitution, or (iii) the world 
as existing independently from any subject -  the existence o f  which no classical 
semiotician ever doubts. The textbook structuralist interpretation attributes the 
constitution/recognition of particular structures to semiotic communities; and the 
ability to perceive the world as being structured to the human constitution in general; 
whereas the world as subject-independent is referred to as ‘undifferentiated 
continuum’. However, let me articulate a few problems inherent to this position. 
Considering that knowledge is a semiotically constituted structure and thus depends 
on our society, how do we know that all humans perceive the world as structured? 
Inversely, it seems that particular structures -  apart from the general property of being 
structured -  are shared by all humans; such as the semiotic meta-structure. Then, 
considering that we constitute the world by our semiotic structures and perceptual 
abilities; how do we know anything about it, including its being an ‘undifferentiated 
continuum’? And, finally, why do we perceive-understand the world through 
structures, and by using them are able to survive better in it, if  they don’t correspond 
in anyway to its reality? Eco observes that, as long as structures succeed in explaining 
many phenomena,
[o ]n e is en titled  to  suspect [that] they m ay w e ll reproduce so m e ‘natural’ order or 
reflec t som e ‘u n iversa l’ function ing o f  the hum an m ind 248
248 A Theory o f  Semiotics, pp.46-47
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However, we should not jump to the conclusion that we have ‘grasped the format of 
the world’. Eco terms this fallacious assumption ‘ontological structuralism’. No 
structuralist semiotician subscribes to this position, as it clearly contradicts the central 
axiom of fundamental semiotic arbitrariness. We should admit, nevertheless, that the 
practice of structuralist semiotics carries a performative belief in the existence of 
structures. Playing it safe, structuralist semioticians prefer to define structures as 
operational hypotheses. In any case, the structures with which they work are no more 
than models of the structures to which they refer, ‘isolating strategic levels’ from 
them. O f course, the models of structures are structures themselves; simplified ones.
I will now try to draw the distinction between ‘structure’ and some concepts 
that are particularly close to it. ‘Form’ as used in Hjelmslev’s stratification appears 
semantically very similar to ‘structure’. As both o f them -  and particularly ‘form’ -  
have many meanings, their inter-relationship is very complicated. The exceptional 
degree of ambiguity regarding the sense of the term ‘form’ is the result o f its double 
Greek ancestry. ‘Form’ -  from the Latin term ‘forma’ -  translates two very different 
concepts o f the ancient Greek philosophy: Plato’s ‘idea’ (idea) and Aristotle’s 
‘poptpri’ (morphe); the former is closer to ‘concept’ and the later to ‘shape’. A first 
fusion of the two concepts was already made by the Aristotelian readings of Platonic 
texts during late antiquity, such as those made by Plotinus. The turning-point 
definition o f ‘form’ for modem philosophy was proposed by Kant; this is the 
immediate philosophical ancestry of the term as used by Hjelmslev. In the context of 
structural semiotics, ‘form’ and ‘structure’ share the property o f being conceptually 
located somewhere between the sensible and the intelligible realm. However, whereas 
Hjelmslev consciously and clearly uses the term ‘form’ in the Kantian sense, many of
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his colleagues keep resonances from its Aristotelian ancestry. In most contexts, ‘form’ 
tends to imply a visual connotation, while ‘structure’ a kind o f organisation; which are 
not mutually exclusive. In visual arts, for example, the opposition ‘form vs. structure’ 
is analogous to ‘outer shape vs. inner organisation’; however, as opposed to ‘matter’ 
or ‘content’, ‘form ’ includes structural organisation. In every-day use, including 
structural semiotic jargon when not of the Hjelmslevian persuasion, ‘form’ is opposed 
to ‘content’. However, this is precisely what structure is not, i.e. opposed to the 
content. Structure ‘is content itself, as Levi-Strauss249 famously claims. Structure 
incorporates form and content in an insoluble connection; this is one of the 
structuralist axioms. It is Hjelmslev’s introduction o f ‘content-form’ and ‘expression- 
form’, which between them constitute the semiotic structure, that allowed ‘form’ to 
gain a sense similar to ‘structure’.
We have seen that ‘semiotic system’ is often used as a synonym of ‘semiotic 
structure’; after all, what became the structuralist concept o f ‘structure’ was bom as 
‘system’ in CLG. Synthesising from its definitions in structuralist semiotic writings, 
we can say that system is: a stock of elements and rules governing their relations, 
which is a whole by itself; this, more or less, is the mathematical definition of system 
too. Firstly, similarly to ‘structure’, ‘system’ may be either the collection of pre­
existing entities or of entities composed by their relationships; we should obviously 
choose the relational definition. Secondly, a system is not necessarily non-reducible 
to the sum of its components, as stmcture is; a system with this additional property is 
called non-linear. Thirdly, ‘system’ is often opposed to ‘process’, as we have already 
seen; a system without the implication of static-ness is dynamic. Fourthly, a system is 
an ‘integrated whole’, which means that the relationships the system has with its
249 ‘ Structure and Form: Reflections on the Work o f  Vladimir Propp’ (1960) as cited by Ronald 
Schleifer in A.J. Greim as and the Nature o f  Meaning , pp. 12-13
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members are different to those that it has with non-members and the relationships a 
member has with another member are different to those it has with a non-member. A 
system has a border, it has an inside and an outside; this is not necessarily so, I think, 
in the case o f structure in general. I think that the restricted definition of structure as 
‘a’ structure does fulfill this autonomy premise but other senses, such as 
‘structurality’, less so. Of course, there needs to be some cohesiveness for 
structurality to exist; so in a very weak taking o f the term, we could speak of 
‘autonomy’. Conversely, despite their definitional autonomy, we have seen how 
difficult it is to distinguish one langue from another. In conclusion, we can say that a 
structure in the structuralist sense is a relational, dynamic, non-linear system. And we 
should also add to our general definition o f structure the premise of relative 
autonomy.
In Chapter 2, we followed the history o f the term ‘structure’ from its building- 
sense to its organic-sense to the more abstract definitions o f the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. Building and organism metaphors have often been used in philosophical 
texts, with the result that ‘structure’ for philosophical audiences may carry strong 
metaphysical connotations, completely irrelevant to the structuralist definition of the 
concept230. I can’t stress enough that structuralist structure is not related either to the 
metaphysics o f foundation, particularly to notions o f origin and essence, or to the 
metaphysics o f organic unity with its implications o f naturalness. Structuralist 
structure is relational and relative, social and subjective, arbitrary and de- 
essentialised.
250 Very interesting is Ernst A. Cassirer’s ‘Structuralism in M odem  Linguistics’, in Word, vol. I, no II, 
August (1945), 99-120 (particularly p. 110), where its author addresses this issue, without altogether 
avoiding to fall in the trap himself. One observes that Cassirer, who is not a semiotician and certainly 
does not belong to structuralism as defined for the purposes o f  this thesis, is in many ways close to the 
positions o f  structural semiotics.
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Summarising the definitional characteristics we deduced in this sub-section, 
firstly (a), structuralist structure is relational-functional, where ‘function’ combines 
topological relation, operation and logical dependence; therefore, on the one hand, 
structure is completely de-essentialised and, on the other, it includes rules of 
composition and evolution. Secondly (b), structure is topological, i.e. incorporates 
elements o f spatio-temporality; it is, therefore, non-reducible to binary relations. 
Thirdly (c), in structure, logic and topology are indistinguishable. Fourthly (d), 
structure is not accessible by our senses. Fifthly (e), structure is ‘generating’; a notion 
that includes generality and causality. Sixthly (f), ‘structure’ includes the senses of 
structure-object, structure-law, structure-cause, structuredness, structurality, 
structuration. Seventhly (g), structure has a degree o f autonomy. Finally (h), in 
structuralism, the exact ontological status of structure is suspended.
a. relational-functional
b. topological —*• non-reducible spatio-temporality
c. logic and topology indistinguishable
d. not immediately perceivable by the senses
e. ‘generating’: generality + causality
f. structure-object, structure-law, structure-cause,
structureness, structurality, structuration.
g. a degree o f autonomy
h. ontological status: suspended
[Figure 3.8. -  Structuralist structure: definition]
3.8. The general structure of the semiotic
Having given a definition of structure, we will now return to the question of what 
distinguishes a structure as semiotic, no longer in order to describe semiotic structures 
but in order to give a structural and structuralist definition o f the concept of the 
‘semiotic’, i.e. signification. This, obviously, corresponds to level B of our previous
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classification , i.e. the semiotic meta-structure. However, this time we will go 
backwards looking for a common nucleus throughout the history of definitions o f the 
concept . To seek a common structure underlying different phenomena is the 
structural-ist movement par excellence; thus, the result o f such an effort is 
unavoidably structural. Therefore, what we try to do is give a structural description of 
the definitional nucleus of the concept of the semiotic through history. We will then 
try to situate the structuralist definition in this tradition. We will seek what it shares 
with the other definitions of the semiotic and in what respects it radically differs, what 
kind of innovation it brings so as to constitute such a significant epistemological 
rupture. We should remember, however, that a retrospective organisation of concepts 
belonging to different theories is made according to categories exterior to them and 
necessarily entails some violence done to them. A significant instance of such 
violence is our classifying together here definitions o f the ‘w ord’ and the ‘sign’. As 
Umberto Eco observes, it is the post-Stoic tradition that first unified the theory of 
language with the theory of signs. The exact relation between the two has never been
• • • •  • tfifully established within the tradition of Western philosophy; and it is only the 20 
century linguistic turn that put, with universal agreement, the word as the exemplary 
case o f sign.
251 See Figure 3 .7.
252 The historical information in this sub-section conies m ostly from: Emile Benveniste, ‘Coup d’oeil 
sur le developpem ent de la linguistique’ (1963), in Problem es de linguistique generate, 1.1, pp. 18-31 ; 
Umberto Eco, Thomas E. Hope, Holger van den Boom, ‘Sign’, entry in Thomas A. Sebeok et al., ed. 
E ncyclopedic D ictionary o f  Semiotics, pp.936-947; Roman Jakobson, ‘A Glance at the Development o f  
Sem iotics’ (1974), in Language in Literature, pp.436-454; Tullio de Mauro, ‘La question des 
precurseurs’ in CLG, pp.380-389.
23J Encyclopedic D ictionary o f  Semiotics, (pp.937-940)
199
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
CHAPTER 3: STRUCTURALIST SEMIOTICS
Throughout that tradition, every definition o f the sign (or the word) is 
articulated on conceptual couples, such as -  using a modem terminology254 -  
signifier/signified, form/content, expression/content, substance/form, sign/idea, 
thing/sign, sign/referent. We observe that the sign is defined either internally or 
externally as a relation between two elements. By ‘internal’ definition, I mean one 
which describes the parts that constitute a sign, such as signifier and signified. By 




e.g. Ser Sed Sign Referent
[.Figure 3.9. -  Definitions o f  the sign: DYADIC structures]
The two different kinds of definitions, internal and external, correspond more or less 
in analytical terms to an interest in intensional and extensional semantics, 
respectively; whereas in structuralist semiotic terms to the relations of meaning and 
reference. Obviously what is considered internal or external to the sign depends to its 
definition and its epistemological background. Sometimes, the sign has been 
identified with signifier alone; in that case, the signifier/signified relation becomes 
strictly speaking external. Then, semantic theories which concentrate on the relation 
with reality often use tripartite models in order to define the sign. These, however, can
254 1 chose not to quote at all the historical terminology -  such as S toics’ ‘ a T ] ( i c u v o v ’ (semainon) and 
‘o r u i a i v o g e v o v ’ (semainomenon) or Scholastics’ ‘signans’ and ls ign a tu m \ M y point o f  view  is not 
historiograhic but structural.
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be analysed as the superposition of the two bi-partite models o f internal and external 
definition.
The metaphysical properties and more specifically the difference between the 
elements that constitute the couples used both in internal and external definitions can 
be traced back to either the Platonic duality o f noumena/phenomena, or the 
Aristotelian duality of form/matter, or combinations of both. The two elements that 
constitute each couple always differ in degree o f sensuous salience and materiality. 
One element is always sensible or more sensible than the other; one element, not 
necessarily the same, is material or more material than the other. As we have 
mentioned earlier255, there has always been some kind of relation between the concept 
of sign and materiality, either viewed from an ontological or a phenomenal point of 
view, i.e. as connected either to matter or to the senses. To be more exact, what is 
necessary is the difference between its constitutive elements in materiality and 
sensibility; this is what makes the sign the particular kind o f object that it is.
The next question concerns the sign’s constitutional relation. One of the most 
traditional definitions would consider it a substitution, as it is expressed by the famous 
scholastic formula ‘aliquidstatpro aliquo’-  ‘something stands for something else’. It 
may also be considered as mediating between our mind and the world; or expression;
255 See sub-section 3.3
[Figure 3.10. -  Definitions o f  the sign: TRIADIC structures and their DYADIC infra-structures]
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or representation. Eco256 divides the sign’s definitions into two groups with respect to 
whether they consider this relation as one of causality or equivalence. He observes 
that the former choice traces its ancestry to theories o f signs as indexes, proofs or 
symptoms in medical or juridical philosophy, the latter to linguistic theories about 
words. In any case, it is interesting to notice that the questions about the internal and 
the external definitional relation of the sign are analogous.
I think that all the different definitions -  whether internal or external -  of the 
semiotic in Western philosophical tradition share the co-existence of two 
characteristics, which can be claimed to constitute the conceptual nucleus of the 
concept. The semiotic always (I) forms a bridge between the intelligible and the 
sensible realm and (II) involves a movement o f materialisation. If  one puts these 
definitional characteristics in terms of topology, subtracting all metaphysical 
vocabulary, their structural expression would be: (Is) a relation between two elements 
and (IIs) a movement of extemalisation.
256 Encyclopedic D ictionary o f  Semiotics, (pp. 939-940)
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TRADITIONAL VIEW (metaphysics)
I. Connection BETW EEN
the SENSIBLE and the INTELLIGIBLE
II. Movement o f  M ATERIALISATION
STRUCTURAL-IST VERSION (topology)
Is. Relation BETW EEN TW O elements
IIs. Movement TOW ARD OUTSIDE
[Figure 3.11. -  Semiotic: general structure]
Significant differences in semiotic epistemology relate to whether a theory 
considers signs as conventional or not. Thomas E. Hope257 classifies three possible 
senses that ‘conventionality’ may take in a semiotic and/or linguistic theory. Firstly, it 
may mean ‘produced by convention’, i.e. artificial as opposed to ‘natural’ signs. In 
this sense, an arrow of inference is a conventional sign, whereas smoke as a sign of 
fire is not. It is not entirely clear what this artificiality includes. As we have said, 
historically ‘natural’ languages were often considered ‘natural’ in this sense: as the 
naturally given to humans medium of expression-communication, opposed to artificial
237 Encyclopedic D ictionary o f  Semiotics, (pp. 942-943)
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[ codes. Moreover, obviously, smoke may be produced by humans, with or without a 
fire, with or without an intention to convey meaning. In modem semiotic terms, 
however, the first kind o f conventionality is better re-phrased as ‘production with the 
intention to convey meaning’; which includes ‘natural’ languages and excludes an 
accidentally lit fire. Secondly, conventionality may mean ‘referring to an object by 
virtue of a convention’, i.e. non-motivated. The question here is whether the bond to 
the referent imposes some restrictions to the sign. In Peirce’s classification, ‘indexes’ 
and ‘icons’ are motivated as opposed to the completely conventional ‘symbols’. The 
discussion o f whether even similarity and analogy are recognised through convention 
is still open. Thirdly, conventional may m ean ‘interpretable on the grounds o f a 
convention’, i.e. non-universal. Signs, being conventional in this latter sense, must be 
learned. Hope, along with every modem semiotician o f whichever persuasion,
■ considers that in the third sense conventionality is not a classificational criterion but a 
definitional characteristic o f the signs. However, this has not been a given for the 
f philosophical tradition. The belief in some natural link between names and things, 
known as Cratylism258, often makes its appearance in the philosophical tradition, 
particularly in the context o f theology with regard to sacred, divine languages, 
whether they may be Hebrew or Greek or Latin or Arabic. We should also stress that 
[the three conceptions of semiotic conventionality are neither equivalent nor related to 
[each other in any necessary way. Furthermore, which signs are classified as examples
t •
tofeach is not a matter o f universal agreement either.
fI Saussure and structuralist semiotics introduce a new kind o f conventionality, 
radically different from the traditional conventionalist views from Aristotle to
i—----------------------------------------
I*** Cratylus, a follower o f  Heraclitus, appears in Plato’s dialogue that bears his name, to support a non- 
lonventional correspondence between words and things. He is opposed by Democritus.
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Whitney. As we have explained earlier259, the principle of fundamental semiotic 
arbitrariness entails that it is not just the relation between words and things but the 
very categoraisation of the world into ‘things’ which is conventional, socially 
constituted. As Tullio de Mauro260 observes, only Wittgenstein -  forty years later than 
Saussure -  had an equally clear vision of the radically social nature o f the semiotic. 
This new kind of conventionality radically changes the notion o f the sign. In Umberto 
Eco’s words: ‘the classical notion of “sign” dissolves itself into a highly complex 
network of changing relationships’261.
An important difference of this new definition is that the entire sign belongs 
now to the non-sensible and non-material realm. Saussure explains clearly that both 
the signified and the signifier are of a ‘psychological’ nature and exist ‘in the mind’. 
Hjelmslev makes it even clearer. Turning the axis form-substance through a right 
angle relative to the axis content-expression, i.e. sub-dividing both form and 
\ expression into form and substance, he limits the semiotic in the realm o f form alone. 
The semiotic retains its dyadic structure. Hjelm slev’s quadric stratification o f the 
sign-function is again a superposition o f the internal and external dyadic definitional 
couples of the sign. Furthermore, Hjelmslev’s stratification shows that the semiotic 
! still has two anchorages to the material world; these, however, are now both external 






259 See sub-section 3.2.
260 CLG, p.XIII
261A Theory o f  Semiotics, p.49
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2i/2e 1 i / 2e
[Figure 3.12. -  Hjelmslev’s definition o f  the sign-function: 
its QUADRIC structure and DYAD IC  infra-structure]
Structural semiotics studies the internal relation o f the semiotic alone, considering the 
external relations outside its scope, as belonging to epistemology. It clearly limits the 
question of meaning to the relation between signified and signifier, or -  in
Hjelmslev’s terms -  between content-form and expression-form. The result is that the
262structuralist definition o f the semiotic converts it into ‘a new order’ o f entity. This
• • • • 263means that (a) a sign is not a physical entity and (b) it is not a fix ed  entity either . 
The order of the semiotic conceived as not belonging to the physical realm and yet 
distinguished from the intelligible is distantly analogous to Ernst Cassirer’s notion of 
‘symbolic’ order. The additional premise o f its completely relational nature, 
introduces the particular structuralist conception of ‘structural object’, as described in 
the previous sub-section. The semiotic order becomes the proprium  o f humanity.
If we compare this new definition with the general structure o f the semiotic as 
deduced earlier264, structuralist semiotics has minimised the metaphysical strength of
262 ‘un nouvel ordre de faits’, Ferdinand de Saussure, CLG, p.33
Umberto Eco, A Theory o f  Semiotics, p.49
264 Figure 3.11.
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the definitional characteristics. In CLG , it is clear that Saussure considers the nature 
of the signified and the signifier to be ‘homogeneous’ 265. There is nothing innate 
making them metaphysically different. They are differentiated by their function alone. 
Hjelmslev defines the sign as a function between two planes, the plane o f content and 
the plane o f expression, which are related by reciprocal implication. The two planes 
do not differ metaphysically. The terms content and expression relinquish their 
metaphysical meaning, and come to denote the two absolutely symmetrical elements 
of a function. This neutrality becomes apparent by the fact that a  whole sign-function 
can become the content or the expression plane for a new, second degree sign- 
function. Both are composed by substance and fo rm , which are also relative and not 
absolute terms too. Structuralist semiotics attempts the emptying o f metaphysical 
structures: position and function  substitute for essence.
Let us see what is left from the general model o f the semiotic. Firstly, both 
Saussure’s and Hjelmslev’s definitions o f the semiotic266, like every other structuralist 
definition, fit the structural version o f requirement (I), i.e. a relation between two 
elements; though now it is the relation itself which is primary and productive, as 
opposed to the elements that it relates. Having subtracted any metaphysical attributes, 
the bi-planar topology becomes crucial. The at least bi-planar structure actually 
becomes the definitional characteristic o f the semiotic. Hjelmslev repeatedly insists 
that the two planes should not be isomorphic267; because in a relational definition of 
structure complete isomorphism means identity, which would reduce the two planes 
into one. The bi-planar structure makes structurally possible all the semiotic
j 265 p.32
1 266 The connection between signified and sign ifier’ and ‘the specific form organized between two 
I  substances’.
I  267 See, for example, Prol., p.73 and Lang., p. 104 
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manipulations -  such as poetry, irony and lying -  the possibility o f which is the
proprium o f  semiosis. This structural possibility is revealed as the propriuvn o f
semiosis precisely through the clear dem arcation between the relation o f signification
and the extra-semiotic relation o f reference. Hans Jorgen Uldall, who clearly states
that ‘with truth as such we are not concerned’, as ‘even the m ost whopping lie may be
couched in the King’s English’269, provocatively claims that, from this point o f view:
Truth is a peculiar style of the content to which a speaker may choose to restrict 
himself, just as he may choose to speak in Alexandrine verse, or to lead a moral 
life270.
What he means is that from an intra-sem iotic point o f  view  the truth o f a proposition 
is not an issue because it does not affect its meaning. M oreover, this disconnection of 
meaning from reference is a structural necessity for the m eaning to exist, as Umberto 
Eco explains:
If something cannot be used to tell a lie, conversely it cannot be used to tell the
271truth: it cannot in fact be used ‘to tell’ at all.
Every time there is possibility o f lying, there is sign-function [...] Every time 
there is a lie there is signification. Every time there is signification there is the 
possibility of using it in order to lie. If this is true (and it is methodologically 
necessary to maintain that it is true) then semiotics has found a new threshold: 
between conditions o f  signification and conditions o f truth272.
Another result o f the double structure o f  the sem iotic is that its elements ‘may at once 
be utilised and referred to ’273, a property  m uch exploited by D errida’s writing 
technique.
Secondly, Saussure’s sign as a whole, being a completely psychological 
entity, constitutes an ‘inside’ as opposed to the world: the inside o f the social- 
subjective realm o f semiosis, an inside w hich attempts to reach the extra-semiotic
268 Anne Hinault, H istoire de la  sem iotique, p. 61
269 ‘Outline o f  G lossem atics’, p .50
270 ibid
271 Theory o f  Sem iotics, p. 7
272 ibid, pp. 58-59
273 Jakobson, and Greimas, as cited in Ronald Sch leifer, A.J. G reim as an d  the N ature o f  M eaning: 
Linguistics, Sem iotics an d  D iscourse Theory , p. 2
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outside; see requirement (II). Hjelmslev’s ever regressing notion of substance is also 
based on repeated relations of exteriority and interiority, where the ‘inside’ constitutes 
its relative ‘outside’ in a (vain) effort to reach the extra-semiotic ‘outside’; which 
again is the structural version of requirement (II). Strictly speaking, in the structuralist 
definition, the structural movement toward the outside is limited to the relation 
between the semiotic and extra-semiotic; whereas the intra-semiotic relation is one of 
mutual dependence. Moreover, it must be stressed that the inside-outside relation 
between the semiotic and the extra-semiotic is not meant as a real-space relationship. 
Structuralists don’t believe in the existence o f a non-material realm in the full 
ontological sense. The semiotic is a kind of super-structure o f  the material world. 
Structuralists are, or at least mean to be, fervent materialists and very much against 
metaphysics. This complicates further the question o f the ontological status of the 
semiotic. However, quite against their intentions, and as Derrida shows in great detail, 
the terms in their definitions keep traces from their previous metaphysical meanings. 
The stronger such trace is that of a sort of unintentional isomorphism between the 
content-expression and the form-substance relations; the result is that the exteriority 
relation creeps in the internal semiotic relation, so that the signifier often seems more 
external than the signified, the expression more external than the content.
Summarising, the de-essentialisation o f signification leads to the primacy of 
relation and to a completely topological perception o f the semiotic. Structuralism no 
longer accepts any essential, metaphysical properties of either the sensible/intelligible 
opposition or the matter/form opposition as pertaining to the semiotic. Its definitions 
of the sign need the positions of sensible and intelligible and matter and form in a 
functional structure. One may question, of course, whether it is ever possible to 
completely neutralise a metaphysical vocabulary. Whichever way one answers this
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question, remains the fact that a particular dual structure still governs the definition of 
&e semiotic; a dual structure with the characteristics we described above: (Is) a 
relation between two elements and (IIs) a (conceptual) m ovem ent o f externalisation. 
We observe that the new structuralist definition is more or less the structural 
expression o f the traditional view. Keeping what is topological from a definition 
previously expressed in a vocabulary o f m etaphysics, we end with the structuralist 
definition. The important difference is that the internal relation is defined as a mutual 
implication. The new kind o f conventionality, as im plicated by the principle of 
fundamental semiotic arbitrariness, introduces the novel order o f the semiotic- 
structural object. The structuralist conception o f sem iotic m eta-structure274, which we 
analysed in previous sub-sections, is based on this radicalised definition.
We can conclude that the general structure o f the sem iotic in its structural 
expression, as shown in the lower part o f Figure 3.11., applies to all the definitions o f 
the sign, structuralist or not. It seems to point to the inherent connection o f the 
concept of the sign with a representational theory o f knowledge. In order to speak of 
signs, one enacts a distinction between two realm s -  the one is subjective, the other is 
‘out there’ -  even if the distinction is relative and purely epistemological, with no 
ontological import. The external relation o f  the sign is actually a sub-set o f the 
relation between knowledge and reality. Consequently, the question o f the relation o f 
the sign to its referent is a sub-case o f  the question o f  epistemological realism. 
However, one observes that even the internal definitional relation is formed on the 
same structural matrix, o f which it seems to retain elem ents even after its structuralist 
de-essentialisation. As we shall see in connection to Derrida s deconstruction, this 
isomorphism may point to a difficulty o f a clear-cut dem arcation between the realms
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of meaning and knowledge; in other words, even intensional semiotics -  such as 
structuralist semiotics -  may not be devoid o f epistem ological implications.
3.9. Structuralist epistemology
This sub-section attempts to outline structuralist epistemology. In structuralist 
semiotics, there is a close interconnection between the principle o f fundamental 
semiotic arbitrariness and the de-essentialisation o f  meaning, on the one hand, and 
scientifism and de-mystification, on the other. The principle o f  fundamental semiotic 
arbitrariness and the de-essentialisation o f m eaning which it entails make possible the 
abstraction o f  metaphysics from semiotics; this leads to the de-m ystification o f the 
concept o f meaning, in keeping with the scientific aspiration o f  structuralists. The two 
main innovations o f structuralist semiotics is the introduction o f  the semiotic order 
and the structural object. These constitute a significant epistem ological rupture. 
Nevertheless, structuralist semiotics also belongs firm ly to the Kantian 
epistemological tradition, from which it inherits an aporia.
Structuralists, as participating to the spirit o f  Enlightenm ent and particularly to 
the more radical turn it took in the 20th century, adm ired the positive sciences and 
favored innovation. By founding the novel science o f  semiotics, as they m eant it, they 
wished to give to the humanities the status o f positive sciences. Structuralist semiotics 
did not wish to be a philosophy; which, as Jean-M arie Auzias275 observes, is itself a 
recognizable philosophic position, tantam ount to putting into question all the 
previously unquestioned givens. The wish to avoid classification as philosophical 
theory and to gain the status o f science, is one that structuralist semiotics shares with 
Marxism and psychoanalysis; this led to a devaluation o f  the term philosophy for a
m Clefs du structuralism e, p. 216
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thlarge part o f the 20 century. Scientifism is more than an interest in the positive 
sciences; it is an emotional investment to what is considered as scientific, an
276admiration with aesthetic and moral resonances . It is intrinsically connected with a 
critical stand, a demand for rigor and a concentration on method; it also entails a
• • 977desire for de-mystification .
Hjelmslev and Uldall’s glossematics278 is probably the best example of 
structuralist semiotic scientifism. The purpose o f glossematics is precisely the 
scientific definition and description of the semiotic. Its founders aspire to ‘elevate’ 
linguistics, and the humanities in general, to the status o f science proper. This effort 
has two aspects: (a) the application of a specific method and (b) the abandonment of 
all metaphysical presuppositions, the latter being tied closely to the former. What
97Qdifferentiates the human from the natural sciences, according to Uldall is not the 
nature o f their object, as our metaphysical prejudices have led us to believe, but their 
methodology. By changing their methods, therefore, the humanities could become 
more successful and gain more rigor and scientific warrant. They need to produce a 
method in order to distinguish ‘what we know with certainty and what we do not
7 80know with certainty’ ; and there is no reason to think that what we do not know 
now, we shall forever be unable to find out.
The method Hjelmslev and Uldall propose is an ‘immanent algebra of
981 989language’ , ‘a non-quantitative science’ . Glossematics is also termed ‘theory’. By
276 Hjelmslev, for example, used to cite Henri Poincare that science is an aspiration to beauty; in 
Henault, H istoire de la semiotique, p.76
277 Jonathan Culler, ‘The Linguistic Basis o f  Structuralism’ in Structuralism: an introduction, (p.29); 
Francois Dosse, H istoire du structuralisme, 1.1, p.9; Anne Henault, H istoire de la  sem iotique, p. 11
278 Glossematics is explicated in Hans Jorgen Uldall, ‘Outline o f  Glossematics: A  study in the 
methodology o f  the Humanities with special reference to linguistics, Part I: general Theory’
[‘Outline’]; and in Louis Hjelmslev, Prolegomena to a Theory o f  Language  [.Prof]
279 ‘Outline’, p.6
280 Hjelmslev, Lang., p.x
281 Prol, p. 51
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theory is meant a method leading to a self-consistent and exhaustive description o f an 
object, which is ‘usually called knowledge or com prehension’283. Two factors are 
important: (a) the arbitrariness o f a theory, i.e. the fact that it is independent o f any 
experience and includes no existence postulate; and (b) its appropriateness, that it 
mtroduces certain premises which fulfill the condition o f application to certain
284experimental data . By virtue o f its arbitrariness a theory is arealistic; by virtue o f its 
appropriateness it is realistic. Definitions in glossem atics are strictly formal, which 
means that they are only ‘anchoring’ their objects ‘in respect to other objects similarly 
defined or premised as basic’285. They are not real, anchoring their objects to the 
world. The main principles o f a scientific description are simplicity, objectivity, self- 
consistency and exhaustiveness. Uldall claims that ‘from the principle o f  simplicity
A Q /
can be derived all the other scientific ideals’ . This is a claim that gains even more
interest if combined with the comment, a few lines earlier, that ‘the appeal o f
simplicity is probably, in the last resort, aesthetic’. One is tem pted to infer that the
principles o f science have an aesthetic foundation; this claim, so uncharacteristic o f
structuralism, is unfortunately not further elaborated. Furthermore, and deriving again
from the principle o f simplicity, ‘the unknown elem ents o f the theory [ ...]  must be
kept down to a minim um ’287, whereas im plicit prem ises must be avoided as much as
possible288. These last two rules lead to the condem nation o f  metaphysics. It is
obvious that in this context ‘m etaphysics’ has a negative resonance.
The new definition o f the semiotic fulfils the counter-m etaphysical demand, as
it no longer needs any recourse to essences and m etaphysical properties. They are all
^ ‘Outline’, p. 18 
20 Prol, p.9
*ibid’p-8
ibid, p. 12 
*  ‘Outline’, p.20 
w  ibid., p.23
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replaced by topological relations, structures. The principle o f fundamental semiotic 
arbitrariness, with its two facets o f radical arbitrariness and differentiality, is 
unquestionably the source o f structuralism in all respects.
As we have seen when investigating term inologies289, the principle of 
fundamental semiotic arbitrariness has affected several concepts, emptying them of 
their metaphysical import. First among them  is the concept o f meaning. Its new 
definition is radically relational and insolubly double-faced. The completely 
functional-relational definition subverted the notion o f  signs pointing to autonomous 
pre-existing essences. In structuralist contexts, the term  ‘signification’290 substitutes 
for ‘meaning’ (sens), which -  when still used -  m ostly refers to the pre-articulated 
continuum of content. Signification designates the entirety o f the semiotic 
phenomenon, both as doing-process and as state. ‘C ontent’ relinquishes its ontological 
weight, as it becomes the name o f one o f the functives o f  the semiotic function. It is 
completely symmetrical to the other functive, to the point o f  becoming 
interchangeable with it. As we have said in the previous sub-section, content/signified 
ceases to have a relation o f interiority as opposed to expression/signifier, despite the 
lingering connotations. This is a significant difference from previous conceptions of 
the sign. Accordingly, meaning can no longer be conceptualised as expression or 
representation in the traditional way. The m etaphysical definition o f expression would 
be precisely the putting into material form o f  pre-existent ideas o f the mind. This is no 
longer a valid description as the ‘ideas’ are not considered as existing prior to their
289 See sub-section 2.6
290 See Greimas and Courtes, Sem iotique: D iction n aire ra isonn e de la  th eorie du lan gage, p. 352. In 
English language the use o f  the term ‘m eaning’ is still com m on even  in structuralist contexts, wi 
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semiotic articulation . Similarly, representation traditionally would be the 
redoubling o f  pre-existing entities from the realm of ideas or o f things, depending on 
the philosophical theory, to the inside our minds and then outside again in a material 
form. This metaphysical geography is flattened by structuralist semiotics. Considering 
that we perceive the world through our semiotic articulations, we have no access to 
any completely pre-semiotic givens, which we would then represent by our thoughts 
and signs. As we will see, a certain redoubling still underlies structuralist semiotic 
theory; however, it is completely emptied of any notion o f mirroring or similarity. 
The opposition ‘form vs. substance’ is also relativised, to a lesser extent though than 
the ‘content vs. expression’ and ‘content vs. form’ oppositions. The term ‘substance’ 
is used in Hjelmslev’s stratification alleviated from its metaphysical import. It is a 
‘formed’, even ‘formal’, kind of substance, as opposed to the unreachable ‘purport- 
matter’. Whereas the content-expression relation is conceived as an equivalence, the 
‘form-substance’ relation is conceived as a determination; which means that whereas 
content and expression don’t differ in any essential way, form and substance do differ, 
even if only in relative degree. The fact, however, that form determines substance, 
and not the other way round, makes it clear that semiotic substance is disconnected 
from its traditional metaphysical past. Actually, the predominance o f form in 
structuralism has led to accusations of formalism. Structuralists are particularly
• 9Q9 •sensitive about this accusation . One must remember that in stmcturalist discourse 
the concept o f structure has challenged the distinction between form and content; 
thus, when ‘form’ is studied, this does not entail a disregard for the content.
291 See, for example: ‘La langue n’est plus l ’expression d ’une pense qu’elle exteriorise Elle structure la 
pense’ {Langue is no longer the expression o f  a thought that it exteriorises. It structures thought.), Jean- 
Marie Auzias, Clefs pour le structuralisme, p.35
292 See, for example, Michael Lane’s presentation o f  Levi-Strauss in Introduction, in Structuralism: A 
Reader, p.31
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These conceptual changes affect the traditional definition of the subject as we
poceive it in different ways. Firstly, as John M epham 293 observes, considering that
(he world we perceive is a product o f its semiotic articulation, we are forced to reject
(he subject-object distinction as an epistemological given. Secondly, a structuralist
semiotic analysis is not interested in the subjects unless as points in the
com munication circuit, for reasons both conceptual and methodological.
Conceptually, meaning is not conceived as pre-existing in the ‘interior’ o f  a subject
before its articulation; which articulation, even if  taking place ‘privately’, is always
immersed in society. M ethodologically, the object o f sem iotic analysis is a signifying
object or a signifying practice, in their property o f being signifying; other possible
parameters are simply objects o f different analyses. Thirdly, in the case o f  Hjelmslev
and his school o f structuralist semiotics, subjects become insignificant even as points
m the communication circuit, because the com m unication circuit is not part o f the
object of analysis either. In Hjelmslevian sem iotics, the object o f  analysis is the
semiotic given alone, the text. As Ronald Schleifer puts it with regard to Greimas:
his systematic or scientific metalanguage [...] attempts to articulate language 
without a subject. It attempts to effect [...] the ‘objectification’ of the text, that 
is, the elimination of all linguistic categories that depend (and indicate) the 
‘nonlinguistic situation of discourse’ within the text
Finally^  the very nature o f signifying structures exceeds the conscious will o f subjects. 
As Robin Gandy explains295, we learn most o f  them without explicit instruction and 
We are able to apply them without being conscious o f doing it. Levi-Strauss has 
clarified in more than one case that the signifying structures which underlie the 
' practices o f a society are usually unconscious and don’t coincide with the explicit 
luorms and rules this society follows.
I® ‘The Structuralist Sciences and Philosophy’ in Structuralism : An In troduction , p. 125 
I A.J. Greimas an d the N ature o f  M eaning, p. 14
r * ‘ “Structure” in M athem atics’, in Structuralism : An Introduction, p .153
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Consequently, it is clear that structuralist sem iotics is not seeking the intention 
of a subject but the significance as embodied in the structure o f  a particular given text. 
However, the notion o f intention remains as a pre-condition for the recognition o f a 
text as text, i.e. as a semiotic entity. A structuralist semiotic analysis has as its object 
only cultural products. A rock as a physical entity would never be the object o f 
semiotic analysis; it would gain semiotic interest only if  it was part o f a cultural 
practice, and therefore invested with signification -  if  it was used, for example, as a 
means of communication, or as a religious or art object, or even as a tool or weapon. 
Structuralists, unlike medieval theologians, do not attribute some meaning to the 
world by itself. This very un-metaphysical conception o f  intention, reduced to a 
human trace, carries a contradiction which is fully developed by the Derridian texts.
From the new definition o f the semiotic, there arise three issues o f  particular
meta-theoretical interest. Firstly, the de-essentialisation o f m eaning makes structures
-  semiotic structures -  meaningful. As there is no longer a metaphysical
differentiation between signified and signifier, m eaning is form and form is meaning.
This is a characteristic which had previously been contem plated only in relation to
poetry and art. Structuralism makes it into general characteristic o f the semiotic realm.
Secondly, semiotic structures enact a bridge between the sensible and the intelligible,
is well as between the formal and the factual296. Actually, each o f the concepts
‘semiotic’ and ‘structure’, even without being combined, is in a position between the
two poles o f the traditional oppositions o f ‘sensible vs. intelligible’ and ‘substance vs.
form’. This cannot but remind to us the concept o f  K ant’s ‘schem a’. Thirdly, there is a
question of whether structuralism entails dualism in different levels. Semiotic
Structures are definitely not reducible to dyadic relations; that is the whole point o f the
**This observation is made by Ernst Cassirer and connected to a Kantian tradition in Structuralism in 
Modem Linguistics’ in Word, vol. I, no II, A ugust (1945 ), 99-120  (pp. 103-104)
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9Q7concept o f structure, as Levi-Strauss made clear . The question of dualism (or not),
therefore, regards the elementary structures and infra-structures; of either the
expression or the content plane. Anne Henault records the life-long disagreement
between the leading figures of structuralist semiotics on this subject; Hjelmslev
accused Jakobson of
a mutilating binarisation, which privileged the disjunctive oppositions between 
two terms and excluded the participative oppositions298.
One question, therefore, is whether the elementary structure is dual; and another is 
whether this duality is a disjunctive opposition. What Hjelmslev, and Brondal, meant 
by ‘participative’ oppositions, as opposed to the ‘disjunctive’ ones, are oppositions 
that are not fully analysable by formal logic. For example, in the couple ‘interesting 
vs. boring’, the term ‘interesting’, while contrary and mutually exclusive with 
‘boring’, can also designate the entire category. A n  effort to disambiguate this 
particular complication has been to introduce an ‘interestingl’, for the contrary term 
to ‘boring’, and an ‘interesting2’, designating the entire category. It did not, however, 
manage to describe the way the couple functions. There is an asymmetry: to say of a 
book that ‘it is not interesting’ means that it is boring, but to say that ‘it is not boring’ 
doesn’t mean that it is interesting either; to ask whether a book is interesting allows 
both the possibilities o f its being interesting and boring, to ask whether it is boring 
already implicates a negative disposition. There are cases of more complicated 
structures. There are also cases where the ‘simple’ difference between a non-marked 
and a marked term has immense philosophical implications, such as the case ‘man vs. 
woman’. Hjelmslev and Brondal named this particular kind o f logic ‘the sub-logic of 
language’. They investigated all possible structures o f semiotic categories and
297 See sub-section 3.7.
298 Anne Henault, H istoire de la semiotique, p. 77
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proposed a hexagonal ‘maximal category’299. This bears many resemblances to 
R.Blanche’s logical hexagon, with the exception that -  unlike his model -  their 
maximal category incorporates the notion of non-reducible semiotic ambiguity. Many 
efforts have been made to propose models that would fit the function of language into 
traditional logic schemas, most of which are applications or extensions o f Aristotle’s 
logical square. Nevertheless, even semioticians who support the possibility of 
reducing the semiotic couples into ‘disjunctive’ ones, accept the existence of different 
kinds of relations between the terms of a couple. Jakobson, for example, subscribes to 
the distinction between ‘contradictory’ and ‘contrary’ oppositions; such as ‘black vs. 
non-black’ and ‘black vs. white’. Only the former opposition, i.e. contradiction, 
makes possible a digitalisation. The later opposition, i.e. the contrary relation, allows 
for the existence o f a third term, and infinite others, which are neither the first nor the 
second. That is why Levi-Strauss in his anthropological studies distinguishes the 
opposition *+/-’ from the opposition ‘+/0/-’.
Consequently, the question of binarism, for structuralism, does not concern the 
level of signification. However, our general intuition is that the mechanism of 
differentiality, at its purely relational minimum, does produce disjunctive, 
contradictory couples alone; i.e. the relation ‘a vs. non-a’. Therefore, an open question 
is how it is possible for this qualitative change to occur between the productive 
mechanism and the higher levels of structure. It is further connected to questions 
regarding the way this mechanism is inter-related to different levels o f cognition; 
whether it affects the levels of logic, or human understanding and perception, or 
epistemology and metaphysics.
299 Ducrot and Schaeffer, Nouveau dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences du langage, pp. 276-291; 
Greimas and Courtes, Semiotique: Dictionnaire raisonne de la theorie du langage, pp.27-33.
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The first question would be what the mechanism of differentiality entails 
regarding logic. Here again, one should make a distinction between the semiotic level 
and an infra-structural level; or between logic as a sub-set and as a super-set of the 
semiotic realm. As we have seen, from a structuralist point o f view, theoretically, 
logic is a kind o f semiotic and, therefore, dependent on a particular semiotic 
community. Nevertheless, when investigating the meta-semiotic level and the infra­
structures o f the semiotic, logic is used as a tool, provisionally objective. On the one 
hand, at the semiotic level, it is quite clear that the rule o f the excluded middle does 
not hold. As a matter of fact, it should not hold by definition, as a result of the non­
isomorphism of the two planes that constitute a semiotic. The exact signification of an 
element is decided by its situation in context. Furthermore, the notion of 
‘participation’ introduces a kind of semiotic logic irreducible to formal logic, even of 
the fuzzy variety. On the other hand, however, as signification is very clearly divorced 
from truth, semiotic value has nothing to do with a supposedly objective truth-value. 
Truth-value, as investigated in the context of a semiotic, is one of the possible 
significations, limited in this semiotic; a semiotic-independent truth-value is not 
accessible. This means, nevertheless, that although a general valuation is 
epistemologically impossible, nothing impends its ontological existence. Actually, 
classical structuralists seem to believe in its existence, by their practice if  not 
explicitly. If one observes the structuralist semiotic metalanguage, the semiotic infra­
structure does not seem to be affected by any logical fuzziness.
The second question concerns the topology o f human understanding and 
human perception, going back to the abilities of our brains. There is a strong 
controversy in cognitive sciences as to whether we understand and/or perceive the 
world digitally or analogically. It is not completely clear where structuralists stand
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with regard to this issue; Saussure seems to endorse the former position. There are 
several complications in this controversy. For example, it could be possible that the 
‘deeper’ infra-structure of the semiotic realm follows a binary matrix, without our 
human abilities being confined in this way of perception; or it could be that the effect 
of ‘analogically’ is the proprium  of human perception. In any case, these issues are 
beyond the scope o f my thesis.
Thirdly and finally, there arises the question o f dualism in epistemology and 
metaphysics -  two realms which structuralist semioticians consider beyond their 
studies. As far as general metaphysics is concerned, strictly speaking, structuralists 
(should) refuse to make any statement, as this would be un-scientific and 
contradictory to their epistemological positions. However, there is no doubt that 
privately they all are materialists; and therefore monists. With regard to epistemology, 
the issue is more delicate. At a first level, structuralist semiotics subvert the traditional 
philosophical dualistic distinctions, among them the distinction between subject and 
object. However, in a second level, they make use o f it. In order to draw a distinction 
between the existence and the knowledge of reality, as structuralists do, one needs to 
presuppose, at least at a conceptual level, two different realms; the one is independent 
of us, o f our existence, the other is not. By ‘us’ we may mean ‘persons’ or ‘human 
beings’ or ‘subjects’ or simple ‘intelligences’. One should observe that the 
presupposition o f a conceptual distinction between an objective and a subjective 
realm is not necessarily equivalent to either a substantiation of the subjective realm or 
an evaluative judgement regarding either. In order to make the distinction between 
existence and knowledge of reality, it is enough to accept that what we perceive may 
not be the way things are; regardless of the metaphysical nature of the perceiver, the 
perceived or the process of perception. Theories of knowledge that presuppose two
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conceptually different realms and define the process o f knowledge as some form of 
relation between the two, I call ‘reflective’ or ‘dualistic’. I think that the epistemology 
pre-supposed by structuralist semiotics is such a theory. On the one hand, it is 
important to stress that a reflective theory of knowledge is not necessarily founded on 
a similarity between the world and our perception o f the world. This allows for the 
gap of epistemological anti-realism. On the other, it seems to me possible that there is 
an inherent relation between any theory of signs and some kind of dualistic theory of 
knowledge -  this hypothesis we will investigate in the following chapters.
The epistemological distinction gives rise to the problem o f reference: ‘the 
problem of the possible states of the world supposedly corresponding to the content 
[plane] of a sign-function’300. Additionally, an associated issue is the problem of
TA1 #
recognition , i.e. the problem of the relationship existing between the subject and the 
perceived object. The latter problem traditionally is not considered as related to 
meaning. However, the principle of fundamental semiotic arbitrariness entails that our 
perception o f the world as containing various distinguishable objects is semiotically 
constituted. This makes perception mediated by meaning. It is the same principle of 
semiotic arbitrariness that separates reference from meaning. The existence of a 
reference is not a necessary condition for semiotic functioning. The assumption that a 
sign has something to do with a corresponding object is termed by Eco ‘referential 
fallacy’. Furthermore, the extensional value o f a sign-function does not help us in any 
way to understand its semiotic functioning. The inverse assumption is termed by Eco 
‘the extensional fallacy’. Therefore, meaning is not correspondence to a subject- 
independent object-domain, whereas knowledge is meaning-mediated. Regarding the
300 Umberto Eco, A Theory o f  Semiotics, p .58, (the addition in square brackets is mine)
301 John Mepham, ‘The Structuralist Sciences and Philosophy’ in Structuralism: an Introduction,
(pp. 122-123)
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position o f  subject-constituted knowledge, structuralism is heir of Kant’s 
epistemology; as such, it inherits too the possibly insoluble problem of the gap 
between knowledge and reality.
We have seen earlier structuralists’ scientifism and how they share this 
characteristic with most o f  their contem porary thinkers. However, their approach to 
science has its particular characteristics that differentiate it from other approaches302. 
Unlike positivism and empiricism, it maintains that experience and experimentation 
are founded on our hypotheses and, therefore, the object o f science is not a 
spontaneous given. Unlike rationalism, its starting point are given texts and its object 
of study a particular stage o f a specified structure; a structure which is likely to 
change in a discontinuous fashion. De Mauro describes the structuralist approach to 
science as ‘a rationalist perspective in the service o f a historicist conclusion’ and 
Hobson as ‘combination o f the empirical w ith the transcendental’. As Cassirer and 
Norris observe, this bridge between rationalism and empiricism is, once again, 
Kantian.
In conclusion, we observe that the definition o f semiotic structure determines a 
structuralist epistemology. The most radical elem ent o f this definition is the principle 
of fundamental semiotic arbitrariness, which entails a de-essentialisation o f meaning. 
Furthermore, the definition o f meaning in purely topological terms enacts a bridge 
between the sensible and intelligible realms. Finally, the main problematic 
consequence of the theory is the possibly unbridgeable gap between knowledge and 
reality; and the tension between this gap and structuralists’ intended realism.
302 Viggo Brondal, ‘Linguistique structurale’ in A cta Linguistica, Vol.I, (pp.4-5); Ernst Cassirer, 
‘Structuralism in M odem  L inguistics’ in W ord, V ol.I, no.II, (pp. 116-118); Anne Hdnault, Les enjeux 
de la sem iotique: Introduction a la  sem io tiqu e gen era te, p. 17 ; Louis Hjelmslev, Essais, p.40, Marian 
Hbbson, Jacques D errida: O pen ing L ines, p.7; Tullio de Mauro, in CLG, (p .x iv ) ; Christopher Norris, 
^Forword’ in R. Schleifer, A .J .G reim as a n d  the N ature o f  M eaning, (pp.xi-xiv).
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4. DECONSTRUCTIVE META-SEMIOTICS
4.1. Introduction
This chapter presents Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive project. The centrality of 
semiotics in this project is revealed, as well as its particularly close interconnection 
with metaphysics. Deconstruction is shown as having two closely woven sides: a 
theory o f semiosis informed by a critique o f  metaphysics, and a critique of 
metaphysics based on a theory o f semiosis. Furthermore, deconstruction is proved to 
have a privileged relation with structuralist semiotics. Structuralist semiotics 
constitutes, on the one hand, the source both o f  its main axiom and o f significant 
elements o f its methodology and, on the other, an exceptional and paradigmatic object 
of critique. The unexpectedly two-way dependence between semiotics and 
metaphysics that characterises deconstruction seems also to have its roots in 
structuralist semiotics, whereas the two projects imply several similar epistemological 
propositions.
Derrida’s deconstruction differs recognisably from the rest o f Tel Quel's post- 
structuralism, from Paul de M an’s deconstruction, from post-modernist philosophy 
and from deconstruction as applied in American literary studies; all o f which tend to 
be confused with it, as they obviously share some characteristics with it. It is not my 
purpose to investigate these comparisons. However, as this chapter presents the 
defining characteristics o f Derrida’s project, it becomes clear that it cannot be 
confused with any o f the above mentioned. Firstly, it is more analytical than most of 
the other post-structuralists’ work, as Christopher N orris1 observes. Derrida is very
1 See, for example, M inding the G ap E pistem ology an d  Philosophy o f  Science in the Two Traditions, 
Amherst: University o f  M assachusetts Press, 2000, pp. 134-135.
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much concerned with the logical structure o f  the texts he deconstructs and he deals 
with traditionally philosophical problems. Additionally, despite his radical critique of 
the protocols o f academic discourse, his writing is characterised by an 
uncompromising logical rigor. This fact usually passes unnoticed by his critics within 
the analytical philosophical tradition, such as John R. Searle2, who are usually 
confounded by the unfamiliarity o f his discourse. Secondly, Derrida’s deconstruction 
is distinctively more structuralist than Paul de M an’s deconstruction3. De Man is the 
other prominent figure usually connected with the name ‘deconstruction’, although 
the coinage o f the term belongs to Derrida. Despite the similarities o f their 
techniques, both based on close reading, Derrida’s is clearly based on structuralist 
semiotic tools and premises, whereas de M an’s is based mostly on traditional 
rhetorics. Furthermore, there is a marked difference in tone between them, closely 
related to their general position with regard to metaphysics. Derrida’s critique of 
metaphysics, based on the structuralist principle o f fundamental semiotic 
arbitrariness, keeps a distance from any positive metaphysical commitment; de M an’s 
critique o f metaphysics, directly indebted to Nietzsche, comes closer to proposing a 
positive metaphysical position, belonging to the post-modernist paradigm. Thirdly, 
Derrida’s project, precisely, is radically different from post-modernist pragmatism, as 
Norris has often convincingly argued. It is true that the term ‘post-modern’ is used in 
several senses. For example, in the sense o f the historical condition o f late-capitalist 
societies, we all are post-modem, regardless o f our ideological choices. Then, in the 
general sense o f criticising several o f the certainties o f the Enlightenment, Derrida is 
post-modem; so is post-structuralism in general, as well as Marxism and
2 ‘Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida’, G lyph  (1977)
3 See Rea Walld&i, ‘Concepts o f  Materiality in Language with reference to the writings o f  Jacques 
Derrida and Paul de Man’, MA thesis, University o f  Cardiff, 2002
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psychoanalysis; as a matter o f fact, it can be claimed that the seed o f its self-critique 
is embedded in the very discourse o f  the Enlightenment. However, there is a stronger 
sense o f post-modernist philosophy, exemplified by Richard Rorty, which is 
characterised by a counter-philosophical pragmatism o f a Nietzschean positiveness. 
In this stronger sense, Derrida is definitely not post-modernist. Fourthly, for all the 
above reasons, D errida’s deconstruction cannot be identified with its application in 
American literary studies; as a matter o f fact, it is questionable whether it is correct to 
consider ‘literary’ deconstruction as an application o f Derrida’s project. Literary 
deconstruction is in large degree unaware o f both the philosophical and, particularly, 
the structuralist semiotic background o f Derridean deconstruction; whereas its 
underlying ideology is post-modernist in the stronger sense. Its use of Derrida is in 
the ‘pastiche’ way characteristic o f post-modernism, which ignores both the inner 
structure and the position in larger structures o f  the elements it borrows. The 
transformation o f deconstruction into a dogma is inconsistent with its spirit, at the 
very least.
Deconstruction, first and foremost, is a particular method o f close reading. 
Derrida’s texts do not appear independently, they develop ‘parasitically’4 on existing 
texts o f our culture -  often philosophical ones.
T h e m o v em en ts  o f  d eco n stru ctio n  d o  n ot d estro y  structures from  the ou tsid e .
T h ey  are not p o ss ib le  and e f fe c t iv e , nor can  th ey  take accurate aim , ex cep t by  
in hab iting th o se  structures5
They always have a double relation with the text under investigation, as they both 
criticise and use it. This use means that the tools for its critique are extracted from the 
text itself, which often includes a kind o f structural and stylistic imitation. A text is in
4 ‘Parasite’ is one of the many quasi-concepts that Derrida introduces, as we shall see in the next sub­
section. For the structural function of the parasite, see for example Mar, p.3 87 / Mar Eng, p. 325, Lim, 
f.17
Gram Eng, p. / Gram, p.39
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a way self-deconstructed, as it carries all the elements that lead to its own 
deconstruction. This is consistent with the deconstructive critique of the subject- 
object division. As the levels o f acceptance and critique co-exist, in an asymmetrical 
fashion, a deconstructive argument cannot be reduced to its conclusion. Its 
irreducibility means that one has to simultaneously keep in mind the entire ‘cogent 
and logically articulated process o f argument’6.
Deconstructive reading is based on a conception o f meaning deriving from 
structuralist semiotics: on the one hand, there are other meaningful elements in a text 
than thematic exposition; on the other, the meaning o f a text exceeds the conscious 
intention o f its author. This premise affects both D errida’s texts and the texts he 
analyses.
Regarding his own writing, it means two things: Firstly, in order to be 
consistent, he needs to argue his position not only through his exposition but also 
performatively through his means o f expression, which I think that he does in an 
remarkably original way. This technique, he names ‘double writing’. Secondly, he 
needs to take constant precautions in order to remind the reader the precariousness of 
his [Derrida’s] position as an author. Therefore, we see that even the use o f various 
unexpected stylistic and narrative devices is part o f a rigorous theoretical consistency; 
whereas as far as thematic exposition goes ‘Derrida for the most part argues his way 
with a strict regard for standards o f logical rigour, consistency, and truth’7. As he puts 
it:
‘On the one hand, I try to submit m yself to the most demanding norms o f  
classical philosophical discussion [...] On the other hand, in so doing I multiply 
statements, discursive gestures, forms o f  writing, the structure o f which 
reinforces my demonstration in something like a practical manner’8
6 Christopher Norris, M inding the G ap , p. 163
7 ibid, p. 161
8 Lim , p .l 14
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The way meaning is produced affects equally the texts under consideration.
This means, on the one hand, that one should interpret not only declarations and
themes but also descriptions, connotations and imagery, rhetoric and stylistic devices,
and -  most importantly -  how all these are structured, in the plane of content and
expression and their interconnection. On the other hand, correspondingly, it means
that a text possesses other levels o f meaning than those intended by its author,
different and possibly contradictory to it. It is these other meanings and their relation
to the intended one that mostly interest Derrida. Their relation is shown to be
structural; whereas, the very differentiation between intended and un-intended
meaning, as well as between content and expression, is proved to be a product of the
structure and not the other way round. As he puts it in De la grammatologie:
It is [...] this difference between implication, nominal presence, and thematic 
exposition that interests us9
We must measure this gap between the description and the declaration10 
[The] text moves [...] between what we have called description  and 
declaration , which are themselves structural poles rather than natural and fixed 
points o f reference11
Reading must always aim at a certain relationship, unperceived by the writer, 
between what he commands and what he does not command o f  the patterns o f  
the language that he uses. This relationship is [...] a signifying structure12
The question is how one accesses those other levels o f meaning, different 
from the express thematic level. Derrida argues that, for this purpose, particularly 
useful are cases that constitute exceptions to the rules and moments where the text 
shows internal contradictions. The structural importance o f these traditionally 
underestimated elements is a result o f the very rigorous and uncompromising logic 
which, according to Derrida, is the only one applicable when concepts are concerned.
9 Gram Eng, p.213 / Gram  304
10 Gram Eng, p .21 7 /  Gram, p .3 10
11 Gram Eng, p .219 / G ram , p .3 12
12 Gram Eng, p. 158 / G ram , p. 227
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Every concept that lays claim to any rigor whatsoever implies the alternative 
‘all or nothing’13
This entails that no accident is possible or, better put, if  something is possible then it
affects the rule: an exception is a refutation. Thus, limit cases are privileged and
aporias, i.e. moments o f  internal inconsistency in the texts, are not mere empirical
accidents but examples o f  structural laws. The limit cases are not revealing because
they are ‘right’, whereas the rest o f the system is ‘wrong’, but because they allow one
to see how the entire system w orks14:
It is the secondary, eccentric, lateral, marginal, parasitic, borderline cases 
which are “important” to me and are source o f many things, such as pleasure, 
but also insight into the general functioning o f  a textual system15
Correspondingly, aporias are symptoms o f  an underlying structural tension. They are, 
as Norris describes them:
blindspots or moments o f self-contradiction where a text involuntarily betrays 
the tension [...] between what it manifestedly means to say and what it is 
nonetheless constrained to mean16
Consequently, deconstruction needs a very careful close reading, ‘a rigour and a 
scrupulous adherence to the letter o f the tex t’17, in order to trace limit cases and 
aporias which tend most often to go unnoticed. These are then shown to be organised 
into a second level o f meaning, different and usually opposed to the intentional one. 
This ‘second register’ does not annul the first but co-exists with it. In a nut shell, 
deconstructive reading shows attention to detail in order to access a general structure.
The result is a multiply rigorous philosophical text, both regarding the 
standards o f consistency o f argument and the attention to the object under 
consideration. Derrida’s project combines a general theory with the subtleties of
13 Lim, p. 116
14 There are certain sim ilarities with the Marxist notion o f  the privileged standpoint o f  the proletariat.
15 Lim, p.44
16 Norris, D errida, p. 19
17 Norris, ibid, p. 109
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detailed analysis and far exceeds the scope o f a textual commentary18. Nevertheless, 
his method is undeniably based on textual work. In consistency with his positions, as 
we shall see, one cannot subtract the text from his argument and be left with a ‘free’ 
content, a ‘transcendental signified’. Accordingly, in consistency with his positions, 
he would be cautious o f the use o f  the word ‘m ethod’ because o f its metaphysical 
connotations19. He would argue that precisely because o f the dependence o f his texts 
on other texts, the tools are each time provided by them and are particular to them. 
However, as we shall show in this chapter, there is structural similarity between all of 
his readings. As he would phrase it, it is a ‘sameness without identity’. Moreover, an 
identical structure does not imply an identical entity, unless both the entity is solely 
structural and the structural identity concerns all its levels. We can, therefore, claim 
that Derrida in all his readings performs not ju st the same, but a structurally identical 
move; and this fact does not reduce the uniqueness o f  each reading.
In the previous paragraphs o f description o f deconstructive reading, one 
cannot fail to observe a certain recurrent double structure: texts, simultaneously, 
expressly say and performatively show; consciously intend to say and unconsciously 
say; use and criticise other texts. These asymmetrical relational couples are governed 
by a kind o f  logic that differs from the ‘all or nothing’ logic, as we shall see.
In this chapter, we will further investigate deconstructive reading, in its 
semiotic and metaphysical aspects. We will first present two well-known and 
structurally important examples o f  deconstructive critique: its engagement with the 
topics o f writing and difference. Then we will approach the general critique of 
metaphysics into which these two examples are placed, and which they are proved to
18 Norris, M inding the G a p , p. 147
19 See, for example, Nom, p .32
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determine, as well as the peculiar logic it introduces. Subsequently, we will 
investigate the way deconstruction affects structuralist semiotics, which appears to be 
a privileged object o f deconstructive critique. Then, we proceed to show that there is 
a structural affinity between deconstruction and structuralist semiotics, and 
Hjelmslev’s work in particular. We conclude to a view o f deconstruction as a radical, 
limit case o f structuralist semiotics.
4.2. Ecriture, difference and their chain of displaced isomorphism
There is no doubt that deconstruction functions as a general critique of metaphysics; 
however, it is equally obvious that a theory o f  signification holds an important 
position in this critique -  a structural position, as will be shown. As Derrida observes
P/7in Positions , all his first published books are intimately connected to each other:
they all deal with the question o f the sign and its centrality for Western metaphysics.
It is in these texts that there are introduced the inter-related notions o f ‘ecriture’ and
'difference', which then re-appear in almost every Derridean text, in connection with
several different philosophical argumentations. Nevertheless, their introduction
happens in a context o f critique o f the philosophical positions regarding signification.
As we shall see, they eventually substitute for the traditional philosophic terms about
language and signification, which include the structuralist semiotic concepts of sign-
* • 2 1function, semiosis and communication; they actually constitute a model o f semiosis . 
Furthermore, they provide the self-deconstructing structure o f Western metaphysics.
Deconstruction, particularly as introduced in the books published in 1967, 
could be perceived as a ‘grammatology’, a theory or science o f writing. It is
20 In the interview o f  1967 with Henri Ronse, Derrida explains the interrelation between D e la  
gram m atologie, L ’ecriture et la  difference  and La voix et le phenom ene , all published in 1967, as well 
as his introduction to H usserl’s O rigin  o f  G eom etry  o f  1962, Pos, pp. 11-13 /  Pos Eng, pp. 3-5
21 See sub-section 4.7
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significant that the text which expressly supplies a ‘theoretical m atrix’ of the 
deconstructive project bears that nam e22: ‘grammatology’; as a matter of fact ‘of 
grammatology’. Very early in the text23 Derrida explains why deconstruction cannot 
but be ‘about’ grammatology, why a grammatology ‘by itse lf cannot exist. The 
nucleus of this impossibility consists in the fact that ‘science’ and ‘theory’ are 
concepts belonging to the metaphysical system that writing puts into question. There 
is a certain contradiction in the notion o f a science about the possibility o f science, a 
theory about the possibility o f theory, a philosophy about the possibility of 
philosophy. However, as Derrida expounds in ‘Tym pan’, the introductory text 
of Marges de la philosophies it is precisely this structural tension that defines 
philosophy: ‘Its own limit [has] not to remain foreign to it’24. In this sense, 
deconstruction, this cautious and self-conscious grammatology, is philosophy par 
excellence.
The beginning o f De la grammatologie includes a passage entitled ‘The 
Program’25, meaning the program o f this particular book. However, strangely, it could 
be considered as the program o f the entire philosophical project o f Derrida, right up 
to the end o f his life. The deconstructive project, as this ‘Program ’ and its subsequent 
‘The Signifier and Truth’26 explain, is constructed around a re-defined notion of 
writing. It demonstrates that the concept o f writing is intimately connected to notions 
of mediation and exteriority, as well as having to do with the difference between the 
sensible and the intelligible; these characteristics are then shown to be the definitional 
basis of signification in general; finally, they are shown to be central for the
22 G ram , p. 7 / Gram Eng, p.lxxxix
23 Gram, pp. 12-14, 42-43 /  Gram E ng  pp. 3-4, 27
24 Mar, p.i / M ar Eng, p.x
25 Gram, pp. 15-21 / Gram Eng, pp. 6-10
26 Gram, pp.21-31 /  Gram Eng, pp. 10-18
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philosophical theories o f  knowledge and the entire construction o f Western 
metaphysics.
Derrida observes that in many texts, philosophical and others27, writing is 
devalued as opposed to speech. It appears as external to language; the signifier of a 
signifier and, therefore, as secondary to and dependent upon language. Moreover, it is 
understood as a transfer from material to material, from sound to visual mark, while 
the proper material o f (natural) languages is sound. Derrida considers these 
presuppositions as deeply inscribed within W estern metaphysics. From Plato to 
Rousseau and beyond, the moment o f spoken utterance is idealized as the moment of 
language par excellence, where the intention o f the addresser, the message and the 
uptake o f the addressee coincide in the unique meaning; independent o f any material 
support and in direct proximity to ‘thought’. In this context writing is seen as dead 
matter, a ‘parasite’, a ‘supplement’ at best.
However, the very same texts include elements that ill fit this position; 
elements which are then shown to be organised in a structure that contradicts the 
text’s express meaning. For example, a text condemning writing as evil may need 
metaphors o f writing in order to define speech; or a text defining writing as secondary 
may be proved to attribute the same characteristics to language. The result is that the 
concept o f writing is shown indispensable for the definition o f its opposites, which 
were supposed independent and primary. W hat is more, writing is shown to be an 
actually more general notion than its opposites.
27 Texts by Austin, Benveniste, Foucault, Freud, H egel, Heidegger, Husserl, Levinas, Levi-Strauss, 
Plato, Rousseau, Saussure and others
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For example, in ‘Signature evenement contexte’28, there are posed the
following three ‘essential predicates in a minimal determination of the classical
concept of writing’29. Firstly, a written sign subsists beyond the presence of the
empirical subject who produced it. Secondly, it carries a force of rupture from its
context. This force o f rupture is the structural possibility for a written sign to
function, i.e. be meaningful, even if  its initial context is irrevocably lost -  including
its addressor’s physical presence and intention, its intended addressee, its textual and
situational, semiotic and extra-semiotic context. Thirdly, this structural force of
rupture is connected to the ‘spacing’ that constitutes the written sign, which separates
it from the all other elements o f the contextual chain and from all forms o f present
referent. However, Derrida shows that all three predicates are appropriate to every
kind of sign and communication. Every sign, in order to be a sign, is ‘iterable’, i.e.
repeatable. Every sign, in order to be a sign, includes the structural possibility of
disconnection from the other signs o f the discourse in which it appears, from its
intended signified, as well as from any referent whatsoever. Finally, a sign is
constituted by its difference from other signs and the fact that it is not identified with
its referent. Therefore, considering that the predicates which distinguish an object
under investigation as writing are proved to characterise every sign, every sign is a
kind of writing. In De la grammatologie appear some of the most memorable
phrasings o f this radical conclusion:
‘Signifier o f a signifier’ describes ... the movement o f language 
If every sign refers to a sign, and if ‘sign o f a sign’ signifies writing...
...language is not merely a sort o f writing... but a species o f  writing.
...language is a possibility founded on the general possibility o f writing.
28 The text deconstructs the concept o f  com m unication in the E ssai sur Vorigine des connaissances 
humaines by Condillac, with references to Husserl and Austin. M ar, pp.365-393 /  M ar Eng, pp.307- 
330 /  Lim, pp. 1-21
29 Mar, p.377 / M ar Eng, p .3 17 /  Lim, p .9
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Writing thus comprehends language30 
The traditional definition o f language largely depends on the distinction 
between sensible and intelligible. Writing is situated on the ‘sensible’ side o f the bi­
pole. It is often considered as more ‘m aterial’ than speech, or at least as having a 
doubly mediated distance from the signified; while questions regarding materials are 
always prominent in a discussion about writing. Even from a very unmetaphyscial 
point o f view, at first glance, the most striking characteristic o f a transfer from spoken 
language to writing is the change o f material. The layman’s question would be: it is 
all very well to demonstrate the generality o f w riting’s properties, but isn’t it true that 
when we read the written text it is the sound that we seek and not visual values? 
Derrida shows that this objection is ethnocentric, based on the assumption that 
writing, at least in its ideal form, is phonetic31. It considers all the other forms of 
writing, from Aztec pictographs to Egyptian hieroglyphics to Chinese ideographic 
characters, as more primitive stages o f a hierarchy leading to European forms of 
phonetic writing. Contrary to that, Derrida observes that even European forms of 
writing are not purely phonetic and that
there is no purely phonetic writing (by reason o f the necessary spacing o f  
signs, punctuation, intervals, the differences indispensable for the functioning 
of graphemes, e tc .)32
Writing always functions like the rebus-puzzles, with an interplay o f modes of 
expression. Derrida goes on to argue that all signification functions in a rebus-like 
way, similar to synaesthesia and Freud’s description o f the mechanism of dreams .
Summarising, the starting point for the deconstruction of the traditional 
relation o f writing to speech is the observation that it structurally repeats the
30 Gram Eng , pp. 7, 43, 52 / Gram, pp. 16, 63, 75
31 Gram, pp. 117-121/ Gram Eng, pp. 79-81
32 Pos Eng, pp.25-26 /  Pos, p. 37
33 Gram, pp. 131-142 / Gram Eng, pp. 87-93; ED, pp.293-340 / WD, pp. 248-291
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traditional relation o f  the signifier to the signified. Every characteristic that is 
attributed to writing and considered its proprium , actually characterises signification 
in general. Writing is better suited than speech or language as model o f signification 
because it exemplifies all its characteristics that metaphysics structurally represses. 
The conclusion is that, in a certain way, speech is a species of writing. This is not a 
question about a historical precedence o f writing, in its narrower, empirical sense; it 
is about the logical priority o f a redefined, extended notion o f writing. It is not a 
question o f denying the existence o f empirical writing either. Deconstruction is about 
the structure, named ‘writing’ by a paleonymic technique, which constitutes the 
condition o f  possibility o f signification in all its forms, including speech and writing. 
Writing in this new sense appears in other contexts, where there is no obvious relation 
to linguistic issues, precisely because it designates a structure, a function-structure.
The paleonymic neo-graphism ‘difference', with an ‘a ’, appears in all the 
three books published in 196734 and then re-appears in many Derridean texts. An 
entire essay in the 1972 book Marges de la philosophie bears its name . Difference is 
intimately connected with the notion o f the extended writing. It is intended to 
combine the function o f signification as ‘differing’ and ‘deferring’. It is the difference 
in space and time that makes possible the functioning o f signification. Its silent ‘a’ 
exemplifies the meaningful difference between the written and the spoken signified; 
the fact that their relation is neither a one-to-one correspondence nor a one-way 
dependence. The conclusion is then extended to the relation between signifier and
34 For example, Gram, pp.38, 92-95, 101, 128, 142 /  Gram Eng , pp. 23, 62-66, 69, 86, 93; ED, pp. 238, 
294-295, 302-303, 428 /  WD, pp. 161, 202, 247-249, 254-255, 370; VPh, pp.75-77, 92, 98, 111 / SPh, 
pp. 67-69, 82, 88, 99 [SPh does not retain consistently the difference between ‘difference' and 
difference’ that exists in the original text o f  VPh]
35 ‘La difference’ in M ar, pp. 1 -29 / M ar Eng, pp. 1-27 / SPh, pp. 129-160. The essay was presented in a 
conference in 1968 and first published in the same year.
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signified; and eventually, via numerous relays and express qualifications, to the 
relation between knowledge and reality.
The notion o f ‘difference' is organised around Saussure’s semiotic difference,
combined with Heidegger’s ontico-ontological difference and Freud’s Verspatung
(delaying). In the essay that bears its name, ‘difference’ is also connected to
Nietzsche’s eternal return and Levinas’ absolute alterity; as well as, by
differentiation, to Hegel’s dialectics and Heraclitus’ ev 5ioupepov sauxco (en diapheron
eauto, the one different to itself). Starting from a writing on writing, ‘difference’ -
which cannot be called a concept for reasons we have implied and will explain further
-  combines the three characteristics o f iterability, force o f rupture and spacing that are
constitutive o f the written mark and the sign in general. Derrida traces the notion of
a general difference as condition o f possibility for signification to Saussure and his
combined principles regarding the arbitrary and differential character o f the sign;
what we have called earlier ‘the principle o f fundamental semiotic arbitrariness’. The
semiotic difference, this difference ‘without positive term s’ which affects the sign in
its totality, entails that no concept is present in itself:
Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a chain or a system 
within which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means o f the 
system atic p la y  o f  differences [the Italics are mine].
[...] There is no presence before and outside semiological difference.37 
Therefore:
Such a play [...] is no longer simply a concept, but rather the possibility o f  
conceptuality, o f a conceptual process and a system in general.
[...] The difference o f which Saussure speaks is itself, therefore, neither a 
concept nor a word among others. The same can be said, a fortiori, o f  
difference,38
36 M ar, p. 10-13 /  M ar Eng, p. 10-12
37 M ar Eng, pp .11-12 / M ar, p p .11-12
38 ibid
2 3 7
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE 
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
CHAPTER 4: DECONSTRUCTIVE META-SEMIOTICS
Keeping -  as he says — ‘the schema if  not the content’ of the Saussurean principle, 
Derrida designates as difference the movement that constitutes language, and every 
system o f referral, as ‘a weave o f differences’. In this weave of differences — as 
already noticed by structuralist semioticians -  presence, truth and the subject become 
effects. This leads Derrida to the Heideggerian questioning of being39 and the 
Freudian unconscious40. These references are beyond the scope o f our present 
investigation.
Difference, as we can see, is a structure; a function-structure such as the ones
defined by structuralist semiotics. As a structure, it is neither sensible nor intelligible.
Furthermore, it is intended to designate the structural relationship between the two;
the structure which produces them, as distinguished and related in a particular way.
This difference is [...] not more sensible than intelligible [...] It permits the 
articulation of speech and writing -  in the colloquial sense -  as it founds the 
metaphysical opposition between the sensible and the intelligible, then between 
signifier and signified, expression and content, etc.41
[It is of] an order which no longer belongs to sensibility. But neither can it 
belong to intelligibility... an order that resists the opposition, founding of 
philosophy, between the sensible and the intelligible.42
Furthermore, difference, as a structure, cannot ‘be’ in the full-fledged metaphysical 
sense o f being; it has no essence: ‘[it] is not an essence, [...] it is not anything’43. This
39 ‘The ontico-ontological difference and its ground (Grund) in the “transcendence o f  Dasein” [...] are 
not absolutely originary. D ifference itself would be more ‘originary’, but one would no longer be able 
to call it “origin” or “ground”, those notions belonging essentially to the history o f  onto-theology’, 
Gram Eng, p.23 / Gram, p .38
‘Difference, the pre-opening o f  the ontic-ontological difference’, WD, p.248 /  ED, p. 295
40 ‘The putting into question o f  the authority o f  consciousness is first and always differential. The two 
apparently different values o f  difference are tied together in Freudian theory’, M ar Eng, p. 18 / Mar, 
p .19
‘Difference, the pre-opening [...] o f  all the differences which furrow Freudian conceptuality’, WD, 
p.248 / ED, p. 295
‘[Freud] com plies with a dual necessity: that o f  recognising difference at the origin, and at the same 
time that o f  crossing out the concept o f  prim arin ess  [...] in a paragraph on the “delaying” ( Verspdtung) 
o f the secondary process’, WD, p .255 / ED, p. 3 02
41 Gram Eng, pp.62-63 / Gram , p .92
42 M ar Eng, p .5 / Mar, p .5
43 WD, p.255
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is the case for every (relational) structure, but difference exemplifies it in an extreme
form as (it is) the structure of the difference between essence and structure, the
structure o f structure.
Difference in its neo-graphism, makes use o f the polysemy, termed
‘immediate and irreducible’44, of the French verb ‘d ifferer\ coming from the Latin
verb ‘differre\ This has two senses45: (a) to be not identical, be other, discernible;
and (b) to put off until later, make a detour, delay. Derrida defines his neo-graphism
as the combination o f these two senses, or rather the condition o f  possibility o f the
difference and similarity between them. Structurally necessary for the two senses of
the verb are notions o f spatiality and temporality. Difference is the structure, spatial
and temporal, that combines and differentiates them. As Derrida puts it, it is
temporalization and spacing, the becoming-time of space and the becoming- 
space of time, the ‘originary constitution’ of time and space46
So, difference is not only an irreducibly spatio-temporal structure, it is moreover the
structural relation between space and time.
This is a very particular kind o f structure. Difference is not just difference; it
is the difference between the same and other, between sameness and difference.
Difference is a relational term, to start with. Difference, being the structure of
difference, is a higher degree structure. Moreover, it is not just any structure of
higher degree. It is the structure that makes structure possible. Being in a sense the
‘origin’ o f structure, gives it a very problematical ‘fit’ with the notion of structure. In
Derrida’s words:
Difference is [...] the formation of form.47
44 Mar, p .8, 19 / M ar Eng, pp.7-8, 18
45 Unlike differre, the Greek term Siacpcpsiv has only the first sense and does not allow for this 
meaningful interplay. Derrida thinks that it may be significant that the term o f  the language considered 
as the mother-language o f  philosophy does not allow for this differential play.
46 M ar Eng, p. 8 /  M ar, p .8
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The difference between the same and the other, which is not a difference or a 
relation among others48
Difference with an ‘a ’ and ecriture in the extended sense are used
interchangeably. They are both fiinction-structures, they are completely relational and
they are isomorphic to each other through and through; therefore, they are identical.
We understand by now why the term ‘identical’ is difficult to use in this case:
ecriture-differance constitutes the condition o f possibility for the differentiation
between identity and difference, whereas the concept o f ‘identity’ is interrelated to
notions o f essence and presence. Still, it is perfectly correct to call them structurally
and functionally identical; and this explains why they can be used interchangeably.
However, there is a passage in De la grammatologie where Derrida makes a
distinction between the two. He explains that this particular structure can be called
ecriture only within the context of Western metaphysics:
this unnameable movement of difference-itself, that I have strategically 
nicknamed [...] difference, could be called writing only within the historical 
closure, that is to say within the limits of science and philosophy49
Indeed, one may observe that ‘difference’ is a functional-relational notion to begin 
with, while ‘writing’ is a descriptive one, despite its relational implications. Despite 
the fact that in its Derridean paleonymic-neologistic use ‘writing’ designates a 
completely relational function-structure, it is obvious that its paleonymic force would 
be lost outside the context o f Western metaphysics. In other words, it would be 
meaningless to call this structure ‘writing’, in a context where writing was not 
perceived through such a structure. In this point, however, one should remember that 
deconstruction introduces an interrogation regarding the possibility of being exterior 
to (Western) metaphysics. In any case, all Derridean readings deconstruct texts
47 Gram Eng , p.63
48 ibid, p.93
49 Gram Eng, p.93
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belonging to Western metaphysics, so the two terms can be interchanged 
unproblematically.
Ecriture-differance is first and foremost the condition o f possibility, the 
constitutive structure o f signification. We may also observe that the paleonymic 
etymology o f the two notions points towards the structural function of medium , as 
mediation and materialisation; mediation and materialisation being the two facets of 
the metaphysics o f semiosis, as we have discussed earlier. ‘Difference’, before the 
deconstructive textual game, corresponds to the relation between the two elements of 
a couple; whereas ‘writing’ corresponds to the ‘more material’, devalued second term 
of the oppositions ‘speech vs. writing’ and ‘language vs. writing’. After their 
paleonymic transformation, they both designate the completely relational function- 
structure that rules all the constitutive couples o f signification, all o f which are 
formed by analogy with the relation between the sensible and the intelligible. 
Eventually, ecriture-differance substitutes for the terms ‘sign’, ‘signification’, 
‘communication’ etc. Moreover, as it is a completely relational structure, it can be 
detached from the conceptual couples that were used for its formation50.
Derrida invents many paleonymic neologisms apart from ecriture and 
differance, such as dissemination , espacement, gramme, hymen, khora, pharmakon, 
supplement, trace, tympan , etc, ‘that they are not entirely words or concepts’51. He 
refers to them as ‘m otifs’52 or ‘undecidables’53 or ‘unconceptual concepts’54;
50 This phrasing seem s not to be consistent with the Derridean argument which questions, among other 
things, the possibility o f  such a detachment. What I mean, however, is not a detachment o f  form from 
content. The ‘detached’ structure is no less m eaningful. What happens with higher degree structures is 
that they constitute a more general meaning under which many apparently different meanings can be 
grouped. This doesn’t make the different structures identical through and through. They all ‘say the 
same thing’ in a level and yet each o f  them ‘says’ something more and particular to it.
51 Lim, p. 117
52 ibid
53 Diss, p. 271; D iss Eng, p. 229-230; Pos, p .58-59 / P os E n g , p.43
54 Lim, p.118
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Rodolphe Gasche and Marian Hobson call them ‘quasi-transcendentals’. Each of 
them is a spatio-temporal relational function-structure; and they are isomorphic to 
each other.
All o f them take the same structural position and fulfil the same function.
Each o f them cannot fit a binary hierarchical conceptual opposition, yet without
constituting a third term; it is the condition o f  possibility o f the opposition; and it is
conceived as ‘in betw een’ the couple o f concepts that it renders possible and ‘outside’
the privileged pole.
I have called undecidables, that is, unities of simulacrum, ‘false’ verbal 
properties (nominal or semantic) that can no longer be included within 
philosophical binary opposition, but which, however, inhabit philosophical 
opposition, resisting and disorganising it, without ever constituting a third 
term, without ever leaving room for a solution in the form of speculative 
dialectics [...] Neither/nor, that is, simultaneously either/or55
the structure and/or, between and and o r .56
What makes these terms able to function in such a way is their structure,
precisely because o f the identity o f function and structure that the structuralists
introduced. The undecidables’
undecidable value [...] always derives from their syntax, whether the latter is in a 
sense ‘internal’, articulating and combining under the same yoke [...] two 
incompatible meanings, or ‘external’, dependent on the code in which the word 
is made to function57.
Therefore, an interesting observation regards the ‘conceptual etymology’ o f these 
terms, i.e. what they meant before being re-situated and/or transformed into 
deconstructive key quasi-concepts. We could group them roughly into three groups: 
(a) devalued second terms, (b) intermediates, and (c) cases o f transcendence. The first 
group is exemplified by ecriture; the second by difference. The third kind of 
undecidables -  such as le don, le secret, la mort -  appear in certain Derridean
55 Pos, pp. 58-59 /  Pos E n g , p.43
56 Diss Eng, p. 268 /  Diss, pp. 319
57 Diss Eng, p. 230 /  D iss, pp.271
242
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE 
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
CHAPTER 4: DECONSTRUCTIVE META-SEMIOTICS
passages and texts with metaphysical resonances, which are o f no interest for my 
thesis. In all cases, the concepts chosen are relational: ‘second to a first’, ‘between 
two’, ‘beyond’. When paleonymically transformed into undecidables, they combine 
and exceed all three types o f relation.
However, Derrida insists that the undecidables cannot be considered 
synonymous . The reader must suspect the reason by now. On the one hand, each 
undecidable emerges from a different deconstructive reading, which cannot be 
subtracted from its conclusion; on the other, undecidables exceed the concepts of 
name and identity. Designating the spatio-temporal structure o f differing and 
deferring, they cannot but resist any attempt to arrest meaning. Derrida conceives 
them as forming a chain o f displacement, a moving structure o f perpetual difference 
and deferral. This chain is open by definition59.
We notice that one gets to all undecidables through the same reading 
technique -  and the same, structurally, philosophical argument -  which is structurally 
identical to their function-structure: a devalued concept constitutes the condition of 
possibility o f  its highly valued opposite and o f the distinction between the two, and 
thus exceeds the economy of that distinction. We also observe that a function- 
structure which initially was examined in relation to a theory o f signification is then 
extended to the entirety o f Western metaphysics. We need to pursue these 
investigations further.
58 For example, Mar, p. 13 /  M ar Eng, p. 12
59 Mar, p p .12-13 I M ar Eng, p .12; P os  pp.23, 61 /  P os Eng, pp.14, 44; Lim, p. 155
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4.3. Inside / outside: Western metaphysics and the logic of deconstruction
Derrida’s ‘strategic generale, theorique et systematique, de la deconstruction
philosophique’60, is built around his technique o f textual close-reading and on his
view o f semiosis; not least because o f his questioning o f distinctions such as content
and form. His objective, however, is
the rigorous reading of metaphysics, wherever metaphysics normalizes Western 
discourse, and not only in the texts of the ‘history of philosophy61
For this purpose, he reads and compares texts from different disciplines apart from
philosophy, such as linguistics and psychoanalysis, as well as literature and poetry.
Writing deconstructs Western62 metaphysics. The function-structure of
signification determines the structure o f the entire system of metaphysics.
Understandably, a critique of metaphysics cannot but affect the theory of
signification. In deconstruction, however, a certain inversion takes place. It is the
destabilisation o f the sign that allows the questioning o f categorical orders , which
leads the critique o f metaphysics. The sign is not just an example o f metaphysics but
the basis o f both metaphysics and its exposure to deconstructive critique.
In the previous sub-section, we have arrived to a certain spatio-temporal
structure, shared by a chain o f quasi-synonymous ‘undecidables’. We have seen that
the relationship between the members o f this chain is one o f displaced isomorphism,
which certainly is not meant to imply any hierarchy. For this reason one may suppose
that ‘writing’ is just one o f the many names this essentially ‘unnameable’ structure
takes, and -  therefore -  its connection to the theory of signification is accidental.
Derrida, however, is quite clear that
60 Pos, p. 93 /  Pos Eng, p .68
61 Mar Eng, pp.22-23 /  Mar, p.23
62 In Derridean texts the determination o f  metaphysics as ‘W estern’ is superfluous, for there is one and 
only one metaphysics, Western m etaphysics. We w ill briefly refer to the issue later in this sub-section.
63 We shall investigate it further in the follow ing sub-sections.
244
REA WALLDfiN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE 
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
CHAPTER 4: DECONSTRUCTIVE META-SEMIOTICS 
the problem o f language has never been simply one problem among others64.
In this thesis we are trying to find out why. We are trying to understand the structural 
complicity between ontology and the theory o f signification. We will see that, for 
Derrida, the very distinction between metaphysics and semiotics is formed on the 
structure o f speech vs. writing. Nevertheless, the structural importance o f the problem 
o f signification does not entail -  according to Derrida -  that language in the empirical 
sense, such as the national languages, gains a priority over philosophy. Derrida 
develops a complicated argument against this position in ‘Le supplement de 
copule’65. It is the structure o f signification as condition o f possibility o f knowledge 
that interests Derrida, rather than the empirical linguistic structures. The distinction, 
however, is not so easy to maintain in the context o f the Derridean project.
The intimate connection o f metaphysics to signification appears at two levels: 
(a) the complicity between Western metaphysics and its theories of signification, and 
particularly their centrality to the over-all system; and as a result, (b) the way that the 
deconstruction o f the theories o f signification destabilises the system of metaphysics.
Derrida names Togocentrism’ the complex conceptual system which elevates 
speech and voice, as opposed to a devalued writing. He shows that logocentrism is 
connected to all metaphysical concepts; or rather that it is the mechanism that 
produces them. Significantly, logos (Xoyoq) in Greek means both speech and reason, 
and this relationship is accentuated in the neologism66. Logocentrism is also called, 
with a certain displacement, ‘phonocentrism’, from the Greek ‘(pcovf|’ (phone, i.e. 
voice). Logocentrism is ethnocentric, Eurocentric as a matter o f fact, because it uses 
as model o f writing the European phonetic systems and assigns to them a primacy
64 Gram Eng, p.6 / Gram, p. 15
65 Mar, pp.209-246 / M ar Eng, p. 175-205; we w ill return to this essay in the final chapter.
66 O f course, ‘reason vs. sp eech’ is once again one o f  the constitutive oppositions o f  signification and, 
as such, deconstructed by the structure o f  extended writing.
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over every other mode. In W estern m etaphysics, speech is conceived as the unity of 
sound and sense within the voice. As we have said earlier, the moment of the 
utterance is idealized as the moment o f  language par excellence, where the intention 
of the addresser, the message and the uptake o f  the addressee coincide in the 
meaning. This structure points to a m eaning ‘unique, uni vocal, rigorously 
controllable, and transmittable’67, independent o f any material support, in proximity 
with ‘thought’; a transcendental meaning. Closely related to this is the notion o f the 
subject who knows him self -  in this context, the paradigmatic subject is male -  
through speaking and listening to himself, and in this way he asserts his existence. As 
we see, ‘phonocentrism merges with the historical determination o f being as 
presence ,68, and its closely related signification o f  truth69. Furthermore, there have 
always been two ways o f defining ‘truth’ : either as aletheia-unveiling or as 
homoi6 sis-a*/e<7Wtf//0 -correspondence; both correspond to theories o f signification.
•  7 1 •  *Knowledge o f truth and signification are moulded in the same matrix . The voice is
77idealised as the moment o f the absolute effacement o f the signifier , whereas truth, 
presence, essence, existence, subject are all conceived as transcendental signifieds. 
The effacement o f the signifier by the transcendental signified is the metaphysical 
gesture par excellence. Therefore, W estern metaphysics, the one and only 
metaphysics, is the implied m etaphysics o f  phonetic writing73.
We observe that the sign is a very peculiar concept, where all the 
metaphysical opposites meet, ‘the place where all contradictory characteristics
67 Lim, p. 1 / M ar Eng, p .309 / M ar, p.367
68 Gram Eng, p. 12 / G ram , p.23
69 Gram Eng, p. 10 / Gram, p .2 1
70 Diss Eng, p .205-206 / D iss, p .237
71 The most unmetaphysical o f  the theories o f  signification is admittedly structuralist sem iotics, which 
falls out o f  the two traditional schemata; Derrida constructs his position on this (structuralist) basis, 
whereas he points out som e lingering elem ents o f  the old definitions.
72 Gram, pp.33-34 /  Gram Eng, p.20
73 Gram, p.20 / Gram Eng, p. 10
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intersect’74. It is the knot that holds the system together. Thus, when the sign -  where 
all the opposites meet -  is no longer stable, the entire system is mobilized. However, 
the sign carries already the possibility of destabilising itself and the system, precisely 
because it is the point where all the opposites meet, for the opposites should not meet. 
The structure of ecriture-differance affects the relationship between the signifier and 
the signified. The difference between them is shown to be relational through and 
through, which entails the impossibility of a transcendental signified. As we have 
seen, the transcendental signified is the metaphysical gesture par excellence. 
Consequently, the difference between the signifier and the signified is the condition 
o f possibility of the metaphysical system and the relativity o f  this difference is its 
condition o f impossibility.
The crucial analytical observation before the catalytic introduction o f ecriture- 
differance is the dualistic structure of the metaphysical system of our culture. 
According to Derrida’s reading, metaphysics is based on oppositional, hierarchical 
couples. Such couples are: ‘speech/writing’, ‘signified/signifier’,
‘intelligible/sensible’, ‘inside/outside’, ‘being/non-being’, ‘self/other’, 
‘subject/object’, ‘activity/passivity’, ‘spirit/matter’, ‘reason/m adness’, ‘male/fem ale’, 
‘Greek/Jew’ etc. All these couples play the same ordered game, re-enact the same 
structural relationship; i.e. they are isomorphic. Each is considered an insurmountable 
opposition, where the second term is devalued and the first is considered privileged. 
Even monistic philosophical positions, such as materialism, construct their arguments 
on a dualistic conceptual language of the same structure as described. Derrida 
observes, for example, that ‘matter’ in materialism designates a transcendental
74 M ar Eng, p.79 / Mar, p.91
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signified75. Therefore, the Western metaphysical system is structured in a very 
specific way, and the hierarchical, oppositional structures are metaphysical; object of 
deconstruction is the metaphysical structure.
We have indicated the reasons why Derrida is reluctant to call deconstruction 
a technique or a method. However, the isomorphism o f the metaphysical oppositions, 
as well as the displaced isomorphism o f the chain o f the undecidables, means that 
every deconstructive reading starts with the same structure and ends with another, but 
always the same, structure. I believe that one could describe deconstruction as a 
structural method proceeding through the following three steps76: (1) Firstly, pairs of 
concepts are identified, one o f which is usually more prominent and paradigmatic of 
the rest and on which the meaning of the text is based. Thus far, the method is similar 
to Greimas’ semantic analysis. The relationship o f the two elements that compose the 
pair is hierarchical; the second element is dependent, secondary, deficient in relation 
to the first. (2) Secondly, by a process o f close reading, it is shown that the 
hierarchical relationship o f the conceptual pair is actually inverted. The first term is 
necessarily associated with the second and, more than that, it depends on it. The claim 
is based on those ‘aporetic’ moments of the text, to which we referred earlier, which 
reveal the unintentional but necessary structure that supports its intentional or express 
meaning, while contradicting or subverting it. (3) The final step is the removal of the 
distinction between the two concepts o f the pair. However, these three steps are not 
considered to constitute an evolutionary progress, among other reasons because of 
Derrida’s particular arguments regarding temporality. They may be presented in a 
successive manner but they are supposed to be understood in a non-linear relation.
75 Pos, pp.87-88 / Pos Eng, pp.64-65
76 Christopher Norris and Rodolphe Gasche also give descriptions o f  deconstruction as a three-step 
process. See, for example, Norris, ‘Deconstruction, Post-modernism and the visual arts’ in What is 
D econstruction?, (p.8); and Gasche, The Tain o f  the M irror, p. 171
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This basically means that they are not to be understood as transcending each other; 
despite the obvious similarity to the Hegelian dialectical triad, they are not meant in 
this way. So, step one, despite being deconstructed is still considered necessary and is 
not annulled by the act o f deconstruction77, while steps two and three, the stages of 
deconstruction proper, are never fully ‘finished’. Step two, the ‘critical’ moment of 
inversion, is put into question by step three which suspends the very border between 
the opposed concepts. Step three is never carried right through because if it was it 
would lead to a new ‘metaphysical’ position, a new Hegelian ‘thesis’. This kind of 
co-existence o f steps two and three, Derrida calls a ‘double register’. He particularly 
insists that one should never think o f the second step as ‘surpassed’ as this would
no
diminish the radicality o f deconstruction .
A B
(1) -------------  (2)----- ( 3 ) --------
B A
[Figure 4.1. -  deconstruction: a model]
Therefore, it is the chain o f indecidables which,
itself [...] both spacious and mobile, gets caught in, but thereby disorganises, the 
whole ontological machine. It dislocates all oppositions79
Deconstruction acts as ‘mochlos’80 (pox^oc;, lever) displacing the system of 
metaphysics. One observes the isomorphism between paleonymics, double reading, 
undecidables, the structure o f signification and the (deconstructed) structure of 
metaphysics. The process and method o f deconstruction, its concepts and tools, and 
its conclusion, all meet in the same structure o f the three non-successive steps.
77 ‘Any attempt to reverse [...] or escape it in one fell swoop by leaping out o f  it with both feet would 
only amount to an inevitable and im mediate fall back into its system ’, D iss Eng, p.217 /  Diss, p.255
78 Pos, pp.89-90 / Pos Eng, pp.66-67; and elsewhere.
79 D iss Eng, p.244 / Diss, p.
80 ‘M ochlos -  ou le conflit des facultes’ (1980), in Du droit a laph ilosoph ie , 1990, pp.397-438  
(pp.424,436)
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Going back to the dual system of Western metaphysics, one wonders whether 
some couples are more paradigmatic from the others. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, the entire problematics o f signification is formed on the opposition 
‘intelligible/sensible’, which indeed constitutes one of the foundational couples of 
Western metaphysics. I think, however, that the couple ‘inside/outside’ fills an even 
more important place, the most important place, because it constitutes the structural 
relationship on which the others rely. This structure is spatial. Actually, we could re­
phrase all three steps of deconstruction in spatial terms: (1) A is inside, B is outside of 
this inside. Their opposition is insurmountable: the outside is outside. A is self- 
sufficient, B is dependent to A. (2) A cannot be defined without B. B is the 
definitional borderline of A. Furthermore, the space of B includes the space of A. A is 
a sub-set o f B. (3) B in its new revealed function, as more general than A and 
condition o f possibility o f their distinction, is re-named B ’. Therefore, distinction 
between A and B cannot be absolute. In a sense, the opposition collapses. These three 
steps co-exist. They constitute a spatio-temporal structure, where the element of time 
cannot be reduced.
A vs. B, A>B 2. B>A -♦  B=>A 3. B’
G)’ G> B ’
[Figure 4.2. -  deconstruction: a spatial model]
We find that that this model makes better sense. It explains quite clearly why the 
devalued second is also the definitional borderline of the first and its super-set. In this
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model, we can see that the paleonymic etymology o f all the undecidables designates
the term B, in its function either as ‘borderline’ or as ‘outside’: ‘in between’ or
‘outside’. As undecidables, B ’s combine both functions as conditions of
(im)possibility o f the distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’: in between and/or
outside the ‘inside/outside’ opposition.
Derrida is well aware that o f all the couples o f metaphysical oppositions it is
the opposition between inside and outside [that] must be accredited as the 
matrix of all possible opposition81
precisely because it constitutes the structural relationship on which the others rely.
The importance o f topology in deconstruction is consistent with a theory which
stresses relationships over essences, a structural theory. M oreover, deconstruction sets
itself to examine signifying structures and, as we have seen, by definition in such
structures topology is meaningful. The description o f metaphysics and its
deconstruction in purely topological terms reveals their underlying logics, which are
irreducibly topological. As Derrida very clearly explains in De la grammatologie, the
principle o f classical ontology is that ‘the outside is outside’, whereas ‘the logic of
supplementarity, which would have it that the outside be inside’82. Christopher Norris
has extensively investigated the logical implications o f deconstruction; deconstruction
as a philosophy o f logic.
The principle of Western metaphysics, i.e. that ‘the outside is outside’, is the
logic o f the excluded middle. This logic, from Aristotle to Boole and Frege, is
81 D iss Eng, p. 106 / Diss, p. 128; see also the successive sub-sections in D e la gram m atologie  entitled 
‘Le dehors et le dedans’ (The Outside and the Inside) and ‘Le dehors (est) dedans’ (The Outside (is) 
Inside).
82 Gram Eng, p.215 / Gram, p .308
83 See, ‘Speech, Presence, Origins: from H egel to Saussure’, in D errida, pp.63-96 (pp.67-68, 91); 
‘Supplementarity and Deviant Logics: Derrida contra  Quine’ and ‘Excluded Middles: Quantum 
Theory and the Logic o f  Deconstruction’, in M inding the Gap, pp. 125-147, 148-171; ‘Derrida on 
Rousseau: Deconstruction as Philosophy o f  L ogic’, in Jacques D errida, pp. 70-124; ‘Deconstruction, 
Analysis and Deviant Logic: Derrida “At The Limits o f  Thought’” , in Fiction, Philosophy and Literary  
Theory, pp.9-34
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interwoven with the linguistic form ‘A is B ’. Actually, it is the two forms ‘A is A ’ 
and ‘A is not non-A’ that are its fundamental minimum principles. One can see how 
predication is interlinked with these principles. Derrida, citing Heidegger, reminds us 
that ‘Western metaphysics [...] is produced as the domination o f a linguistic form’84. 
This logico-linguistic form is the matrix o f all that Derrida calls ‘onto-topological 
prejudices’85. However, it is this same form that allows the distinction between 
concepts, categories, orders; it is the necessary condition for philosophising. Derrida 
accepts its necessity. His critique is not a rejection; and certainly not from any anti- 
philosophical point of view. As we have seen, Derrida is rigorous to the extreme, 
requiring the highest, the most absolute standards o f logical consistency, in a logic of 
all or nothing. It is by following this logic to its limits that brings about its 
deconstruction. As he describes it in ‘Afterword: Toward An Ethic o f  Discussion’:
A  co n ce p t d eterm in es it s e lf  o n ly  accord in g  to  ‘all or n o th in g ’86
[T he lo g ic  o f  ‘all or n o th in g ’] m ust (and th is  ‘m u st’ tran sla tes the fa ith fu ln ess o f  m y  
lo v e  for  p h ilo so p h y ) b e  sustained  again st all em p ir ica l c o n fu s io n , to th e p oint w here the  
sam e dem and o f  rigor requires the structure o f  that lo g ic  to  b e  transform ed and 
co m p lic a te d 87
It is logic itself that leads to its deconstruction. Apart from the significant difference 
of philosophical style, Derrida’s questioning o f logic is very similar to Saul 
Kripke88’s famous commentary on the difficulty o f defining what it means to follow a 
rule, which boils down to the impossibility o f defining the function of identity 
without already using it. The insurmountable problem is that logic, which functions as 
the ultimum meta-language, is also a theory with its axioms and meta-linguistic rules, 
which -  by definition -  exceed it.
84 Gram Eng, p.23 / Gram, p.37
85 Norn, p .58
86 Lim, p. 116
87 Lim, pp. 122-123
88 Wittgenstein on Rules and P riva te Language: An Elem entary Exposition, 1982
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So, Derrida follows the logic o f Western metaphysics to its limits. The result
is the strange ‘alogical logic’ o f deconstruction.
[Deconstruction] takes into account the conditions of this classical and binary 
logic, but it no longer depends entirely upon it.
[Undecidables] must transform concepts, construct a different ‘logic’, a different 
‘general theory’, perhaps even a discourse that, more powerful than this logic, 
will be able to account for it and reinscribe its possibility. This is what I try to 
do89
The logic o f deconstruction ‘would have it that outside be inside’; it is ‘a crisis of the 
versus’ and a blurring o f the line between inside and outside. The supplement and the 
virus function as model structural (archi-)metaphors90 for this logic. The virus, which 
lies in the definitional borderline between organic and inorganic, is a parasite which 
uses the genetic material of the organism it affects; an outside inside. The 
supplement, similarly, is both a superfluous addition and a necessary completion; an 
outside inside. This is the logic o f supplementarity -  and, precisely, ‘writing is the 
supplement par excellence’91. It is interesting to observe that the logic of 
supplementarity does not exceed only Boolean logic but it cannot be translated in the 
terms even o f a deviant logic. For a logician, this is no logic at all. The reason must 
be Derrida’s effort to point towards the conditions o f possibility o f logic.
A last observation is that traditionally logic is considered non-spatial and non­
temporal, by definition. However, Derrida shows that there is an inherent spatiality- 
topology in it. It is through this inherent spatiality that we are led to the logic of 
deconstruction. The realisation o f the topology o f the metaphysical opposition opens 
the way to comprehend that it is always already deconstructed. Simultaneously, the
69 Lim, p. 117
90 The originarity o f  metaphoricity is one o f  the recurrent cases o f  deconstruction.
91 Gram Eng, p. 281 /  Gram, p .398
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logic o f deconstruction introduces a novel spatiality too, the condition o f possibility 
of any space and time and the difference between space and time; khora92, difference.
This peculiar impossible topology has a paradigmatically problematic 
application in the super-set ‘Western m etaphysics’. The question o f the space of 
Western metaphysics is particularly pertinent because it is the field o f application o f 
deconstruction. It is the manifold in which all those structures and effects -  
metaphysical and deconstructed -  take place; or rather the manifold that these 
structures constitute. Derrida has repeatedly addressed the impossibility o f getting 
outside the text o f Western metaphysics93. He has also made it quite clear that 
‘metaphysics’ is ‘Western metaphysics’ because the concept o f ‘metaphysics’ 
belongs to the Western metaphysical discourse. There is no other metaphysics. This, 
however, is a Eurocentric position; it equals more or less in denying to non-W estem 
thought many things, among which formal logic and scientific thought. I think that 
this may be one o f the weakest points o f the Derridean argument. It is actually 
revealing o f the one serious problem inherent in the radical deconstructive critique: 
the fact that it elevates the object under critique to an insurmountable position of 
necessity -  even if  under deconstruction.
It always perplexed me that ‘Western m etaphysics’ and ‘metaphysics’ end by 
becoming the same thing, and finally end in denoting the kind o f  thinking that makes 
possible the principle o f non-contradiction. One should not forget that this kind of 
thinking, rational thinking tout court, has been the basis o f all emancipation struggles 
and technological advancements. To claim that all this belongs solely to the West can 
hardly be pluralistic. W hat starts as an opening to the ‘other’, ends by denying this
92 See the text Khora, 1993; as well as, Nom , p.58 and elsewhere. Derrida uses this Platonic term as 
undecidable.
93 See for example, M ar, p.27 / M ar Eng, p.25
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‘other’ certain human abilities. Actually, if  one follows the Derridean argument about 
necessary impossibility, this ‘other’ comes close to annulment94. So, the necessary 
impossible condition of being ‘Western’ ends by denoting the human condition. It 
shouldn’t come as a surprise that this position is perceived as paternalistic and 
imperialistic by non-Westemers. Exactly this point was made by Dr Li Victor, a 
Chinese researcher, whom I heard in a conference95 arguing that all this critique o f 
Eurocentricism was very Eurocentric. He then went on to propose as a remedy that 
we should forget Europe; which rather unsettled me96. The proposition is somehow 
rough and certainly not in the Derridean ‘spirit’ but illuminates a lot of the delicately 
camouflaged political issues arising from the discourse regarding ‘Eurocentricism’. 
Considering philosophical thought as Eurocentric by definition is more imperialist 
than considering the so-called European philosophy as belonging to humanity.
Facing the Derridean description and critique o f W estern metaphysics, I was 
inclined to ask several questions; for example: For whom is it impossible to escape 
Western metaphysics? If Asia and Africa have been the margins -  with all the 
deconstructive force o f the term -  o f Europe, what has Europe been for Asia and 
Africa? Do we really think that there are not metaphysical and philosophical systems 
outside Europe? And what are those kinds o f thought without borderlines and
94 Derrida was very conscious h im self o f  this structure in his critique o f  Levinas, ED, pp .l 17-228 /
WD, pp.97-192; yet, he doesn’t investigate the question regarding the non-W estemers, possibly  
because he starts from an internal point o f  view  o f  W estern m etaphysics. This is apparent in the ‘Letter 
to A Japanese Friend’, for example. He explains why ‘deconstruction’ cannot be univocally and 
unproblematically translated into languages other than French; however, all the languages that he 
mentions are Indo-European. He does not address the problem o f  Japanese being a non-W estem  
language. What makes particular interesting Derrida’s ‘internal’ point o f  view  are his own biographical 
details: an Algerian Jewish writer who claim s to speak only French; ‘je  reste obstinement monolingue 
[ .. .]  Je lis l’allemand, je  peux enseigner en anglais, m ais mon attachement a la langue franfaise est 
absolu’ ‘Du mot a la vie : un dialogue entre Jacques Derrida et Helene C ixous’, m agazine litteraire,
N o 430, April 2004, pp.22-29 (p.25). He exem plifies the topical structure o f  difference.
95 Following D errida: Legacies, organized by the journal M osaic, Winnipeg, Canada, October 2006
96 It seems to me that the point is to remember the others than to forget Europe. It would be terrible to 
forget both the gifts and terrors o f  Europe -  such as democracy and Enlightenment, colonisation and 
the Holocaust. I just think that Europe belongs to the world, rather than being the world.
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margins, so completely outside our categorical distinctions? And, by the way, why is 
Western metaphysics contemporary, i.e. it can be traced from the past until this 
moment, whereas every example o f  the thought o f the ‘other’ is situated somewhere 
in the past, such as Confucius, the Koran etc? We cannot even start to answer these 
questions in the frame o f my thesis. We will just note that, whereas the Derridean 
discourse can offer no answers to them, it has been very helpful in revealing their 
complexity.
Western metaphysics and philosophy has always included a notion of 
simultaneity and universality, o f ‘getting out o f time and place’, as a structure if  not 
as a premise. M oreover, Western philosophy has always included a critique of 
Western philosophy, an element o f self-reference, combined with a desire to ‘have the 
last word’, to end philosophy by giving it its final correct formulation. I think that in a 
certain way Derrida fits this tradition, precisely as all the past ‘destructors’ do: 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Freud, and Marx; and structuralism too.
Summarising this sub-section, we have seen that the Derridean project relies 
on the close interconnection between metaphysics and semiotics. As Western 
metaphysics is basically a theory o f representation, epistemology becomes identical 
to a theory o f signification. The constitutive relation o f signification -  ‘signifier vs. 
signified’, ‘sensible vs. intelligible’ -  determines, rather than being determined by, 
the other metaphysical oppositions. On this matrix, all metaphysical couples repeat 
the same structural relation between an outside and an inside, where the outside is 
proved as the definitional super-set of the inside. The unexpected primacy o f 
semiotics over epistemology, as well as metaphysics, is explained by this same 
structure. The relations ‘signification vs. knowledge’, ‘knowledge vs. m etaphysics’, 
‘signification vs. metaphysics’ all repeat the relation ‘signifier vs. signified’ -  and as
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we have seen, the undervalued term is proved the condition of possibility of the 
supposedly primary one.
Structuralist semiotics has been historically the first theory to treat semiotics 
as radically prior to epistemology. It is also the source o f Derrida’s theory of 
signification, which acts as a filter for his epistemology and critique of metaphysics. 
Therefore, its deconstruction is particularly significant for the entire deconstructive 
project.
4.4. Deconstruction of structuralist semiotics
Preliminarily, I should note that Derrida conceives o f structuralism in a slightly 
different way than our approach of chapter 3, both because he takes into account a 
general ‘structuralist’ ambience that was dominant when he started writing, which 
was not necessarily consistent with received structuralist theoretical texts, and 
because structuralist semiotics has since incorporated elements o f his critique and my 
presentation is unavoidably engrafted with it. In this sub-section, I present Derrida’s 
deconstructive critique o f structuralist semiotics as organised around the interrelated 
notions of sign, writing and structure; and then some more general issues regarding 
the ‘philosophical style’ of the movement, as well as its inscription in general 
structuralism. Along with this, I make a few short comments regarding possible 
counter arguments.
0 7
Derrida assigns two different roles to structuralist semiotics , as he puts it in 
his interview of 1968 with Julia Kristeva98: one critical and one metaphysical; as we
97 He actually calls it ‘semiology o f the Saussurean type’, P os Eng , p. 18 /  Pos, p.28. This, on the one 
hand, is a generic term, designating all that I have defined earlier as ‘structuralist sem iotics’, which 
includes both Jakobson’s and Hjelmslev’s schools o f  semiotics. On the other, however, it allows him to 
differentiate it from the work o f subsequent semioticians, such as Jakobson’s and Hjelm slev’s. Derrida 
is making a point in showing that Saussure is more radical than some o f  his followers, such as 
Jakobson and Barthes, whereas he is less consistent that some others, mainly Hjelmslev.
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shall see, the former is the source o f  his own project and the latter an exemplary
object o f deconstruction. The metaphysical role o f  structuralist semiotics concerns its
inscription into W estern metaphysics, by the means o f  its continuing use o f the
concept o f the sign. Its critical role concerns its radical redefinition o f the semiotic,
which constitutes the basis for the deconstruction o f the sign and its metaphysics, the
one and only metaphysics. Structuralist sem iotics is simultaneously the culmination
of the metaphysics o f  the sign — ‘inflation o f  the sign itself, absolute inflation,
inflation i ts e lf99 -  and a radical rupture with it. Structuralist semiotics is, in a way,
the limit case o f  W estern metaphysics, and as such provides an ideal vantage-point
for its deconstruction.
In the highly illuminating interview with Kristeva, D errida explains that the
crux o f structuralist sem iotics’ inscription into W estern m etaphysics is its continuing
use o f  the concept o f  the sign, in spite o f  its radical redefinition. He argues that no
concept can be used in a completely novel way.
One necessarily assumes, in a non-critical way, at least some o f the implications 
inscribed in its system. [...] ‘[EJveryday language’ is not innocent or neutral. It is 
the language of Western metaphysics, and it carries with it [...] presuppositions 
inseparable from metaphysics.100
These presuppositions he summarises as the following four: the differentiation 
between the signifier and the signified, the privileging o f  speech, the importance of 
the phonic (vocal) substance and psychologism . All o f  these positions have been 
refuted by structuralist semiotics since its beginning, since Saussure, and it is in 
structuralist semiotics that Derrida finds the tools for their — and every — 
deconstruction. Unlike other texts which are explicitly metaphysical and in which 
Derrida reveals their latent auto-deconstructive structure, structuralist texts are
98 ‘S& niologie et gram m atologie’ in Pos, p p .25-50  / P o s Eng, pp. 15-36
99 Gram Eng, p.6 / G ram , p. 15
100 Pos Eng, p. 19 / P os, p.29
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explicitly counter-metaphysical, in a way very close to Derrida’s project. It is a 
second, mostly unconscious level which is proved to be still metaphysical and then 
this is deconstructed using tools from the explicit level o f  meaning. This inversion 
alone is sufficient to show the exceptional and privileged position o f  structuralist 
semiotics for the deconstructive project.
Cours de linguistique generate is not a unified and consistent text. We have 
seen how all texts are necessarily inconsistent; however, because o f its editorial 
history, CLG  exemplifies the nature o f every text in a very direct and striking way. 
The courses were spread over a long period o f  tim e in which the concepts were 
progressively formed; they were addressed to a student audience and presented 
progressively for educational reasons, possibly also sim plified for the same reasons; 
and the material o f the courses was never revised by Saussure, who would apply the 
(would-be) unifying intension o f an author101. The result is a book which is self­
contradictory even by lower standards o f consistency than D errida’s.
As we have seen, the most radical novelty introduced in CLG  is the principle 
of fundamental semiotic arbitrariness, which, along with the vision o f a new science 
of signs, became the starting point o f  structuralist sem iotics. The passages o f CLG  
organised around this novelty are the canonical reference for every structuralist 
semiotician. Nevertheless, there are several other passages o f  different degrees of 
inconsistency with the radical principle and its im plications; these passages — when 
identified as such — have been treated by the structuralists with attitudes ranging from 
slight embarrassment to complete disregard. M oreover, structuralist semiotics has 
been a new field, having to make its own way; thus, it always shows different degrees
101 The function o f  an editor is by custom  different from that o f  the writer, despite the fact that the two 
roles always m ingle with each other; editors are invested w ith less authoritative power. Therefore, 
CLG as a book was not ever subjected to any strong authoritative unifying force.
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of consistency regarding its own principles, mirroring in a way the contradictions of 
CLG. Accordingly, there are two levels in which Derrida is ‘oppos[ing] Saussure to 
h im se lf102: on the one hand, he deconstructs the passages that don’t live up to the 
radicality o f  the Saussurean novelty; on the other, he shows that even the radical 
passages carry with them a metaphysical residue. This latter critique is, I think, more 
important. Up to the point o f deconstructing the non-radical passages, Derrida is 
perfectly inscribed into the structuralist sem iotic tradition o f  progressive self- 
improvement; turning the structuralist radicality upon itself, however, brings it up 
against its limits and shows its inherent insurm ountable contradictions. This really 
affects structuralist semiotics as a project.
The concept o f  the sign constitutes, according to Derrida, simultaneously a 
progress and an im pedim ent to the deconstruction o f  m etaphysics . His argument is 
that structuralist sem iotics exemplifies this double function as it completely empties 
the concept o f all its metaphysical content, and yet still continues to use it, becoming 
in this way imprisoned in its metaphysical implications; for the concept o f  sign, even 
thus emptied, still carries the imprint o f  the subtracted premises.
The structure that ties the concept o f  sign to m etaphysics is the following: The 
concept o f  sign is insolubly connected with the division between signified and 
signifier. This distinction, on the one hand, relies on the difference between the 
sensible and the intelligible, which organises W estern metaphysics. On the other, in 
order for this distinction to be possible, it is necessary that it imply the reference to a 
transcendental signified104, which is the m etaphysical elem ent p a r  excellence. It is a
102 Gram, p .77 / Gram  Eng, p.52
103 Pos, p. 27 /  Pos Eng, p. 17 . .
104 T h e  sem iological [...] “scien ce” cannot hold the difference between sign ifier and signified -  the 
very idea o f  the sign [...] without retaining [...] the reference to a signified able to take place in its 
intelligibility’, G ram  Eng, p. 13 / Gram , p.25; and T h er e  has to be a transcendental signified for the
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circular structure in which the sign as the division betw een a signified and a signifier
is simultaneously the product and the matrix o f  W estern  m etaphysics105. Structuralist
semiotics puts at risk the metaphysical certainties by in troducing a radically relational
definition o f  the signifier and the signified, w hich no  longer differ in kind. Yet, for
Derrida, even their nominal use ties the user to their m etaphysical background. This
borderline position o f Saussurean semiotics is acknow ledged  -  for example -  in the
following passages from De la grammatologie [the Ita lics are mine]:
The sign always implies within itself the distinction between signifier and 
signified, even if, as Saussure argues, they are distinguished simply as the two 
faces o f  one and the same lea f106
The difference between signified and signifier, or a t least the strange separation 
o f their ‘parallelism ’, and the exteriority, however extenuated , o f one to the other 
[...] bring[s] with it all its metaphysico-theological roots107
Thus, according to Derrida, the opposition betw een  the sensible and the 
intelligible forms all the oppositions o f W estern  m etaphysics, which allow 
delimitations and categorical distinctions:
The distinction of the sensible and the intelligible [...] with all that it controls, 
namely, metaphysics in its totality108
The distinction between signifier and signifier, as one o f  the metaphysical
distinctions, its paradigmatic one, is formed on this fundam ental opposition.
The semiological [...] ‘science’ cannot hold the difference between signifier and 
signified — the very idea of the sign — without the difference between the sensible 
and the intelligible109
The difference between the signifier and the signified has always reproduced the 
difference between the sensible and the intelligible
Structuralist semiotics constitutes a drastic rupture w ith  this tradition as, already in 
the Saussurean text, signifier and signified are defined  as inseparable and o f  the same
difference between signifier and signified  to be som ew here ab so lu te  and irreducible , G ram  E ng, p.20 /  
Gram, p .33
106 Gram Eng, p. 11 / G ram , p .23
107 Gram Eng, p. 13 / G ram , p.24
101 Gram Eng, p. 13 /  Gram , p .24
109 Gram Eng, p. 13 / Gram , p .25
110 Pos Eng, p .98 / P os, p.29
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-  psychological’ — nature. Hjelmslev makes these premises clearer, defining the 
sign-function as constituted by two completely interdependent and interchangeable 
planes, both o f which are divided into form and substance. Moreover, the very 
concept o f  structure belongs to — or rather constitutes — an intermediate realm, where 
the sensible and the intelligible intermingle. One must also observe that the concept 
of sign, even in its traditional definition, carries an elem ent o f surpassing the 
intelligible/sensible division, despite its being determ ined by it: it is the point o f co­
existence o f  these apparently mutually excusive opposites -  in their many disguises 
we have already met, such signified and signifier, form and substance, content and 
form, content and expression etc. As Derrida reminds us in Z ’ ecriture et la 
difference, Levi-Strauss ‘sought to transcend the opposition between the sensible and 
the intelligible by operating [...] at the level o f the signs’111. Nevertheless, Derrida 
insists that
the concept of the sign cannot in itself surpass this opposition between the
sensible and the intelligible. The concept of the sign, in each of its aspects, has
been determined by this opposition throughout the totality of its history. It has
• 112 lived only on this opposition and its system
But then again, it is precisely this generalised isomorphism that makes the
displacement from one level o f the system to another and the subsequent collapse of
the distinctions possible; which possibility deconstruction unfailingly exploits.
The system o f metaphysics needs the reference to a transcendental signified, a
point escaping its generalised isomorphism, in order to stabilise itself.
A concept signified in and of itself, a concept simply present for thought, 
independent of a relationship to language, that is of a relationship to a system of 
signifiers113
A point in the system where the signifier can no longer replaced by its signified, 
so no longer any signifier can114
111 L6vi-Strauss, The R aw  an d  the C ooked, as cited in WD, p .355 /  ED, p.412
112 WD, p .355 /  ED, p .412-413
113 Pos Eng, p. 19 / Pos, p .30
114 Gram Eng, p. 2 66 /G ram , p. 376
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Correspondingly and paradigm atically, the distinction between signifier and 
signified depends on this stabilising element.
The semiological [...] science” cannot hold the difference between signifier and 
signified — the very idea o f  the sign [...] without retaining [...] the reference to a 
signified able to ‘take place’ in its intelligibility, before its “fall”, before any 
expulsion into the exteriority o f  the sensible here below’115 
There has to be a transcendental signified for the difference between signifier and 
signified to be somewhere absolute and irreducible116
Structuralist semiotics, once again, does not allow  the existence o f a transcendental 
signified. As an immediate consequence o f  the principle o f  fundamental semiotic 
arbitrariness, the signified does not exist independently o f  and previously to the 
semiotic articulation. W hat Derrida interprets as a latent reference to a transcendental 
signified by structuralist semiotics is its use o f  categorical distinctions. According to 
his argument, only the position o f a transcendental signified would m ake possible 
categorical distinctions. It is what he names the ‘centre’ o f  a structure and, as we shall 
see later, he considers that structuralism, although emptying it o f  determinate content, 
still makes use o f  its function.
Derrida describes two ways o f erasing the difference between the signified 
and the signifier: the first, the metaphysical way, is subm itting the signifier to the 
signified; whereas the second, the critical way, is putting under interrogation the 
system that produces the difference as an e ffec t117. Structuralist sem iotics combines 
both. Derrida names its metaphysical aspect ‘psychologism ’; its critical aspect is 
organised around the fundamental semiotic arbitrariness, as is the project o f 
deconstruction. In order to avoid the danger o f  sliding from a critical to a 
metaphysical stand, one has to destabilise the opposition between signifier and
115 Gram Eng, p. 13 / Gram, p.25
116 Gram Eng, p.20 / Gram, p.33
117 ED, p. 413 /WD,  p.355
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signified without confusing [them] at every level, and in all simplicity’118. This is, 
our well-known by now, structure o f deconstruction: steps two and three co-exist, the 
final collapse o f distinctions is never enacted; a kind o f destabilised duality must be 
retained in order to avoid the return to the metaphysics o f the One.
As Derrida observes
the thematics o f the sign have been for about a century the agonized labor o f  a 
tradition that professed to withdraw meaning, truth, presence, being, etc, from the 
movement o f signification119
Structuralist semiotics is the culmination o f  this effort. As we have seen in the
previous chapter, it constitutes a significant break w ith the tradition o f metaphysical
thought on the topic o f  signification. Derrida analyses this tradition at great length
and his critique mostly coincides, even stem s from, structuralist semiotics.
Signification as representation120 and as expression121 is refuted by the principle of
fundamental semiotic arbitrariness which prescribes that, in D errida’s words, ‘there is
no presence before the semiological difference’122. Similarly, the concept o f the
subject is much weakened; already in Saussure ‘langue is not a function o f the
I ^ 1
speaking subject’
What, according to Derrida, is still deeply inscribed in m etaphysics is the 
concept o f communication, which holds a central position in structuralist semiotic 
theory, substituting for the more m etaphysically laden concepts o f representation and 
expression. As he explains in ‘Signature Evenem ent C ontexte’12 , but also in Limited
118 Pos Eng, p.20 / Pos, p.31
119 Gram Eng, p. 14 / Gram, p.26
120 ED, p.412 / WD, pp.354-355; Mar, pp.9-10 / Mar Eng, pp.9-10
121 Pos, p.32 / Pos Eng, p.22 ; Lim, p.66
122 Mar Eng, p.\2 / Mar, p. 12
123 CLG, p.30, cited in Mar, p. 16 / Mar Eng, p. 15
124 Mar, pp. 365-393 / Mar Eng, pp.307-330 / Lim, pp. 1-21
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Inc a b c ’125 and other texts, the concept o f communication presupposes a unified and 
intentional meaning, and is inscribed in a vicious circle between the literal and 
metaphorical meaning o f  metaphoricity. The difference between denotation and 
connotation126 and the possibility o f  disam biguation o f polysem y127, which are 
necessary for the definition o f the concept o f  communication, already beg the 
question and rely strongly on a latent intentionality.
Derrida’s deconstruction o f the subject is more extreme, in a way more 
metaphysically oriented, than the position o f  structuralist semiotics. Semiotics has 
never extended the field o f  application o f its claim s beyond the semiotic realm; that is 
why the co-existence o f  real human subjects with the dissolution o f the semiotic 
subject into an effect o f  langue does not really constitute a contradiction. The process 
of semiosis can be an exchange between intentional beings even if  the communicated 
signification is not unique, univocal, fully transm issible and, most importantly, 
consciously controllable by its producer. D econstruction, however, questions the 
relation between the semiotic and its beyond, and cannot afford this, or any, 
categorical distinction to be absolute. Therefore, the subject cannot have a 
transcendental existence, outside signification. If taken literally, D errida’s claims lead 
him to a view o f signification as an empty, self-generating machine ; this view is 
consonant with contem porary arguments regarding artificial intelligence and genetics. 
Nevertheless, this would have been a very un-Derridean gesture, because we have 
seen the difficulty o f ‘taking (anything) literally’ (or not) in the context o f  his project 
and, particularly, because this would mean ‘jum ping with both feet to the last step of
Lim, pp.29-110
126 See also the argument about metaphoricity in De la grammatologie
127 See also ‘La dissemination’ and Pos, p.62 I Pos Eng, p.45
128 See, for example, Papier Machine: Le ruban de machine a ecrire et autres reponses, 2001
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deconstruction. Norris gives an interpretation o f the Derridean position which is very 
close to structuralism:
What is at issue is not the intentionality o f  language — the precondition o f all 
understanding — but the belief that texts must always point back to their source in 
a moment o f  pure, self-authorised meaning [...] Language is intentional through 
and through, but not in the sense that its meaning either could or should be 
confined to what the author (supposedly) intended129.
In any case, what would strike a structuralist semiotician as peculiar in the Derridean
argument is that he cannot account for what signs are fo r ; he cannot even pose the
question. For the structuralist the answer would be, precisely, communication130.
For Derrida, firstly, the concept o f the sign organises the system of Western
metaphysics and, as such, is indispensable to our thought. Secondly, as it carries the
entire system with it, it imprisons our thought in metaphysics. Thirdly, being the key-
joint o f the system, it makes possible and even initiates its deconstruction.
From the outset, structuralist semioticians realised that the central concept of
their science was ill matched with their object o f investigation, though their concerns
were less philosophical than Derrida’s. As we have seen, already Saussure observes
that the unit o f  signification may be smaller or larger than the word. Hjelmslev
replaces the concept o f sign with the concept o f sign-function, which includes from a
prefix to an entire sQvniotic-langue, and also covers any semiotic manifestation. By
the mid-60’s, structuralist semiotic theory -  with or without the ‘post’ prefix -  had
turned its interest in the less studied parts o f the semiotic phenomenon: the signifier,
the syntagmatic relation, the process, the use and production o f signification. All this
was exemplified by the ‘tex t’131 and ‘writing’, which took the place o f language as
129 Derrida, p.l 13
130 We have described in Chapter 3 the multiplicity o f functions according Jakobson. However, 
communication constitutes the super-category under which all of them are classified.
*3* We have seen in chapter 3 the use o f ltext’ by Hjelmslev. According to Eco, the post-structuralist 
use of the term was introduced by Christian Metz, Theory o f Semiotics, p.57
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the paradigmatic cases o f  signification. So, by the time Derrida published his first 
works:
Everything that for at least some twenty centuries tended toward and finally 
succeeded in being gathered under the name o f  language [was] beginning to let 
itself be transferred to, or at least summarized under, the name o f  writing1
This tendency is exemplified by the studies o f  the Tel Quel group, with which Derrida 
was quite closely connected for some time. So we see that the idea that writing is the 
more generative term o f which speech is ju s t a species was much widespread at the 
time. What Derrida did was to explain this in philosophical terms; one may even say, 
in metaphysical terms. He observed that in the m etaphysical discourse writing is 
defined in terms o f  sensibility and exteriority, and that the identification o f the two 
provides the m atrix-structure o f Western metaphysics. He introduced the concept o f 
‘transcendental signified’ by opposition to all the traditional attributes o f  writing in 
order to designate the function shared by the privileged ‘first’ terms o f all 
metaphysical oppositions.
Once again, structuralist semiotics provides the step between metaphysics and 
its deconstruction. That is why Derrida is particularly interested in Saussure’s 
approach to writing. He considers it a ‘privileged exam ple’, o f which the peculiarity 
however ‘does not interfere with the generality o f [his] argument . We have 
already described the structuralist semiotic approach to writing in chapter three. Now 
we will concentrate on how it is presented in CLG  and its critique by Derrida, who 
brings into relief the tex t’s contradiction betw een the radicality o f  the principle o f 
fundamental semiotic arbitrariness and a certain phonocentric prejudice.
Saussure is the first to claim  that
132 Gram Eng, p.6 / Gram, p. 16
133 Gram Eng, p.29 / Gram, p.44
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The essential in language [langue]... has nothing to do with the phonic character 
of the linguistic sign .
This is, o f course, an immediate consequence o f his differentional definition o f the 
sign and the principle o f  fundamental semiotic arbitrariness135. Nevertheless, he 
defines writing as a system o f  signs distinct from (spoken) language whose ‘unique 
raison d ' etre’ is to represent it136. Here, he already uses the term ‘langue’ in a 
slippery way, as he clearly means ‘spoken language’, although this contradicts the 
more general definition o f the term. The definition o f writing as a second degree 
semiotic system 137 is not intended as pejorative; however, Derrida rightly observes 
that it includes hidden premises and unwanted im plications138. On the one hand, it is 
based on phonetic writing; so, it already assumes what it proves, by choosing as 
paradigmatic case the kind o f writing that is m ost closely related to speech. This 
constitutes a sign both o f  phonocentrism and o f enthnocentrism , Eurocentrism , as it is 
European writings that are mostly phonographic. Saussure’s preference o f  phonetic 
writing, which he deem s more rational, is evident in his classification o f  the systems 
of writing139. On the other hand, by designating writing as representation o f  speech, 
he re-introduces the concept o f representation in the semiotic relation. The principle 
of fundamental semiotic arbitrariness dictates that the relation between signified and 
signifier is not one o f  representation; Saussure’s definition o f writing contradicts it. If
134 CLG, p.21
135 Derrida describes it as a ‘principal affirm ation’, G ram  E ng, p.42 / Gram , p .63
m CLG , p.45
137 Incidentally, this definition coincides with H jelm slev’s definition o f  higher-degree sem iotics; 
according the first classification , it w ould be a m eta-sem iotic.
138 Gram, p .46 / G ram  Eng, p .30
139 Saussure’s classification o f  the system s o f  writing is exceptionally short and uninspired, CLG, 
pp.47-48. It is limited into tw o categories: ideographic and phonetic writing, the latter divided into 
syllabic and alphabetic. Derrida com m ents on its burden o f  m etaphysical assum ptions, G ram , pp.49-50  
/ Gram Eng, pp.32-33.
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it is a semiotic system, as Saussure clearly th inks14^ , then it cannot be representation 
of anything141.
Saussure goes at great length to argue that the object o f  linguistics is spoken
and not written language. One o f the main assumptions that organize this
contradictory current in CLG  is that the way o f  com m unication that is natural to
humankind is spoken language. There are many different issues that converge in the
course o f this argument and Derrida is very thorough in untangling them; among
them, what is natural and what is artificial, w hat is arbitrary and w hat is not. We must
not forget, however, that Saussure him self cautions us that
it is not proven that the function of language the way it is manifested when we 
speak is completely natural142
What he really is arguing against is the customary predisposition o f the linguists until
his time to disregard spoken language as an object o f  study and lim it their researches
to written material. So he is actually arguing against a dom inant pro-writing
prejudice, which is as old as its devaluation. D errida has not given much attention to
this part o f the W estern metaphysical tradition, w hich expressly supports the primacy
of writing. Saussure’s struggle against an established attitude and his feeling of
breaking new ground partially explains the passionate language used in this argument.
Nevertheless, it remains the fact that his expressions concerning writing, if  indeed
they are his, are startlingly emotional compared to the rest o f CLG  and invested with
negative evaluation; for example: ‘unfortunate’, ‘illegitim ate’, ‘tyranny’,
‘pathological’, ‘m onstrosity’, ‘teratological’, and the verbs ‘usurp’ and ‘trick’. It is
interesting to notice that one o f the main accusations against writing concerns its
m CLG, p p .3 3 ,4 5 , 165 . . . .  . . .
hi arbitrariness of" the s ig n ...  m ust forbid a radical distinction betw een the linguistic and the
graphic sign ’, Gram  Eng, p .44  / G ram , p .65  
f42 CLG, p. 25
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discrepancies with spoken language143; the very same characteristic that led 
Hjelmslev to classify writings as independent semiotic systems.
One o f the things that D errida was probably the first to pay attention to is how 
often Saussure uses the example o f  writing for the definition o f  other concepts144. 
Derrida cannot but be particularly interested in the fact that ‘four demonstrating 
items, borrowing pattern and content from w riting ’ 145 are used in the definition of 
linguistic value, which is the basis both o f  structuralist sem iotics and the 
deconstructive project. Another interesting observation regards the length and 
position o f the passages dedicated to w riting146; although at least the latter should 
rather be attributed to the editors than to Saussure. These observations locate aporias, 
moments o f  inconsistency which lead to the deconstruction o f  a hierarchical structure, 
as we have previously described the usual deconstructive process. The peculiarity of 
this case is that these are inconsistencies within an inconsistency.
Therefore, Saussure’s conception o f writing is inscribed w ithin the tradition of 
Western metaphysics and in contradiction w ith his general theory. Its leading thread 
is writing’s exteriority to (spoken) language, which Derrida by his critique shows to 
be structurally im possible147. He shows that there is no way to draw  a line where 
writing begins. His criticism  concentrates on the implied phonocentrism  o f  Saussure’s 
view o f writing and how it is inconsistent w ith his general theory. He stresses the
143 CLG, pp.47-54
144 The exam ple o f  writing is used in the definition o f  the acoustic image (p.32 ), o f  the sem iotic system  
(p.33) and o f  linguistic value (pp. 165-166); it is also used several tim es to clarify issues o f  phonology  
(e.g., pp.81-82).
145 Gram Eng, p.52 / G ram , p .76
146 There is reference to w riting just before the fam ous passage predicting the birth o f  the science o f  
signs (p.33); the chapter VI o f  the Introduction, entitled ‘The representation o f  language by writing’ 
(pp.44-54) precedes the chapter entitled ‘P h on ology’ (pp.55-61); m ost o f  the chapter Phonology is 
dedicated once again to w riting (pp .56-61), whereas even  the two pages that are not use five times 
terms derived from writing; finally, even  in the appendix to the Introduction entitled Principles o f  
Phonology’ (pp .63-95), entire paragraphs deal with or refer to writing (pp .64-65, 77, 81-82 , 91-95)
147 Gram, pp.44-69 / G ram  Eng, pp.29-47
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importance o f the reduction o f phonic substance for Saussure, without which it would 
never be possible to maintain the difference between langue and parole148. Elsewhere, 
however, he also argues that the reduction o f  substance leads him to metaphysics by 
another route, by the means o f psychologism 149. M ost o f Saussure’s followers are 
laden with the same prejudices; a notable exception, noticed by Derrida, is Hjelmslev.
I would add two observations. Firstly, Saussure’s phonocentrism  is less 
dependent on the metaphysics o f presence than is usually the case with the texts that 
Derrida deconstructs. It is crucial that in the distinction langue/parole, Saussure gives 
primacy to langue. It is language, not speech, that he considers as his object o f study, 
despite the latent prem ise o f ‘spoken’ language. It can hardly be claim ed that self­
presence is central to his discourse as it is precisely the non-presentable structure that 
interests him. After all, he initiates the m ovem ent from linguistics to semiotics, away 
from languages and toward semiotic system s150. It is precisely this privileging of 
structure that attracted the charge o f psychologism , despite the fact that he perceived 
structure as something o f  both social and ‘concrete ’ 151 reality. The importance of 
spoken language for Saussure does not lie w ith phone , the voice, but rather with the 
definition o f natural language. Secondly, Derrida him self is not com pletely free of 
this form of phonocentrism . All his com plicated argument about writing and the 
interplay o f  semiotic substances never really includes other semiotic systems than
148 Gram, p. 77 / G ram  Eng, p. 53
149 Mar, pp.87, 184 / M ar Eng, pp.76, 152
150 Derrida noticed that and situated his ow n project in a continuation o f  this m ovem ent, as w e shall see 
in the next sub-section. It is interesting to notice that Saussure uses the exam ple o f  writing in order to 
explain the ‘concreteness’ o f  langue, C LG , p .32
1511 have explained earlier the use o f  the term ‘p sych o log ica l’ by Saussure and his fear o f  the term 
‘abstract’
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natural languages; his approaches to other semiotic systems rely strongly on lexical 
meaning152.
Langue brings us back to the concept o f  structure, which likewise does not 
escape from metaphysics, although in a way,
like all questions about language, [it] escapes the classical history o f ideas 
which already supposes [its] possibility153
The system of m etaphysics is itself a structure and the metaphysical concept o f
structure doubles the structure o f metaphysics. M ost importantly, in order to speak o f
that structure, to recognise and criticise it and even deconstruct it, we already need
some notion o f structure, though not necessarily in its metaphysical definition. We
have seen, however, how names have the habit o f  dragging with them  unwanted
presuppositions. Deconstruction, even to the degree that it is anti-structuralist, needs
to be structural, a structural process o f de-structuring154.
In the text ‘Force et signification ’ 155 Derrida is addressing the literary
structuralism o f his time and thereby issues about the concept o f  structure. He claims
that in practice, if  not in theory, structure had becom e the literary object itself, and
this in a literal sense. He analyses the implications o f  the interplay between the literal
and metaphorical sense o f  structure. Structure, he explains, literally means -  or rather
initially meant -  a construction.
Only metaphorically was this topographical literality displaced in the direction of 
its [...] topical signification156.
Obviously, the structuralist definition o f  structure is topical and has detached itself 
from its topographical past. Derrida argues, however, that by not acknowledging its
152 We will return to this later.
153 W D, p.2 / ED, p .l 1; the claim  is made for ‘structuralism ’ but fits ‘structure’ too.
154 See Letter, and Marian H ob son ’s com m ent: ‘D oes the de  apply to con, or do they sim ultaneously  
gesture in different though not opposed directions?, in O pening Lines, p. 16
155 In ED, pp.9-49 / WD, pp. 1-35
156 WD, p. 17 ! ED, p.28
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initially metaphorical origin, structuralists often fall back in practice onto the
topographical sense o f the concept1' . This practical fetishism o f  structure was often
noticed and cautioned against by structuralists themselves and I don’t think it really
affects the structuralist definition o f structure. A m ore interesting question is whether
the fact that language can determine things only by spatializing them suffice to 
explain that, in return, language must spatialize itself as soon as it designates and 
reflects upon itself158
And the most interesting part o f this interesting question regards the topical, rather 
than the topographical, sense o f ‘spatialization’.
Derrida argues that inherent in the concept o f structure are notions o f ‘form,
relation, configuration’ but also o f ‘interdependence’ and ‘to ta lity ’159. It is this
‘totality’ that one finds more difficult to trace in the com pletely relational definition
of structuralist structure, although it is less difficult for one to feel in  the ambience o f
the structuralist m ovem ent the ‘totalitarian desire’ that D errida describes160. In the
milestone text ‘La structure, le signe et le jeu  dans le d iscours des sciences
humaines’161, Derrida deals with the rupture in the traditional definition o f the
structure that culminates in his own time -  the ‘event’ as he calls it. He claims that
traditionally the concept o f structure inolves a tension betw een its ‘s truc tu ra lly ’ and
the tendency to orient and immobilise it by giving it a centre:
The structurality of structure -  although it has always been at work, has always 
been neutralized or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a centre or of 
referring it to a point of presence [...] The function of this centre was not only to
157 ‘as long as the metaphorical sense o f  the notion o f  the structure is not ack n ow led ged  as such, that is
to say interrogated and even destroyed as concerns its figurative quality so  that the nonspatiality or
original spatiality designated by it may revive, one runs the risk, through a kind o f  slid in g  as unnoticed 
as it is efficacious, o f  confusing m eaning w ith its geom etric, m orphological, or, in the best o f  cases, 
cinematic m odel’, WD, p. 18 /  ED , p .29; a sim ilar question is posed b y G aston Bachelard in La 
poetique de I ’espace, 1957
158 WD, p. 18 /  ED, p .28
159 WD, p.3 /  ED, p. 12
160 See, for exam ple, ED, p .88 /  WD, p .69
161 First presented in 1966; published in ED, p p .409-427 / WD, p .351-370
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orient, balance and organize [it] [...] but above all to [...] limit what we may call 
the play of the structure.162
The centre is the point where the substitution o f  elem ents is forbidden; as such it
escapes structurality, despite the fact that it controls the structure. Therefore, in its
traditional definition the structure has a centre which is ‘paradoxically, within  the
structure and outside it’163. It is this centre with regard to the structure o f Western
metaphysics, which Derrida names ‘transcendental signified’. However, at some point
in the history o f ideas it became necessary to think
that there was no centre, that the centre [...] was not a fixed locus but a function 
[...] This was the moment when language invaded the universal problematic164
This process o f decentralisation o f structure Derrida traces through N ietzsche, Freud 
and Heidegger to the structuralism o f Levi-Strauss. He argues, however, that 
structuralism needs to keep the empty space o f  centre despite its ontological non­
value, which it does by its practice o f  methodological ‘ b r ic o la g e ’. H e also argues for 
not choosing between the ordered game o f structure and the possibility o f  free play, 
for trying ‘to conceive o f  their common ground and the d ifferan ce  o f  this irreducible 
difference’165.
I think that one must stress that the structuralist definition o f  structure does 
not include a centre. 1 suppose that it w ouldn’t forbid the possibility that a structure 
might have a centre, but it is not one o f  its definitional characteristics and it certainly 
does not apply to langues-semiotics as structures. D errida’s sense o f  centre functions 
in a meta-theoretical level and translates, on the one hand, a certain  staticness- 
stability and, on the other, a latent prem ise o f  autonomy. As regards the form er point, 
it can be analysed into the com m on accusation o f  the staticness o f  structure and the
162 WD, p.352 / ED, p.409
163 ibid
164 WD, p.353-354 / ED, p.411
165 WD, p.370 / ED, p.428
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more ‘structural’ observation regarding the possibility o f  distinctions. Structuralism  is 
commonly accused o f reducing historicity and generally the dim ension o f 
temporality, making it depend on and derive from the synchronic structure. W e have 
already addressed this criticism in Chapter 3, and how it stem s from  a 
misunderstanding o f the provisional and methodological choice o f  point o f  view  that 
Saussure makes in CLG. The question o f the possibility o f  holding any distinction 
goes ‘deeper’. Structuralist semioticians indeed make use o f categorical distinctions 
and distinctions o f order, despite their constantly cautioning us as regards their 
relativity; their models are clear-cut. If the possibility o f  such clarity is founded on 
the (even latent) existence o f a centre, as Derrida argues, then -  in this sense -  
structuralist structures are centred.
The other point leading to a conception o f  the structuralist structure as centred 
is the premise o f  autonomy included in its definition. We have already argued that 
‘autonomy’ does not mean ‘closed-ness’. Langues-semiotics, at least, are not 
considered as closed systems. A certain notion o f  autonom y is implied by the fact that 
it is possible for an element not to belong in a structure. W hat we have here, however, 
is an unavoidable confusion between different orders o f spatiality. As the elem ents of 
a completely relational structure are products o f  the structure alone, there should not 
be any uncertainty as to which structure they belong to. It would be wrong to imagine 
them wandering in a quasi-geometrical space uncertain as to whether they are part or 
not o f a nearby construction. However, this definition becomes more com plicated by 
the fact that semiotic elements can in a certain degree be detached from the systems 
that produced them, a function exem plified by their ‘material traces , which is 
precisely Derrida’s point. As we have seen in chapter 3, it is practically im possible to 
draw the line between one semiotic and another, and Derrida extends the scope o f this
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impossibility to the distinction between kinds o f semiotics. The problem is that the 
practical impossibility also affects the theoretical level. As we have seen, there is no 
other way to distinguish one semiotic from another than by reference to its form. This 
form, apart from being structured as sign-function, a characteristic which is shared by 
all semiotic forms, can be only identified by reference to its particular structure. This 
particular structure is accessed through its particular manifestations, and so on. There 
is a communication between the levels o f  a semiotic, o f  which remains unaffected 
only the meta-structure o f  the semiotic, which is com m on to all semiotics, and cannot 
help us to differentiate between them. So, the result is that the entire realm  o f 
signification, i.e. human culture as a whole, forms one space, one hyper-structure. 
This structure may be o f  different degrees o f density but it is still one. This structure, 
through its deconstructive solicitation, has a very indistinct borderline with the non- 
semiotic realm. The consequence is paradoxical and problematic. It is again related to 
the impossibility to imagine a space with no outside, combined with the empirical 
experience o f its exterior166. In any case, it is the desire o f the possibility o f 
distinguishing between structures that Derrida interprets as a desire for a centre.
In Derrida’s texts, there is a constant displacem ent between structurally and 
the metaphysical concept o f structure, as well as between structuralism as a meta- 
theoretical category and structuralism as the m ovem ent strictu sensu. We understand 
that this is consistent with his practice o f  questioning the categorical distinctions; 
however, it occasionally leads to confusions and misunderstandings, not entirely at 
his readers’ fault. I have made clear, I hope, that the structural definition of structure 
differs significantly from the m etaphysical concept and that i f  Derrida includes the 
former in the latter, it does it in a very particular, borderline way. I have also
166 We will address the issue further in the final chapter. It com bines many issues regardhg spatiality.
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explained, in chapter 3, that the notion of* structurality is included in the structuralist 
definition o f structure, both as structural process and as structural cause. What 
necessarily exceeds the structuralist definition is the notion o f a structural cause that 
opens the possibility o f  structure, the very difference between structure and non- 
structure. This is the structural function o f  D errida’s quasi-transcendental 
undecidables.
The opening of the structure is ‘structural’, that is, essential [...]: the difference 
between the (necessarily closed) minor structure and the structurality of an 
opening -  such, perhaps, is the unbeatable site in which philosophy takes root167 
The secret place where it is neither construction nor ruin but lability168
Regarding the term  ‘structuralism’, we have also several delicate and unstable 
distinctions. There is the historical movement o f  semiotic structuralism 169, with post­
structuralism considered sometimes as part o f  it and sometimes not. Then, there is 
structuralism as a meta-theoretical category170; in this sense Kant is a structuralist, 
while Heidegger for example is not. This general structuralism  borders on an even 
more general form o f structuralism, which is probably a necessary attribute o f  human 
thought. As a necessary attribute o f hum an thought, it includes two elements, 
corresponding to ‘structurality’ and ‘minor structure’, which are -  respectively -  the 
condition o f possibility o f  thought in general and o f  holding specific distinctions in 
particular. Then, there are psychological attitudes that privilege or even fetishise 
elements o f structure; an admiration for clarity and classification, for example, or for 
closed-ness and control. One understands that the interconnection between these 
different kinds o f structuralism  is com plicated and multi-leveled. What Derrida
167 WD, p. 1 9 4 /E D , p.230
168 WD, pp.4-5 / ED, p. 13; ‘lab ility’ is a term from biochem istry and designates the property o f  
undergoing constant change or the object having this property.
1691'pjjg structuralist invasion... an adventure o f  vision, a conversion o f  the w ay o f  putting questions to 
any object posed before u s’, WD, p .l /  ED, p.9
170 ‘A certain structuralism has alw ays been philosophy’s m ost spontaneous gesture , WD, p.200 /  ED, 
p.237
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describes as metaphysical structuralism comprises elements o f the meta-theoretical 
category, certain related attitudes and desires, along with a specific definition of 
structure, all together form ing an ideological system. This metaphysical structuralism 
is then generalised to the entirety o f  W estern metaphysics. What we can, at least, 
assert is that the historical movement is not confined into metaphysical structuralism 
in the narrower sense; whereas it constitutes very much a borderline case of the 
generalised version.
Nevertheless, there are certain attributes o f  the historical movement, the one 
to which we refer in the context o f this thesis as simply ‘structuralism ’, which indeed 
are at odds with the deconstructive project, which Derrida ascribes to Western 
metaphysics and which are evident in structuralist semiotics. Structuralist semiotics is 
organised as a view from ‘the inside’ o f  the semiotic systems; almost every
171structuralist refers to this choice and it does not passes unnoticed by Derrida . The 
distinction inside/outside is constantly used in order to construct definitions, although 
often expressly in a relative sense. At a less express level, Derrida reveals an 
ethnocentric, Eurocentric, ‘inside’ that is often implied. Expressly, structuralism is an 
opening to the other, particularly through the introduction of the fundamental 
relativity o f semiotic systems. This had a very impressive practical application in the 
expansion o f anthropological studies. Derrida, however, points out latent premises 
that contradict this break-through, organised — significantly — around the primacy of 
phonetic writing. Furthermore, structuralism  is unashamedly progressivist; and this 
could be the main divergence between structuralist semiotics and deconstruction. 
Structuralism falls prey to ‘scientifism ’, the admiration and desire for science, which 
we have described in Chapter 3. Derrida discusses this meta-psychological myth of
171 Gram, p.51 / Gram  Eng, pp.33-34
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the engineer at length. M oreover, he accuses structuralist semiotics o f psychologism; 
particularly semiotics o f  the Saussurean kind, as he excludes Hjelmslev from this 
accusation. This is connected with a certain formalism and idealism, which, 
nevertheless, neither Hjelmslev nor Derrida him self can fully avoid. After all, ‘all 
discourse involves [an] effect o f  idealism ’172. Finally, structuralism and 
deconstruction are both theories that proclaim  themselves anti-idealist and counter­
metaphysical; though from a diametrically opposite point o f view. Structuralism, like 
Marxism and psychoanalysis, aspires to science as a means to distance itself from 
metaphysics; deconstruction shows that scientifism  and the effort to break completely 
with metaphysics are inescapably inscribed in metaphysics: metaphysics can very 
well be ‘structuralist’ or ‘M arxist’173.
4.5. Deconstruction (is) structuralist semiotics
The ‘deconstruction o f  structuralist sem iotics’, i.e. the deconstructive critique o f the 
theory o f signification as described and practiced in the texts o f semioticians 
belonging to the structuralist movement, can be read as bearing a second implication: 
that deconstruction is o f  structuralist semiotics, i.e. belongs to it. It must be apparent 
by now that the process o f  deconstructing structuralism has been very central in the 
self-definition o f deconstruction and that the two projects share a great deal. In this 
sub-section, I concentrate on these com m on elem ents174. As the title o f the sub­
section suggests175, and Derrida makes quite clear, the relation of deconstruction to
172 Lim, p.94
173 Gram, p.67 / Gram Eng, p.46
174 We have met these com m on elem ents in previous sub-sections; that is w hy I m ostly don t repeat the 
references. This sub-section m ainly organises observations already made previously.
173 My titles o f  this sub-section and its previous one keep a resonance o f  the titles o f  two sub-sections 
of De la gram m atologie — ‘The O utside and the Inside and The Outside (is) Inside — w here the 
relationship between writing and the sign is presented.
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structuralist semiotics redoubles the relation o f writing to language, it is an inscribed 
exteriority.
As we have seen, Derrida in his interview with Julia Kristeva17^  acknowledges 
the critical role played by structuralist semiotics. He locates its crucial role in two 
innovations: the inseparable connection between the signified and the signifier; and 
the differential and formal character o f  the semiotic functioning, which led to the de­
substantiation o f both the signified content and the substance o f expression. These 
topics are connected to the radical innovation that we have termed ‘principle of 
fundamental arbitrariness’. This is the axiom on which Derridean difference is based, 
and undoubtly constitutes the most important link between deconstruction and 
structuralist semiotics. Apart from this, one observes m any other similarities between 
the two projects, either because they share com m on roots or because o f the immediate 
continuity between them, and particularly as results from their similar definition of 
the semiotic. From the tradition o f  Enlightenm ent, structuralism and deconstruction 
inherit the critical stance; whereas from the ambience o f their times, they take the 
interest in language. Furthermore, they share the characteristic o f being both 
descriptive models and methods o f analysis. M oreover, deconstruction borrows from 
structuralist semiotics several o f  its analytical tools, as well as a structural(ist) 
conception of the system o f W estern m etaphysics. Finally, they both face the aporia 
of the epistemological gap between the semiotic realm and a subject-independent 
world which is their Kantian inheritance.
The principle o f  fundamental semiotic arbitrariness is, I think, the most 
important contribution o f structuralism  to the history o f ideas. Derrida bases his 
approach to signification on this principle and, precisely because o f  the centrality o f
176 Pos, pp.25-50 / Pos Eng, pp. 15-36
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the semiotic in his project, the principle ends up by determining it in its entirety. 
Without exaggeration, D errida’s entire project can be summarised as the demand for 
a generalised -  and m axim ally consistent — application o f  this principle; whereas his 
multi-quasi-concept o f  difference relies strongly on it. The principle has several inter­
related consequences for semiotics and epistemology. First is a topological 
conception o f signification; this, on the one hand, bridges the division between the 
sensible and the intelligible and, on the other, de-essentialises meaning. In semiotics, 
as we have seen, this is interlinked to the unbreakable relation between the signifier 
and the signified, which no longer differ metaphysically, as well as to the concept o f 
structure as transcending the difference between content and form. It also relates to 
the reducing o f the authorial position into a function o f  the text. Moreover, 
signification can no longer be perceived in terms o f expression or perception. 
Therefore, the status o f  reference is also influenced, which takes us to questions 
beyond the semiotic realm into epistemology. It is this connection that Derrida 
extends further in a quasi-transcendental gesture.
The anti-metaphysical stance that is based on and expressed by the de- 
essentialisation o f m eaning is structuralism ’s and deconstruction’s common 
inheritance from the Enlightenment. It has been argued that the Enlightenment brings 
a double tradition: one o f critique and one o f  optimistic self-confidence. Classical 
structuralism participates in both traditions, which are exemplified by its explicit 
scientifism. Derrida has a more ambiguous relationship to them: his project is critical 
but not positive. In his later work, he argued in great length for the necessity o f  the 
Enlightenment and o f  reason as a prom ise o f  justice; as well as for his own belonging
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to this tradition177. W hether or not one accepts this promise as sufficient substitute for 
the positiveness o f reason, one must acknowledge that deconstruction is a very radical 
critique, and as such it is inscribed in the tradition o f the Enlightenment.
Another common topos o f  structuralism and deconstruction, because o f the 
centrality they attribute to the semiotic, is their belonging to the ‘linguistic turn’ o f 
the 20th century178. D errida’s affiliation to the linguistic turn is both wider and 
narrower than the movement o f  structuralism. On the one hand, the attention he gives 
to signification is mediated not only through structuralist semiotics but also through 
phenomenology; on the other, he participates in the latest phase o f  the structuralist 
movement, the post-structuralism o f the Tel Quel group. However, what differentiates 
the structuralist semiotic approach to language from other approaches, which also 
privilege it, is that the primacy o f  the semiotic is founded on the principle of 
fundamental semiotic arbitrariness. Immediate consequence o f  this principle is the 
position that our approach to the world is not only mediated but, in a sense, 
constituted by the semiotic. Derrida shares this premise, which attaches him  to the 
structuralist lineage.
Moreover, both structuralist semiotics and deconstruction provide (or 
constitute) simultaneously a descriptive model o f  signification and a m ethod for the 
study of phenomena o f signification. This double function is inherent to the self- 
reflected nature o f a theory about the semiotic and is intensified by the intermingling 
of subject and object that takes place in the semiotic structure. Derrida puts it in
177 See, for example, the texts included in D u dro it a la  ph ilosoph ie, 1990. Nevertheless, his 
argumentation did not persuade com m entators like Slavoj Zizek, who found the m essianic prom ise a
weak substitute for reason. . . . .
178 ‘This inflation o f  the sign “ language” is the inflation o f  the sign itself, absolute inflation, inflation
itself, Gram Eng , p .6 / G ram , p. 15
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philosophical terms as the structural impossibility o f maintaining the subject/object, 
activity/passivity distinction.
Furthermore, deconstruction borrows methodological tools from structuralist 
semiotics. I think that these can be roughly classified into two groups: on the one 
hand are the concepts and techniques that support and underlie the entire process of 
deconstruction; on the other are specific techniques that Derrida transform s for his 
own purposes. In the first category, that o f  tools o f  structural necessity for the 
deconstructive project, I would put the concepts o f  structure and isomorphism, as well 
as isotopy and Greim acian analysis. To the concept o f structure, differentional and 
signifying, we have referred extensively earlier. It is indispensable tool for Derrida’s 
approach, which
[is] not concerned with comparing the content of doctrines, the wealth of positive 
knowledge; [it is] concerned, rather, with discerning the repetition or 
permanence, at a profound level of discourse, of certain fundamental schemes 
and of certain directive concepts.179
In order to discern ‘the repetition or perm anence’ o f structures, indispensable is the
concept o f isomorphism. It is isomorphism that allows us to perceive the relation
between the signifier and the signified as the matrix for all the oppositions o f the
system of Western metaphysics, and eventually reduce them to a single common
structure; it is isomorphism too that allows the dislocation o f one opposition to spread
to the entire system; isomorphism, finally, allows the displacement between
categories and orders. The case o f isotopy is less straightforward. There is no doubt
that that the first step o f deconstruction is almost identical with a Greimacian
analysis; what it is not certain is w hether we have here a case o f  direct influence or a
179 Mar Eng, p. 153 / Mar, p. 184
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case o f parallel inspiration o f  people moving in the same intellectual environm ent180. 
In the second category, o f  transform ed semiotic concepts, one observes — for example 
-  that the technique o f  ‘paleonym ics’ is inspired by the structuralist ‘bricolage’ or 
that the deconstructive reading generalises what I have earlier called the structuralist 
habit o f ‘terminological m etonym y’.
As a result o f the com bination o f  the com m on basic axiom and common 
methodological techniques, D errida’s conceptualisation o f W estern metaphysics is 
not simply structural but structuralist too. The first step o f deconstruction is the 
translation o f a text into the idiom o f structuralism. It is significant, I think, that 
Derrida’s view o f  the object o f deconstruction, i.e. o f W estern metaphysics, is 
structuralist through and through.
The final similarity between structuralist semiotics and deconstruction is, as I 
implied earlier, one o f epistemology: as an im m ediate consequence o f the principle o f 
fundamental semiotic arbitrariness, the access to the subject-independent world 
becomes problematic. I will call this problem ‘the epistemological gap’. The opening 
of this gap can be traced back to Immanuel K ant who conceived o f phenom ena as 
constituted by the human faculties and o f ultim ate (noumenal) reality as lying 
altogether beyond our epistemic grasp. Once again, the Kantian lineage reaches 
Derrida not only through structuralism but also through phenomenology; however, it 
is to structuralism that he owes the more radical premise according to which our 
knowledge-perception is constituted by the semiotic, which depends on the different 
semiotic communities, and not by the hum an faculties alone, which are at least
180 The first three books by Derrida are published a year after Greim as’ Sem antique structura le:  




REA WALLDfeN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE 
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
CHAPTER 4: DECONSTRUCTIVE META-SEMIOTICS
natural and common to all human beings. The world becomes a transcendental 
signified.
One may conceive o f deconstruction as a radicalisation of structuralist 
semiotics. On the one hand, deconstruction’s higher standard o f consistency leads 
structuralist semiotics outside itself and reveals, more than accidental inconsistencies, 
its inherent aporias. On the other, deconstruction relies heavily on structuralist 
premises. Then, one should remember that, despite the complicated relativisation of 
these terms, the deconstructive project is m ainly a philosophical theory, whereas 
structuralist semiotics is an applied theory o f  signification; the range o f their interests 
and aims differs. It is precisely deconstruction’s objective to address the 
epistemological limits o f  signification, which lim its structuralist semiotics places 
beyond its field o f  study. It would be very unpractical, actually structurally 
impossible, to subject applied semiotics to D errida’s standards, as he very well 
knows:
I do not question, on the level on which he says it, the truth of what Sanssure 
saysm
Derrida does not question the empirical truth and effectiveness o f structuralist 
semiotics; he just situates it in the space o f  its condition o f  possibility, w hich he calls 
grammatology. He would have it that structuralist semiotics is a species of 
grammatology. It depends on the point o f view.
4.6. Between glossem atics an d  g ram m ato logy
In several instances in our overview  o f the relationship o f deconstruction to 
structuralist semiotics, we have noticed that Louis Hjelmslev and the school o f
181 Gram Eng, p.39 / Gram, p .58
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Copenhagen manage to escape the deconstructive critique. It seems that H jelm slev’s 
extremely high standard o f  consistency leads him to similar observations and 
conclusions to Derrida s, and therefore makes him his immediate precursor. 
Hjelmslev’s consistency turns him  into a paradigmatic and exceptional case in 
structuralist semiotics -  paradigm atic because he follows the theory’s principles, 
exceptional in actually carrying those principles though into practice. Therefore, what 
separates Derrida from Hjelmslev in particular specifies the fundamental difference 
between structuralism and deconstruction.
Derrida refers to Hjelmslev and his school in a few very dense pages in the
J O ' )
first part o f  De la grammatologie  . The position o f  the passage is, I think, 
significant. It is situated in the chapter ‘Linguistique et gram m atologie’ (Linguistics 
and Grammatology), in the second part o f the sub-chapter ‘Le dehors (est) dedans’ 
(The Inside (is) Outside), just before the introduction o f the quasi-concept of 
differm ce, which closes the sub-chapter. The first part o f  De la gram m atologie , as we 
have said, encapsulates the theoretical m atrix o f  the project o f  deconstruction. 
Hjelmslev takes his place in the chapter that describes the relationship between 
linguistics and grammatology, and particularly in the sub-chapter arguing that the 
‘outside (is) inside’: grammatology (is) linguistics. The passage on H jelm slev acts as 
a bridge between Saussure and d ifferm ce , i.e. Derrida’s own project. Actually, it is 
quite clear that Derrida considers Hjelmslev as the culmination o f the lineage starting
183with Saussure, as he uses the expression ‘from Saussure to Hjelmslev twice; once 
a few pages before the passage on Hjelmslev and once in closing it, ju s t before
introducing differm ce.
182 Gram, pp.78-91 / G ram  Eng, p p .53-62; there also two isolated references o f  the nam e previous to 
the passage: Gram, pp.64, 73 / G ram  E ng, pp.326, 50
183 Gram Eng, pp.50, 62 /  G ram , pp.73, 91
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Hjelmslev appears when Derrida begins to argue for the liberation o f the
semiological project from linguistics, in the process o f replacing semiology by
grammatology184. The first reference to his name is a footnote, where he figures as the
exception to structuralist phonocentrism 185. The first reference to his nam e in the
main text brackets him, even him, with the European tradition o f binding semantics to
linguistics186. Then, he is brought forward as the exception to the phonocentric sub-
current that underlies structuralist semiotics, against its principles, from the
beginning. Derrida claims that,
reconsidering the order of dependence prescribed by Saussure, apparently 
inverting the relationship of the part to the whole, Barthes in fact carries out the 
profoundest intention of the Course.187
Derrida uses the theoretical debate -  between Hjelmslev and his school, on the one 
hand, and Jakobson and h is188, along w ith M artinet189, on the other -  about the 
possibility o f  the neutralisation o f  the phonic substance, in order to  present his own 
position regarding the semiotic substance. Dealing with the rather passionate 
polemics against glossematics, he defends grammatology. H e arrives at the 
conclusion that ‘Hjelmslev [...] undoubtedly drew the most rigorous conclusions 
from the radical principle o f  the CLG  and that ‘undoubtedly the Copenhagen School 
thus frees a field o f research’191, his own. The Copenhagen School is thus within
Saussure’s heritage and also breaks with it:
Hjelmslev situates his concept of the scheme or ploy of language within 
Saussure’s heritage — of Saussure’s formalism and his theory of value.
184 G ram , p.74 / Gram Eng, p. 51
185 Gram, pp.64 / Gram Eng, note p.43, p .326
186 Gram, p.73 / Gram Eng, p .50
187 Gram Eng, p.51 / Gram , p .75
188 Gram, pp.64, 70 / G ram  Eng, pp.326, 53 -54
189 Gram, pp. 80, 82/ G ram  Eng, pp.327, 56
190 Gram Eng, p.57 / Gram , p .83
191 Gram Eng, p.59 / G ram , p .86
192 Gram Eng, p .57 / G ram , p .84
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H.J.Uldall provides a remarkable formulation of the fact that glossematic 
criticism operates at the same time thanks to Saussure and against him; that, as I 
suggested above, the proper space of grammatology is at the same time opened 
and closed by The C ourse in G enera l Linguistics. [He] show[s] that Saussure did 
not develop ‘all the theoretical consequences of his discovery’.193
Derrida’s endeavour doubles the glossematic break with Saussurean phonocentrism.
Then, however, deconstruction breaks w ith glossematics by questioning its
scientifism and its conditions o f possibility194. I will now organise a comparison
between glossematics and deconstruction around eight points o f convergence and two
points o f major divergence.
Firstly, as we have already explained, H jelm slev’s definition o f  the semiotic
not only breaks with the tradition o f substitution, as Saussure already had done, but
comes to consider it as a particular kind o f  function between two completely
equivalent planes, the plane o f content and the plane o f  expression, w hich are related
by reciprocal implication. The transformation o f  the concepts o f  the signifier and the
signified — necessarily metaphysical, as we have seen — into two completely
symmetrical and ontologically indistinguishable planes o f a function is obviously
closer to the Derridean view o f  semiosis, both because o f  the interchangeability
between them and the fact that their function extends beyond the closed concept o f
the sign. Then, each plane is divided into form and substance. The sign-function p er
se is the relation between the content-form and the expression-form, w hich excludes,
as Derrida puts it, ‘not only the consideration o f  the substance o f expression [...] but
also that o f the substance o f content’195. This detaches the sem iotic from the
‘transcendental signified’. In D errida’s words, it allows for the play o f  language. As
we have seen, in the Hjelm slevian stratification the terms content and expression
193 Gram Eng, p.58 / G ram , p. 86
194 Gram, pp.88-89 / G ram  Eng, pp .60-61
195 Gram Eng, p.57 / G ram , p. 84
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relinquish their m etaphysical m eaning o f  interiority vs. exteriority, and come to 
denote the two absolutely symmetrical elements o f a function, whereas ‘form ’ and 
‘substance’ become relative terms. Therefore, the deconstructive solicitation o f the 
metaphysical oppositions is less applicable to them. Actually, with regard to the two 
planes o f the sign function, it w ouldn’t be applicable at all, had it not been for the 
‘terminological conservatism ’ that ties them  to m etaphysics196.
Secondly, by emptying the m etaphysics o f language, H jelmslev becomes 
defendant o f  the autonomy o f writing. Correspondingly, Derrida uses writing in order 
to question the m etaphysics o f language. Hjelm slev very explicitly and consistently 
refuses ontological primacy to voice, or sound in general; on which point he disagrees 
with many other prom inent structural linguists and, obviously, agrees w ith  Derrida. 
This is the result o f his distinguishing form from substance, and making the semiotic 
a relation between forms. As the semiotic form is independent o f  semiotic substance, 
there is no point in considering the expression-substance as a definitional 
characteristic o f language. Derrida would not agree to complete ‘independence’ but 
construe it as a possibility o f  detachment. Furthermore, for Hjelmslev, a written 
language is a semiotic equivalent to and usually independent from its spoken 
counterpart. The only case where a sonic substance and a graphic substance would 
manifest the same form would be if  they denoted exactly the sam e formal 
relationships. Derrida, again, does not put the relationship between em pirical writings 
and spoken languages in terms o f independence but rather in term s o f  the 
impossibility o f clear distinction, whereas his novel use o f writing designates the 
condition o f possibility o f  them all.
196 Gram, p. 89 / Gram Eng, p .328
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Thirdly, Hjelmslev, ju st like Derrida, does not consider that there is any 
natural bond between speech and human communication. However, in some self- 
conscious passages, he does privilege natural languages, though their ‘naturalness’ 
has nothing to do with the phonic substance. Unexpectedly, Derrida shares this 
preference. It is not the expression-substance by which Hjelmslev tries to explain the 
specificity o f natural languages, but the content-substance; and as there can be no 
difference in kind, he tries to make the distinction in formal terms. We have discussed 
at some length in Chapter 3 how this undermines both the symmetry between content- 
plane and expression-plane and the symmetry between natural languages and other 
semiotic systems. Derrida would not explicitly fall into the same contradiction, as the 
content-substance is the transcendental signified par excellence. However, most o f  his 
analyses deal with written texts, which are examples o f  natural languages, not with 
texts of other semiotic systems. W hen he does introduce other semiotic systems, he 
mostly views them through written texts that act metalinguistically on them. His 
difficulty with non-lexical meaning is particularly obvious in his unsuccessful 
collaboration with the architect Peter Eisenm an197. This difficulty is inscribed in the 
debate about whether there can be other than lexical meaning, which we addressed in 
chapter 3. O f course, Derrida has undermined the distinction between metalanguage 
and language-object; it just seems that when the language-object is a non-lexical 
semiotic system, metalanguage threatens to make it disappear. Hjelmslev’s theory is 
exceptional because it is formal enough to allow the study o f different semiotic 
systems, such as painting or architecture, on equal terms. His inconsistent preference
197 See Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenm an, C hora L Works. This collaboration was infested with two- 
ways misunderstandings. Derrida seem ed incapable o f  im agining the possibility o f  deconstruction  
without the m ediation o f  words, o f  w hich Eisenman is quite ingeniously able; whereas Eisenman 
mostly m issed the delicacies o f  Derrida’s arguments.
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to natural languages does not affect his stratification. In a paradoxical way, Derrida’s 
project is more dependent to lexical meaning.
Fourthly, as must be obvious, a characteristic that Hjelmslev and Derrida 
share is the preoccupation with expression-substance and its disengagement from the 
traditional metaphysics o f  the material and the sensuous. Both agree in not attaching 
metaphysical attributes or values to any sensory function or any material. Hjelmslev, 
following the principle o f  fundamental semiotic arbitrariness and its ultimate Kantian 
implications, attaches our articulations o f  the world to semiotic form; therefore he 
cannot maintain any ‘objective’ distinction o f the media. Derrida’s fundamental 
synaesthesia rules out both the distinction o f m edia and o f sensory functions. He even 
considers as metaphysical
an objectivist concept of the body proper and of the diversity of sensory 
functions (the ‘five’ senses considered as so many apparatuses at the disposition 
of the speaker or writer)198
In Hjelmslev, an expression-substance is ‘selected’ by an expression-form, and 
therefore defined by it and not according to our senses. This means that there are at 
least as many expression-substances as expression-forms and that an expression- 
substance may use more than one sensory function. Two deconstructive objections 
arise. One is that the sense-classification may have been transferred from the level o f 
semiotic expression-substance to that o f extra-semiotic expression-substance and that 
of expression-purport. However, there is always the notion o f the unknowable 
continuum where, finally, the two planes o f the sign-function merge. The other 
objection is that if  an expression-substance is defined by form, we need to assume 
that a form is rigorously defined. Derrida rejects this possibility as a result o f the
198 Gram Eng, p. 82 / Gram, p. 123
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absence o f a transcendental signified. The impossibility o f a stable system implies, 
then, the impossibility o f distinguishing between expression-substances. We revert to 
the idea o f a sensuous continuum.
Fifthly, both Hjelmslev and Derrida question the status o f metalanguage and 
connotation. On the one hand, Derrida argues for the original metaphoricity of 
signification and the metaphysical roots o f scientificity; and, therefore, the structural 
impossibility o f rigorously distinguishing between literal and metaphorical meaning, 
between language-object and meta-language. On the other, Hjelmslev starts by 
conceptualising both as second-degree sign-functions: the connotative semiotic has an 
entire sign-function as its expression-plane, whereas a meta-semiotic has it as its 
content-plane. This structure includes the premise o f  an isomorphism between the 
different degrees o f sign-functions, which opens the way for Derrida’s questioning of 
the difference o f  degree. It also includes the isomorphism between the two types of 
higher-degree semiotics, which, combined with their equivalence, means that the two 
become indistinguishable, as Hjelmslev soon realised. He proceeded to give a new 
definition, where he distinguishes them according to scientificity. This, though, is not 
an immanent criterion, as glossematics demands o f its definitions; it is a meta- 
theoretical one. Moreover, it is not acceptable by Derrida, who precisely classifies 
both scientifism and the desire for the stability o f structure as being complicit with the
system of Western metaphysics.
Sixthly, Hjelmslev and Derrida share a certain mechanistic conception of 
signification. Glossematics has often subjected to this charge by semioticians o f other
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schools, whereas Derrida and other post-structuralists praise him for it199. 
Glossematics focuses on the structure o f  signification, on the text, and is not 
interested in the function o f communication, the message. Nowhere in its conceptual 
vocabulary does it make reference to intention. In the stratification, the symmetry 
between the content and expression planes, along with the neutralization of their 
metaphysical meaning, leads to a m echanistic view  o f  semiosis. And when someone 
chooses to view semiosis as encoding rather than interpersonal communication, 
writing appears a better simile than speech. Derrida’s definition o f signification as 
writing stresses precisely the ability o f  the semiotic to be freed from both the 
intention o f its author and its original context. This authorless text is in a way 
inhuman, or non-human at least, a ‘productive and perform ative machine’200, in his 
words. Nevertheless, neither doubts the existence o f real, empirical subjects; and the 
way they re-introduce them  into the machine o f signification distinguishes the two 
approaches. Hjelmslev does not question that the raison d 'etre  o f signification is for 
human beings to communicate; he simply chooses to investigate the phenomenon 
from another point o f view. Derrida’s deconstruction affects the borderlines o f the 
semiotic realm and complicates the issue; distinctions such as human/non-human, 
culture/nature do not stand unquestioned, whereas any reference to an extra-semiotic 
certainty falls into the structure o f  transcendental signified. In any case, the 
possibilities opened by both glossematics and deconstruction have made them useful 
tools for the study o f novel fields, such as artificial intelligence, genetics, virtual 
reality, multimedia and contem porary art.
•99 por exaniple, Derrida tw ice in M arges  acknowledges that H jelm slev escapes both the 
phonocentrism and the p sychologism  o f  Saussure, M ar , pp.87, 184 / M ar E ng  pp.76, 152. D eleuze and 
Guatari make a sim ilar com m ent, A nti-O edipus: C apitalism  and Schizophrenia, p .242
200 Papier M achine, p. 74.
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Seventhly, the inter-related issues o f formalism, idealism and the 
epistemological gap concern both glossematics and deconstruction, despite their 
insistent denials. The source o f the aporia  lies with the principle o f semiotic 
arbitrariness and haunts structuralism in general; what makes it particularly apparent 
in their cases is precisely their rigorous consistency with that principle. On the one 
hand, Hjelmslev’s stratification, with its repeated gesture o f formalisation of 
substance, does not manage to give a solution to the problem o f how one reaches the 
extra-semiotic; despite repetition, the form is projected by us and the purport remains 
unknowable. On the other hand, D errida’s destabilisation o f the distinction between 
the semiotic and the extra-semiotic realm, instead o f opening the semiotic to its 
beyond, threatens to enclose the extra-semiotic w ithin the semiotic. Furthermore, both 
o f them refer to Saussure’s definition o f language as consisting o f  differences without 
positive terms, conceive signification as a topical structure and propose model- 
structures for its description. It is difficult to conceive these structures in other than 
formal terms. Derrida considers H jelm slev’s exclusion o f substance from the semiotic 
unit as an inevitable step towards idealism. Then, Hjelmslev would insist that 
‘separating and distinguishing is not the same th ing’201. Derrida argues that he 
himself avoids idealism by taking a step back before the division of substance and 
form. It remains, however, the fact that his theory appears to offer no way out of 
language.
Eighthly, an interesting similarity between glossematics and deconstruction is 
a certain underlying tw o-term  matrix-structure, redoubled as four-term structure. 
Quite obviously, H jelm slev’s stratification is a four-term structure generated by two 
dyadic oppositions. W hat he did was to separate the duality content vs. expression
201 Ess a is, p. 59.
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from the duality form vs. substance’, which up until then had been amalgamated in 
the traditional definition o f the sign into the complex opposition ‘[signified = content 
+ substance] vs. [signifier = expression + form ]’. He then turned through 90° the axis 
o f one duality and produced his four-term stratification o f the semiotic. The ‘content 
vs. expression’ opposition is formed on the Platonic duality ‘noumena vs. 
phenomena’ and the ‘form vs. substance’ opposition on the Aristotelian duality 
‘morphe vs. h y le \ Hjelmslev’s structural movement o f separating and turning the 
axes duplicates Kant’s. The two couples ‘content vs. expression’ and ‘form vs. 
substance’ are not completely isomorphic, and their cross-section gives to the system 
stability, which allows for categorical and order distinctions. Derrida’s argument also 
shows a preference for the dyadic structure. We have already mentioned the ‘double 
reading’ and the ‘double writing’ o f  deconstruction. Derrida stresses the importance 
of the critical step o f deconstruction, which would correspond to the Hegelian 
antithesis. The third step -  o f transcendence, sublimation or synthesis — can never be 
realised because this would lead to a new thesis, exactly as the Hegelian dialectic 
prescribes. Deconstruction is against the metaphysical dream o f unity, the dominion 
of the one; it is also against the ‘trinitarian horizon ’202 o f Hegelian dialectics and the 
symbolic order, which it interprets as a metaphysical desire for returning to the one. 
However, we observe that the system o f  metaphysics is also characterised by a 
repeated two-term structure. We need to distinguish the two. The characteristic o f  the 
metaphysical dual structure is that it is oriented and hierarchical: the second term 
depends on the first. This structure is a product o f the desire to subordinate the second 
term to the one. In deconstruction, however, the structure o f undecidables is a duality 
that cannot be controlled by the one. In Dissemination, Derrida argues that this can be
202 Diss, p.3 5 / Diss Eng , p .20
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conceived as the addition o f ‘the more or less o f a fourth term ’203 , the asymmetrical 
fourth which prevents the third term  from synthesising the first two, ‘beyond the 
opposition between one and tw o’204. In very different ways, both in Hjelmslev and 
Derrida, the four-term structure prevents significant distinctions from collapsing.
As we have seen, Hjelmslev and Derrida share a high standard o f conceptual 
rigor, precision and consistency, though they apply it differently. The interpretation o f 
this ninth similarity leads us to their two main differences: scientificity and the 
transcendental question. Hjelmslev’s scientifism is considered metaphysical in a 
deconstructive context; Derrida’s quasi-transcendental point o f view is considered 
metaphysical in a structuralist context.
Hjelmslev is a fervent supporter o f scientificity, which can be summarised in 
his methodological requirement o f self-consistency, exhaustiveness, and simplicity205. 
It is this criterion that he uses in order to stabilise his system when it is threatened by 
its isomorphism. Derrida recognises here one o f his transcendental signifieds. He 
deems the work o f the Copenhagen School to be
plagued by a scientificist objectivism, that is to say be another unperceived or 
unconfessed metaphysics206.
This is the crucial difference between them, which emerged previously when we 
attempted to differentiate their very similar paths. Their programs, their 
metatheoretical attitudes are each the converse o f the other. Hjelmslev chooses 
stability, clarity, the system; Derrida chooses mobility, ambiguity, play. They both 
recognise the necessity o f their other though; and again in different ways. Derrida 
considers the system as a species o f play; Hjelmslev considers play as another point
203 Diss, p.36 /  D iss Eng, p .21
204 Diss, p .402 / D iss Eng, p .363
205 Prol, p.6
206 Gram Eng, p.61 /  G ram , p .89
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of view on the system. This difference has to do with their perception o f the notion o f 
the other in general. I wonder whether H jelm slev’s symmetry is more liberating than 
Derrida’s respectful dissymmetry.
Derrida, in order to keep his own standard o f consistency, needs to investigate 
the conditions o f possibility o f what he analyses, as well as o f his own analysis. One 
needs to ask
the question of the transcendental origin of the system itself [...] and, 
correlatively, of the theoretical system that studies it207
This endeavour, however, cannot be part o f  H jelm slev’s system, because it exceeds
the structuralist demand for immanence. This dem and Derrida considers as a bind to
metaphysics. As he says o f arche-writing,
It would constitute not only the pattern uniting form to all substance, graphic or 
otherwise, but the movement of the sign-function linking a content to an 
expression [...] This theme could not have a place in Hjelmslev’s system. // It is 
because arche-writing [...] cannot, as the condition of all linguistic systems, form 
part of the linguistic system itself and be situated as an object in its field. (Which 
does not mean it has a real field elsewhere, another assignable site.) Its concept 
could in no way enrich the scientific, positive, and “immanent” (in the 
Hjelmslevian sense) description of the system itself.208
For the symmetrically opposite reason, H jelmslev would consider all transcendental 
questions as metaphysical. Derrida fends o ff the danger o f falling back to 
metaphysics by his ‘trace’ technique, the paradoxical spatio-temporal structure o f 
diffe ranee.
To see to it that the beyond does not return to the within is to recognize in the 
contortion the necessity of a pathway. The pathway must leave a track in the text. 
Without that track, abandoned to the simple content of its conclusions, the ultra- 
transcendental text will so closely resemble the precritical text as to be 
indistinguishable from it.209
207 Gram Eng, p.61 / G ram , p .89
208 Gram Eng, p.60 / G ram , p .88
209 Gram Eng, p.61 / G ram , p .90
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Hjelmslev would probably consider this kind o f logic metaphysical, similar to the 
semi-logic o f language but not up to scientific standards; and the mirroring goes on 
ad infinitum.
In conclusion, we observe that the work o f  the Copenhagen School may be 
deployed in order to show the double relation o f deconstruction to structuralist 
semiotics, to explain ‘grammatology’ and to show its difference from semiotics. What 
we have again is a step in between. I f  semiotics is a step toward the deconstruction o f 
metaphysics, and structuralist semiotics a step toward the deconstruction of 
traditional semiotics, then glossematics is a step toward the deconstruction of 
structuralist semiotics; and deconstruction is itself ju st such a step.
2 9 8
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The project of deconstruction can be seen as an expansion o f the project of
structuralist semiotics in two ways: one the one hand, it extends the applicability of
its principles beyond the semiotic realm; on the other, it investigates its conditions of
possibility. Thus, deconstruction is both a continuation and a critique o f  structuralist
semiotics; Derrida states as much on several occasions. The result is that, to a
significant extent, deconstruction develops on structuralist semiotics; it needs it both
as its own foundation and as its exemplary object. Derrida indeed presents his
‘grammatology’ as a liberating transformation o f structuralist semiology/semiotics:
The transformation o f  general semiology into grammatology, this latter executing 
a critical labor on everything within semiology, including the central concept o f  
the sign1
One may replace semiology by grammatology [...] [L]iberat[ing] the 
semiological project itself from [...] linguistics2
Liberating] the future o f a general grammatology o f which linguistics- 
phonology would be only a dependent and circumscribed area3
In a significant passage, he paraphrases the famous passage from CLG :
I shall call it semiology...Since that science does not yet exist, no one can say 
what it would be; but it has a right to existence, a place staked out in advance. 
Linguistics is only a part o f  that general science...; the laws discovered by 
semiology will be applicable to linguistics.4
He replaces the ‘sem iology’ o f the original with ‘grammatology’ [in square brackets
Derrida’s alterations]:
I shall call it [grammatology]... Since that science does not yet exist, no one can 
say what it would be; but it has a right to existence, a place staked out in 
advance. Linguistics is only a part o f that general science...; the laws discovered 
by [grammatology] will be applicable to linguistics.
1 M ar Eng, p. 15 / M ar, p. 16
2 Gram Eng, p .51 / G ram , p.74
3 Gram Eng, p .30 / G ram , p .45
4 CLG, p.33
5 Gram Eng, p .51 / Gram, p .74
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I would add that an even more pointed alteration of this passage will involve
replacing the ‘linguistics’ o f the original with ‘semiotics / semiology’{in hooked
brackets my additional alterations}:
I shall call it [grammatology]... Since that science does not yet exist, no one can 
say what it would be; but it has a right to existence, a place staked out in 
advance. (Semiology / semiotics} is only a part o f that general science...; the 
laws discovered by [grammatology] will be applicable to {semiology / 
semiotics}.
The relation of deconstruction to structuralist semiotics redoubles the relation of 
writing to sign-function.
In the same way that the project o f deconstruction can be described as a 
doubly extending transformation of structuralist semiotics, its argument supports a 
double connection of semiotics to metaphysics. There are two clearly different, 
though related, senses o f ‘metaphysics’: on the one hand, it designates the area of 
philosophical investigation which exceeds our cognitive and perceptual limitations; 
on the other, it designates an ideological construction on or around the contents o f 
this realm, which cannot but be illusory. W hat connects the two senses is the belief, 
Kantian in origin, that any claim about the metaphysical realm cannot have any 
cognitive warrant. It is in this second sense that the term ‘metaphysics’ is used by 
both Derrida and the structuralists. The critical tradition o f Enlightenment thinking 
combines two movements: ( 1) the epistemic movement o f attaining a knowledge of 
the world; (2) the critical movement o f liberating ourselves from metaphysical 
illusions. It conceives them as indistinguishable; in our effort to know the world, we 
are getting rid of our illusions. However, at a second level, it opposes them to each 
other: the effort to achieve knowledge o f the world itself plunges us back into 
metaphysical illusion. So our only way to knowledge is through the negative gesture 
of reducing the scale o f our illusions and investigating our epistemic limits. Both
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structuralism and deconstruction partake o f this Kantian, negative tradition. However, 
there is a difference. Derrida takes the antithesis o f the two movements to its more 
radical extreme.
The concept and the theory o f  signification act as the intermediate step in both 
movements. With regard to knowledge, signification is our way to the world and of 
the world to us. With regard to metaphysical illusions, signification is both what 
binds us to them and what gives us a hope o f liberation. Deconstruction duplicates 
this bridging structure, while drawing attention to its asymmetry; the other end o f the 
bridge never reaches the other side.
Because o f  this doubly double relation o f  semiotics to metaphysics ‘the 
problem o f language has never been simply one problem  among others’6 and one
7 • •could describe ‘modernity as linguistic science’ . In this context, structuralist 
semiotics is placed as the culmination o f a tradition beginning with Kant and the 
Enlightenment; the last link to metaphysics and the last step toward an impossible 
beyond. And Hjelm slev’s glossematics is the last step o f this last step. And 
deconstruction is the last step o f this last step o f this last step.
The conclusions o f  my thesis can be grouped in two interrelated 
constellations: ( 1) the ways deconstruction affects the structuralist definition of 
signification; and (2) its epistemological implications. Hjelmslev and the Copenhagen 
School have an exceptional position in this context. On the one hand, Derrida s quasi- 
meta-theory o f signification looks in some ways much like the Hjelmslevian 
stratification; put into m otion and out o f balance, flattened or multiplied ad infinitum.
6 Gram Eng, p.6 / G ram , p. 15
7 M ar Eng, p. 136 /  M ar, p. 168
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On the other, glossematics is probably the closest semiotics can get to posing the 
question o f its limits, without exceeding the immanent point o f view.
5.2. The ghost of semiotic structure
Deconstruction, like structuralist semiotics, proposes a theory o f signification. Unlike 
it, however, it also poses questions about the conditions o f possibility o f signification 
and of constructing a theory about it. It can thus be called ‘meta-semiotics’. 
Nevertheless, as it seriously questions the possibility o f  meta-theory and o f  a 
transcendental viewpoint, we should qualify our characterisation as ‘quasi-meta­
semiotics’. Its relation to the definition o f signification follows the same structure o f 
quasi-transcendence. This makes it difficult, or rather structurally impossible, to 
devise a deconstructive model o f  semiosis. A model o f  semiosis cannot include as its 
object its own condition o f possibility; and a model is objectifying per se. However, 
what we can do is see how the deconstructive approach to signification affects the 
structuralist model and imagine the quasi-meta-model o f ecriture/differznce in its 
impossible spatio-temporality. We will now summarise the ways in which the 
structuralist definitions o f structure, o f the semiotic and o f  semiotic structure are 
affected by deconstruction; and draw some concluding observations.
We have previously summarised the definition o f the structuralist concept o f 
structure into the following eight prem ises8: (a) structure is relational-functional; (b) 
it is topological, o f a non-reducible spatio-temporality; (c) in it logic and topology are 
indistinguishable; (d) it is not im mediately perceivable by the senses, (e) it is 
‘generating’, both in the sense o f  generality and causality, (f) it comprises the 
different functions o f structure-object, structure-law, structure-cause, structuredness,
8 See Figure 3.8.
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structurality, structuration; (g) it has a certain degree o f autonomy; and (h) its 
ontological status rem ains suspended. As we have seen, Derrida’s 
difference!structurality retains the six first premises almost unchanged. The first main 
difference concerns the premise o f structure’s autonomy. Derrida interprets it as the 
desire for a centre by which to arrest the free play o f structurality. This desire 
inscribes the structuralist concept o f  structure into W estern metaphysics, as it 
describes the desired structure and the structural desire o f  its system. The second 
difference concerns, once more, the deconstructive quasi-transcendence.
Difference/structurality is the structural condition o f possibility o f structure. The 
notion o f structure as condition o f possibility is already included in the structuralist 
definition. However, the condition o f possibility o f the concept o f structure, and o f 
the difference between structure and non-structure, must necessarily exceed the 
concept. But then structure is a very peculiar concept; it is not a concept in the 
metaphysical sense as already defined by the structuralists. This explains the 
structuralists’ hesitation to decide its ontological status. In deconstruction, the 
suspension becomes a position, an inherent premise o f structurality; because 
structurality is also the condition o f possibility o f the ontological question.
We have seen that the definition o f the semiotic, throughout the history o f 
Western philosophy and linguistic science, is organised around two characteristics: 
( 1) a relation between a sensible and an intelligible element; and (2 ) a movement o f 
materialisation. These also correspond to the two senses o f the ‘medium : (1) middle 
and (2) element. Derrida shows that the traditional definition o f  writing, and its 
devaluation compared to speech, is based precisely on these two characteristics. Thus, 
what was thought as exterior and derived was shown not to differ from what was 
thought as interior and original; and exteriority and derivativeness were introduced in
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the definitional dualism o f  the semiotic. Derrida then uses this observation in order to 
question the definition o f the semiotic itself. Before Derrida, structuralist semiotics 
had already de-essentialised the definition o f the semiotic. What was left was a 
division, a duality o f two completely relational terms which did not differ in anything 
but position. So, the semiotic was still defined as the relation between two terms, only 
the ‘sensible vs. intelligible’ division had been subtracted. The other characteristic o f 
the semiotic, in the radically de-essentialised form o f  the articulation with an 
‘outside’, was transferred to the borderline o f the semiotic with substance and, then, 
with the extra-semiotic realm. In this reference to the stabilising, though inaccessible, 
presence o f  the extra-semiotic, Derrida diagnoses the residue of the metaphysical 
desire for a transcendental signified. This residue, along with theoretical 
inconsistencies and the burden o f  a ‘terminological conventionalism ’, keeps 
structuralist semiotics bound to W estern metaphysics.
In a completely de-essentialised manner, the semiotic is still defined in terms 
o f mediation and exteriority; and writing as the mediation o f  a m ediation and the 
exterior to an exterior. W hat is eventually revealed as the structural desire, disguised 
as certainty, o f Western metaphysics -  formed on the m atrix o f its definition of 
writing and the semiotic — is that the distinction be absolute, i.e. that the distinction 
between inside and outside be absolute, that the outside remain outside. Derrida, 
using writing as a lever, attacks this desired certainty: the outside is revealed as the 
condition of possibility o f the inside, as well as o f  its distinction from the outside; the 
inside is but a species o f the outside. This is the structure o f ecriture/differance. In 
this novel quasi-concept, the functions o f the intermediate and the exterior are 
amalgamated in a peculiar kind o f spatiality which allows for the outside to be inside.
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Thus the semiotic is the effect o f  ecriture/differance. Then, again, in a sense,
ecriture/difference (is) the semiotic; because (essentially) and (structurally):
the sign (is) that ill-named (thing), the only one, that escapes the instituting 
question o f philosophy: ‘what is?’9
Let us, then, summarise how deconstruction affects the structuralist 
conception o f  the semiotic structure. First o f all, we have seen that the main axiom of 
deconstruction is based on no other than the main axiom o f  structuralist semiotics: the 
principle o f  fundamental semiotic arbitrariness. W hat is different in the 
deconstructive deployment o f the principle is the range o f  its applicability; or, rather, 
by its extremely consistent application, the principle is revealed to have more radical 
effects than structuralist semiotics had predicted. The m ost unexpected o f them, for a 
structuralist, is the refutation o f the excluded-middle logic which was supposed to 
constitute it. Structuralist semiotics introduced differentiality as the productive 
mechanism of semiotic terms; i.e. semiotic terms were the products o f differences 
without positive terms. Derrida argues that the fact that the terms have no positive 
existence, and that the differences are relative through and through, makes them 
unstable. The borderline may be moved or removed at any time; it is mobile by 
definition. Therefore, the terms that are defined by it are not absolutely 
distinguishable from each other. This proposition becomes more radical when the 
applicability o f the principle is shown to extend to the very division between the 
semiotic and its exterior, and then to all logical and categorical distinctions that were 
traditionally believed to be outside the semiotic realm.
In chapter three, we have classified the kinds o f semiotic relations10. The way 
the general structural relations (A) are affected by deconstruction, we have covered in
9 Gram Eng , p. 19 / G ram , p .31
10 See Figure 3.7
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relation to Derrida s notion o f  structurality. Let us review the way that the semiotic 
meta-structure (B) is affected. One cannot fail to observe that it is altogether formed 
on dual, although relative, distinctions. The effect o f ecriture/differmce on it is that 
all these distinctions are questioned, which eventually affects the differences of order 
too.
The constitutive duality o f the semiotics, the two completely equivalent and 
interdependent planes that retain, through terminological conventionalism, the names 
o f ‘content’ and ‘expression’, ‘signified’ and ‘signifier’, are the first to be affected. 
The difference between them  is never radical; in a sense, the difference between them 
is ‘nothing’. As a result, and as already noticed by Hjelmslev, we cannot distinguish 
between connotation and meta-semiosis. Furthermore, as no distinction is stable and 
no connection essential, there is nothing to rigorously distinguish a first-degree from 
a higher-degree sign-function; which means that the distinctions between literal and 
metaphorical sense, as well as between theory and its object, cannot be conceptually 
rigorous.
There is a similar effect on the relation between form and substance. In 
glossematics, the relation o f dependence between them, within the confines o f the 
semiotic realm, was partially covered by the notion o f the formation of substance, the 
constant ‘invasion’ o f substance by form. W hat was suppressed was the inverse 
dependence, i.e. the ‘invasion’ o f form by substance. The only cases in which classic 
structuralism recognises this inversion are exceptional (even pathological) cases — i.e. 
synaesthesia -  and art. Derrida does not recognise exceptions; exceptions reveal 
structural possibilities. Therefore, synaesthesia and art become paradigmatic of the 
universal functioning o f  signification. Another characteristic o f synaesthesia and art, 
as well as of rebus-gam es and the mechanism o f dreams, is the communication
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between semiotic substances. Hjelmslev already opens the way for such a conclusion 
by detaching the distinction o f semiotic substances from any objective criterion, such 
as the division o f our sensory apparatuses or the division o f the material o f the world. 
A semiotic substance is ‘selected’ by and dependent solely on a semiotic form. 
Derrida, however, attributes the premise o f the autonomy o f structures to the desire 
for a centre, for a transcendental signified, and thus argues for the structural 
impossibility o f drawing a line between one semiotic and another. Thus, it becomes 
impossible to distinguish between the substances that these forms ‘select’. 
Furthermore, the destabilisation the ‘form vs. substance’ distinction spreads to the 
relation o f the semiotic realm  to the semiotic-independent world. This occurs because 
Hjelmslev conceptualises this relation through the concept o f semiotic substance. The 
sign-function is anchored in the extra-semiotic in two ways: by means o f the content- 
substance to that which it refers to; by means o f the expression-substance to the 
material trace. Both are not cognisable in themselves, outside the semiotic 
articulation. Derrida considers the allusion to them both as evidence o f the desire for 
the transcendental signified.
Similarly, one cannot absolutely distinguish between langue and parole, 
between system and process; which means that one cannot distinguish between the 
general and the particular, between cause and effect, between generative mechanism 
and generated object. Thus, one cannot absolutely distinguish between the condition 
of possibility and what it renders possible. This explains how ecriture/difference can 
take the place o f both the semiotic and its condition o f possibility.
Then, structuralists conceive o f the semiotic structure as being in constant 
evolution and change. They choose to study it from a synchronic point o f view, 
without denying the possibility o f studying it diachronically. Derrida, obviously, does
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not object to the idea, that the semiotic structure is subject to change and movement. 
His disagreement concers the manner o f  this movement. He construes the structuralist 
approach as an ordered game, or rather as an effort to subject the free play of 
signification to an order. According to his approach, the spatio-temporality of 
ecriture/difference does not allow for a linear conception of time or the distinction 
between synchrony and diachrony.
Finally, as a result o f  deconstruction the distinctions ‘general vs. particular’ 
and ‘cause vs. effect’, as well as o f the difference o f order, the particular instantiation 
o f the semiotic, i.e. the text, becomes the condition o f possibility, the paradigm and 
the matrix o f  all signification. This position is in agreement with the post-structuralist 
privileging o f the text as the locus o f merging o f  langue and parole, the syntagmatic 
and the paradigmatic, the structural and the functional. And thus, we arrive at the 
famously paradoxical formulation:
II n ’y  a pas de hors-texte. 11 (There is nothing outside o f the text.n )
A few general remarks: Firstly, deconstruction is based on the principle of 
fundamental semiotic arbitrariness. Ecriture is introduced by a deconstructive labor 
on the concept o f the sign, whereas difference is introduced by a deconstructive labor 
on the principle o f differentiality and o f  the concept o f structure. In the same way that 
the structuralist concepts o f the semiotic and o f structure are intimately connected, the 
deconstructive undecidables ecriture and difference become indistinguishable. 
Ecriture/difference is the condition o f  possibility o f the semiotic, o f structure and of 
the semiotic structure. Secondly, the destabilisation of categorical distinctions has a 
reciprocal implication w ith the destabilisation o f epistemological orders. The leap 
between semiotics and metaphysics is accomplished precisely through this
11 Gram, p .227
12 Gram Eng, p. 158
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questioning o f the stability o f the distinction between epistemological orders. 
E critu re /d ifferen ce  is the condition o f possibility o f the difference between semiotics 
and metaphysics.
Thirdly, the deconstructive conception o f signification is mobile and 
multidimensional. However, this multidimensionality and constant mobility always 
threatens to flatten it. The constant movement between categories and orders also 
means the disappearance o f any clear or rigorously specifiable difference between 
them. If this view was pressed to its final conclusion, which it is not, it would arrive 
at absolute non-difference. In order not to revert to metaphysics, it needs to keep a 
trace o f the sign-function, like a ghost. This ghost o f the sign-function (is) 
ecritu re/d ifferance. Fourthly, this spatio-temporal multi-dimensionality -  which 
allows for the simultaneous existence and non-existence o f difference, for the 
different moments not to follow each other and for the outside to be inside -  demands 
a new kind of spatio-temporality. This kind o f spatio-temporality cannot be reduced 
to our conceptual and empirical perceptions o f space and time; it constitutes their 
condition o f possibility and o f the distinction between them. This spacing of time and 
temporalisation o f space (is) ec r itu re /d iffe ra n c e . Fifthly, like all other distinctions, the 
distinction between semiotic systems and between semiotic substances is relative, 
mobile and, in the last instance, non-existent. Thus, every effort to achieve an 
objective partitioning o f the semiotic realm is bound to metaphysics. We should 
probably conceive it as a non-homogenous, ever-changing manifold.
Sixthly, the concept o f condition o f possibility is very important in order to 
understand Derrida’s argument. For example, if  ecritu re/d ifferan ce  is the condition of 
possibility o f knowledge, then it cannot be an object o f knowledge among others. As 
Christopher Norris explains,
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What Derrida is using [...] is the form of ‘transcendental’ reasoning which Kant 
first brought to bear upon the central problems of philosophy.[...] A 
‘transcendental’ question takes the form: what exactly are the
presuppositions... 13
Unlike Kant, Derrida does not believe in a faculty like reason that would permit us to 
think the conditions o f possibility o f our thought, even without being able to cognise 
them. Reason (logos) is for him the transcendental signified par excellence. So every 
transcendental claim needs to be qualified. The trace o f the process of deconstruction 
allows him this qualification, the non-reducibility o f the trace, ecriture/difference. 
Therefore, seventhly, deconstruction needs a minimum residue o f the structure o f the 
semiotic. Even before Derrida, structuralist semiotics had already de-essentialised 
signification, as a consequence o f the principle o f fundamental semiotic arbitrariness. 
Derrida subtracts the names too and puts the empty structure in motion; a multiplying, 
relativising, endangering and, in fact, flattening motion. The final consequence o f this 
motion would be the total disappearance o f structure. This, however, would be a 
return to metaphysical self-presence, which was disrupted by the redoubling of 
representation. Derrida needs to keep a minimum o f representational theory as a 
defence against this metaphysical return. He keeps a dual structure, emptied and 
relativised in the extreme, but always prevented from collapsing. He introduces the 
paradoxical notion o f a representation without presence, a redoubling without 
origin14. This function can have no name, because names are among its effects. An 
unnamed function between two non-existing poles, this ghost o f the semiotic
structure, ecriture/difference,
perhaps communicates, but certainly does not exist. Or barely.
13 Derrida, p.94
14 ‘Representation mingles with what it represents [...] In this play o f representation, the point of origin 
becomes ungraspable’, Gram Eng, p.36 / Gram, p.54-55
15 Lim, p.21 / Mar Eng, p.330 / Mar, p.393
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5.3. From semiotics to metaphysics: the epistemological limits
Derrida thinks o f  the concept o f the sign as both the matrix that organises the system
of Western metaphysics and the lever for its deconstruction; as such, the semiotic
becomes the necessary precondition for our thought.
The sign and divinity have the same place and time of birth16 
But we cannot do without the concept of the sign, for we cannot give up this 
metaphysical complicity without also giving up the critique we are directing 
against this complicity17
The sign (is) that ill-named (thing), the only one, that escapes the instituting 
question of philosophy: ‘what is?’18
As we have seen, its double function as a medium is redoubled at the level of
epistemology. Its traditional characteristics are at this level combined into the
function o f a bridge toward its outside, itself a part o f the cognitive bridge toward the
world. However, its radically novel definition, based on the fundamental semiotic
arbitrariness, seems to open an insurmountable epistemological gap. I will organise
the relevant epistemological questions around the two traditional structural functions
of the semiotic: ‘in betw een’ and ‘outside’. So, which realms does the semiotic
bridge? And how does it reach, if  it does, the other (out) side?
In this discussion o f ‘bridging’, we constantly slip between what in traditional
philosophic discourse would be classified as three distinct issues — signification,
cognition and perception -  all o f which are performing a bridging function, at least in
a dualistic theory o f knowledge. As Derrida accurately observes, all three depend on a
matrix o f inside vs. outside, where inside is the subject and outside is the world of
things. Each o f them is construed in terms o f different degrees o f dependence (or
independence) o f  the subject. The exact relation between them depends on the
particular philosophical theory one endorses. Up until Immanuel K ant’s three
16 Gram Eng, p. 14 / Gram, p.25
17 WD, p.355 / ED p.413
18 Gram Eng, p. 19 / Gram, p.31
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Critiques, the two banks on either side o f this bridge were supposed to have some 
intimate relation, usually o f similarity or analogy, determined by how things are. Kant 
inverts this relation; he introduces the idea that it is we who give form to our 
experience and who, by projecting forms onto the world, provide the conditions of 
possibility for our understanding. By this gesture he initiates what Derrida calls ‘the 
stratification and historical potentialisation o f  meaning’19. Signification, knowledge 
and perception become one-way bridges from the subject to the objects, while it is 
uncertain whether they will ever reach the other side. In the case of Kant, the problem 
was solved by an ultimate belief in God, as was the case with Descartes’ hypothesis 
o f the evil spirit. However, for the philosophy o f the 20th century, deprived of the 
transcendental warrant o f  divinity, K ant’s gesture opened a gap.
Thus, it was Kant who introduced the idea that we give form to a form-less 
continuum, which in turn inspired the structuralist principle o f fundamental semiotic 
arbitrariness. However, Kant meant it to apply at the level o f perception-cognition; 
the forms were provided by the faculties o f the human mind, and thus shared by all 
human beings. Structuralism transferred the notion to the level o f cognition- 
signification; the forms are now provided by the semiotic structure and thus 
dependent on a semiotic community, without any reference to human faculties. 
Deconstruction endorses this radicalisation o f the Kantian gesture. In a traditional 
conceptual vocabulary, we would distinguish several different orders o f questions, a 
multiple ‘stratification’. However, the principle o f fundamental semiotic arbitrariness 
subjects them all to the semiotic articulation.
Strictly speaking, structuralist semiotics does not study perception in the sense 
of sensory extra-semiotic experience. What it studies and where it applies its
19 WD, p.224 / ED, p.
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fundamental principle is the realm o f signification. However, the way we form the 
world semiotically does not leave our perception unaffected. In order to see, for 
example, a chair as a chair, which means not only as an object on which one sits but 
also as an object distinguished from its environment, one needs to possess a concept 
for it, a sign to be precise. The question o f recognition lies at the ‘lower threshold’ of 
semiosis as Umberto Eco calls it20. Thus, the semiotic — through its articulation — 
constructs the given not only o f  cognition but even o f perception. Structuralist 
semiotics consciously chooses an ‘im m anent’ point o f view concerning signification; 
therefore, it studies the world to the degree that it is semiotisised, invested with 
meaning, and only with respect to its semiotisation. It doesn’t study the relation to the 
extra-semiotic. Nevertheless, classical structuralists are not only ontological realists, 
i.e. assuming the existence o f  a semiotic-independent reality, but also epistemological 
realists, at least in practice.
Deconstruction does address (quasi-)transcendental questions. While it is also 
based on the principle o f  fundamental semiotic arbitrariness, its applicability extends 
to the very limits of the semiotic realm. This means that among the deconstructed 
oppositions and the relativised differences o f order is the distinction between the 
semiotic and the extra-semiotic realm. In the same move, deconstruction opens the 
semiotic to its outside and encloses this outside in the semiotic. Realism in the 
Derridean discourse is reference to a transcendental signified, and as such deeply 
embedded in Western metaphysics. However, he does not by any means subscribe in 
the belief in the non-existence o f the extra-textual or extra-semiotic, despite his most 
quoted dictum, on which is based many a nominalistic interpretation: 7 / n 'y  a pas de
20 See, for example, A Theory o f Semiotics and Kant and the platypus
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21
h o rs - te x te \  It is ambiguous whether this formulation means that ‘there is nothing in 
the world o f which the existence does not depend on the text’ or that ‘there is nothing 
in the world on which the text does not depend’; so it may be not a statement about 
reality but about signification. It is the case, nevertheless, that D e g ra m m a to lo g ie , and 
even more his more experimental-performative texts, do provide arguments for an 
anti-realist interpretation. On the other hand, the text ‘Le supplement de copule: La 
philosophic devant la linguistique’22 (The Supplement o f the Copula: Philosophy 
before Linguistics) gives arguments for the opposite interpretation. In this 
uncharacteristic text, Derrida responds to Benveniste, who maintains that 
philosophical categories are o f linguistic origin. Derrida disagrees, and argues for a 
primacy o f philosophy over language; because the very distinction between language 
and philosophy is philosophical. He asserts the existence o f a non-linguistic element 
of the copula, something which in a way is prior to language and languages. It seems 
that we have returned to the beginning. The supposed opening to the extra-semiotic is 
enacted by its quasi-transcendent condition o f possibility. And, as we have already 
seen, as the distinction between the semiotic and its exterior is radically relativised, it 
must be prevented from collapsing by preserving a minimum notion of redoubling, a
23minimum o f dualistic structure .
Summarising, structuralist semiotics, choosing an immanent point o f view, 
investigates only its interior distinctions and borderlines. It perceives these 
distinctions as completely relative and de-essentialised, as a result o f the principle of 
fundamental semiotic arbitrariness. It keeps as a stable borderline the distinction o f its 
realm from the extra-semiotic. Its inherent a p o r ia  is the manner o f the connection
21 Gram , p.227
22 M ar, p.209-246 / M ar Eng, p. 175-205
23 See also, Norris, D errida , p.55
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between those clearly demarcated realms. Deconstruction chooses a quasi- 
transcendental point o f view  and, thus, opens its field o f investigation to the external 
limits o f semiotics, its conditions o f possibility. Difference, the condition of 
possibility of the semiotic, and its distinction from the extra-semiotic realm, affects 
the stability of this distinction. In the peculiar spatiotemporal terms o f deconstruction, 
the distinction is both upheld and withheld. This, however, does not resolve the 
aporia inherited from structuralism, if  anything it intensifies it.
Structuralist semiotics has to reconcile two contradictory principles: the 
fundamental semiotic arbitrariness and epistemological realism, which correspond to 
the contradictory demands o f  the semiotic articulation and knowledge o f  the world. 
The best it can do is approach the question o f articulation from the side o f the 
semiotic. Hjelmslev provides the most consistent approach. He distinguishes the 
points o f articulation into two, one from each o f the planes o f the sign-function; then, 
he proceeds to a m ultiplication o f subdivisions and o f the ‘semiotisation’ of 
substance, which ideally, in a way analogous to the mathematical limit would know 
the world without ever reaching it. For Derrida, this is the movement o f a 
metaphysical desire.
The problem faced by deconstruction is put in different terms: the semiotic 
seems to have made the extra-semiotic disappear; there is no outside to the text.
Norris explains that
‘writing’, as Derrida employs the word [...], is not just synonymous with written 
or printed marks on a page. Nor is it opposed to a real world existing outside or 
beyond the text, at least in the sense that one might draw a clear demarcation 
between the two realms.24
So to what is it opposed, i f  it is opposed to anything, and what happened to the real 
world? Here we face the difficulty o f imagining a realm with no outside. However, if
24 Derrida, pp. 121 -122
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we conceive difference as the manifold, the condition o f possibility for everything, 
then indeed there is nothing outside it. The reason we should not conceive this 
assertion as enclosure in the sem iotic is that difference exceeds the semiotic precisely 
by being its condition o f  possibility. The impossibility o f distinguishing the semiotic 
from the extra-semiotic should m ean that the extra-semiotic affects and invades the 
semiotic too. What is im possible is for us to conceive the extra-semiotic as anything 
else than affected by the semiotic, in any other way than through the semiotic, which 
amounts more or less to the structuralist semiotic position. The prohibition on posing 
the question, on even nam ing the distinction, does not in any way change our 
imprisonment. Derrida’s unfinished gesture o f  transcendence is an open-ended bridge 
toward an inexistent destination.
Structuralist semiotics and deconstruction are trying to bridge the Kantian 
epistemological gap by a Kantian strategy. Kant proposed that we can gain a negative 
knowledge of what we can’t reach by realising our own limits. In the case of 
structuralist semiotics, this m eans studying in the utm ost detail the anchors o f the 
semiotic to the extra-semiotic from the inside; as Hjelmslev did with his investigation 
o f semiotic substance. In the case o f Derrida, it means studying the conditions of 
possibility o f the semiotic; a quasi-transcendence. Both endeavours are unfinished 
gestures; structurally unfinished. They are bridges whose other end never reaches the 
other side; and an open-ended bridge is a closed pathway.
Structuralist semiotics, in its effort to reach its outside, seems to ever expand 
its own realm. Deconstruction, by its movement o f  opening up the borderlines o f the 
semiotic, finishes by enclosing the world. One wonders which attitude is less 
imperialistic. On one proposition they both agree; the epistemological limits o f the 
semiotic are the epistem ological limits tout court.
316
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRIJCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
LIST OF FIGURES
P-
Figure 3.1. -  Hjelmslev’s stratification of semiotic systems...........................  99
Figure 3.2. -  Degrees of the sign-function........................................................ 101
Figure 3.3. -  Connotation and Metasemiosis: Examples................................  103
Figure 3.4. -  Hjelmslev’s second definition of higher degree semiotics  104
Figure 3.5. -  Hjelmslev’s stratification of semiotic systems: levels of
substance..........................................................................................  114
Figure 3.6. -  Hjelmslev: facets of the semiotic phenomenon..........................  153
Figure 3.7. — Relations in semiotics...................................................................  180
Figure 3.8. -  Structuralist ‘structure’: definition..............................................  198
Figure 3.9. -  Definitions of the sign: DYADIC structures..............................  200
Figure 3.10. -  Definitions of the sign: TRIADIC structures and their
DYADIC infra-structures............................................................  201
Figure 3.11. -  Semiotic: general structure.........................................................  203
Figure 3.12. -Hjelmslev’s definition of the sign-function: its QUADRIC
structure and DYADIC infra-structure.........................................  206
Figure 4.1 -  Deconstruction: a model................................................................  249
Figure 4.2 -  Deconstruction: a spatial model.................................................... 250
3 1 7
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE




 EwpoXoyixo Ae&tco rqg Koivrjg NeoeXXqviKijg (Etymological Dictionary of the Common
Modem Greek Language), Thessaloniki: ApnrcoxsA^io Ilave7aaxf|fj.io @eaaaA,ovucr|<; 
‘'ISpupa MavcbXxi Tpiavxacpu MISti’, (1951) 3rd ed. 1985
ANGELIDI, Antoinetta
 ‘O KivrmaxoypacpiKoq Xpovoq’ (Cinematographic Time), delivered in the conference Time
in Psychiatry, Neurosciences and Human Sciences, September 2008 [to appear in 
Evvay/ig -  EmOecbprjar} WvxiaxpiKrjg, Nevpoemarrjpcbv icai Emcrcrjpcbv tov AvOpcbuov]
AUSTIN, John Langshaw
 How to D o Things w ith Words (1955), ed. by J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa, Cambridge
MA: Harvard University Press, 2nd ed., 1975
AUZIAS, Jean-Marie
 Clefs p o u r le structuralism e, Paris: Seghers, 3rd ed., 1971
BACHELARD, Gaston
 L apoetique de Tespace, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957
BARTHES, Roland
 ‘Le degre zero de l’ecriture’ (1953) in Le degre zero  de Vecriture suivi de Nouveaux essais
critiques, Paris : Seuil, 1972
 ‘Elements de semiologie’, Communications 4, Paris: Seuil, (1964), 91-144
 ‘Introduction a 1’analyse structurale du recit’, Communications 8, Paris: Seuil, (1966), 1-
27
 L ’aventure sem iologique, Paris: Seuil, 1985
BENVENISTE, Emile
Problem es de linguistique generale, t . l ,  Paris: Gallimard, 1966
 Problem es de linguistique generale, t.2, Paris: Gallimard, 1974
3 1 8
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOKLUND -  LAGOPOULOU, Karin
 *0t cruyxpoveq (is9 o 5 o i av&Xu<rr|<; X,oyoxexviKcbv Keipevcov’ (‘Contemporary methods of
literary text analysis’), OikoXoyog, x p ip .T |v ia la  eK S oorj xon ooA.A.oyou a,7co(polxcov xr|<; 
cpiXooo(piKT|q oxo^f|<; xou n avem axrifiloD  0 e o a a ta )v lK r |< ; , No 29, Thessaloniki 
(October 1982), 145-162
  ‘Ti eivai r| <yq|ieui>xiicr|;’ (What is semiotics?), AiafiaCco, 8eKa7iev0f||i£pr| e7n0ed>pr|crr|
PipUon, special edition: Semiotics, Athens (1985), 15-23
BR0NDAL, Viggo
 ‘Linguistique structurale’, A cta  Linguistica, revue internationale de linguistique
structurale, vol.I, Copenhagen: Einar Munksgaard (1939), 2-10
 and Louis Hjelmslev, Editorial, A cta  Linguistica, revue internationale de linguistique
structurale, vol.I, Copenhagen: Einar Munksgaard (1939), 1-2
CASSIRER, Ernst A.
 ‘Structuralism in Modem Linguistics’, Word, Journal o f  the Linguistic C ircle o f  N ew  York,
vol. I, no II, August (1945), 99-120
COURTES, Joseph
 La semiotique du langage, France: Nathan, 2003
CULLER, Jonathan
 On Deconstruction: Theory an d  Criticism  after Structuralism , London: Routledge, 1983
DASENBROCK, Reed Way
 ed. Redrawing the Lines: A nalytic Philosophy, Deconstruction, and L iterary Theory,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989
DASTUR, Fran^oise
_ ‘Martin Heidegger’, H isto ry  o f  Philosophy: 20th century, Encyclopedic de la Pleiade 
(1974), trans. from French to Greek Nikos Nasofidis and Kostis Papagiorgis, Athens: 
MopcpcGxiKo'ISpufia EOviktjc; Tpa7ce^ri(;, 1987, pp. 159-184
DELEUZE, Gilles
‘ncbq avayvcopi^oupe xov oxpouK X onpa^ia(i6 ;’( ‘H ow  do we recognise structuralism?’), 
Philosophy, t.IV, Twentieth Century, ed. by Francis Chatelet (1979), trans. from 
French to Greek by Kostis Papagiorgis, Athens: rvcbari, 1990, pp.323-361
3 1 9
REA W ALLDfiN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
 and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1972), trans. by
R.Hurley, M.Seem, H.R.Lane, Mineapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press 
1983
DERRIDA, Jacques
Edmund Husserl, L’ origine de la geometrie: traduction et introduction, Paris : Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1962
Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, preface, afterword and trans. by 
John P. Leavey, Jr., Lincoln / London: University of Nebraska Press, 1989
 L ’ ecriture et la difference, Paris: Seuil, 1967
 Writing and Difference, intro, and trans. by Alan Bass (1978) , London / New York:
Routledge, 2001
 De la grammatologie, Paris: Minuit, 1967
 Of Grammatology, preface and trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1976), Baltimore /
London: John Hopkins University Press, 1997
 La voix et le phenomene: Introduction au probleme du signe dans la phenomenologie de
Husserl, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967
Speech and Phenomena: and other Essays on Husserl’s Theory o f Language [from 
Marges], intro, and trans. by David B. Allison, preface by Newton Garver, Evaston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973
 La dissemination, Paris: Seuil, 1972
 Dissemination, intro, and trans. by Barbara Johnson (1981), London / New York:
Continuum, 2004
Marges de laphilosophie, Paris: Minuit, 1972
Margins o f Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass, London etc: Prentice Hall, 1981
 Positions: entretiens avec Henri Ronse, Julia Kristeva, Jean-Louis Houdedine, Guy
Scarpetta, Paris: Minuit, 1972
 Positions, interviews with Henri Ronse, Julia Kristeva, Jean-Louis Houdedine, Guy
Scarpetta, trans. by Alan Bass, London: Athlone, 1981
 ‘Lettre a un ami japonais’ (1983), Le Promeneur, XLII, 1985
 ‘Letter to a Japanese Friend’, Derrida and Difference, ed. by Wood and Bernasconi,
Warwick: Parousia, 1985, pp. 1-5
 limited inc, trans. by Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman, Evanston IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1988
 Du droit a la philosophie, Paris: Galilee, 1990
_Kh6ra, Paris: Galilee, 1993
 Passions, Paris: Galilee, 1993
_Saufle  nom, Paris: Galilee, 1993
3 2 0
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
 Papier Machine: Le ruban de machine a ecrire et autres reponses, Paris: Galilee, 2001
 ‘Du mot a la vie : un dialogue entre Jacques Derrida et Helene Cixous’, magazine
litteraire, No 430, April 2004, 22-29
_  and Peter Eisenman, Chora L Works, Jeffrey Kipnis and Thomas Leeser eds., The 
Monachelli Press, 1997
DOSSE, Francois
_Histoire du structuralisme, t.l Le champs du signe, 1945-1966, Paris: La Decouverte, 
1992
Histoire du structuralisme, t.2 Le chant du cygne, 1967 a nos jours, Paris: La Decouverte, 
1992
DUCROT, Oswald
 and Tzvetan Todorov, Dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences du langage, Paris: Seuil,
1972
 and Jean-Marie Schaeffer, Nouveau dictionnaire encyclopedique des sciences du langage,
Paris: Seuil, 1995
ECO, Umberto
 A Theory o f Semiotics, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, (1976) 1979
 The Role o f the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics o f Texts (1979), Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1984
 Semiotics and the Philosophy o f Language, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, (1984)
1986
 Kant and the platypus: Essays on Language and Cognition (1997), trans. by Alastair
McEwen, London: Vintage, 2000
FOUCAULT, Michel
 Les mots et les choses, Paris : Gallimard, 1966
FREGE, Gottlob
_  ‘On Sense and Reference’ (1892), Translations from the Philosophical Writings o f 
Gottolb Frege, ed. by P.Geach and M.Black, Oxford: Blackwell, 1960
3 2 1
REA W ALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
GASCHE, Rodolphe
_ T h e  Tain o f the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy o f Reflection, Cambridge MA 
/London: Harvard University Press, 1986
GRANEL, Gerard
 ‘napaiT|pf|cei<; yia xr|v 7rpoaeyyicrr| rr|<; aK£\j/r|<; too Martin Heidegger “Sein und
Zeit’” (‘Observations on the approach to the thought of Martin Heidegger in “Sein 
und Zeit’” ), Philosophy, t.IV, Twentieth Century, ed. by Franfois Chatelet (1979), 
trans. from French to Greek by Kostis Papagiorgis, Athens: rvcbori, 1990, pp. 191- 
236
GREIMAS, Algirdas Julien
Semantique structurale: recherche de methode, Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1966
 and Joseph Courtes, Semiotique: Dictionnaire raisonne de la theorie du langage, Paris:
Hachette, 1979
GUIRAUD, Pierre
 La semiologie, Que sais-je?, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971
GURVITCH, Georges
 ‘Husserl’, History o f Philosophy: 20th century, Encyclopedic de la Pleiade (1974), trans.
from French to Greek Nikos Nasofidis and Kostis Papagiorgis, Athens: MopcpcoxiKo 
'I8popa E0vucr|c; Tpa7te^r|q, 1987, pp. 69-96
HARRIS, Roy
Saussure and his Interpreters, New York: New York University Press, 2001
HEIDEGGER, Martin
_ T h e  Basic Problems o f Phenomenology (1927), Indiana University Press, 1975
HENAULT, Anne
Les enjeux de la semiotique: Introduction a la semiotique generale, preface by Algirdas 
Julien Greimas, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, (1979) 1993
Histoire de la semiotique, Que sais-je?, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992
3 2 2
REA W ALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
HJELMSLEV, Louis
 Principes de grammaire generate, Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabemes Selskab, Historik-
filologiske Meddelelser XVI, 1, Copenhagen: Bianco Lunos Bogtrykkeri, 1928
 ’On the principles of phonematics’, Proceedings o f the Second International Congress of
Phonematic Sciences, Held at University College, London in July 1935, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1936
 ‘La notion de rection’, Acta Linguistica, revue internationale de linguistique structurale,
vol.I, Copenhagen: Einar Munksgaard (1939), 10-23
 i Prolegomena to a Theory o f Language (1943), trans. by Francis J. Whitfield, Memoir 7 of
the International Journal o f American Linguistics, Vol. 19, No.l, Indiana University 
Publications, 1953
  Language: an Introduction (1943, 1963), trans. by Francis J. Whitfield, Madison,
Milwaukee / London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970
 Le langage, trans. by Michel Olsen, preface by Algirdas-Julien Greimas, Paris: Gallimard,
1966
  Editorial, Acta Linguistica, revue internationale de linguistique structurale, vol.IV,
Copenhagen: Einar Munksgaard (1944), v-xi
 Essais linguistiques (1937-1957), preface by F rancis Rastier, Paris: Minuit, 1971
HOBSON, Marian
 Opening lines, London / New York: Routledge, 1998
HONDERICH, Ted
 ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press,
1995
JAKOBSON, Roman
 Language in Literature, ed. by Krystyna Pomorska and Stephen Rudy, intro, by Krystyna
_  Pomorska, Cambridge Ma / London: Belknap Press Harvard University Press, 1987
KANT, Immanuel
 Critique o f Pure Reason (1781), ed. and trans. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998
Critique o f Practical Reason (1788), ed. and trans. by Mary Gregor, intro, by Andrews 
~  Reath, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997
 Critique o f the Power o f Judgement (1790), ed. by Paul Guyer, trans. by Paul Guyer and
Eric Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000
3 2 3
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
KRIPKE, Saul A.
_Naming and Necessity (1970), Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1972, 2nd ed. 
1980
 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1982
LAGOPOULOS, Alexandros-Phaedon
 ‘In quest of architectural theory’, Semiotica 55 -  Vi (1985), 105-124
 E kktttjfxoAoywg rov Nofipaxoq, Aopiopoq icai ErjpsicoziKrj (Epistemologies of Meaning,
Structuralism and Semiotics) (2001), trans. in Greek by Rea Wallden, Thessaloniki: 
napaxT|pr|Tr|c;, 2004
 ‘Structural and Functional Theories in Semiotics’(2001), Semiotic Systems and
Communication, Thessaloniki: naparqpqTf|<;, 2004, pp. 48-73
 ‘Static structuralism versus the dynamics of structure’, Semiotica 149 -  1/4 (2004), 1-35
 ‘From semiologie to postmodernism: A genealogy’ [to appear in Semiotica]
LAKATOS, Imre
 Proofs and Refutations: The Logic o f Mathematical Discovery (1976), Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977
LANE, Michael
Structuralism: a Reader, London: Jonathan Cape, 1970
LEVI-STRAUSS, Claude
 Structural Anthropology (1958), trans. from the French by Claire Jacobson and Brooke
Grundfest Schoepf, London: Penguin, 1968
MACKSEY, Richard
 and Eugenio Donato eds., The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages o f Criticism and
The Sciences o f Man, Baltimore / London: John Hopkins University Press, 1971
MOUNIN, Georges
 Introduction a la semiologie, Paris: Minuit, 1970
324
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
NORRIS, Christopher
Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, London: Routledge, (1982) 1991
 ‘Questions on Method: Greimas’s Structural Semantics', Journal o f Literary Semantics:
An International Review XIV73 October (1985), 186-194
 Derrida, London: Fontana, 1987
 What’s Wrong with Postmodernism: Critical theory and the ends o f philosophy, New
York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1990
New idols o f the cave: On the limits o f  anti-realism, Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1997
 Minding the Gap: Epistemology and Philosophy o f Science in the Two Traditions,
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000
 Fiction, Philosophy and Literary Theory: Will the Real Saul Kripke please stand up?,
London: Continuum, 2007
 and Andrew Benjamin, What is Deconstruction?, London: Academy, (1988) 2nd ed. 1996
 and David Roden eds., Jacques Derrida, London: Sage, 2003
PIAGET, Jean
 Le structuralisme, Que sais-je?, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972
QUINE, W.V.
 ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (1951), From a Logical Point o f View: Nine Logico-
Philosophical Essays, Harvard University Press, (1953) 1961
REYNOLDS, Jack
 and Jonathan Roffe, Understanding Derrida, New York / London: Continuum, 2004
ROBEY, David
 ed., Structuralism: an introduction, Wolfson College Lectures 1972, Oxford: Clarendon,
1973
RUSSELL, Bertrand
 ‘On Denoting’ (1905), Logic and Knowledge, ed. by R. C. March, London: George Allen
and Unwin, 1956
3 2 5
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
SANDERS, Carol
 ed., Saussure, The Cambridge Companion to, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004
SAUSSURE, Ferdinand de
 Cours de linguistique generate, ed. by Charles Bally, Albert Sechehaye and Albert
Riedlinger (1916), critical ed. and intro, by Tullio de Mauro, trans. of de Mauro’s 
intro, from Italian to French by Louis-Jean Calvet, Paris: Payot, 1972
 Course in General Linguistics, ed., intro, and trans. in English by Roy Harris, London :
Duckworth, 1983
_Ma.drjpa.Ta TeviKrjg TXcDoooXoyiaq, ed., intro, and trans. in Greek by F.D. Apostolopoulos, 
Athens: na7ia^fjaT|, 1979
SEARLE, John R.
 ‘Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida’, Glyph: John Hopkins Textual Studies 7
(1977), 198-208
SEBEOK, Thomas A.
 et al., ed. Encyclopedic Dictionary o f Semiotics, 2 tomes, 2nd ed., Berlin/New York:
Mouton de Gruyter, 1994
SCHLEIFER, Ronald
 A.J.Greimas and the Nature o f Meaning: Linguistics, Semiotics and Discourse Theory, ed.
by Christopher Norris, London / Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987
SCHERER, Rene
 ‘O Husserl, rj cpaivo|isvo^oyla xai oi e^e^eiq  (‘Husserl, Phenomenology and its
developments’), Philosophy, t.III, From Kant to Husserl, ed. by Frampois Chatelet 
(1979), trans. from French to Greek by Kostis Papagiorgis, Athens: Tvtt)ar|, 1990, 
pp.317-350
SMITH, James K. A.
Jacques Derrida: Live Theory, London: Continuum, 2005
STAMATAKOS, Ionannis
A s & k o v  Apxaiaq EXXrjvuajq rXcbaorjq (Dictionary of the Ancient Greek Language) 
AOfivaiov, 1949
3 2 6
REA WALLDEN -  IN BETWEEN AND OUTSIDE
DECONSTRUCTION AND STRUCTURALISM ON SEMIOTICS AND ITS LIMITS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
TEL QUEL
 no 34, summer 1968
ULDALL, Hans Jorgen
  ‘Outline of Glossematics: A study in the methodology of the Humanities with special
reference to linguistics, Part I: general Theory’ (1952), Travaux du Cercle 
Linguistique de Copenhague, Vol. XI, Copenhagen: Nordisk Sprog — og 
Kulturforlag, 1957
WALLDEN, Rea Emilia Alexandra
 ‘O KTiopevoq Ka0pe(pTrj<;: |iexa£6 apxvreKxovucriq Kai Kivrjpaxoypacpou’ (The built mirror:
between architecture and cinema), Megacities: And xr\v npaypaxiK r\ arrj (pomaoxiKYj 
koXtj, Thessaloniki: <E>saxt(3dA, 08oaaA.ovucr|<;, 2000
 ‘Concepts of Materiality in Language with reference to the writings of Jacques Derrida
and Paul de Man’, MA thesis, supervisor Christopher Norris, University of Cardiff, 
2002
ZIZEK, Slavoj
The Puppet and the Dwarf: the perverse core o f Christianity, Cambridge MA / London: 
MIT Press, 2003
In the Internet;
IASS-AIS International Association for Semiotic Studies
http: //filserverarthist.lu.se/AIS/IASS, last visited: 31 / 7 / 2008
‘Louis Hjelmslev’ in www.uni-erfurt.de, visited: 27/03/2004
THE OXFORD FRENCH LITERATURE COMPANION
 ‘Tel Quel’, visited: 14 / 09 / 2007
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
‘Phenomenology’, by David Woodruff Smith, visited: 20 / 5 / 2005
3 2 7
